Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC

                              COURT OF CHANCERY
                                    OF THE
                              STATE OF DELAWARE
   BONNIE W. DAVID                                            COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE
MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY                                                 34 THE CIRCLE
                                                                   GEORGETOWN, DE 19947


                           Final Report: December 28, 2023
                          Date Submitted: December 20, 2023

    Julia Bettina Klein, Esquire             Sean A. Meluney, Esquire
    Klein LLC                                William M. Alleman, Esquire
    225 West 14th Street, Suite 100          Meluney Alleman & Spence LLC
    Wilmington, Delaware 19801               1143 Savannah Road
                                             Lewes, Delaware 19958

         RE:   Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
               C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

   Dear Counsel:

         This final report addresses respondent Insight Building Co., LLC’s motion to

   dismiss petitioner Jane Clevenger’s Amended Verified Petition (the “Petition”)

   under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

   12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the

   reasons explained below, I recommend that the Court grant the motion and dismiss

   the Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to the

   Superior Court pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 2 of 13

I.    BACKGROUND1

      On August 3, 2021, petitioner Jane Clevenger (“Petitioner”) and respondent

Insight Building Co., LLC (“Respondent” or “Insight”) entered into an agreement

pursuant to which Petitioner agreed to purchase, and Insight agreed to sell, a new

construction home in Milton, Delaware (the “Construction Contract”). Am. Verified

Pet. [hereinafter, “Pet.”], Ex. A, Dkt. 11. Paragraph 18 of the Construction Contract,

entitled “Dispute Resolution,” provides that:

      Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to any of
      the terms or provisions in this Agreement shall be submitted to
      mandatory final and binding arbitration, subject to the terms of this
      Paragraph. No party may have recourse to the jurisdiction of any court
      unless any disagreement or contest has first been submitted to
      arbitration in the manner described below . . . .

Pet., Ex. A § 18 (the “Dispute Resolution Provision”). In addition to setting forth

procedures governing arbitration, Paragraph 18 requires that:

      The Parties shall maintain the confidentiality of all aspects of this
      Agreement (including information respecting any arbitration entered
      into between the Parties). As such, each party acknowledges and agrees
      that it shall not, without the other party’s prior written permission in
      each instance, disclose the Confidential Information of such other party

1
  The following facts are taken from the Petition and the documents incorporated by
reference therein, including the Construction Contract (defined below) attached as Exhibit
A to the Petition. See Freedman v. Adams, 

, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30,
2012) (“When a plaintiff expressly refers to and heavily relies upon documents in her
complaint, these documents are considered to be incorporated by reference into the
complaint[.]” (citation omitted)).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 3 of 13

      to any third party (other than as required to fulfill its obligations
      hereunder and/or as may be required by any applicable law, rule or
      regulation (such as a subpoena or other valid discovery request). The
      term “Confidential Information” shall not include information that is
      either: (i) in the public domain; or (ii) independently discoverable
      without violating any confidentiality or other obligation of any kind to
      any individual or entity. To the extent that Confidential Information is
      required to be provided to an affiliate or other third party to effectuate
      the terms hereof, such third party must first agree to be bound by the
      same confidentiality provisions as set forth herein.

 § 18(i) (the “NDA”).

      According to the Petition, in the weeks before the Construction Contract was

signed, “Insight refused to let [Petitioner] engage her own real estate agent; tried to

pressure her into buying too big of a house; discouraged her from retaining counsel

. . . ; [and] manufactured a persistent sense of impending doom and urgency . . . .”

Pet. at 3; see also id. ¶ 52 (alleging Insight “took advantage of [Petitioner]’s known

vulnerabilities” and “discouraged her from seeking professional advice”). During

that period, “Insight Homes never mentioned or discussed with [Petitioner] that she

would be required to sign an NDA and a [Dispute Resolution Provision] in

connection with the Contract to build her Home”; rather, “[t]he only terms

[Petitioner] ever discussed with Insight Homes were terms concerning the

construction of her Home: purchase price, model, lot number, timing, upgrades, and
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 4 of 13

the like . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 26, 46.2 Petitioner alleges she “signed the [Construction]

Contract under duress when it was emailed to her for her electronic signature, not

realizing that certain inconspicuous provisions of the contract deprived her of her

day in court and of the opportunity to present any breach of the [Construction]

Contract on the merits after discovery and with the assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 47;

see also id. ¶ 26 (alleging Petitioner “had no idea of what an arbitration was and the

limited avenues for a review of arbitration decisions by the court,” and “had no

reason to expect, nor did she understand, that this was, in effect, what she was doing

by signing the [Construction] Contract”).

       After closing, Petitioner raised with Insight concerns about poor air quality,3

standing water, an infestation of frogs, and holes in the foundation of her new home,

among other issues. Id. ¶ 32.



2
  Petitioner alleges those terms were memorialized in a Customer Priceout Worksheet,
attached as Exhibit B to the Petition. See Pet. ¶ 49; id., Ex. B.
3
   The Petition emphasizes that the air quality in Petitioner’s home is particularly
troublesome given Petitioner’s respiratory ailments. See Pet. at 2 (“[C]limate is irreverent,
especially when provoked, and when the weather ravaged parts of Colorado with an
extraordinary wildfire in 2021 it also ravaged Ms. Clevenger’s lungs. Her respiratory
system, already debilitated by asthma, imploded, and Plaintiff resolved to retire in
friendlier and calmer climes by the Delaware beaches.”); id. ¶ 36 (“Ms. Clevenger, who
several times had to seek medical care and receive treatment for bronchitis and sinus
infections and had become increasingly anxious and depressed about the ongoing
nightmare of dealing with the issues at her home and Insight Homes representatives, has
lost any confidence in Defendant’s ability to do anything right.”).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 5 of 13

        On March 24, 2023, Petitioner initiated this action through the filing of a

Verified Petition. Dkt. 1. On August 1, 2023, Petitioner filed the operative Petition,

which alleges five counts. Count I seeks reformation of the Construction Contract

to remove the Dispute Resolution Provision, including the NDA therein. Pet. ¶ 45.

Count II seeks a declaratory judgment that “(a) the NDA is void for lack of

consideration; (b) void and unenforceable because it was obtained through

inequitable conduct; (c) unenforceable as a matter of public policy . . . ; [and]

(d) unenforceable as unconscionable . . . .” Id. ¶ 59. Count III seeks a declaratory

judgment that the Dispute Resolution Provision “is unenforceable (a) as

unconscionable . . . and (b) because arbitration is strictly a matter of consent and

[Petitioner], even though she signed the [Construction] Contract and initialed each

page electronically, did not knowingly consent to the [Dispute Resolution Provision]

. . . .” Id. ¶ 65. Count IV alleges a claim for breach of contract premised on Insight

“supplying defective product and unworkmanship like services,” and Count V

alleges a claim for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.

¶ 72.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 6 of 13

II.   ANALYSIS

      Respondent has moved to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Court of Chancery

Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.4

      “The Court of Chancery will grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss ‘if it

appears from the record that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the claim.’”

Yu v. GSM Nation, LLC, 

, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 7, 2017) (citation

omitted). “The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction.” 

 Title 10,

Section 342 of the Delaware Code states that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall not have

jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by

common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State.” 10 Del.

C. § 342. This Court “maintains subject matter jurisdiction ‘only when (1) the


4
  On August 11, 2023, Insight filed its Opening Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Petition or to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It. Resp’t.’s Op. Br.
In Supp. Of Its Mot. To Dismiss The Am. Pet. Or To Strike Certain Allegations Contained
In It [hereinafter, “OB”], Dkt.12. On October 3, 2023, Petitioner filed her Answering Brief
in Support of Opposition to Respondent’s Opening Brief in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Petition or to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It. Pet’r.’s
Ans. Br. In Supp. Of Opp’n To Resp’t.’s Op. Br. In Supp. Of Its Mot. To Dismiss The Am.
Pet. Or To Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It [hereinafter, “AB”], Dkt. 15. On
October 18, 2023, Insight filed its Reply Brief in Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Petition or to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It. Resp’t.’s Reply Br.
In Further Supp. Of Its Mot. To Dismiss The Am. Pet. Or To Strike Certain Allegations
Contained In It [hereinafter, “RB”], Dkt. 17. I heard oral argument on December 20, 2023.
Dkt. 19.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 7 of 13

complaint states a claim for relief that is equitable in character, (2) the complaint

requests an equitable remedy when there is no adequate remedy at law or

(3) Chancery is vested with jurisdiction by statute.’” Smith v. Scott, 

, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2021) (citation omitted).

       Petitioner’s sole jurisdictional hook5 is a request for reformation, which is an

equitable remedy.6 But “Chancery jurisdiction is not conferred by the incantation of

magic words[,]” and simply asking for an equitable remedy is not an “open sesame”

to equity jurisdiction. Yu, 

, at *3 (footnote omitted) (first quoting

McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 

 (Del. Ch. 1987); then Int’l Bus.

Machs. Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., 

 (Del. Ch. 1991)). Rather, “‘[i]f a

realistic evaluation [of the pleadings] leads to the conclusion that an adequate




5
  Petitioner concedes that Counts II and III of the Petition, which seek declaratory
judgments, do not provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See
Heathergreen Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Paul, 

 (Del. Ch. 1985) (“[T]he
Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action only if there exists
an underlying basis for equity jurisdiction measured by traditional standards . . . .”).
6
 The parties agree that Count I seeking reformation is not subject to arbitration because it
presents a threshold issue of enforceability. See OB at 15-20; AB at 11-12; RB at 1-2; see
also, e.g., Chemours Co. v. DowDuPont Inc., 

, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30,
2020) (applying “state contract law to determine whether [the plaintiff] consented to
arbitration”), aff’d, 

 (Del.); Carder v. Carl M. Freeman Cmties., LLC, 

, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2009) (“[W]hether parties agree to arbitrate is generally
one for the courts to decide and not arbitrators.” (citation and internal question marks
omitted)).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 8 of 13

remedy is available, this court, in conformity with the command of Section 342 of

Title 10 of the Delaware Code, will not accept jurisdiction over the matter.’” 

 at

*3 (quoting McMahon, 

).

      The Petition here seeks to “reform” the Construction Contract to remove the

Dispute Resolution Provision, and the NDA therein, based on “unilateral mistake

and inequitable conduct.” Pet. ¶ 45. But, as Insight argues, the “reformation”

Petitioner seeks—deleting the offending provision—would have the same effect as

a declaratory judgment determining that such provision is invalid or otherwise

unenforceable.7 Thus, “[w]hile the [Petition] includes the ‘magic words’ of certain

equitable remedies in an attempt to invoke equity jurisdiction, the Superior Court

can grant a full, fair, and complete remedy” through a declaratory judgment—the

same relief sought in Counts II and III. Yu, 

, at *4-5 (concluding

the Court of Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint seeking

reformation, among other equitable remedies, where the plaintiff’s “best remedy”

was available at law).




7
 See OB at 27 (first citing ISS Facility Servs., Inc. v. JanCo FS 2, LLC, 

,
at *2 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2023) (finding the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a
request for specific performance because a declaratory judgment, available at law, would
provide a sufficient remedy); then Hillsboro Energy, LLC v. Secure Energy, Inc., 

, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2008) (same)).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 9 of 13

      Even if a declaratory judgment would provide a less than “full, fair, and

complete remedy,” this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action for a separate

reason—the Petition fails to adequately plead entitlement to reformation.

“Reformation is an equitable remedy which emanates from the maxim that equity

treats that as done which ought to have been done.” Greenberg v. BCV Social, LLC,

, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2023) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Obsidian Fin. Gp., LLC v. Identity Theft Guard Sols., Inc., 

, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2021)). “Reformation does not . . . provide

the Court ‘equitable license . . . to write a new contract at the invitation of a party

who is unsatisfied with his or her side of the bargain; rather, it permits the Court to

reform a written contract that was intended to memorialize, but fails to comport with,

the parties’ prior agreement.’” 

 (ellipses in original) (citation omitted). A party

seeking reformation must plead the following:

      (i) that the parties reached a definite agreement before executing the
      final contract; (ii) that the final contract failed to incorporate the terms
      of the agreement; (iii) that the parties were similarly mistaken or that
      [one] knew of [another’s] mistake and remained silent; and (iv) the
      precise mistake the parties made.

AECOM v. SCCI Nat’l Hldgs., Inc., 

, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27,

2023) (alterations in original) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). The

circumstances constituting the mistake must be pled with particularity in accordance
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 10 of 13

with Court of Chancery Rule 9(b). See Joyce v. RCN Corp., 

, at

*3 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2003) (“Rule 9(b) requires that ‘in all averments of . . . mistake,

the circumstances constituting . . . [the] mistake shall be stated with particularity.’”

(alteration and ellipses in original)).

      The Petition fails to adequately plead these elements. First, the Petition fails

to allege facts supporting an inference that the parties reached a specific prior

agreement that the Construction Contract would not include a dispute resolution

procedure. The Petition alleges in conclusory fashion that “[t]here was a specific

understanding that the construction contract would contain only the terms pursuant

to which the Home would be constructed,” which “did not include the [Dispute

Resolution Provision] or the NDA.” Pet. ¶ 50; see also 

 Ex. B. Yet, the Petition

also alleges that “Insight[] never mentioned or discussed” dispute resolution or

confidentiality, such that Petitioner “had no reason to anticipate or believe” that the

Construction Contract would address those issues. Id. ¶¶ 46-47 (emphasis added);

see also id. ¶ 26 (“The only terms [Petitioner] ever discussed with Insight Homes

were terms concerning the construction of her Home . . . .”). In other words, the

Petition expressly alleges the absence of a prior agreement concerning dispute

resolution or confidentiality. And without such an agreement, the Petition does not

plead a conceivable basis for reformation. See In re TIBCO Software Inc. S’holders
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 11 of 

 WL 6155894, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015) (explaining that

“[r]eformation requires an antecedent agreement” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); see also AECOM, 

, at *7 (dismissing

reformation count where plaintiff’s theory was not premised on “any actual

agreement between the parties” (emphasis added)); Obsidian Fin. Gp., 

, at *10 (concluding a “reformation claim fail[ed] as a matter of law” where

the petition was “bereft of particularized facts detailing a ‘specific prior

understanding’ as to the terms it s[ought] to reform”); Richard B. Gamberg 2007

Fam. Tr. v. United Rest. Gp., L.P., 

, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2018)

(concluding plaintiff failed to adequately plead entitlement to reformation where it

did not “offer any facts or arguments to explain what ‘specific prior contractual

understanding’ should govern” (alterations in original) (citations and footnotes

omitted)).

      Second, the Petition fails to allege facts supporting an inference that Insight

knew Petitioner was “mistaken” about the inclusion of the Dispute Resolution

Provision in the Construction Contract, or that Insight remained silent in the face of

such “mistake.”     Aside from conclusory allegations that Insight discouraged
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 12 of 13

Petitioner from retaining counsel8 and “took advantage of [her] known

vulnerabilities,”9 the Petition provides no factual basis to infer that Insight knew

Petitioner did not agree to the Dispute Resolution Provision and yet remained silent.

To the contrary, the facts alleged in the Petition—that Petitioner electronically

signed the Construction Contract and initialed every page, including the page on

which the Dispute Resolution Provision appears—compel the opposite inference.10




8
 But see Pet., Ex. A § 11(c) (“The Purchaser has the right . . . to retain an attorney of the
Purchaser’s choice to represent the Purchaser at settlement.”).
9
  Pet. ¶¶ 52-54; see also id. ¶ 24 (claiming Insight tried to “upsell” and “intimidate”
Petitioner into executing the Construction Contract); id. ¶ 53 (“At no time relevant hereto
did Insight Homes point out to [Petitioner] that the [C]onstruction Contract contained a
waiver of her right to seek redress in the judicial system or that she agreed to an NDA for
no consideration.”); AB at 9 (claiming Insight “actively discouraged [Petitioner] from
seeking counsel”).
At oral argument, Petitioner’s counsel suggested that Insight and Petitioner stood in a trust
relationship, but the Petition does not allege that Insight, Petitioner’s contractual
counterparty, owed fiduciary duties to Petitioner.
10
   Under Delaware law, “[w]here [a] putative contract is in the form of a signed writing,
that document generally offers the most powerful and persuasive evidence of the parties’
intent to be bound.” Eagle Force Hldgs., LLC v. Campbell, 

 (Del.
2018) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Chemours, 

, at *10 (“Delaware
law views . . . a signature as ‘the most powerful and persuasive evidence’ of [a party’s]
intent to be bound by the [agreement], and, consequently, its consent to arbitration.”
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). The Petition alleges no facts from which the Court
could reasonably infer that, despite Petitioner signing, and initialing every page of, the
Construction Contract, Insight knew she did not mean to agree to certain terms therein.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,
C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD
December 28, 2023
Page 13 of 13

       Because the Petition fails to adequately allege Petitioner’s entitlement to the

equitable remedy of reformation, I recommend that the Petition be dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.11

III.   CONCLUSION

       For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Petition be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to the Superior Court

pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902. This is a final report pursuant to Court of Chancery

Rule 144(d)(1).12

                                                 Sincerely,

                                                 /s/ Bonnie W. David

                                                 Bonnie W. David
                                                 Magistrate in Chancery


cc:    All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)




11
  In light of the recommendations herein, Insight’s motion to strike certain allegations in
the Petition is moot.
12
   See Ct. Ch. R. 144(d)(1) (“In actions that are not summary in nature or in which the
Court has not ordered expedited proceedings, any party taking exception shall file a notice
of exceptions within eleven days of the date of the report.”).