Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

HOLLAND, Justice,

for the majority:

Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant-appellant, Kevin McDonald, was convicted of Trafficking Cocaine and Possession with Intent to Deliver a Schedule II Controlled Substance. In this appeal, McDonald challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence that was seized following a traffic stop of the motor vehicle in which McDonald was a passenger. McDonald contends that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the *1075United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution because the police did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation.

We have concluded that McDonald’s Fourth Amendment argument is meritorious.2 Accordingly, his motion to suppress should have been granted, and the judgments of the Superior Court must be reversed. This matter will be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Facts

On August 12, 2005 at approximately 12:15 a.m., Corporal David S. Hake3 of the Delaware State Police entered the parking lot of the Canterbury Shore Stop in an unmarked patrol car. While there, he observed a lawfully parked Honda Accord with a driver and passenger seated inside. Corporal Hake also observed a third person standing by the vehicle. He did not notice any illegal activity involving the three individuals.4 As he drove by the Honda Accord, Corporal Hake ran the vehicle’s registration number, but inadvertently transposed some of the digits. Because of that error, the system indicated that the vehicle was unregistered. In fact, the vehicle was at all relevant times properly registered with the State of Delaware.

Corporal Hake continued to observe the automobile and its passengers. As he was exiting the Canterbury Shore Stop private parking lot, the driver faded to use his turn signal to indicate he was turning right onto the public roadway. Believing that failure to use a turn signal constituted a traffic violation, Corporal Hake immediately activated his emergency equipment and stopped the vehicle. As a result of events that transpired after the stop, the driver and the passenger (McDonald) were transported back to the police station. The motor vehicle was towed.

Later that same day, Corporal Hake obtained a warrant for McDonald’s arrest from the Justice of the Peace Court. The arrest warrant charged McDonald with nine criminal offenses. The arrest warrant was issued based upon Corporal Hake’s sworn affidavit recounting the events that had occurred several hours earlier that day, as follows:

Your affiant CPL HAKE can truly state that: On Friday 08/12/05 at approximately 0015 hours, I was patrolling U.S. 13 north of Felton when I entered the Shore Stop parking lot at the intersection of U.S. 13 and Irish Hill Road (CR 31), I observed a Honda Accord parked at the front of the store and there was a subject on foot near the car. I passed the Accord and continued northbound thru the parking lot. After I passed the Accord, the Accord began to back up and it headed towards the exit at the intersection of Irish Hill Road. I parked in the Shore Stop parking lot and the Accord passed me and headed towards the exit. The operator failed to activate his turn signal and then the operator made a right turn onto Irish Hill Road. I activated my emergency equipment and stopped the Accord (DE REG. 438917) on Irish Hill Road between U.S. 13 and the intersection of Canterbury Road.
*1076I approached the Accord and I contacted the operator. The operator identified himself as Juan Lucas (04/07/83). The front passenger identified himself as Mikell Young and he stated that his date of birth was 10/11/74. I recognized the front passenger as being Kevin McDonald because I had contacted him during the month of July 2005. I asked Def. McDonald how they knew each other and he advised that they were cousins. Def. Lucas informed me that they were cousins and that his passenger was in fact Mikell Young. Def. Lucas was unable to provide valid proof of insurance for the Accord. P.O. Willard responded to the traffic stop to assist. I conducted a Deljis inquiry which revealed that Kevin McDonald had an active capias. I had Def. McDonald exit the vehicle and I detained him without incident. I asked Def. McDonald if there was anything illegal in the car and he advised that there was not. Def. McDonald advised that it was his uncle Eric McDonald’s vehicle and that I could search the car. Then, I had Def. Lucas exit the vehicle and I detained him without incident. I conducted a patdown on Def. Lucas and I located six fireworks in his pockets. Def. Lucas also had a hollowed blunt in his pocket, which is the type that is commonly used to smoke marijuana. I asked Def. Lucas if there was anything illegal in the car and he advised that there was not. Def. Lucas advised that I could search the car.
I conducted a search of the vehicle and I located the following evidence: approximately 0.1 grams of marijuana between the front seats, approximately 0.1 grams of loose cocaine on the driver’s seat and on the front passenger seat, and a cigar that is typically used to smoke marijuana. I conducted field tests on the suspected marijuana and the suspected cocaine and the substances field tested positive.
After the vehicle was removed by Chambers towing, I transported Def. Lucas to Troop 3. P.O. Willard transported Def. McDonald to Troop 3.
At Troop 3, I conducted a strip search on Def. McDonald. During the search, I located a plastic baggie pinned to def. McDonald’s boxer shorts with a safety pin. The baggie contained a plastic baggie of crack cocaine which weighed approximately 14.8 grams and it contained a baggie of marijuana which weighed approximately 2.5 grams. A search of Def. McDonald’s socks revealed approximately 2.9 grams of marijuana and $350.00 is U.S. Currency.
Based upon my training and experience, the amount of crack cocaine which was located on Def. McDonald’s person is consistent with the sale of crack cocaine. Based upon my training and experience, the amount of marijuana and the way in which it was packaged is consistent with the sale of marijuana. The $350.00 in U.S. Currency in Def. McDonald’s sock along with the marijuana is also an indicator of the sale of illegal drugs.
Def. Lucas continued to claim that his passenger’s name was Mikell Young.

Motion to Suppress

Before his trial, McDonald moved to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop and subsequent search incident to his arrest. McDonald argued that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment guarantee to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”5 McDonald contended that the police did not have probable cause to stop the Honda Accord in which McDonald was a passenger. Specifically, McDonald urged, the alleged turn signal violation for which the Honda was *1077pulled over could not have formed the requisite probable cause to stop the vehicle because Delaware’s Motor Vehicle Code does not require a driver to signal when entering a public highway from private property. Thus, McDonald argued, if no traffic violation was committed, there was no legal justification for the stop and all evidence resulting there from should be suppressed.

In denying McDonald’s motion, the Superior Court stated: “I think that leaving [the parking lot] without a turn signal in and of itself would seem to present, at best, only a very questionable suspicion, but it’s not in and of itself.” After concluding that the alleged turn signal violation alone was “a very questionable suspicion” to stop the motor vehicle, the Superior Court used a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. The Superior Court concluded that the combination of the two people in the vehicle with a third standing nearby at a store in an area known for criminal activity, together with the registration issue and the vehicle’s “unprovoked flight” from the Shore Stop parking lot, provided a reasonable articulable basis to stop the vehicle. The Superior Court’s decision did not identify what criminal activity was reasonably suspected from those facts. The decision also did not indicate what facts formed the basis for the conclusion that Juan Lucas executed an “unprovoked flight” from the lot. Nor did the Superior Court’s ruling explain why those facts were relevant, since Corporal Hake did not stop the motor vehicle for any of those reasons.

Fourth Amendment and Traffic Violations

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The United States Supreme Court has held that temporary detentions of persons during a motor vehicle stop by police constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has also held that a traffic stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that it not be “unreasonable” under the circumstances.7 “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”8

The United States Supreme Court has summarized its Fourth Amendment cases as “foreclose[ing] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of the traffic stop depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”9 The Supreme Court has held that a traffic violation arrest is “not rendered invalid by the fact that it was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search’ and that a lawful post-arrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was not motivated by the officers’ safety concern that justifies such searches.”10 In Prouse, the Supreme Court distinguished random traffic stops from “probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations.”11 The Prouse de-*1078cisión noted that where police officers are required to act upon actual traffic violations that they observe, it will provide “ ‘the quantum of individualized suspicion’ that is necessary to ensure the police discretion is sufficiently constrained.”12

Traffic Violation as Probable Cause

The legal issue presented in this appeal is whether there was probable cause, to stop the motor vehicle in which McDonald was a passenger. The focus of our analysis is upon the sworn affidavit of probable cause, executed by Corporal Hake, that was the basis for issuing the warrant to arrest McDonald. The “four comers” test is used to determine whether an affidavit demonstrates probable cause to issue either an arrest warrant or a search warrant.13 Under that test, sufficient facts must appear on the face of the affidavit such that a reviewing court can ascertain from that document alone the factual basis for a determination that probable cause exists.14

After the automobile was stopped, Corporal Hake arrested McDonald without a warrant and transported him to the police station. Nevertheless, the sworn affidavit that Corporal Hake subsequently executed in support of the nine-count arrest warrant has determinative probative value because it is the only contemporaneous evidence of why he stopped the motor vehicle several hours earlier that day. The only reason cited in the affidavit for stopping the vehicle was the alleged turn signal traffic violation. Corporal Hake’s testimony at the suppression hearing confirmed that fact:

Defense Counsel: Officer, you would agree with me in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, the only basis that you identified for stopping the vehicle that Mr. McDonald was riding in was the fact that it failed to signal its intent to proceed in a right-hand direction from the parking lot (emphasis added).

Corporal Hake: That’s correct.

Based upon the affidavit and Corporal Hake’s testimony, McDonald’s defense counsel argued that the only issue the Superior Court needed to decide was whether there was a turn signal violation that satisfied the probable cause requirement. We agree. Nevertheless, in denying McDonald’s motion to suppress, the Superior Court relied upon additional factors such as the high crime area in which the Shore Stop was located, the defendants’ “unprovoked” flight and the registration issue. Those factors, however, were based upon Corporal Hake’s additional testimony at the suppression hearing. They were not included in the affidavit of probable cause to arrest as reasons for stopping the vehicle. The Superior Court’s reliance upon those extra affidavit considerations ran counter to the purpose of the “four corners” test, which is to ensure that the reviewing court determines “whether the constitutional requirements [of probable cause] have been met without reliance upon faded and often confused memories.”15

The only basis identified by Corporal Hake for stopping the motor vehicle within the Affidavit of Probable Cause to Arrest, was the alleged turn signal viola*1079tion. The affidavit did not contain any reference to the vehicle registration or to the fact that the Shore Stop was located in an area allegedly known for drug and other criminal activity. Accordingly, we look solely to the validity of the traffic violation to determine whether there was sufficient probable cause to stop the motor vehicle.

As recited in his affidavit, the alleged traffic violation that Corporal Hake observed was the driver’s failure to use his turn signal when exiting the private parking lot of Canterbury Shore Stop onto Irish Hill Road. In his testimony, Corporal Hake cited Title 21, section 4155(a) and (b) as the basis for the violation. That statute states in relevant part:16

§ 4155. Turning movements and required signals
(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in § 4152 of this title, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway or turn so as to proceed in an opposite direction unless and until such movement can be made with safety without interfering with other traffic. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
(b) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 300 feet or more than one-half mile traveled by the vehicle before turning.

The Affidavit of Probable Cause asserts the vehicle entered the public highway without signaling. But that did not constitute a traffic violation, for two reasons. First, the provisions of Chapter 41 only apply to public highways except as otherwise provided.17 Nothing in section 4155(a) provides for its application to motor vehicles that exit from private parking lots on to a public highway. Second, the record indicates that the Canterbury Shore Stop parking lot was only about 200 feet in total. Apart from the fact that section 4155(b) does not apply to private property, by Corporal Hake’s own admission it would have been impossible for anyone to comply with its terms. Thus, the record reflects no factual basis to establish probable cause to stop the motor vehicle for a traffic violation of either section 4155(a) or (b).18

Evidence Obtained Inadmissible

It is indisputable that but for his improper traffic stop of the vehicle, Corporal Hake would not have had any contact with its occupants and thus, would not have had an opportunity to see the drugs on the driver’s seat and in the center console. Corporal Hake’s view of those drugs provided the probable cause to impound the vehicle and arrest its driver and McDonald. The search conducted incident to McDonald’s arrest uncovered the additional drugs McDonald had on his person.

Without probable cause to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation, the stop was unreasonable and in violation of McDonald’s Fourth Amendment rights.19 It has long been established that any evidence recovered or derived in violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be introduced at trial for the purpose of proving the defendant’s guilt.20 All of the police *1080action taken after the traffic stop was a direct result of the improper traffic stop that violated McDonald’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Superior Court erred as a matter of law by denying McDonald’s motion to suppress.

Comments on Dissent

The dissent notes that the Superior Court identified four possible factors to support the motor vehicle stop. The dissent agrees with the majority’s conclusion that three of those factors do not support a stop. The dissent concludes, nevertheless, that the motor vehicle stop was justified by the “state trooper’s mistaken belief that the vehicle was not properly registered.” The record, however, reflects that Officer Hake never testified that he stopped the vehicle on the basis of that admittedly mistaken belief about the car’s registration.

Officer Hake’s contemporaneous affidavit states that he stopped the motor vehicle for the alleged turn signal violation. The dissent suggests the only reason for the stop that was given by Officer Hake in the affidavit was incomplete. The dissent disregards the fact that the alleged turn signal violation was also the only basis for the motor vehicle stop that Officer Hake gave at the suppression hearing. Officer Hake testified he “pulled out, activated my emergency equipment, and stopped the vehicle” after “there was no turn signal on when the car made a right turn onto Irish Hill Road.”

The doctrine of deference on appeal to a finding of historical fact (invalid registration) has no application when that additional factual finding is not supported by and is inconsistent with the sole fact (turn signal violation) identified by Officer Hake in his candid testimony at the suppression hearing and contemporaneous affidavit. Irrespective of what else was known to Officer Hake, the record reflects that Officer Hake only stopped the motor vehicle for one reason: an alleged turn signal violation. The dissent acknowledges that if the non-existent turn signal violation was the basis for the motor vehicle stop, then McDonald’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

Conclusion

The judgments of the Superior Court are reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

. Consequently, it is unnecessary to address McDonald’s claim under the Delaware Constitution.

. Corporal Hake was assigned to the Governor’s Task Force in Kent County, a drug enforcement unit.

.Corporal Hake later testified at the suppression hearing, however, that the fact that these individuals were together at a location known for drug activity is what first drew his attention to the vehicle.

. U.S. Const, amend. IV.

. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

.Id.

. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769.

. Id. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)).

. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391.

. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 817-18, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55, 99 S.Ct. 1391).

. Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573 (Del. 1975). See also United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.1988) (applying four corners test to arrest warrants as well as search warrants).

. Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d at 573.

. Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 574 (quoting United States v. Acosta, 501 F.2d 1330 (1974)).

. Del.Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4155(a) and (b).

. Del.Code. Ann. tit. 21, § 4101(a).

. Although the Superior Court did not rule directly that there was no traffic violation, it characterized the alleged turn signal violation as “very questionable suspicion,” i.e. not probable cause.

. Whreri v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) and Cold*1080well v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1051 (Del.2001) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).