Tippett v. Daly
James TIPPETT, Trustee for the Revocable Trust of James Tippett, Appellant, v. Gregory DALY, Appellee
Attorneys
Morris R. Battino, Washington, DC, for appellant., Carol S. Blumenthal, for appellee.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
James Tippett appeals from judgments entered following a consolidated trial of his suit for possession of a dwelling and his tenant’s suit for breach of contract.
I. The Factual and Procedural Background
The revocable trust of James Tippett owns a single-family dwelling which Gregory Daly (“the tenant”) has rented for more than thirty years. On April 28, 2001, pursuant to TOPA, see D.C.Code § 42-3404.03 (2001), the owner mailed an offer of sale which the tenant received on April 30. The tenant testified that he mailed a statement of interest to the owner on May 18 and filed a copy with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”) the same day. The owner testified, however, that he did not receive the statement of interest until June 2.
On April 29, 2002, the tenant filed a complaint seeking damages, specific performance of the alleged contract for sale of the property, and an injunction ordering the owner to comply with TOPA. Following a bench trial, the trial court directed the owner to “negotiate with [the tenant] in good faith for the sale of’ the property. The court first found that the tenant had timely provided his statement of interest by mailing it on May 18. The court calculated the thirty-day period for response from the date the owner mailed the offer of sale, April 28, added three days for mailing and an additional day because April 29 was a Sunday, see Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6 (2001), and determined that the statement had to be provided by June 3, 2001. Moreover, the court held that the tenant’s “acceptance of the offer of sale was complete upon mailing the statement of interest on May 18, 2001[,]” and that the statement of interest was therefore timely regardless of when the owner actually received it. (Bench Order and Op. at 4 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63(a) (1981).))
II. Was the Statement of Interest Timely Provided?
Under TOPA, an owner of a rental housing accommodation who wishes to sell the property must first “give the tenant an opportunity to purchase the accommodation at a price and terms which represent a bona fide offer of sale.” D.C.Code § 42-3404.02(a) (2001).
A. May 30 Was the Deadline.
The owner argues that the trial court erred both in calculating the time within which the tenant was required to provide his statement of interest and in holding that the tenant had “provided” that statement when he mailed it on May 18. The tenant wisely concedes error on the first point. The statute states that, “[u]pon receipt” of the written offer of sale, the tenant shall have thirty days to provide a written statement of interest. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1) (2001). The tenant testified, and it was undisputed at trial, that he received the offer on April 30. Thus, the tenant had thirty days from April 30 (until May 30) to provide a statement of interest. TOPA has its own provision for calculating time periods, see D.C.Code § 42-3405.02 (2001),
B. What Does the Statute Require?
The remaining question then is whether the tenant “provide[d] the owner ... with” the statement of interest when he placed it in the mail on May 18 or whether, as the owner contends, the tenant did not “provide [him] with” the statement until he received it on June 2. The meaning of the term “provide ... with” is a question of statutory interpretation, and we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Wemhoff v. District of Columbia, 887 A.2d 1004, 1007 (D.C.2005); 1618 Twenty-First Street Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C.2003).
1. The Language of the Statute
“We start, as we must, with the language of the statute.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). “The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used.” Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Moreover, in examin ing the statutory language, it is axiomatic that ‘the words of the statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis v.
Neither TOPA nor the related regulations define the term “provide ... with.” See D.C.Code § 42-3401.03 (2001) (definitions section); 14 DCMR § 4799.1 (1991) (same). Thus, it is appropriate for us to look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of these words. 1618 Twenty-First Street Tenants’ Ass’n, 829 A.2d at 203. “Provide” means “to supply for use” and is synonymous with “furnish.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1827 (2002); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1458 (3d ed. 1992) (“[t]o furnish,” “supply,” or “make available”). In order to “use” the statement — to be able to read it and act upon it — the owner must have access to it. Therefore, “to supply [the statement of interest] for use” or to “make [it] available,” the tenant must place it in the owner’s possession. Depositing the statement in the mail may give rise to an inference that the owner will receive it eventually, see, e.g., Kidd Int’l Home Care, Inc. v. Prince, 917 A.2d 1083, 1087 (D.C.2007) (There is “a rebuttable presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and mailed, and not returned to the sender, has been delivered to the addressee.”), but the owner does not have possession of, or access to, the statement while it is in the mail stream. Thus, the “ordinary sense” of the term “provide ... with” is that the tenant must ensure that the statement reaches the landlord within thirty days.
2. The Statutory Context
We recognize, however, that “[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.” Dolan v. United States Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). “The meaning— or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000). Therefore, “we do not read statutory words in isolation; the language of surrounding and related paragraphs may be instrumental to understanding them.” District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 652 (D.C.2005) (en banc). “We consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145, 116 S.Ct. 501. “Statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor....” Washington Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 982 A.2d 691, 716 (D.C.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
TOPA contains separate provisions dealing with single-family accommodations (§ 42-3404.09), accommodations with two through four units (§ 42-3404.10), and accommodations with five or more units (§ 42-3404.11). Variants of the word “provide” appear throughout the statutory scheme. Some portions of TOPA require the tenant to provide notice to the owner; others require the owner to provide information to the tenant.
The process begins when the owner provides each tenant and the Mayor a written
(4) A statement that the owner shall make available to the tenant a floor plan of the building and an itemized list of monthly operating expenses, utility consumption rates, and capital expenditures for each of the 2 preceding calendar years within 7 days after receiving a request. The statement shall also indicate that the owner shall, at the same time, make available the most recent rent roll, list of tenants, and list of vacant apartments. If the owner does not have a floor plan, the owner may meet the requirement to provide a floor plan by stating in writing to the tenant that the owner does not have a floor plan.
D.C.Code § 42-3404.03(4) (2001). The owner’s obligation is to make this information available to the tenant “within 7 days after receiving a request.” § 42-3404.03(3). The last sentence of subsection (4) refers to one aspect of this obligation as “the requirement to provide a floor plan” (emphasis added). Later sections of TOPA dealing with the sale of accommodations of different sizes all use common language to refer back to this requirement: “For every day of delay in providing information by the owner as required by this subchapter, the negotiation period is extended by 1 day.” § 42-3404.09(2); § 42-3404.10(2); § 42-3404.11(2) (emphasis added). In context, therefore, providing information to tenants is synonymous with making it available to them. If the owner had mailed the information and it still were in the mail stream after the seven-day deadline had expired, each day that passed before the mail arrived would be counted as a day of delay.
Thus, § 42-3404.09(1) gives the tenant “30 days to provide the owner and the Mayor with a written statement of interest.” Section 42-3404.09(2) refers to the owner’s obligation to provide information to the tenant. Similar parallel use of these terms is found in D.C.Code § 42-3404.10 (2001) (accommodations of two through four units). The word “provide” and its variations should have the same meaning, whether the tenant or the owner has the obligation to “provide.” Both the language and the structure of the statute confirm that “provide” means “make available.”
3. The Legislative History
We have not found any legislative history from 1980 that is particularly useful in deciding the question before us. This is not surprising because, as originally enacted, TOPA did not require tenants in accommodations of up to four units to submit a statement of interest within any specified period of time. Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980, D.C. Law 3-86, §§ 409-410, 27 D.C.Reg. 2975, 2993-94 (1980).
In its original form, TOPA set only one deadline for an expression of interest, and it applied to tenants in an accommodation with five or more units. “In order to make a contract of sale with an owner,” D.C.Code § 45-1640, now codified as D.C.Code § 42-3404.11 (2001), required the tenants to “[f]orm a tenant organization with the legal capacity to hold real property” and “deliver a statement of registration to the Mayor and the owner by hand or by first class mail within 45 days of receipt of a valid offer.” Whether the tenants used the mail or made hand delivery, the statement of registration had to be delivered to the owner “within 45 days.” This served as notice that the tenant organization wished to purchase the property.
In 1983 the Council was asked to extend the life of the Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act and to make certain amendments. The Committee Report explained that § 45-1639 (now codified at § 42-3404.10) “is amended to require tenants to indicate in a time certain an interest in purchasing a two- to four-unit building, thereby giving the owner timely notice of the tenants’ intent to purchase” (emphasis added). D.C. Council, Report on Bill 5-162 at 3 (June 7,1983).
During the legislative process, Mayor Barry wrote to Councilmember John Ray, urging, among other things, an amendment to § 45-1639 “requiring that tenants in properties with two to four units indicate interest in purchasing as a prerequisite to using all of the existing negotiation period.” Carol Thompson, Director of the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, explained the need for this amendment during her testimony on behalf of the executive branch:
Under the current law, an owner of a building with two to four units must wait a total of 135 days[9 ] before the owner knows whether the tenants will attempt to buy the property. On the other hand, the tenants in a building with five units or more must indicate an interest in purchasing within 45 days in order to continue with the purchase process. We recommend that a parallel provision be included for buildings with two to four units. This amendment would make the law more equitable for the “smaller” landlords who are often the owners of these small rental properties.
Id., Report on Bill 5-162 at Attachment B, page 6. As indicated, this amendment was designed to give “timely notice” to the owner and to reduce the time he must wait before learning whether the tenants will attempt to buy the property.
Section 1639 was amended in two respects. Three sentences, here italicized, were added to the end of subsection (1) so that it read:
(1) Joint and several response. — The tenants may respond to an owner’s offer first jointly, then severally. Upon receipt of a written offer of sale from the owner, a group of tenants acting jointly*1130 shall have 15 days to provide the owner and the Mayor with a mitten statement of interest. Following that time period, an individual tenant shall have 7 days to provide a written statement of interest to the owner and the Mayor. Each statement of interest must be [a] clear expression of interest on the part of the tenant or tenant group to exercise the right to purchase as specified in this subchapter [.]
Subsection (2) was amended by adding the italicized words at the beginning:
(2) Negotiation penod. — (A) Upon receipt of a letter of intent from a tenant or a tenant group, the owner shall afford the tenants a reasonable period to negotiate a contract of sale, and shall not require less than 90 days. For every day of delay in providing information by the owner as required by this subchap-ter, the negotiation period is extended by 1 day;
(B) If, at the end of the 90-day period or any extensions thereof, the tenants jointly have not contracted with the owner, the owner shall provide an additional 30-day period, during which any 1 of the current tenants may contract with the owner for the purchase of the accommodation[.]
D.C. Law 5-38, § 2(k), 30 D.C.Reg. 4866 (1983). To be sure, our task would have been simpler if the Council had used the word “deliver” instead of “provide,” but there is every reason to believe that the Council intended this “parallel provision” to have a similar meaning to the statute on which it was modeled — the section dealing with buildings of five units or more, which required that the statement of registration be delivered within 45 days. See testimony of Director Thompson, quoted above. This 1983 amendment was intended to give the owner “timely notice” “in a time certain” and required that the statement of interest be provided (made available or delivered) to the owner within fifteen days.
We now come to the deadline at the heart of this case. The Preamble to D.C. Law 7-154 (effective September 29, 1988) explains that the purpose of the 1988 amendments was to extend the life of the legislation and “to require a tenant to provide the owner of a single-family accommodation with a written statement of interest within 30 days of receiving a written offer of sale from the owner.” D.C. Law 7-154 § 2(g), 35 D.C.Reg. 5715-16 (1988). The Committee Report confirms that “[t]he new bill will require a tenant of a single family accommodation, like tenants of 2-4 unit accommodations, to submit a written statement of interest to purchase the property within 15 days [later changed to 30 days in the case of single-family dwellings] of an offer of sale.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 7-462 at 3 (June 27, 1988).
This change had been suggested to benefit landlords — to “ease the hardships faced by property owners, without weakening any of the existing tenant protections.” Id. at 4 (summarizing testimony on behalf of Apartment and Office Building Association which characterized the restrictions of TOPA as “a gross infringement on property rights,” but suggested, if legislation was extended, changing several procedural provisions, including adding a time limit for providing a statement of interest); id. (reporting that Association of Realtors opposed renewal of legislation but, in the alternative, asked Council “to require tenants in a single-family accommodation who want to exercise them right to purchase to give written notice within 15 days of receipt of the owners’ notice to sell”). The history of this provision demonstrates that it was added to benefit landlords by establishing a time certain for the tenant to respond. This legislative history supports the conclusion derived from the structure of the statute and the “ordinary sense” of the words used in it: “shall have 30 days
4. Recent Amendments
Soon after a division of this court issued its decision on February 5, 2009, the Council of the District of Columbia amended the statute through a series of emergency, temporary, and permanent acts. The permanent legislation became effective on July 23, 2010, after the required period of congressional review. 57 D.C.Reg. 7532 (2010) (notice of effective date). This legislation amended § 42-3404.09(1) and § 42-3404.10(1) by inserting the following words and punctuation: “by hand or by sending by certified mail,” after the phrase “provide the owner and the Mayor.” See § 2(a) and § 2(b) of Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Preservation Clarification Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-404, 57 D.C.Reg. 4510 (2010). Thus, after amendment, § 42-3404.09(1) provides in pertinent part that “the tenant shall have 30 days to provide the owner and the Mayor, by hand or by sending by certified mail, with a written statement of interest.”
The Council asserted that this court’s decision made it “necessary to clarify the Council’s intent that tenants have the full 30 days provided by law to express an interest in purchasing their unit following an offer of sale from the landlord.” See § 2(e), (g) of the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Preservation Clarification Emergency Declaration Resolution of 2009 (emphasis added).
The Council may have clarified TOPA for the future, but it did not purport to enact legislation that would govern this case. Given the absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, we presume that the amendment does not apply retroactively. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (“If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.”). In fact, at oral argument, the tenant’s counsel assured us that the amendment operates prospectively only.
Nor did the Council’s action in 2009 provide meaningful assistance in discerning the intent of the predecessor Councils which enacted TOPA and later added the thirty-day deadline. In the first place, the Council did not assert that it was clarifying what the earlier legislators meant.
“[T]he Supreme Court often has said ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’ ” Winters v. Ridley, 596 A.2d 569, 579 (D.C.1991) (Ferren, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313, 80 S.Ct. 326, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960)). See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530 n. 27, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (quoting Price). The hazard certainly is greatest in circumstances like these, where more than two decades have passed, and the Council that acted in 2009 did not contain any members who passed the legislation in 1980, 1983, and 1988. Cf. Winters, 596 A.2d at 578 (Schwelb, J., concurring) (“Relatively little time elapsed between the enactment of the GTCA [in 1986] and the Council’s actions in 1989. Most of the legislators were members of the Council at both relevant times.”); United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, Inc., 335 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 339-40, 173 F.3d 870, 878-79 (1999) (“Post-enactment legislative history ... becomes of absolutely no significance when the subsequent Congress ... takes on the role of a court and in its reports asserts the meaning of a prior statute.”).
This decision implies no disrespect for the Council, nor does it step beyond our proper role as judges. Ultimately, the interpretation of statutes is “the responsibility of courts, not of subsequently elected legislative bodies.” Winters, 596 A.2d at 577 (Schwelb, J., concurring) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)). In sum, nothing about the recent amendments changes our understanding of what the statute meant in 2001.
5. Other Considerations
Practical considerations confirm our reading of the statute. Permitting the tenant to invoke his right to purchase by placing a statement of interest in the mail on the thirtieth day would create uncertainty and impose a significant additional burden on the owner, who would have to decide, without guidance from the statute, how long to wait before concluding that the tenant had not responded. In this case, for example, it apparently took two full weeks for the mail to arrive. Requiring the owner to choose between further, potentially costly, delay in the sale or redevelopment of his property and possibly violating TOPA would serve none of the Act’s salutary purposes, see D.C.Code § 42-3401.02 (2001 & 2010 Supp.) (stating purposes of the legislation), and we have seen no evidence that the legislature intended this result. To the contrary, this language was adopted for the benefit of owners and to shorten the time in which they must remain uncertain whether the tenant will claim the right to purchase the property.
On the other hand, enforcing the thirty-day deadline by requiring that the statement of interest be made available to the owner within that time will provide certainty and predictability that benefit landlords and tenants alike. Moreover, it is a common feature of TOPA that the end of one period triggers the beginning of another, and it often will be important for tenants to know with certainty that a new period has begun.
Having considered the language of the statute, its structure, and its legislative history, we hold that the tenant must “provide the [owner] ... with” a statement of interest by ensuring that it is made available to him within thirty days.
III. The Tenant’s Arguments
The tenant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He urges us to interpose the “mailbox rule” that acceptance of an offer generally is effective “as soon as put out of the offeree’s possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the of-feror. ...” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 63(a) (1981). We have seen no indication that the legislature intended to incorporate this common law rule by implication. Indeed, the language, history, and structure of TOPA seem to exclude this possibility. The plain language of § 42-3404.11(1) (applying to accommodations with five or more units) precludes use of the mailbox rule by providing that “the tenants shall ... deliver an application for registration [as a tenant organization] to the Mayor and the owner by hand or by first class mail within 45 days of receipt of a valid offer.” Although use of the mail plainly is authorized, the application must be delivered within 45 days. It would be odd, indeed, if the legislature meant to take a radically different approach and incorporate the mailbox rule into a corresponding section of TOPA without at least mentioning that change. Cf. Orius Telecommunications, Inc., 857 A.2d at 1068 (“[W]e cannot endorse the mailbox rule because its application ignores the existence of relevant statutory language and would nullify the essential holding of the director’s interpretation that the relevant date under the statute is that of receipt by the claimant.”).
Nor are we persuaded by the fact that some provisions of TOPA expressly allow (or require) notice to be sent by mail. See,
Finally, while we recognize that the Council intended that ambiguities in the statute be resolved “toward the end of strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations,” see D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 (2001);
Even if we were to apply this legislative rule of statutory construction, it does not provide a straightforward answer to the question before us. “[S]trengthening the legal rights of tenants” as a whole is not the same thing as devising an ad hoc rule that would permit an individual tenant to win. Moreover, the provision of TOPA at issue in this case was meant to balance the rights of tenants and owners. “[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice — and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987). Indeed, as we have demonstrated above, the interpretation of “provide ... with” that we adopt today could in fact benefit tenants as well as owners, even though it does not help the individual tenant in this case.
IV. Conclusion
The tenant acknowledged that he received the owner’s offer of sale on April 30, 2001, and he presented no evidence to dispute the testimony that the owner did not receive the tenant’s statement of interest until June 2, 2001, more than thirty days later. See note 3, supra. Accordingly, the tenant did not “provide” the owner “with” his statement of interest within thirty days of receiving the offer of sale. Because the tenant did not timely invoke his right to purchase under TOPA, the trial court erred in ordering the owner to negotiate a contract for sale to the tenant.
So ordered.
. Although the dwelling is owned by the revocable trust of James Tippett, we shall refer to Mr. Tippett as the owner or landlord.
. Our order granting appellee’s petition for rehearing en banc could have been more clear. Although we vacated our prior opinion and judgment in its entirety, appellee had not petitioned for rehearing on the second issue (having won that issue, he had no reason to do so), and appellant did not file a cross-
. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the tenant “submitted a statement of interest to [the owner] dated May 18, 2001,” but that "the date of receipt by [the owner] is disputed.” However, the tenant failed to produce any evidence at trial to dispute the owner's testimony that he received the statement on June 2. There thus is nothing to support a contrary finding, and we take it as established that the statement was received on June 2. Although our dissenting colleague suggests that we should remand for further proceedings on this issue, the trial has taken place (in May 2005), the tenant failed to present any contrary evidence, and the court denied his motion to reopen the record. We disagree with our colleague's argument that we are terminating this litigation prematurely.
. Unless otherwise indicated, we quote the statutory language in force in 2001.
. D.C.Code § 42-3405.02 (2001) (entitled “Time periods”) provides: "If a time period running under this chapter ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, it is extended until the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” May 30, 2001, was a Wednesday, so this statute does not operate to extend the thirty-day period under the circumstances presented here.
. Cf. Orius Telecommunications, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 857 A.2d 1061, 1065 (D.C.2004) (upholding as reasonable Director’s conclusion "that the term ‘paid’ ... means receipt of the payment by the claimant within the ten-day statutory time limit”; check was mailed within ten days but received after time limit had expired); United States ex rel. B & R, Inc. v. Donald Lane Construction, 19 F.Supp.2d 217, 223, 224 (D.Del.1998) (interpreting the term "give” in the Miller Act to mean "to put into the possession of another for his use”; notice must be received, not merely mailed, within ninety days).
. There are additional examples from context which support the conclusion that the term "provide ... with" means to make the statement of interest available to the owner. See D.C.Code § 42-3404.05(a-2) (2001) ("The owner may not require the tenant to pay the purchase price in installments unless the owner provides deferred purchase money financing on terms reasonably acceptable to the tenant.”); D.C.Code § 42-3404.32 (2001) ("To exercise [the District’s] right [to purchase] under this subchapter, the Mayor shall provide a written statement of interest to the owner and tenant within 30 days of the May- or’s receipt of the copy of offer of sale required by § 42-3404.03.”) (emphasis added); cf. D.C.Code § 42-3404.08 (2001) ("a tenant or tenant organization shall also have the right of first refusal during the 15 days after the tenant or tenant organization has received from the owner a valid sales contract to purchase by a third party”) (emphasis added).
. Title IV of this Act is known as the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act of 1980. See Columbia Plaza Tenants’ Ass’n v. Columbia Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 869 A.2d 329, 332 (D.C.2005).
. We are not certain how Ms. Thompson derived the total of 135 days.
. Resolutions may be used, among other things, "to express simple determinations, decisions, or directions of the Council of a special or temporary character.” D.C.Code § 1-204.12(a) (2001).
. In Winters v. Ridley, 596 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1991), by contrast, the Resolution passed by the Council declared, among other things, that "[t]he Council of the District of Columbia never intended the [Good Time Credits] Act to apply to persons convicted for first degree murder.... The Council of tire District of Columbia believed that the 'notwithstanding any other provision of law’ language of Section 801 of the Criminal Code ... would exclude first degree murder from coverage of the Act as it applies to minimum sentences.” 596 A.2d at 571 (Schwelb, J., concurring).
. For example, when an accommodation lias two through four units, "[t]he tenants may respond to an owner’s offer first jointly, then severally,” and "a group of tenants acting jointly shall have 15 days to provide the owner and the Mayor with a written statement of interest.” D.C.Code § 42-3404.10(1) (2001).
. We recognize that the 2009 Council weighed the benefits of a clear deadline somewhat differently, deciding that a tenant would, in the future, have 30 days to provide the statement of interest, either "by hand or by sending by certified mail[.]” Significantly, however, the Council did not adopt in wholesale fashion the mailbox rule urged by appellant. If delivery is not made by hand, the tenant is required to use a form of mailing that will generate time-stamped documentation.
. We do not consider here a situation where the owner fails to pick up his mail, is absent for several days, or otherwise frustrates timely receipt of notice. See, e.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104, 105 n. 1 (1961) ("Unavailability of the party to be notified may affect the rule [that notice to exercise an option is effective only upon receipt].)”; United States ex rel. B & R, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d at 225 n. 15 (referring to exception when "the receiver intentionally avoids the receipt of notice”).
.The tenant's counsel has cited a section of the rental housing regulations which provides that "[s]ervice by mail shall be complete upon mailing.” 14 DCMR § 3911.5 (1991). "Service” is a term of art, however, and this provision applies to documents required to be “served” under the rental housing regulations. See, e.g., 14 DCMR § 4014.1 (motion for continuance of a scheduled hearing or for an extension of time to file a pleading), § 4204.10(c) (certificate of election to increase rent ceiling), § 4300.1 (notice to vacate). The terms "serve” or “service” are not found in those regulations applying to the sale of residential rental housing. See 14 DCMR §§ 4711.1-4711.13 (1991).
. D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 provides: "The purposes of this chapter favor resolution of ambiguity by the hearing officer or a court toward the end of strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations to the maximum extent permissible under law. If this chapter conflicts with another provision of law of general applicability, the provisions of this chapter control."
. This statutory rule, "as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.” Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961) (commenting on the rule of lenity applied in criminal cases). It "comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what [the Council] has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to [tenants].” Id.
.Because we rule in the owner’s favor on this ground, we need not address his alternative argument that the trial court erred in finding that the tenant filed a copy of the statement of interest with DCRA (the Mayor's representative), as the statute requires. See D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1) (2001).