Sessa v. Province
DANIEL M. SESSA v. DONALD J. PROVINCE, SR.
Attorneys
Paul D. Buhl, for the appellants (defendant Donald J. Province II et al.)., Howard Fetner, with whom, on the brief, was Glenn W. Dowd, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Opinion
The defendants Donald J. Province II and Field Company Builders, LLC,
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants in connection with the construction of a home in Had-dam. The court, Sferrazza, J., ordered the parties to attend a mediation session before Hon. Samuel H. Teller, judge trial referee. Approximately two months before the mediation session, the parties received a copy of Judge Tellerâs mediation orders. Those orders provided in relevant part: âAt least seven days prior to the mediation [session], the parties shall exchange and submit to the mediator current available information disclosing all relevant material pertaining to the case .... Failure to attend, unless excused in advance by the court, shall result in the imposition of sanctions, including a nonsuit or default against the party failing to comply, and an award to the complying party of [attorneyâs] fees.â
The mediation session was scheduled for May 24, 2005, but the defendants did not submit any material to Judge Teller beforehand, and neither they nor their attorney, Paul D. Buhl, attended the mediation session. Buhl incorrectly recorded the date of the mediation session as May 31, 2005, and was instead in Illinois on May 24, 2005. Judge Teller defaulted the defendants for failure to appear and ordered them to pay the plaintiffs $200 in attorneyâs fees.
The defendants then filed a motion to set aside the default pursuant to Practice Book § 17-42, which provides in relevant part that â[a] motion to set aside a
âWe review a courtâs ruling on a motion to set aside a default under the abuse of discretion standard. . . . In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great weight is given to the trial courtâs decision and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial courtâs ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did.â (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Merritt v. Fagan, 78 Conn. App. 590, 593, 828 A.2d 685, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 916, 833 A.2d 467 (2003).
The record indicates that the defendants received notice of Judge Tellerâs orders regarding the mediation session and failed to comply with them. In light of the defendantsâ negligence, Judge Sferrazza reasonably concluded that the defendants had failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the default. This court repeatedly has stated that negligence is an improper ground on which to set aside a default. See, e.g., Wilson v. Troxler, 91 Conn. App. 864, 872, 883 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928, 929, 889 A.2d 819, 820 (2005). Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Sferrazza did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendantsâ motion to set aside the default.
The judgment is affirmed.
The other defendants in this case, Donald J. Province, Sr., Field Company, Inc., and Monogram Millworks, LLC, are not parties to this appeal. We therefore refer to Donald J. Province II and Field Company Builders, LLC, as the defendants.