State v. James A.

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         STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES A.*
                    (SC 20453)
              Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                        Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

                                    Syllabus

Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second
   degree, risk of injury to a child, strangulation in the first degree, threaten-
   ing in the second degree, and disorderly conduct in four cases that were
   joined for trial, the defendant appealed to this court. The two cases
   involving the sexual assault, risk of injury, and strangulation charges
   arose from the defendant’s sexual abuse of J and L, the daughters of
   the defendant’s then girlfriend, D, and his choking of J to the point
   of unconsciousness on one occasion. The threatening and disorderly
   conduct charges in the other two cases arose from the defendant’s
   conduct in connection with two incidents that occurred soon after he
   and D were married. During the wedding after-party, D’s eldest daughter,
   S, accused the defendant of sexually abusing J and called him a ‘‘pedo-
   phile son of a bitch.’’ In response to S’s accusation, the defendant became
   extremely agitated and threatened to decapitate S, D, and other family
   members if any charges were brought against him, grappled with S’s
   father, A, who had intervened to protect S, punched a hole in the wall,
   flipped over a table, shattering a chandelier in the process, and thereafter
   screamed at the remaining guests. Thereafter, S, J, L, and other family
   members departed for A’s house. The following night, after J disclosed
   the defendant’s sexual abuse and her allegations were reported to the
   police, the defendant arrived at A’s house and peered into the living
   room where J and L were sleeping. D’s father, M, and A confronted the
   defendant with their guns drawn and ordered him to leave the premises.
   The defendant proceeded to taunt M and then threw an open can of
   beer and charged at M. M shot the defendant, and the police arrived
   shortly thereafter. The defendant was charged in separate informations
   with threatening in the second degree, in connection with his conduct
   at the after-party, and with disorderly conduct, in connection with his
   conduct at A’s house. The state moved to consolidate the four cases
   for trial. Although the defendant did not object to the consolidation of
   the two sexual assault cases, he filed a motion to sever, arguing that
   the threatening and disorderly conduct cases should be tried separately
   from the sexual assault cases. The trial court nevertheless granted the
   state’s motion to consolidate and denied the defendant’s motion to
   sever, concluding that the evidence in the sexual assault cases and the
   threatening and disorderly conduct cases was cross admissible and that,
   under State v. Boscarino (

), joinder would not be unduly
   prejudicial to the defendant. The trial court also granted the defendant’s
   pretrial motion in limine, barring the state from inquiring about the
   defendant’s prior felony record. During the prosecutor’s direct examina-
   tion of M, however, M testified that, at the wedding after-party, the
   defendant yelled that he was not going back to jail. The court struck
   that testimony and gave a curative instruction, but it denied defense
   counsel’s request, as a remedy for M’s improper disclosure, that the
   defendant be allowed to testify about the nonsexual nature of his prior
   felony convictions without opening the door to being asked on cross-
   examination about the name or nature of those felonies. The defendant
   ultimately opted not to testify. On the defendant’s appeal from the
   judgment of conviction, held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had
    abused its discretion when it joined the defendant’s sexual assault cases
    and his threatening and disorderly conduct cases for trial, as the evidence
    in each case was cross admissible in the other cases:

   a. This court clarified the procedures involved in the trial court’s determi-
   nation of whether joinder is proper:

   The trial court first must consider whether, in the event of separate
   trials, evidence relating to each of the cases would have been admissible
in the other, which requires consideration of whether the evidence in
each of the cases is relevant in the other case or cases and, if the evidence
is relevant, whether admission of the evidence relating to each of the
cases would be more probative than prejudicial in the other case or cases.

If the court determines that the evidence in each case is relevant in the
other case or cases and that its admission would be more probative than
prejudicial, the evidence is cross admissible, and the cases may be joined;
if the court determines that the evidence in one case is relevant to the
other case or cases but that its admission would be more prejudicial
than probative, the evidence is not cross admissible, and the cases may
not be joined.

If the court determines that the evidence in one case is not relevant in
the other case or cases, it must determine whether joinder of the cases
would be unduly prejudicial by applying the factors set forth in Boscar-
ino, including whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguish-
able factual scenarios, whether the crimes were of a violent nature or
concerned brutal or shocking conduct, and the duration and complexity
of the trial if the cases were to be joined.

b. There was no merit to the defendant’s contention that, for evidence
to be cross admissible, all evidence from each case must be fully admissi-
ble in each of the other cases:

The defendant’s claim regarding the proper standard for joinder was
inconsistent with this court’s well established joinder jurisprudence,
which holds that cross admissibility is not defeated by virtue of the fact
that evidence may be admitted only for a limited purpose in one of the
cases to be joined and that the state must prove either that the evidence
in the cases is cross admissible or that joinder will not unfairly prejudice
the defendant pursuant to the Boscarino factors.

Moreover, requiring full, bilateral and actual cross admissibility would
defeat the benefits of judicial economy and providing context for the
trier that are afforded by joinder.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that evidence
of the conduct that gave rise to the charges in the threatening and
disorderly conduct cases was admissible in the sexual assault cases:

The evidence in the threatening and disorderly conduct cases was rele-
vant in the sexual assault cases, as the defendant’s violent reaction to
S’s accusation of sexual abuse at the after-party, which underlay the
threatening and disorderly conduct charges, tended to establish that he
was intent on preventing the victims from disclosing the allegations
of sexual abuse to the authorities, which, in turn, demonstrated his
consciousness of guilt and tended to make it more probable that he
had committed the sexual abuse, and the defendant’s reaction to the
accusations also tended to explain why J and L would have been afraid
of the defendant and, in turn, delayed their disclosure of the defendant’s
sexual abuse.

Moreover, the evidence in the threatening and disorderly conduct cases
was more probative than prejudicial in the sexual assault cases, and,
although the trial court improperly applied the Boscarino undue preju-
dice analysis, which applies only when the trial court has determined
that the evidence in one case would be irrelevant in the other case or
cases, rather than the ordinary more prejudicial than probative eviden-
tiary analysis in determining whether the evidence was cross admissible,
that error was harmless insofar as those analyses are substantially
similar.

The trial court reasonably determined that the defendant would not be
unduly prejudiced by the admission of the evidence in the threatening
and disorderly conduct cases in the sexual assault cases, especially given
the shocking and brutal nature of the sexual assault charges, and this
court rejected the defendant’s contention that he was substantially preju-
diced by joinder insofar as he was represented by different attorneys
with respect to the sexual assault cases and the threatening and disor-
derly conduct cases, the ten count information made it more likely that
the jury would draw negative conclusions about the defendant and his
guilt, and joinder made it more likely that a witness would disclose that
he previously had been incarcerated, in violation of the trial court’s
   ruling prohibiting the admission of such evidence.

   d. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that evidence
   of the conduct that gave rise to the charges in the sexual assault cases
   was cross admissible in the threatening and disorderly conduct cases:

   With respect to the threatening charge, the evidence pertaining to the
   charges in the sexual assault cases was relevant to whether the defendant
   intended to terrorize other persons when he threatened to decapitate S,
   D, and other family members because, without knowing whether S’s
   accusation that the defendant was a ‘‘pedophile son of a bitch’’ had any
   basis in fact, the jury would have been unable to determine whether his
   enraged response was a drunken expression of momentary indignation
   and outrage at being falsely accused or, instead, revealed his conscious-
   ness of guilt and an intent to terrorize the targets of, and those who
   heard, the threats to keep them from reporting the sexual abuse to the
   police, and it was also relevant to whether the targets of the threats and
   others would interpret them as a genuine threat of violence or, instead,
   as drunken bluster.

   With respect to the disorderly conduct charge, the evidence pertaining
   to the charges in the sexual assault cases was relevant to whether the
   defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk that he
   would cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm when he went to A’s
   house to confront A’s family and threw a can of beer and charged at M,
   and whether that conduct was genuinely threatening.

   Moreover, although the sexual assault cases involved conduct that was
   more brutal and shocking than that involved in the threatening and
   disorderly conduct cases, the disparity between the cases was not so
   great that the evidence relating to the sexual assault cases was more
   prejudicial than probative in the threatening and disorderly conduct
   cases, especially given the trial court’s finding that the cases were inter-
   woven and the highly probative nature of the evidence.

   Furthermore, even if the evidence relating to the sexual assault cases
   was inadmissible in the threatening and disorderly conduct cases because
   it was more prejudicial than probative, the joinder of the cases was
   harmless in view of the record, as the defendant failed to establish that
   the joinder substantially affected the verdict.

2. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court
    improperly had denied his request to testify about the nonsexual nature
    of his prior felony convictions without being subject to cross-examina-
    tion about the specific nature of those convictions, the record having
    been inadequate for review of that claim:

   Nothing in the record indicated the reason for the defendant’s ultimate
   decision not to testify, and it was possible that he would have decided
   not to testify, even if the trial court had barred the prosecutor from
   asking the defendant on cross-examination about the specific nature of
   his prior convictions.

   Moreover, nothing in the record indicated whether the defendant
   intended to testify only that his prior convictions were of a nonsexual
   nature or, instead, that he intended to testify concerning the lack of guilt
   on the charges he was facing, and, without knowing what the defendant
   intended to testify about, this court could not determine whether the
   testimony that the prosecutor intended to elicit on cross-examination
   would have been relevant to the defendant’s veracity.
          (Two justices concurring separately and one justice
                       concurring in part separately)
        Argued March 25—officially released December 19, 2022*

                            Procedural History

   Two part substitute information, in four consolidated
cases, charging the defendant, in the first part, with
three counts each of the crimes of sexual assault in the
first degree and risk of injury to a child, and with one
count each of the crimes of sexual assault in the second
degree, strangulation in the first degree, threatening in
the second degree and disorderly conduct, and, in the
second part, with being a persistent dangerous felony
offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Waterbury, where the first part of the infor-
mation was tried to the jury before Klatt, J.; verdicts
of guilty; thereafter, the defendant was presented to
the court, Klatt, J., on a plea of guilty to the second
part of the information; judgments of guilty in accor-
dance with the verdicts and plea, from which the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
   Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s
attorney, and Amy L. Sedensky and Don E. Therkildsen,
Jr., senior assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee
(state).
                          Opinion

   KELLER, J. The primary issue before us in this appeal
is whether the trial court properly joined for trial, pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 41-19,1 sexual assault, risk of
injury to a child, and strangulation charges with threat-
ening and disorderly conduct charges. The defendant,
James A., appeals2 from the judgments of conviction,
rendered after a jury trial, of one count of threatening
in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-62 (a) (2) (A), three counts of sexual assault in
the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
70 (a) (2), one count of sexual assault in the second
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1),
three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of
General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2), one count of strangula-
tion in the first degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-64aa (a) (1) (B), and one count of disorderly con-
duct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1).
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion when it (1) joined for trial his
sexual assault, risk of injury to a child, and strangulation
charges with his threatening and disorderly conduct
charges, and (2) denied his request, as a remedy for
the disclosure of his prior incarceration by one of the
state’s witnesses, that he be allowed to testify about
the nonsexual nature of his prior felony convictions
without opening the door to being asked on cross-exam-
ination about the nature of those convictions. We reject
the defendant’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judg-
ments of the trial court.
   The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. The defendant began a relationship with D some-
time around 2011. D was the mother of S, who was
born in 1996, J, who was born in 2003, L, who was born
in 2006, and V, who was born in 2016. In 2014, the
defendant, D, J, and L moved into a basement apartment
in Naugatuck. The apartment was small, and they
shared it with D’s brother, his girlfriend, and their three
children. The five children shared one bedroom. J testi-
fied that the first time the defendant sexually assaulted
her was in this apartment during the summer before she
entered the sixth grade. While the adults were outside
smoking and the other children were in a different
room, the defendant came into the room where J was
reading to kiss her goodnight. He then took down her
blanket, pulled down her pajama pants and underwear,
and put his tongue in her vagina.
  Later that year, the defendant purchased a five bed-
room home in Naugatuck, into which he moved with
D, S, J, L, and D’s father, M. J testified about three
incidents of sexual abuse that occurred at the Nauga-
tuck home. During the first incident, J was watching a
movie with L and the defendant, when he asked her to
come lie down with him. At this point, J’s buttocks
were against the defendant’s penis. The defendant put
a blanket over J and himself and then put his hand in
J’s pants and inserted his finger into her vagina. J testi-
fied that she felt the defendant’s penis become erect
during the incident. J asked the defendant to stop in a
whispered tone so that L, who was also on the couch,
would not see or hear what was happening.
   During the second incident, the defendant and J were
sitting in the dining room of the house. The defendant
pulled J onto him and started kissing her neck. When
J stood up, the defendant stood up as well, slid his hand
into her underwear, and digitally penetrated her vagina
while holding her arms down and grabbing her chest.
After a couple of minutes passed, J pushed the defen-
dant off and ran to a nearby cul-de-sac to meet a friend.
Several hours later, J returned home, and the defendant
apologized. He also told J not to tell D what had hap-
pened ‘‘because he bought the house for [them] and . . .
fed [them] and . . . made [her] mom happy.’’ J did not
tell D what had happened because she was afraid of
the defendant.
   During the third incident, the defendant entered J’s
room while she was video chatting with a friend on her
computer. The defendant pulled down J’s pants and
licked her anus. J stopped her conversation and flipped
her computer upward to prevent her friend from seeing
what the defendant was doing. After the defendant left
the room, J locked her door and did not mention the
incident to her friend. At some point, J disclosed to S
the sexual abuse by the defendant.
   In addition to the sexual abuse, J also testified that
the defendant had strangled her to the point of uncon-
sciousness on multiple occasions. On one occasion, the
defendant, without warning, started choking her with
L present in the room. When L noticed that J could not
breathe, L jumped on the defendant’s back, but J still
lost consciousness temporarily. When J regained con-
sciousness, the defendant shook her and said: ‘‘[D]on’t
tell your mom. It was an accident. I didn’t know you
were going to pass out.’’
   The defendant also sexually assaulted L. On one occa-
sion, when L was in the fourth or fifth grade, the defen-
dant entered her bedroom where she was playing with
dolls. He attempted to close the door but was unable
to do so because its hinge was broken. The defendant
then pulled L’s pants and underwear down to her knees
and put his tongue on her vagina. At this point, D entered
the room, saw the defendant with his face near L’s
naked buttocks, and began to hit and scream at the
defendant. It appeared to D that the defendant was
‘‘blowing farts’’ in L’s buttocks. L testified that she knew
the defendant’s actions were ‘‘inappropriate,’’ but she
‘‘was scared of him.’’
  On August 4, 2018, the defendant and D were married
and hosted a wedding after-party at the Naugatuck
home. Shortly after midnight, the defendant and D had
an altercation. S, upset by the altercation, approached
the defendant, accused him of touching J inappropri-
ately, and called him a ‘‘pedophile son of a bitch.’’ S
testified that the defendant responded to her comment
with ‘‘[e]xtreme anger and extreme violence.’’ The
defendant charged at S after stating: ‘‘If any charges are
brought against me, I will cut your fucking head off
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defen-
dant also threatened S’s father, A, D’s sister, K, M, and
D. While making these threats, the defendant grappled
with A, who had stepped in to protect S from the defen-
dant, smashed several framed pictures that were on the
wall in the corridor next to his bedroom, and punched
a hole in the wall. The defendant also flipped over a
heavy wooden dining room table, shattering the glasses
that had been on it and the chandelier hanging above
it. While engaged in this conduct, the defendant screamed
at the wedding guests, who were still present in the
house, to ‘‘[g]et the fuck’’ out. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) J, who was in her bedroom with a friend,
heard S and the defendant screaming and the flipping
of the table. The ruckus was so loud that it was heard
by neighbors, who reported it to the police.
   Immediately after the defendant made the threats
against S and the others, S rushed to J’s bedroom and
informed her that she had told the defendant about J’s
disclosures of sexual abuse. In response, J was ‘‘terri-
fied, hysterical [and] crying,’’ and stated, ‘‘[h]e’s going
to kill me. I told on him.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) At some point, both J and L left the house
and were brought to A’s van. As J approached the van,
she saw the defendant, panicked, and ran back to her
bedroom, where she hid in a closet. Her uncles found
her there and brought her to the van a second time. At
that point, the defendant, who had been ‘‘yelling at
people’’ in the driveway, ordered L to get out of the
van. She refused.
  The police eventually arrived in response to the noise
complaint and spoke to several people, including M,
who told them that the defendant ran off into the woods
when they arrived. After a short time, the police left,
and A, K, J, L, and S left in the van and went to A’s house.
   S, J, and L remained at A’s house the day after the
wedding. M, D, and V arrived at some point, and J told
D at that time about the defendant’s sexual abuse of
her. A notified the Naugatuck police about the sexual
abuse allegations, and they came to the house to investi-
gate. The police then made unsuccessful attempts to
locate the defendant. Believing that the defendant
would come to the house to carry out his threats, the
adults there made a plan that M and A would arm
themselves and stay outside, and, if the defendant showed
up, they would give a signal, and S, D, and K would
‘‘grab the children and . . . go into the basement.’’
   At approximately 11 p.m., A observed a car slowly
drive down his secluded, dead-end street and stop in
the middle of the road. A walked down the driveway
to investigate, and the car then began to move toward
the dead end and turned around. As A walked back up
the driveway, he saw the defendant emerge from behind
a bush, walk onto the front porch of the house, and peer
into the living room, where J, L, and V were sleeping
on the couch. A drew a handgun and stated, ‘‘James
is that you?’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This
caused M to walk toward the front of the house. The
defendant acknowledged his identity, and A ordered
him to leave and shouted the secret word to trigger
everyone inside the house to get to the basement and
to call the police. The children were ‘‘hysterical’’ and
‘‘crying,’’ and cowered under a utility sink while cov-
ering their ears. J called the police.
   Meanwhile, A told the defendant that the police were
looking for him, and he responded, ‘‘I know. For what?’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant fur-
ther stated that he was not going to leave. At that point,
both A and M had their guns pointed at the defendant,
and A told the defendant, ‘‘[y]ou got another gun on
you, so just get down,’’ and said that the police were
on their way. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The
defendant then began to act ‘‘crazy.’’ He looked at M
and said, ‘‘How did I do ‘em? Did I do ‘em like this?’’
while ‘‘humping the air.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) He then threw an open beer can that he was
holding at M and charged at him. M shot the defendant
once when the defendant was four to six feet away
from him. M then walked up the driveway, placed the
gun on the top of a car, and waited for the police to
arrive, knowing that they had already been called. The
Naugatuck and Prospect police arrived at the scene
shortly thereafter.3 At that point, everyone at the house
was ‘‘extremely relieved that [they] were safe [and] that
[they] knew where [the defendant] was [and] . . . that
he couldn’t come and try to hurt [them].’’
   The state subsequently charged the defendant with
disorderly conduct in connection with the altercation
with A and M on the day after the wedding. The state
also charged the defendant in a separate information
with threatening in the second degree in connection
with his conduct at the after-party at the Naugatuck
house. With respect to his conduct toward J and L, the
state charged the defendant, in two separate informa-
tions, with three counts of sexual assault in the first degree,
one count of sexual assault in the second degree, three
counts of risk of injury to a child, and one count of
strangulation in the first degree.
  Prior to trial, the state moved to consolidate the four
cases for trial, and the defendant responded by filing
a motion to sever. The defendant did not object to the
consolidation of the sexual assault cases4 involving J
and L but argued that the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases should be severed and tried separately
from the sexual assault cases. The trial court granted
the state’s motion to consolidate and denied the defen-
dant’s motion to sever, determining that the state had
met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the evidence in the sexual assault
cases and the threatening and disorderly conduct cases
was cross admissible. The trial court also determined
that, under State v. Boscarino, 

, 722–24,

 (1987), joinder would not be unduly preju-
dicial to the defendant.5
   The cases were tried to a jury. During its jury charge,
the trial court instructed the jury to consider each of the
ten charged counts separately during its deliberations.6
The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. There-
after, the defendant pleaded guilty to a part B informa-
tion charging him with being a persistent dangerous
felony offender, and the trial court imposed a total
effective sentence of fifty years of incarceration, execu-
tion suspended after thirty-five years, followed by
twenty years of probation.7 This direct appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
   On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion when it (1) joined the sexual
assault cases with the threatening and disorderly con-
duct cases for trial, and (2) denied the defendant’s
request for permission to testify that his prior felony
convictions were nonsexual in nature, without being
subject to cross-examination by the state as to the
nature of those prior convictions, as a remedy for the
inadvertent disclosure of the defendant’s prior incarcer-
ation by a state’s witness. We address each claim in turn.
                             I
   We begin with the defendant’s claim that the trial
court abused its discretion when it joined the sexual
assault cases and the threatening and disorderly con-
duct cases for trial. The defendant contends that, for
evidence to be cross admissible for purposes of our
joinder jurisprudence, all evidence from each case must
be fully admissible in every other case. The defendant
also contends that, under State v. 

 204
Conn. 722–24; see footnote 5 of this opinion; he was
substantially prejudiced by the joinder as a result of
(1) the shocking and brutal nature of the sexual assault
charges, (2) issues concerning trial strategy and jury
selection occasioned by his having a public defender
representing him with respect to the sexual assault
cases and private counsel representing him with respect
to the threatening and disorderly conduct cases, (3) the
adverse effect that having to consider and deliberate
on a ten count information may have had on the jury,
and (4) the increased chance that the multiplicity of
witnesses in the consolidated cases would result in
the inadvertent disclosure of his felony record, which
indeed happened during M’s testimony.
   In response, the state contends that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
evidence underlying the sexual assault cases and the
threatening and disorderly conduct cases was cross
admissible because the defendant’s threats and conduct
in response to the accusation of sexual abuse were
relevant and probative to establish his consciousness
of guilt with respect to the sexual assault charges, and
the evidence of the sexual assaults established a motive
for his threats and disorderly conduct. The state also
contends, in the alternative, that none of the Boscarino
factors is present here because each case involved dis-
crete, easily distinguishable factual scenarios, and none
of the cases was so shocking and brutal that any preju-
dice could not be cured by the court’s instructions to
the jury. Finally, the state contends that, even if the
trial court abused its discretion in joining the cases,
any error was harmless because it did not substantially
sway the jury’s verdict. We conclude that the trial court
properly joined the cases.
   We begin with a review of the governing legal princi-
ples. ‘‘[The] General Statutes and rules of practice
expressly authorize a trial court to order a defendant
to be tried jointly on charges arising from separate
cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Rivera, 

, 

 (2002); see
General Statutes § 54-57; Practice Book § 41-19. ‘‘[I]n
State v. LaFleur, 

, 159, 

 (2012),
and State v. Payne, 

, 544–50, 

 (2012) . . . we rejected the notion of a blanket
presumption in favor of joinder and clarified that, when
charges are brought in separate informations, and the
state seeks to join those informations for trial, the state
bears the burden of proving that the defendant will
not be substantially prejudiced by joinder pursuant to
Practice Book § 41-19. [See footnote 1 of this opinion.]
The state may satisfy this burden by proving, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, either that the evidence
in the cases is cross admissible or that the defendant
will not be unfairly prejudiced pursuant to the factors
set forth in State v. 

 204 Conn. 722–24]
. . . . Although the state bears the burden of proof in
the trial court, [i]t is the defendant’s burden on appeal to
show that joinder was improper by proving substantial
prejudice that could not be cured by the trial court’s
instructions to the jury . . . . As we emphasized in
LaFleur, our appellate standard of review remains
intact. Accordingly, [i]n deciding whether to [join infor-
mations] for trial, the trial court enjoys broad discretion,
which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate
court may not disturb.’’8 (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Devon D., 

, 664–65, 

 (2016).
   ‘‘A long line of cases establishes that the paramount
concern is whether the defendant’s right to a fair trial
will be impaired. Therefore, in considering whether
joinder is proper, this court has recognized that, [when]
evidence of one incident would be admissible at the
trial of the other incident, separate trials would provide
the defendant no significant benefit. . . . Under such
circumstances, the defendant would not ordinarily be
substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for
a single trial. . . . Accordingly, we have found joinder
to be proper [when] the evidence of other crimes or
uncharged misconduct [was] cross admissible at sepa-
rate trials. . . . [When] evidence is cross admissible,
therefore, our inquiry ends.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaFleur, supra, 

; see Leconte v. Commissioner of Correction,

, 

 (‘‘[I]t is well
established that [when] the evidence in one case is
cross admissible at the trial of another case, the defen-
dant will not be substantially prejudiced by joinder.
. . . Our case law is clear that a court considering join-
der need not apply the Boscarino factors if evidence
in the cases is cross admissible.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 

, 

 (2021). To be cross admissible, the evidence must
be both relevant and more probative than prejudicial.
See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3 (‘‘[r]elevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence’’); see also State v. Campbell, 

, 

 (2018) (‘‘[f]or prior miscon-
duct evidence to be admissible, it must not only be
relevant and material, but also more probative than prej-
udicial’’).
   Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim,
we address his claim that, under the foregoing princi-
ples, full cross admissibility for joinder purposes means
that every intimate detail necessary to prosecute each
charge must be admissible in each case. He asks us
to ‘‘reject any suggestion that partial or unidirectional
admissibility is sufficient to join cases’’ because, in such
a circumstance, separate trials would provide a signifi-
cant benefit to the defendant. See State v. LaFleur,
supra, 

 (‘‘[when] evidence of one incident
would be admissible at the trial of the other incident,
separate trials could provide the defendant no signifi-
cant benefit’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
defendant contends that the cases should not be joined
if (1) evidence in one case is admissible in the other
case only for a limited purpose, or (2) the evidence
presented at one of the trials would not be fully admissi-
ble at another. We disagree. With respect to the defen-
dant’s first contention, our case law establishes that
the fact that evidence that may be admitted only for a
limited purpose in one of the cases to be joined does
not defeat a finding of cross admissibility for purposes
of joinder. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 

,
86–88, 

 (2014) (establishing cross admissi-
bility by concluding that evidence of assault and first
degree kidnapping charges in first case would be admis-
sible as to murder charge in second case to establish
intent and that evidence of murder and second degree
kidnapping charges in second case would be admissible
as to first degree kidnapping charge in first case to
establish motive and intent).
   With respect to the defendant’s contention that the
evidence in both cases must be fully cross admissible
before the cases may be joined, that contention is incon-
sistent with our well established jurisprudence holding
that the state must prove ‘‘either that the evidence in
the cases is cross admissible or that the defendant will
not be unfairly prejudiced [by joinder] pursuant to the
[Boscarino] factors . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Devon 

 321
Conn. 664–65. The defendant’s proposed standard also
conflicts with the principle that, ‘‘in making the discre-
tionary, pretrial decision to join multiple cases, [the
trial court] rules on whether the evidence could be
admissible, not whether the evidence actually is admit-
ted.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Crenshaw, supra,

. ‘‘Because the decision to join two cases
occurs prior to the introduction of evidence, the trial
court must make its decision on the basis of potential
admissibility rather than what actually transpires at
trial. It would not make sense for a reviewing court to
overturn the trial court’s discretionary, pretrial decision
to consolidate solely on the ground that the parties did
not ultimately introduce the evidence at trial.’’ Id. Thus,
under Crenshaw, cases may be joined for trial, even if
it is possible that no cross admissible evidence will
actually be admitted. Indeed, requiring the state to
establish full, bilateral and actual cross admissibility
would defeat the benefits of judicial economy and con-
text for the trier that are afforded by joinder.
    Having rejected the defendant’s claim related to the
proper standard for joinder, we turn to the questions of
whether the evidence in the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases was admissible in the sexual assault
cases, and vice versa. We begin with the question of
whether the evidence in the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases was admissible in the sexual assault
cases. Although evidence of other crimes is generally
‘‘inadmissible to prove the bad character, propensity,
or criminal tendencies’’ of the defendant; Conn. Code
Evid. § 4-5 (a); it is admissible for nonpropensity pur-
poses, ‘‘such as to show intent, an element [of] the
crime, identity, malice, motive or a system of criminal
activity,’’ if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Anderson, 

, 693, 

 (2015); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5 (c); State
v. James G., 

, 

 (2004)
(‘‘[s]uch evidence is admissible if: (1) it is relevant and
material to at least one of the circumstances encom-
passed by the exceptions; and (2) its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect’’). We conclude that the
trial court reasonably could have concluded that the
defendant’s violent reaction to the accusation of sexual
abuse, which underlay the threatening and disorderly
conduct charges, tended to establish that he was intent
on preventing the victims from disclosing the allega-
tions of sexual abuse to the authorities. In turn, this
intent showed consciousness of guilt and tended to
make it more probable that he committed the sexual
abuse. See State v. Walker, 

, 

 (1990) (‘‘evidence of threats against witnesses is
generally admissible either on the theory that such con-
duct is inconsistent with the defendant’s claim of inno-
cence or on the theory that the making of such threats
evinces a consciousness of guilt’’); see also State v.
Edwards, 

, 

 (2017) (‘‘[i]t
is well established that ‘[i]n a criminal trial, it is relevant
to show the conduct of an accused, as well as any
statement made by him subsequent to the alleged crim-
inal act, which may fairly be inferred to have been
influenced by the criminal act’ ’’ (emphasis added)).
We also agree with the state’s argument that the defen-
dant’s violent reaction to the accusation would be rele-
vant to explain why J and L would have been afraid of
the defendant and, in turn, their delayed disclosure of
the defendant’s sexual abuse to D and the authorities.
See, e.g., State v. Daniel M., 

,

 (evidence of domestic violence witnessed
by sexual assault victim was probative of her credibility
because it provided explanation for delayed disclo-
sure), cert. denied, 

, 

 (2022).
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence in the threat-
ening and disorderly conduct cases also was relevant
in the sexual assault cases.9
   We also conclude that the evidence in the threatening
and disorderly conduct cases was more probative than
prejudicial in the sexual assault cases. See, e.g., State
v. Hill, 

, 698, 

 (2013) (‘‘evidence
is admissible to prove consciousness of guilt if, first, it
is relevant, and second, its probative value outweighs
its prejudicial effect’’); see also State v. James 

 (‘‘a reviewing court must be able to infer
from the entire record that the trial court considered the
prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative
nature before making a ruling’’ (emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘[T]he test for
determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is
not whether it is damaging to the [party against whom
the evidence is offered] but whether it will improperly
arouse the emotions of the jur[ors].’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Best, 

, 322–23,


 (2020).
   Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim
that he was prejudiced by the joinder of the cases,
because there appears to be some confusion on this
issue, we take this opportunity to clarify the procedures
for a trial court’s determination of whether joinder is
proper. To make this determination, the trial court must
first consider whether, ‘‘in the event of separate trials,
evidence relating to each of the cases would have been
admissible in the other.’’ State v. Greene, 

, 

 (1988). Thus, the court must consider
(1) whether the evidence in each of the cases is relevant
in the other case, and (2) if the evidence is relevant,
whether admission of the evidence relating to each of
the cases would be more probative than prejudicial in
the other case. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3 (relevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect). If the court deter-
mines that the evidence in each case is relevant in the
other case and its admission would be more probative
than prejudicial, the evidence is cross admissible, and
the cases may be joined. See State v. LaFleur, supra,

 (‘‘[when] evidence is cross admissible
. . . our inquiry ends’’); Leconte v. Commissioner of

 (‘‘[o]ur case law
is clear that a court considering joinder need not apply
the Boscarino factors if evidence in the cases is cross
admissible’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). If the
evidence in one case is relevant to the other case, but
its admission would be more prejudicial than probative,
then the evidence is not cross admissible and the cases
may not be joined. There is no need for the trial court to
determine whether joinder would be prejudicial under
Boscarino because the court has already determined
that admission of the evidence would be prejudicial
under ordinary evidentiary principles. If the court deter-
mines that the evidence in one case is not relevant
in the other case, then the trial court must determine
whether joinder of the cases would be prejudicial by
applying the Boscarino factors. Thus, it is only when
the trial court has determined that the evidence in one
case would be irrelevant in the other case that Boscar-
ino comes into play.
   In the present case, the trial court determined that,
although the evidence in the threatening and disorderly
cases showed that the defendant had engaged in violent
conduct, the conduct was not so brutal and shocking
that it would unduly prejudice the defendant.10 Specifi-
cally, the court determined that the evidence in the
threatening and disorderly conduct cases was relevant
in the sexual assault cases and then determined that
admission of the evidence in the sexual assault cases
would not be unduly prejudicial under Boscarino. As we
explained, the court should have applied the ordinary
‘‘more prejudicial than probative’’ evidentiary analysis
to determine whether the evidence was cross admissi-
ble, not the Boscarino undue prejudice analysis. Because
those analyses are substantially similar, however, we
conclude that this error was harmless. Compare Conn.
Code Evid. § 4-3 (‘‘[r]elevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence’’) with State v. 

 204
Conn. 722–24 (to determine whether joinder of cases
in which evidence is not cross admissible would cause
undue prejudice, trial court must consider (1) whether
charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual
scenarios, (2) whether crimes were of violent nature
or concerned brutal or shocking conduct on defendant’s
part, and (3) duration and complexity of trial). We fur-
ther conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that the
defendant would not be prejudiced by the admission of
the evidence in the threatening and disorderly conduct
cases in the sexual assault cases was reasonable. This
is especially so given the shocking and brutal nature
of the sexual assault charges. Cf. State v. Dillard, 

, 

 (2011) (‘‘[t]his court
consistently has declined to conclude that the admis-
sion of evidence was unduly prejudicial when the prior
acts of misconduct were substantially less shocking
than the crimes charged’’), cert. denied, 

,

 (2012).
   The defendant also contends that he was prejudiced
by the joinder because he was represented by different
attorneys with respect to the sexual assault cases and
the threatening and disorderly conduct cases, and join-
ing the cases deprived them of their ‘‘ability to each
make tactical decisions about jury selection, cross-
examination, and argument that would benefit [the
defendant] in the [cases] each was retained for.’’ The
trial court rejected this contention, concluding that
each attorney would be required to take into account
the existence of the cases in which he was not repre-
senting the defendant when making tactical decisions,
regardless of whether the cases were joined. We agree
with the trial court and, therefore, reject the defen-
dant’s contention.
   The defendant further contends that, even if the sub-
stance of the evidence in the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases was not unduly prejudicial, the ten count
information by itself made it more likely that the jury
would draw negative conclusions about the defendant
and his guilt. We disagree. Without the misdemeanor
threatening and disorderly conduct charges, the charges
in the sexual assault cases accounted for eight of the
ten counts of the information. Further, the trial court
instructed the jury that the evidence must be considered
separately as to each element in each count and that
each count was a separate entity requiring separate con-
sideration.
   Finally, the defendant contends that he was preju-
diced by the joinder of the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases with the sexual assault cases because
joinder made it more likely that a witness would dis-
close that he previously had been incarcerated in viola-
tion of the trial court’s ruling prohibiting the admission
of such evidence, which actually occurred during M’s
testimony.11 Again, we disagree. In the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, we cannot conclude that the
trial court must foresee that a witness will, either inten-
tionally or inadvertently, violate the court’s rulings on
the admissibility of evidence when determining whether
joinder is appropriate. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that evidence of the conduct that gave rise to the
charges in the threatening and disorderly conduct cases
would be admissible in the sexual assault cases.
   The question remains whether the trial court cor-
rectly determined that evidence of the conduct that
gave rise to the charges in the sexual assault cases
was cross admissible in the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases. The state contends that evidence that
the defendant sexually assaulted J and L established
the requisite intent in the threatening case, namely, that
the defendant threatened to commit a ‘‘crime of vio-
lence with the intent to terrorize another person . . . .’’
General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (2) (A). Specifically, the
state contends that the evidence would tend to establish
the defendant’s motivation for making threats and to
rebut any claim that the defendant was engaged in
‘‘mere puffery.’’ The state further contends that evi-
dence in the sexual assault cases was relevant to estab-
lish the elements of disorderly conduct pursuant to
§ 53a-182 (a) (1) because it explained why M and A
were patrolling outside A’s house and why the defen-
dant went there, which, in turn, tended to show that
the defendant’s violent and tumultuous conduct was
intended to cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.
We agree with the state.
   Understanding the elements of the crimes of threaten-
ing in the second degree and disorderly conduct is
essential to determining whether the evidence in the
sexual assault cases was admissible to prove the charges
in the threatening and disorderly conduct cases. To
prove that a defendant is guilty of threatening in the
second degree, the state is required to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant ‘‘threaten[ed] to
commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize
another person . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-62 (a)
(2) (A). To meet this standard, ‘‘the state [is] required
to present evidence demonstrating that a reasonable
listener, familiar with the entire factual context of the
defendant’s statements, would be highly likely to inter-
pret them as communicating a genuine threat of vio-
lence . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Pelella, 

, 

 (2017). This
‘‘factual context’’ includes the specific language used
by the defendant, the parties’ prior relationship, and the
immediate circumstances surrounding the defendant’s
statement. See 

 20–21. Whether the speaker had a
history of making threats toward the person threatened
or had a history of abusing the victim also is relevant
to the determination as to how the victim would inter-
pret the speech. See State v. Krijger, 

,
457, 

 (2014) (citing cases).
   For purposes of § 53a-62 (a) (2) (A), a threat ‘‘need
not be unconditional . . . . [Rather] a threat may still
be a true threat even if it is presented in conditional
terms such that the listener can escape from physical
violence by fulfilling certain demands or directives.’’
(Citation omitted.) State v. Pelella, 

 n.15.
In addition, the threat of violence need not be directed
at the same person that the defendant intends to terror-
ize. For example, the statement, ‘‘if you report me to
the police, I’ll kill your family,’’ may be encompassed by
the statute. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 16.
   With respect to the crime of disorderly conduct,
§ 53a-182 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creat-
ing a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting
or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior
. . . .’’ Thus, ‘‘the crime of disorderly conduct consists
of two elements: (1) that the defendant intended to
cause, or recklessly created a risk of causing, inconve-
nience, annoyance or alarm and (2) that he did so by
engaging in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threat-
ening behavior . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Parnoff, 

, 276, 

 (2015), aff’d, 

, 

 (2018).
In the present case, the defendant was charged with
recklessly creating a risk of causing inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm by engaging in a prohibited form
of conduct.
   With this background in mind, we turn to the question
of whether the evidence pertaining to the charges in
the sexual assault cases was admissible to prove the
threatening and disorderly conduct charges. We con-
clude that it was. With respect to the threatening charge,
the evidence was relevant to the question of whether
the defendant intended to terrorize other persons when
he threatened to decapitate S, M, A, D, and K. Without
knowing whether S’s accusation that the defendant was
a ‘‘pedophile son of a bitch’’ had any basis in fact, the
jury would be unable to determine whether his enraged
response was a drunken expression of momentary
indignation and outrage at being falsely accused or,
instead, revealed consciousness of guilt and an intent
to terrorize the targets of the threats—and others who
heard or later learned of them, including J and L—to
keep them from reporting the sexual abuse to the police.
The evidence was also relevant to the question of
whether the persons at whom the threats were directed
and others would interpret them as a genuine threat of
violence or, instead, as drunken bluster. See, e.g., State
v. 

 (jury should consider ‘‘the
entire factual context of the defendant’s [threatening]
statements’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted)); 

 (to find defendant guilty of threatening,
jury must find ‘‘that a reasonable listener . . . would
be highly likely to interpret [the defendant’s speech] as
communicating a genuine threat of violence’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Krijger,
supra, 

 (whether speaker had history of
abusing victim is relevant to determination as to how
victim would interpret threatening speech). Similarly,
with respect to the disorderly conduct charge, the evi-
dence was relevant to whether the defendant was aware
of and consciously disregarded the risk that he would
cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm when he
went to A’s house on the day after the wedding to
confront his family and threw a can of beer at and
charged M, and whether that conduct was genuinely
threatening. See, e.g., State v. 

 (to establish disorderly conduct, state must
prove ‘‘(1) that the defendant intended to cause, or
recklessly created a risk of causing, inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm and (2) that he did so by engaging
in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening
behavior’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine how the threatening and disor-
derly conduct charges could be tried without introduc-
ing any evidence related to the sexual assault cases.
   We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that the probative value of the
evidence related to the sexual assault cases outweighed
any prejudicial effect in the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases.12 The evidence underlying the threaten-
ing and disorderly conduct charges established that the
defendant, on his wedding night, threatened to decapi-
tate S, K, A, M, and his new wife, D; smashed framed
pictures; punched a hole in the wall; overturned a heavy
wooden table, shattering glasses and a chandelier in
the process; and screamed at his guests to ‘‘[g]et the
fuck’’ out of his house. The next day, knowing that the
police were looking for him in connection with the
accusations of sexual abuse, the defendant approached
A’s house at night; crept onto the front porch and peered
into the living room where J, L, and V were sleeping;
taunted M by miming sexual acts with J and L; and
threw an open can of beer at M and charged at him.
By the defendant’s own admission, this conduct was
brutal and shocking.13 Although any sexual assault on
a child is also brutal and shocking, the assaults in the
present case were not unusually so. Accordingly, we
conclude that, although the sexual assault cases involved
conduct that was more brutal and shocking than that
involved in the threatening and disorderly conduct
cases, the disparity between the cases was not so great
that the evidence related to the sexual assault cases
was more prejudicial than probative in the threatening
and disorderly conduct cases, especially given the trial
court’s finding that the cases were interwoven and the
highly probative nature of the evidence. We conclude,
therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it joined the cases. See, e.g., State v. Sanseverino,

, 

 (2008) (when cases
were equally likely to arouse emotions of jurors, trial
court did not abuse discretion when it denied defen-
dant’s motion to sever cases) (overruled in part on other
grounds by State v. DeJesus, 

, 

 (2008)), superseded in part, 

, 

 (2009); State v. Stevenson, 

,

 (1996) (‘‘when all of the cases sought to
be consolidated are brutal or shocking, they may be
joined properly, if consolidation does not cause a high
risk of one case being tainted by the unusually shocking
(e.g., sexual derangement) or brutal nature of the other,
or others’’), cert. denied, 

, 

(1997); State v. Hermann, 

, 62–, 

 (trial court properly denied defendant’s motion
to try charges of sexual assault and risk of injury to
child separately from charge of interfering with officer
because ‘‘counts involving sexual assault and risk of
injury to children are not necessarily so brutal and
shocking as to mandate severance . . . if the jury is
properly instructed to consider the counts separately’’),
cert. denied, 

, 

 (1995);14 cf.
State v. LaFleur, supra, 

 (‘‘[when] evi-
dence is cross admissible . . . our inquiry [into
whether joinder was proper] ends’’). We conclude,
therefore, that the trial court properly joined the cases
because the evidence in each case was cross admissible
in the other cases.15
   In any event, even if the defendant were correct that
the evidence related to the sexual assault cases was
not admissible to prove the threatening and disorderly
conduct charges because it was unduly prejudicial, we
would conclude that the joinder of the cases was harm-
less on this record. The evidence that the defendant
violently threatened to decapitate multiple persons was
overwhelming, as was the evidence that multiple per-
sons were terrorized by the defendant’s threatening and
violent speech and conduct on the night of the wedding
and the following day.16 Although many of the witnesses
to the events on the night of the wedding had consumed
alcoholic beverages at the wedding reception and the
after-party, the defendant has pointed to no evidence
that would support a finding that they were so inebri-
ated that their capacity to perceive or remember the
events was significantly impaired. In fact, M expressly
testified that, although he had had a ‘‘couple of beers’’
earlier in the day, he was sober during the after-party
when he heard the defendant’s death threats and
observed his violent conduct. Moreover, all of the wit-
nesses gave substantially consistent testimony about
the events of that evening, and the jury reasonably could
have concluded that any slight inconsistencies could
be explained by the violent and chaotic nature of the
events. Finally, and perhaps most significant, during his
closing argument, defense counsel did not even attempt
to contest the state’s evidence with respect to the threat-
ening and disorderly conduct charges. Rather, he made
reference to the events on the night of the wedding
only to point out that, when the police responded to
the neighbor’s noise complaint, no one told them about
S’s accusation that the defendant had sexually abused
J. We conclude, therefore, that, even if the evidence
related to the sexual assault cases was inadmissible in
the threatening and disorderly conduct cases because
it was more prejudicial than probative, the defendant
has not established that the joinder of the cases substan-
tially affected the verdict. See State v. 

 (‘‘When an error is not of constitutional
magnitude, the defendant bears the burden of demon-
strating that the error was harmful. . . . The proper
standard for review of a defendant’s claim of harm is
whether the jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by
the error.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
                            II
   We next turn to the question of whether the trial
court properly denied the defendant’s request to testify
about the nonsexual nature of his prior felony record
without permitting the prosecutor to elicit on cross-
examination testimony that he had been convicted of
seven counts of robbery. We conclude that the record
is not adequate for review of this claim.
   The following procedural history is relevant to this
issue. Before trial, the trial court granted the defen-
dant’s motion in limine barring the state from asking
its witnesses about the defendant’s prior incarceration.
During trial, the court ruled that, if the defendant testi-
fied, the state could not ask him about his prior convic-
tions for robbery. The court also barred defense counsel
from asking a state’s witness about his convictions as
the defendant’s codefendant in the robbery case. The
trial court concluded that the convictions were not rele-
vant to either the defendant’s or the witness’ credibility.
  Thereafter, the state called M as a witness. The prose-
cutor asked M whether he had heard the defendant say
anything during the ruckus on the night of the wed-
ding.17 M stated that the defendant was yelling that he
was not going back to jail. The prosecutor immediately
interrupted the testimony and asked that the jury be
sent out of the courtroom. He then asked the trial court
to strike the testimony and to give a curative instruction,
which the trial court did.18
   The following day, the defendant sought permission
to testify about the nonsexual nature of his prior felony
record. He also asked the trial court to bar the prosecu-
tor from eliciting any testimony on cross-examination
that he had been convicted of robbery. Defense counsel,
Tashun Bowden-Lewis, argued that the curative instruc-
tion was an insufficient remedy for M’s disclosure
because ‘‘you can’t unring the bell . . . .’’ In response,
the prosecutor pointed out that the defendant did not
have only one felony conviction, but seven, and argued
that the nature of the prior convictions was relevant to
the defendant’s veracity. The prosecutor also pointed
out that the defendant was planning to call a character
witness and argued that the prosecutor was allowed to
cross-examine that witness about his knowledge of the
defendant’s truthfulness and that the robbery convic-
tions were directly relevant to that issue. The trial court
ruled that, if the defendant testified about his prior
convictions, the state would be allowed ‘‘to inquire as
to the fact that he’s a convicted felon, the name of the
felony or felonies, and that’s it. We’re not getting into
the details, because then we’re getting into collateral
issues.’’
   Bowden-Lewis then asked permission to have a brief
discussion with the defendant, which the trial court
granted. After a brief recess, the defendant took the
witness stand. Bowden-Lewis then had a brief discus-
sion with cocounsel, John Bowdren, and stated, ‘‘I just
have to address one thing with [the defendant] because
he just said to me—I apologize, can I have just two
minutes?’’ The defendant then apparently left the court-
room with Bowdren.19 When they returned to the court-
room, Bowden-Lewis indicated that the defendant had
decided that he did not want to testify. The prosecutor
then argued that, because the defendant was not going
to testify, the defendant could not present testimony
about his truthfulness through a character witness. The
trial court agreed and reinstated its initial ruling that
evidence about the defendant’s prior convictions would
not be admitted. The prosecutor then stated, ‘‘[m]ay we
have one second Judge. I think we’re going to talk a
plea.’’ After a brief, off-the-record discussion between
counsel, Bowden-Lewis indicated that they were ready
for the jury to be brought back into the courtroom, and
the defendant continued his presentation of evidence.
   We conclude that the record is inadequate to review
the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly
denied his request to testify about the nonsexual nature
of his prior felony convictions without being subject
to cross-examination on the specific nature of those
convictions. First, nothing in the record indicates the
reason for the defendant’s decision not to testify, and
it is certainly well within the realm of possibility that
he would have made that decision, even if the trial court
had barred the prosecutor from asking him about the
specific nature of his prior convictions on cross-exami-
nation. Second, nothing in the record before the trial
court indicates whether the defendant intended to tes-
tify only that his prior convictions were nonsexual or,
instead, that he intended to testify concerning his lack
of guilt on the charges he was facing.20 If he intended
to testify only that his prior convictions were for a
nonsexual offense, testimony on cross-examination that
the offense had been a robbery would have not have
tended to establish the defendant’s lack of veracity
because the testimony would only have corroborated
his testimony on direct examination.21 If, on the other
hand, he intended to testify concerning his lack of guilt,
the fact that his prior convictions were for robbery
would have been relevant to establish his lack of truth-
fulness on that issue. See State v. Rivera, 

, 

 (2020) (‘‘[w]e have consistently
recognized that crimes involving larcenous intent imply
a general disposition toward dishonesty or a tendency
to make false statements’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).22 Without knowing what the defendant
intended to testify about, we cannot know whether the
testimony that the state intended to elicit on cross-
examination would have been relevant.23 We conclude,
therefore, that the defendant’s claim is unreviewable
for lack of an adequate record.
   The judgment is affirmed.
  In this opinion D’AURIA, MULLINS and KAHN, Js.,
concurred, and ECKER, J., concurred as to part I.
   * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victims or others through
whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes
§ 54-86e.
   Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 

 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, 

, 

, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
   * December 19, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
   1
     Practice Book § 41-19 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may, upon its
own motion or the motion of any party, order that two or more informations,
whether against the same defendant or different defendants, be tried
together.’’
   2
     The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 51-199 (b) (3).
   3
     After an investigation, the Naugatuck police determined that M’s shooting
of the defendant was justified because the defendant had been the ‘‘primary
aggressor’’ during the altercation. Accordingly, the state did not prosecute
M for the shooting.
   4
     In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the cases related to the sexual
assault, risk of injury to a child, and strangulation charges as the sexual
assault cases.
   5
     In State v. 

 204 Conn. 722–24, this court ‘‘identified
several factors that a trial court should consider in deciding whether a
severance [or denial of joinder] may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice
resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for trial. These factors
include: (1) whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable
factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or con-
cerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the
duration and complexity of the trial. . . . If any or all of these factors
are present, a reviewing court must decide whether the trial court’s jury
instructions cured any prejudice that might have occurred.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. LaFleur, 

, 156, 

 (2012).
   6
     The trial court instructed the jury: ‘‘Now, the defendant is charged with
ten separate counts in a long form information. The defendant is entitled
to and must be given, by you, a separate and independent determination of
whether he is guilty or not guilty as to each of the counts—each of the
counts charged as a separate crime.
   ‘‘The state is required to prove each element in each count beyond a
reasonable doubt. Each count must be deliberated upon separately. The
total number of counts charged does not add strength to the state’s case.
You may find that some evidence applies to more than one count in the infor-
mation.
   ‘‘The evidence, however, must be considered separately as to each element
in each count. Each count is a separate entity. This includes a separate
consideration as to the charges related to each victim and the evidence
pertaining to each victim. You must consider each count separately and
return a separate verdict for each count. A decision on one count does not
bind your decision on another count. This means you may reach opposite
verdicts on different counts.’’
   7
     The trial court imposed the following concurrent sentences of imprison-
ment with respect to each count: On count one, threatening in the second
degree, the court imposed a sentence of one year; on count two, sexual
assault in the first degree, the court imposed a sentence of fifty years,
execution suspended after thirty-five years; on count three, risk of injury
to a child, the court imposed a sentence of twenty years; on count four,
sexual assault in the first degree, the court imposed a sentence of fifty years,
execution suspended after thirty-five years; on count five, sexual assault in
the second degree, the court imposed a sentence of twenty years; on count
six, risk of injury to a child, the court imposed a sentence of twenty years; on
count seven, strangulation in the first degree, the court imposed a sentence
of ten years; on count eight, sexual assault in the first degree, the court
imposed a sentence of fifty years, execution suspended after thirty-five
years; on count nine, risk of injury to a child, the court imposed a sentence
of twenty years; and, on count ten, disorderly conduct, the court imposed
a sentence of ninety days. In addition to imprisonment, the trial court also
imposed a twenty year probationary period and ordered the defendant to
register as a sex offender, to comply with protective orders that it issued
for the benefit of the victims, and to pay sexual assault victims account
fines totaling $1057.
   8
     The discretion accorded to the trial court is, of course, bounded by the
need to safeguard the defendant’s right to a fair trial. See State v. LaFleur,
supra, 

. Trial courts must remain highly sensitive to the risk
of prejudice flowing from improper joinder.
   9
     See State v. Bermudez, 

, 

 (2021) (‘‘Relevant
evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the
determination of an issue. . . . Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the
existence or nonexistence of any other fact more probable or less probable
than it would be without such evidence. . . . To be relevant, the evidence
need not exclude all other possibilities [or be conclusive] . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
   10
      The trial court stated that it would not be prejudicial to try the disorderly
conduct and threatening cases with the sexual assault cases because ‘‘they’re
obviously separate charges, they have separate elements, [and] they’re easily
distinguishable factual scenarios for a jury. While [the threatening and disor-
derly conduct cases] involve violence, it’s not to the extent [that] it’s brutal
or shocking violence on the defendant’s part. In fact, [the defendant] seems
to have been the victim of the most serious violence [i.e., the gunshot wound
inflicted by M], setting aside the sex assault charges. It certainly wouldn’t
add to the length of the trial as I indicated; it appears from argument from
both parties this is all interwoven with each other.
   11
      We discuss these facts and procedural history more fully in part II of
this opinion.
   12
      Although the trial court made no express finding to this effect, such a
finding is implicit in the trial court’s determination that joinder was appro-
priate, despite the fact that the sexual assault cases involved ‘‘the most
serious violence,’’ because the cases were ‘‘all interwoven with each other.’’
See footnote 10 of this opinion (noting that trial court found that defendant
was victim of ‘‘the most serious violence . . . setting aside the sex assault
charges’’ (emphasis added)). Indeed, we must presume that the trial court
applied the proper standard for joinder. See, e.g., DeNunzio v. DeNunzio,

, 197, 

 (2016) (‘‘[w]hen examining an ambiguous
decision . . . we presume that the trial court applied the correct standard’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
    13
       We recognize that the trial court concluded that, although the threaten-
ing and disorderly conduct charges ‘‘involve violence, it’s not to the extent
[that] it’s brutal or shocking violence on the defendant’s part.’’ The court
had not yet heard the evidence supporting the charges, however, when it
made this statement. Moreover, read in context, the court was merely observ-
ing that the conduct underlying the charges was not so brutal and shocking
that it would improperly arouse the jurors’ emotions in the sexual assault
cases, an assessment with which we agree.
    14
       As we indicated, the jury in the present case was instructed that it must
consider all of the counts separately. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
    15
       In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the defendant’s contention
that joining the sexual assault cases with the threatening and disorderly
conduct cases meant that the jury was confronted with a ten count informa-
tion instead of a two count information, and that this made it more likely
that the jury would think of him as a ‘‘bad person and more likely to be
guilty.’’ We cannot conclude that the number of counts in the sexual assault
cases, standing alone, required the trial court to deny the state’s motion to
consolidate under the circumstances of this case.
    16
       To the extent that the defendant contends that, without the evidence
related to the sexual assault cases, there would have been only weak evi-
dence of his intent to terrorize, any such claim would support our conclusion
that the evidence was highly relevant to the threatening and disorderly
conduct charges.
    17
       The prosecutor was attempting to elicit testimony about the defendant’s
threats to kill people.
    18
       Specifically, the trial court stated that it was ‘‘going to strike the witness’
last statement. I will order you [the jury] . . . to not consider that at any
point in time in your deliberation[s]. Reminding you, and you will get full
instructions, that, when a statement or an exhibit or an item is stricken,
you cannot consider that as part of your deliberations.’’
    19
       The trial transcript does not expressly indicate that the defendant left
the courtroom, but it does indicate that, after a brief colloquy between the
trial court and Bowden-Lewis, Bowden-Lewis stated, ‘‘I’ll wait for him to
come back out,’’ and that the defendant was then brought back into the
courtroom.
    20
       During the argument on the defendant’s request to testify about the
nonsexual nature of his prior felony record, defense counsel told the trial
court that the defendant would testify ‘‘to the fact solely that he is a convicted
felon of a nonsexual crime’’ and that counsel was ‘‘asking only for [the
defendant] to be able to say that he is a convicted felon of a crime of a
nonsexual nature . . . .’’ We do not interpret this language as necessarily
meaning that the defendant intended to testify only about his prior convic-
tions. Rather, it could mean that the only testimony that the defendant was
going to give concerning the convictions were that they were for a nonsexual
offense. We note in this regard that, in his brief to this court, the defendant
argues that, as the result of the trial court’s ruling, ‘‘[t]he jur[ors] did not
hear him deny harming [J] and [L]. They did not hear him explain what he
said on his wedding night. They did not hear him explain why he went to
[A’s] house, deny that he taunted [A] and [M], and deny that he charged
two men who were pointing handguns at him.’’ Thus, the defendant has
suggested to this court that he intended to testify about his lack of guilt.
He did not, however, make any such offer of proof to the trial court.
    21
       Accordingly, we do not agree with the concurring justice that the fact
that the defendant was previously convicted of robbery would affect the
credibility of his testimony that his prior convictions were not for a sexual
offense. With respect to the concurring justice’s statement that we have
concluded sua sponte that the record is not adequate for review, we note
that that state contended in its brief to this court that ‘‘[t]he record does
not disclose why [the defendant] changed his mind’’ about testifying and
‘‘is devoid of any evidence as to what the defendant’s testimony would
have been.’’
    22
       We recognize that the trial court initially determined that the robbery
convictions were not relevant to the defendant’s lack of veracity. That
determination would have been incorrect if the trial court believed that the
defendant intended to testify about his lack of guilt, and nothing prevented
the trial court from correcting an earlier incorrect ruling, especially when
it was the defendant’s own request that triggered the correction.
   23
      We also note that, if the defendant wanted to testify about his lack of
guilt, he could have simply withdrawn his request to testify about the nonsex-
ual nature of his prior felony convictions and asked the trial court to keep
in place its initial ruling that questions about the prior convictions would
not be permitted on cross-examination. Thus, any harm caused by not
presenting such testimony was self-inflicted.