DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law

Opinion

The plaintiff, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs appeal from the decision of the defendant, Pamela Law, the commissioner of revenue services, denying the plaintiffs claim for a refund of state sales tax it had paid to consumers pursuant to General Stat *704 utes § 42-179 (d), 1 a part of what is commonly known as the state’s lemon law. See General Statutes §§ 42-179 through 42-190. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that its claims were barred by sovereign immunity because it was not an aggrieved taxpayer authorized to appeal from the defendant’s decision pursuant to General Statutes § 12-422, 2 and that the state has not waived its sovereign *705 immunity under § 42-179 (d) because that provision does not compel the defendant to reimburse manufacturers for refunds of sales tax made to consumers. The plaintiff further claims that the defense of sovereign immunity could not be interposed in a claim against the state for unconstitutional acts. We disagree with the plaintiff, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed relevant facts and procedural history. During the period relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff was engaged in the business of manufacturing motor vehicles for sale and lease to consumers in Connecticut. More significantly for the purposes of this appeal, the plaintiff refunded state sales tax to certain consumers when it accepted for return their motor vehicles pursuant to § 42-179 (d), which provides that a consumer may return a materially defective new motor vehicle that cannot be repaired to the manufacturer, which must then refund to the consumer the vehicle’s contract price plus all collateral charges, including the sales tax previously paid by the consumer. Thereafter, on October 27, 2004, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-425, 3 the plaintiff timely filed *706 a claim with the defendant for a refund of sales and use taxes arising from the various refunds it had given to lemon law consumers. On or about February 22, 2005, the defendant issued notice to the plaintiff disallowing the tax refund. The plaintiff timely filed a written protest; however, on August 26, 2005, the defendant issued a final determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief pursuant to §§ 42-179 and 12-425. Specifically, the defendant concluded therein that “the vehicle sales in question were completed transactions properly subjected to sales tax in this state. Without statutory provisions allowing a refund of said tax, the [department [of revenue services] is without authority to approve this refund claim.”

*707 The plaintiff subsequently appealed, pursuant to § 12-422, from the defendant’s decision to the trial court. The plaintiff asserted that, although it was not the retailer of the motor vehicles for which it sought a tax refund and, accordingly, was not legally obligated to, and therefore did not, charge, collect and remit sales tax to the defendant in connection with the sales of any of these motor vehicles, it nevertheless was a taxpayer entitled to reimbursement because it had refunded the sales tax pursuant to § 42-179 (d). According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s failure to reimburse it for the refunds it had paid pursuant to § 42-179 (d) has resulted in, inter alia: a violation of the plaintiffs rights to due process and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions; an unconstitutional taking under the state constitution; and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff also alleged that it was entitled to the refund on various equitable grounds, including equitable subrogation.

The defendant moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on several grounds. First, the defendant contended that the appeal was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the plaintiff was not “[a] taxpayer aggrieved because of any order, decision, determination or disallowance of the [defendant]”; General Statutes § 12-422; and therefore could not pursue an appeal under § 12-422, the statutory provision waiving sovereign immunity for such appeals. Rather, the plaintiffs obligation to reimburse consumers arose from the lemon law, specifically, § 42-179 (d), which discloses no legislative authorization for a manufacturer to recover any of the contract price or collateral charges, such as sales tax, that had been refunded to the consumer. Therefore, according to the defendant, § 42-179 (d) does not authorize the plaintiffs appeal expressly or implicitly. Second, the defendant contended that, even if § 42-179 (d) did authorize the appeal, the plaintiff was neither statutorily aggrieved *708 because it did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute, nor classically aggrieved because it did not have a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter. 4 Finally, the defendant contended that, to the extent that the plaintiff had alleged that it was equitably subrogated to the rights of the consumer under the lemon law, the plaintiff had no standing to seek a refund on the basis of that doctrine because the Connecticut Sales and Use Taxes Act, General Statutes § 12-406 et seq., does not expressly authorize subrogation.

The plaintiff opposed each of the grounds asserted in the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, with respect to the issue of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff asserted that it is an aggrieved taxpayer entitled to file for a refund pursuant to §§ 12-422 and 12-425. The plaintiff contended that, if the trial court were to construe §§ 12-422 and 12-425 otherwise, and thereby deprive the plaintiff of the right to a refund of the sales tax that the defendant statutorily was required to make under § 42-179 (d), then an unconstitutional deprivation of property would occur. The plaintiff further contended that sovereign immunity properly cannot be interposed as an affirmative defense when, as in this case, the claim is that, inter alia, an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process and a violation of its right to equal protection will result if the *709 refund is denied. Finally, the plaintiff contended that the facts alleged in its complaint, specifically, that it had refunded the sales tax pursuant to the statutory mandate of § 42-179 (d), were sufficient to establish standing under both statutory and classical aggrievement.

In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that, although the plaintiff had asserted several theories of recovery, the dispositive issue was whether the defendant was immune from suit because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The trial court agreed with the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff was not a taxpayer within the meaning of § 12-422, a sales and use taxes statute, but, rather, that it was a claimant seeking reimbursement from § 42-179 (d), the lemon law, which does not authorize expressly or implicitly the plaintiffs claim for reimbursement. Additionally, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs contention that sovereign immunity could not be interposed as a defense when a claim is brought against the government for unconstitutional acts, noting that “[t]o overcome sovereign immunity, the [plaintiff was] required to clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 755, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet this burden because its claims were “founded on the [defendant’s] refusal to refund state sales taxes to the plaintiff as provided for in §§ 12-422 and 12-425,” and the plaintiff was not a taxpayer entitled to claim a refund under any of those sections of the sales and use taxes statutes. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign *710 immunity without reaching the issue of aggrievement. This appeal followed. 5

The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly determined that sovereign immunity was a bar to its appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the trial court acted improperly when it rejected its claims that the state authorized the present action against the defendant by the plaintiff as an aggrieved taxpayer pursuant to §§ 12-422 and 12-425, and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar the court’s ability to consider the plaintiffs claims regarding the various constitutional ramifications of the refund denials. The plaintiff also contends that, on the basis of the allegations, the trial court should have concluded that it was classically and statutorily aggrieved. In response, the defendant reiterates her contention that the plaintiff was not a taxpayer, and therefore could not prevail, under § 12-422, the statutory provision waiving sovereign immunity. Rather, because the plaintiffs obligation to reimburse consumers arose from § 42-179 (d), which does not authorize an appeal, the state did not waive sovereign immunity. Furthermore, the defendant maintains that the trial court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claims for the alleged unconstitutional results ensuing from the refund denial. Finally, the defendant repeats her earlier assertions that the plaintiff did not establish the requisite aggrievement to have standing to bring this appeal. See footnote 4 of this opinion. We agree with the defendant that the trial court properly determined that sovereign immunity was a bar to the plaintiffs appeal. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs appeal, and, accordingly, we *711 do not reach the other jurisdictional issues raised by the parties.

I

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is . . . well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 610-11, 793 A.2d 215 (2002).

“Sovereign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. ... In so doing, we must decide whether [the trial court’s] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record. . . . The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law. ... It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law. ... Not only have we recognized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state. . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence. . . .

“[A] litigant that seeks to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity must show that (1) the legisla *712 ture, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. ... In making this determination, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) C. R. Klewin, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 257-59, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007). Because the plaintiff does not claim that its statutory claims fall within the exception to sovereign immunity, 6 the central issue before the court is whether there was a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.

Whether the legislature has waived the state’s sovereign immunity protection raises a question of statutory interpretation. General Statutes § l-2z provides that “[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not. yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” When the meaning of a statute is not plain and unambiguous, however, “we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circum *713 stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 292, 869 A.2d 1193 (2005). There are two statutes that are central to this appeal, and we address each in turn.

A

We begin with § 12-422, which provides in relevant part: “Any taxpayer aggrieved because of any order, decision, determination or disallowance of the Commissioner of Revenue Services under section 12-418, 12-421 or 12-425 may, within one month after service upon the taxpayer of notice of such order, decision, determination or disallowance, take an appeal therefrom to the superior court .... Said court may grant such relief as may be equitable and, if such tax has been paid prior to the granting of such relief, may order the Treasurer to pay the amount of such relief, with interest ... to the aggrieved taxpayer. . . .” 7 The plaintiff contends *714 that this provision expressly waives sovereign immunity for those aggrieved taxpayers who fall within its limitations. It is readily apparent, and the plaintiff does not claim otherwise, that it does not fall within either those persons afforded relief under § 12-418; see General Statutes § 12-418 (1) (A) (“[a]ny person against whom an assessment is made under section 12-414a, 12-415, 12-416 or 12-424”); General Statutes § 12-418 (1) (B) (“[a]ny person against whom an assessment is made under section 12-417”); or those persons afforded relief under § 12-421 (“[a]ny taxpayer, having paid any tax as provided by this chapter, aggrieved by the action of the commissioner or his authorized agent in fixing the amount of such tax or in imposing any penalty hereunder”). The plaintiff does claim, however, that § 12-425 authorizes its administrative claim for a refund, thereby placing it squarely within § 12-422, because, according to the plaintiff, § 12-425 “contains no limitations or restrictions on who may be a claimant thereunder.” The plaintiff claims, in essence, that §§ 12-422 and 12-425, read in tandem, act as a waiver of sovereign immunity.

The defendant responds that the plaintiffs reliance on these provisions is misplaced, because these provisions merely set forth the two step process that must be followed in order to file an appeal to the Superior Court under the Sales and Use Taxes Act, § 12-406 et *715 seq. We agree with the defendant that § 12-425 does not itself either expressly or by necessary implication waive the state’s sovereign immunity. Cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Crystal, 251 Conn. 748, 760, 741 A.2d 956 (1999) (noting that General Statutes § 12-225 “establishes an administrative request for a refund [of corporate business taxes] as the prescribed avenue of relief that the [plaintiff] was required to follow in order to lake advantage of the state’s limited waiver of its sovereign immunity [under General Statutes § 12-237]” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). We disagree, however, that § 12-422 does not statutorily waive sovereign immunity for those persons that fall within the ambit of that section. See American Totalisator Co. v. Dubno, 210 Conn. 401, 411-12, 555 A.2d 414 (1989) (Section 12-422 “authorize [s] the Superior Court to set aside an assessment of interest. . . . The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Robert Emmet & Son Oil & Supply Co. v. Sullivan, 158 Conn. 234, 243, 259 A.2d 636 (1969) (“the court in the exercise of this express authorization may properly enter an order for a refund . . . with interest as provided by [§ 12-422]”).

The issue, therefore, is whether the plaintiff falls within the provisions of § 12-422 as a “taxpayer aggrieved because of any order, decision, determination or disallowance of the Commissioner of Revenue Services under section . . . 12-425,” because, as this court repeatedly has underscored, “[t]he scope of any statutory waiver must be confined strictly to the extent the statute provides.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., supra, 273 Conn. 294; accord Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 55-56, 569 A.2d 518 (1990) (“because such statutes are in derogation of the com *716 mon law, [a]ny statutory waiver of immunity must be narrowly construed . . . and its scope must be confined strictly to the extent the statute provides” [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). We conduct this inquiiy mindful that § 12-425 mandates that the defendant refund certain taxes; Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 277 Conn. 681, 692-93, 894 A.2d 919 (2006); thereby imposing a monetary obligation on the sovereign, and thus it is essential for its requirements to be satisfied.

The plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of § 12-425 for several reasons. First, the plaintiff cannot establish eligibility for the tax refund because it neither qualifies as a “taxpayer” as that term is contemplated in the Sales and Use Taxes Act; see Plasticrete Block & Supply Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 216 Conn. 17, 21, 579 A.2d 20 (1990) (“[a] tax is imposed upon a taxpayer for the sale of goods or services at retail”); nor does it qualify as a “taxpayer” as that term commonly is understood. See Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 273 Conn. 240, 256 n.16, 869 A.2d 611 (2005), quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993) (defining taxpayer as “ ‘one that pays or is liable for a tax’ ”); see also Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 277 Conn. 690 (relying on mandate under General Statutes § 1-1 [a] to construe statutory terms “according to their common usage” and looking to dictionary definition of term “suit” in tax statute, General Statutes § 12-39s [internal quotation marks omitted]). Additionally, the plaintiff invokes the mandatory refund provision of § 12-425 independent of the statutory prerequisites for its application, which clearly focus on the original sale and purchaser; see, e.g., General Statutes § 12-407 (a) (3) (B) (“[i]fthe original purchaser has paid sales or use tax on the original sale of such property to the original purchaser, such original pur *717 chaser may (i) claim a refund of such tax under the provisions of section 12-425, upon presentation of proof satisfactory to the commissioner that the mutual contractual obligations described in this subparagraph were undertaken no later than one hundred twenty days after the original sale and that such tax was paid to the original retailer on the original sale and was remitted to the commissioner by such original retailer or by such original purchaser”); and without the ability to satisfy those prerequisites. In short, because the plaintiff alleges neither that it was the purchaser of the vehicles subject to the sales tax, nor that it was responsible for the payment of the original sales tax at the time of the original purchase giving rise to the sales tax, we cannot conclude that it was an aggrieved taxpayer under § 12-422. Hence, the plaintiff does not fall within the class of persons entitled to a refund pursuant to § 12-425 for whom the legislature waived sovereign immunity.

B

The second statute at issue in this case and the one that imposed upon the plaintiff the obligation to refund the tax to the consumer is § 42-179 (d), which is part of the lemon law, rather than the sales and use taxes statutes. Section 42-179 (d) provides in relevant part that, “[i]f the manufacturer or its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty . . . the manufacturer shall . . . accept return of the vehicle from the consumer and refund to the consumer . . . [inter alia] (2) all collateral charges, including but not limited to, sales tax . . . .” There is nothing in the language of the statute to show that the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity. See Mahoney v. Lensink, supra, 213 Conn. 555 (“A legislative decision to waive sovereign immunity must be manifested either by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implica *718 tion. Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558, 534 A.2d 888 [1987], quoting Murphy v. Ives, 151 Conn. 259, 262-63, 196 A.2d 596 [1963].” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

Moreover, as this court previously has explained, the lemon law was intended to protect consumers of new automobiles. 8 See Cagiva North America v. Schenk, 239 Conn. 1, 12, 680 A.2d 964 (1996). “The lemon bill . . . [gives the] consumer rights against . . . the party responsible for the defective car.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Construing the statute to mandate a refund to manufacturers for taxes paid under the lemon law would do nothing to advance the legislature’s remedial concerns of consumer protection, and, indeed, would undermine the incentive to provide nondefective products to consumers.

We note that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reached a similar conclusion when considering whether manufacturers are authorized to obtain refunds for sales tax returned to consumers under that state’s lemon law. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Executive *719 Director, Maine Revenue Services, 922 A.2d 465, 469-71 (Me. 2007); cf. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Commonwealth, 885 A.2d 117 (Pa. Commw. 2005) (discussing refund by state to manufacturer for sales tax refunded to consumer under Pennsylvania’s lemon law based on tax code provision, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 72, § 7252, broadly authorizing refund “to the person, his heirs, successors, assigns or other personal representatives, who actually paid the tax”). Indeed, the mere fact that manufacturers such as the plaintiff refund to the consumer more than the manufacturer received does not suggest that our reading of the statute is illogical. See Paternostro v. Edward Coon Co., 217 Conn. 42, 49, 583 A.2d 1293 (1991) (“ [statutes must be construed to avoid illogical, irrational results”). As one court noted in discussing Indiana’s lemon law, “[the plaintiff] is not entitled to any sales tax refunds under Indiana’s [l]emon [l]aw because the purpose of that state’s [l]emon [l]aw is to give the consumer back exactly what it paid for as a result of the transaction and to have the manufacturer pay more than it ever received originally to suffer a financial discomfort to improve the quality of its products. See DaimlerChrysler-Corporation v. Indiana Department of Revenue, Indiana Tax Court, Cause No. 49T10-0307-TA-38, decided November 10, 2004, (2004 Ind. Tax LEXIS 105).” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Commonwealth, supra, 121 n.8.

In short, there is no express indication that the legislature intended to permit the manufacturer to recover any of the collateral charges such as sales tax required to be refunded to the consumer by the manufacturer upon the consumer’s return of a defective vehicle. Nor does the plaintiff point to anything from which we can conclude that there is a necessary implication from the language of § 42-179 (d) that the state will assume part of the manufacturer’s burden. Although the state may waive its immunity from suit by the enactment of appro *720 priate legislation, we find nothing in § 42-179 (d) to support the conclusion that the legislature intended to waive immunity so that the state could assume the mandatory refund obligation imposed under the lemon law on the manufacturer.

II

The plaintiff also claims that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the state and federal constitutional claims raised in its complaint, contending that sovereign immunity cannot be interposed as a defense when the claim against the state is for unconstitutional acts. In essence, the plaintiff claims that, because it was required by § 42-179 (d) to refund sales and use taxes to consumers, if it is precluded from obtaining a refund for those taxes pursuant to § 12-422, the state’s actions would constitute a violation of, inter alia, its constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. See footnote 9 of this opinion. The plaintiff relies on this court’s holding in Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 610 A.2d 590 (1992), for the proposition that sovereign immunity is not a bar to an action for unconstitutional acts. Its reliance is misplaced.

As we previously have stated, the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity; Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 86, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights; Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987); and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority. Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 *721 Conn. 479, 497, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled in part by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Because we already have concluded that the first exception does not apply, we turn to the second and third exceptions. For both of these exceptions, we have imposed specific pleading requirements. For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, we require that “[t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests.” Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 64, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988). For a claim under the third exception, “the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations.” Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 174-75, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part by Miller v. Egan, supra, 325. In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.

Although the trial court in this case concluded that the plaintiffs allegations were insufficient, there is a more fundamental problem with the plaintiffs due process and equal protection claims. 9 It has not sought *722 declaratory or injunctive relief to remedy those viola *723 tions. Cf. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 628, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (concluding that sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiffs’ claim seeking declaratory judgment that system of financing public elementary and secondary education in this state violated state constitution, when plaintiffs alleged that governmental officials were acting pursuant to unconstitutional statute or in excess of statutory authority in implementing system). The plaintiffs request for relief — an order that the defendant refund all sales taxes for which the plaintiff had submitted a claim for refund — must be characterized as a claim for damages. See Gonsalves v. Internal Revenue Service, 975 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) (treating constitutional claims arising from failure to refund taxes as action for damages); Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Sup. 1571, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (claim for tax refund is action for damages and hence barred by sovereign immunity).

“When a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state, he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, §§ 4-141 through 4-165. Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003). This is the case even if the claims are brought pursuant to the United States constitution. See id. (dismissing causes of action seeking money damages based on, inter alia, first and fourteenth amendments to United States constitution when permission to sue not received from claims commissioner); Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 422, 562 A.2d 1080 (1989) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 *724 “does not abrogate the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S. Ct. 757, 107 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1990).

Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs contention that sovereign immunity did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claim that the statutory obligation imposed by § 42-179 (d) resulted in violations of its constitutional rights. For purposes of the issue before us, it is without significance that it is the defendant’s decision denying the refund pursuant to § 12-422 that gives rise to the constitutional claim. The plaintiff in this case sought money damages from the state for these alleged violations. The plaintiff has not received permission from the claims commissioner to bring the action, nor has it pleaded a valid exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 10 Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as these claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.