State v. Johnson

Opinion

A jury found the defendant, Matthew Steven Johnson, guilty of three counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. 1 The trial court rendered judgments in accordance with the jury ver *439 dicts, 2 and the defendant appealed to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the state’s motion to consolidate for trial the three counts of murder upon concluding that the evidence of each murder was cross admissible as to the other two murders to prove both intent and a common plan or scheme, and (2) permitted the state to adduce expert testimony characterizing the three murders as serial killings. With respect to the defendant’s first claim, we conclude that the defendant cannot prevail on his claim because the evidence was cross admissible to demonstrate propensity in accordance with our recent decisions in State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45 (2008), and State v. Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742, 954 A.2d 165 (2008). 3 With respect to the defendant’s second claim, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to present the challenged expert testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our determination of the defendant’s claims. On the afternoon of April 16, 2000, the body of Aida Quinones, a thirty-three year old Hispanic female intravenous drug user 4 with an arrest record for prostitution, was discovered near an Interstate 84 overpass adjacent to Laurel Street in Hartford. Quinones’ body was found lying facedown and covered with dirt and gravel. Her shirt and sweater had been pushed up to her chest, and *440 her pants had been pushed down and dangled from her left leg, revealing the lower portion of her naked torso. Although Quinones’ right shoe had been removed and was found in the vicinity of her body, her left shoe remained on her left foot. The positioning of Quinones’ arms and the abrasions on her back and buttocks indicated that she had been dragged a short distance to the location where her body was found.

An autopsy indicated that Quinones had died either on the night of April 15,2000, or early the next morning. The medical examiner determined that Quinones had been murdered, and that the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head and manual strangulation. The nature and severity of the injuries that had been inflicted to Quinones’ head indicated that she may have been stomped to death.

Swab samples were taken from Quinones’ oral, anal and vaginal cavities to test for the presence of DNA. 5 The vaginal swab tested positive for semen, which revealed the existence of at least two genetic profiles, one of which matched Quinones’ profile and another of which matched the defendant’s profile. The probability that an individual other than the defendant contributed to the DNA found in Quinones’ vagina that matched the defendant’s profile was determined to be approximately 1 in 39 million, 1 in 59 million and 1 in 46 million among the African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic populations, respectively.

About four and one-half months later, on August 29, 2000, the body of Rosali Jimenez, a thirty-two year old *441 Hispanic female drug user 6 with an arrest record for prostitution, was discovered in the basement of an abandoned building located at 50-52 Cedar Street in Hartford, approximately eight-tenths of one mile from the site where Quinones’ body was found. As in the case involving Quinones, Jimenez’ shirt had been pulled up, and her pants and underwear' had been pulled down and dangled from her left leg, revealing the lower portion of her naked torso. Jimenez’ right sneaker had been removed and was found near her body; her left sneaker remained on her left foot. Jimenez’ head and face were covered in blood, and a bloody shoe print was found on her right arm.

An autopsy established that Jimenez had been murdered and that the cause of her death was blunt force trauma to the head and neck. Jimenez died on the night of August 28, 2000, or early the next morning. 7 The injuries inflicted on Jimenez’ head and neck were consistent with forceful contact with a wall or the ground, and with the repeated stomping of a foot. Forensic testing conducted on Jimenez’ oral and vaginal cavities indicated the presence of semen. 8 DNA testing revealed that the semen found in Jimenez’ mouth matched the defendant’s genetic profile, whereas the semen found *442 in Jimenez’ vagina did not. The probability that an individual other than the defendant contributed to the DNA found in Jimenez’ mouth was determined to be approximately 1 in 205 million, 1 in 215 million and 1 in 195 million among the African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic populations, respectively. In addition, a dried, blood like substance was found under the fingernails of Jimenez’ right hand. DNA testing of this substance revealed that it matched both Jimenez’ and the defendant’s genetic profiles. The probability that individuals other than Jimenez and the defendant contributed to these genetic profiles was determined to be approximately 1 in 11 million, 1 in 9 million and 1 in 5 million among the African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic populations, respectively.

About eleven months later, on July 22, 2001, the body of Alesia Ford, a thirty-seven year old African-American female drug user 9 with an arrest record for prostitution, was found next to the loading dock of an abandoned building located at 1 Myrtle Street in Hartford, approximately eight-tenths of one mile from the location where Quinones’ body had been found and eight-tenths of one mile from the location where Jimenez’ body had been found. Ford’s body was discovered “semi-face up” near the comer of the building, with her head and face covered in blood. As in the cases involving Quinones and Jimenez, Ford’s shirt had been pushed up, and her pants and underwear had been pulled down and dangled from her left leg, revealing the lower portion of her naked torso. Unlike in the cases involving Quinones and Jimenez, however, both of Ford’s sneakers remained on her feet. A boot print was visible on the outside of Ford’s T-shirt.

*443 An autopsy indicated that Ford had been murdered and that she likely had died in the late afternoon of July 21, 2001. The cause of death was determined to be blunt force trauma to the head and neck. Injuries that Ford had sustained to her throat established that she also had been manually strangled immediately prior to her death. Forensic testing revealed the presence of semen on Ford’s abdomen and in her vagina, as well as the presence of a blood like substance on her chin. 10 DNA testing conducted on the semen found on Ford’s abdomen indicated the presence of two genetic profiles, one of which matched the defendant’s profile. The probability that an individual other than the defendant contributed to the genetic profile that matched that of the defendant in the foregoing samples was determined to be approximately 1 in 300 million among the general population. DNA testing conducted on the semen found in Ford’s vagina also revealed the existence of two genetic profiles. The defendant could not be eliminated as a contributor of this semen. Finally, forensic testing conducted on the blood like substance found on Ford’s chin revealed the existence of at least two genetic profiles, one of which matched the defendant’s profile. The probability that the matching profile belonged to someone other than the defendant was determined to be approximately 1 in 41 million, 1 in 120 million and 1 in 300 million among the African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic populations, respectively.

*444 On January 2, 2002, at the invitation of the police, the defendant voluntarily went to Hartford police headquarters for questioning. The defendant was advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), shown a color photograph of Quinones, and asked whether he knew her. After studying the photograph for approximately one minute, the defendant responded that he did not know Quinones. The defendant then was asked if he could explain the presence of his semen in Quinones at the time of her death, and he could not do so. The defendant further stated that he had not had sexual intercourse with a woman since 1982. 11

The defendant thereafter was arrested and charged with the murders of Quinones, Jimenez and Ford. The state filed a motion to consolidate the three murder counts for trial, claiming that, if the counts were to be tried separately, the evidence as to each murder would be admissible in the trial of the others under § 4-5 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 12 In particular, the state maintained that the evidence of each murder was cross admissible to establish, inter alia, intent, identity, common plan or scheme, and motive. Alternatively, the state claimed that consolidation was appropriate under State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 722-24, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), because the three murder counts *445 involved discrete and easily distinguishable factual scenarios, they were neither brutal nor shocking in comparison to one another, and a consolidated jury trial would not be unduly lengthy or complex. Defense counsel objected to the state’s motion for consolidation on the grounds that the evidence of each murder was not cross admissible and that a consolidated trial would be unduly prejudicial to the defendant. After noting the distinct similarities among the three murders, the trial court granted the state’s motion, concluding, ultimately, that the evidence of each murder was cross admissible to prove intent and a common plan or scheme.

At trial, Henry C. Lee, a forensic scientist and the former state chief criminalist and director of the state police forensic laboratory, testified as an expert on behalf of the state. Lee reviewed the autopsy reports, police reports, photographs and physical evidence that investigators had gathered, and performed a partial reconstruction of each crime scene. Lee characterized the Quinones crime scene as a “primary crime scene” with “two separate locations, in close-by vicinity.” Lee defined a “primary crime scene” as one in which the victim is murdered in the same location where his or her body is discovered. A primary crime scene has “two separate locations, in close-by vicinity” when the victim initially is assaulted in one location and the victim’s body subsequently is moved a short distance to another location. Lee testified that the presence of a pool of Quinones’ blood found a short distance from her body, the abrasions, gravel and soil found on Quinones’ back and buttocks, and the position of Quinones’ limbs, all led him to conclude that Quinones initially was assaulted in one location and subsequently dragged a short distance to a different location, where she ultimately was discovered.

Lee further testified that the presence of the defendant’s semen in Quinones’ vagina, and the absence of *446 his semen from Quinones’ pants, was significant. Lee explained that, typically, following vaginal intercourse, gravity will cause recently deposited semen to drain out of a woman’s body and onto the fabric of her pants or underwear. Because the defendant’s semen was found in Quinones’ vagina but not on her pants, Lee indicated that Quinones had been killed after she had vaginal intercourse with the defendant but before she had an opportunity to put on her pants.

According to Lee, the Jimenez crime scene, like the Quinones crime scene, was a primary crime scene with two separate but nearby locations. Lee based his conclusion on the fact that Jimenez’ shoe and some of her personal belongings were found a distance from the location where her body was discovered. Lee also indicated that the defendant’s DNA, which was found in Jimenez’ mouth and under her fingernails, was deposited shortly before Jimenez’ death. Lee explained that semen deposited in an oral cavity degrades very quickly because of the large amount of bacteria and fungi found in the mouth, and is washed away very easily by drinking, eating or brushing one’s teeth. Likewise, Jimenez’ fingernails, which were relatively clean and very short, would not have retained biological material for very long.

Lee also testified that the Ford crime scene, like the Quinones and Jimenez crime scenes, was a primary crime scene with two separate locations. Lee reached this conclusion because Ford’s blood was found on the wall located a short distance from where her body was discovered. Lee further stated that the defendant’s DNA had been deposited on Ford’s body shortly before her death. Lee explained that the semen found on Ford’s abdomen was “relatively fresh” because it contained intact sperm, which typically degrade rapidly.

After Lee testified with respect to each individual murder, the assistant state’s attorney asked him to con *447 sider the three cases together and to explain the importance of any shared similarities. Lee testified that there were several significant similarities which, in his opinion, linked the three murders. First, each murder was committed in a publicly accessible yet “very secluded” location within a one mile radius in Hartford. Second, each of the three victims was a minority woman in her thirties with a history of prostitution and drug abuse. Third, each victim’s clothing was positioned in a similar fashion: each victim’s shirt had been pushed up, and her pants—and underwear in the cases of Jimenez and Ford—had been pulled down and left dangling off of her left leg, revealing the lower portion of her naked torso. Fourth, the victims had been killed in a similar manner: each victim died of blunt force trauma to the head and, in the cases of Jimenez and Ford, to the neck, 13 and each victim’s body was discovered in the secondary location of a primary crime scene. Fifth, each crime scene could be categorized as “organized” and “active” because the killer individually selected his victim, lured her to an isolated location and murdered her in a brutal manner. Sixth, the defendant’s DNA was found on or in each victim.

Lee also testified that, for purposes of forensic science, murders are classified by category depending on their distinguishing characteristics. Thus, if only one victim is murdered in a single instance, it is classified as a “single homicide.” If, however, two victims are murdered in a single instance, it is classified as a “double homicide . . . .” If three or more victims are murdered in a single instance, it is classified as a “mass killing.” Furthermore, if two or more separate murders appear to be unrelated, they are classified as “separate homicide[s].” If, however, two or more separate mur *448 ders appear to be related by the existence of certain similarities, including similar victims, along with the presence of a “cooling off period” between each murder, they are classified as “serial killing[s].” Finally, if two or more minders appear to be related by the existence of certain similarities but are committed in a short period of time, one after another, they are characterized as “continuous killing[s].” Over defense counsel’s objection, Lee opined that, on the basis of his extensive experience and training, the Quinones, Jimenez and Ford murders were consistent with the forensic definition of the term “serial killings.”

Following the close of evidence and final arguments of counsel, the trial court instructed the jury that, in considering each separate murder count, it could consider evidence of the other murders for two purposes only: to determine (1) “whether there is a characteristic method in the commission of [the] criminal acts or modus operandi”; and (2) “the existence of . . . intent, which is a necessary element of the crime charged.” Thereafter, the court explained that “characteristic method” means a common plan or scheme in the commission of the crimes. 14 The trial court also emphasized, however, that the jury was required “to consider each charge or count separately.” The court further cautioned the jury: “You may not consider such evidence as establishing a predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit any of the crimes charged or to demonstrate a criminal propensity. You may consider the evidence if you believe it and further find [that] it logically, rationally and conclusively supports the issues *449 for which [it is] being offered by the state, but only as it may bear ... on the issues of a characteristic method of committing criminal acts or the question of intent. If you do not believe such evidence, or even if you do, if you find [that] it [does] not logically, rationally and conclusively support the issues for which [it is] being offered by the state, then you may not consider the testimony for any purpose except in the charged crime itself. In other words, you may not, just because [you are] convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged in one count, use that conclusion to find that [he is] a bad person, and, therefore, more likely to have committed the crimes charged in the other counts. That you cannot do.” 15 Defense counsel excepted to this portion of the *450 jury instructions on the ground that, inter alia, the evidence of each murder was not cross admissible to establish either intent or common plan or scheme.

Thereafter, the jury found the defendant guilty of each of the three murder charges. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion to consolidate the three murder counts upon concluding that the evidence as to each count was admissible as to the other two counts under the intent and common plan or scheme exceptions to the general rule barring the use of evidence of other crimes. We need not decide whether the evidence was properly admitted to prove intent or a common plan or scheme because we conclude that the evidence was cross admissible to demonstrate propensity in accordance with our recent decisions in State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. 470-71, and State v. Snelgrove, supra, 288 Conn. 758-61, 16 both of which were issued while this appeal was pending. 17

*451 We commence our review of the defendant’s claim by summarizing the law applicable to the consolidation of similar charges in pending cases against the same defendant. “General Statutes § 54-57 18 and Practice Book § 41-19 19 permit a trial court to join similar charges in pending cases against a common defendant. Our prior decisions have made clear that the trial court enjoys broad discretion in this respect and that its decision to consolidate will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 519-20, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007). [T]his court consistently has recognized a clear presumption in favor of joinder and against severance . . . and, therefore, absent an abuse of discretion . . . will not second guess the considered judgment of the trial court as to the joinder or severance of two or more charges. . . . Id., 521. On appeal, [t]he defendant bears a heavy burden of showing that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice, and that any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of the court’s instructions. . . . Id., 520.

“[When] evidence of one incident can be admitted at the trial of the other, separate trials would provide [a] defendant no significant benefit. It is clear that, under such circumstances, [a] defendant would not ordinarily be substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for a single trial. State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 68, 530 A.2d 155 (1987). We consistently have found joinder to be proper if we have concluded that the evidence of *452 other crimes or uncharged misconduct would have been cross admissible at separate trials. State v. McKenzie-Adams, supra, 281 Conn. 520 (citing cases); see also State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 765, 670 A.2d 276 (1996) (concluding that consolidation was proper, in part, because evidence of escape offense would have been admissible at trial to prove consciousness of guilt of other factually unrelated offenses); State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 464, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988) ([t]he trial court properly joined the two cases for trial because, in the event of separate trials, evidence relating to each of the cases would have been admissible in the other); State v. Pollitt, supra, 72.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608, 628-29, 949 A.2d 1156 (2008).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the law governing the admissibility of propensity evidence. “We recently have adopted an exception to § 4-5 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence . . . allowing the admission of prior misconduct evidence to establish propensity in sex related cases if certain conditions are met. See State v. DeJesus, [supra, 288 Conn. 470-74]. Specifically, we concluded in DeJesus that evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct is admissible only if it is relevant to prove that [a] defendant had a propensity or a tendency to engage in the type of aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual behavior with which he or she [was] charged. Relevancy is established by satisfying the liberal standard pursuant to which evidence previously was admitted under the common scheme or plan exception. Accordingly, evidence of uncharged misconduct [or other crimes] is relevant to prove that [a] defendant had a propensity or a tendency to engage in the crime charged only if it is: (1) . . . not too remote in time; (2) . . . similar to the offense charged; and (3) . . . committed [against] persons similar to the prosecuting witness. . . .

*453 “[Such] [e]vidence ... is admissible only if its probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect that invariably flows from its admission. ... In balancing the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect, however, trial courts must be mindful of the purpose for which the evidence is to be admitted, namely, to permit the jury to consider a defendant’s prior bad acts in the area of sexual abuse or child molestation for the purpose of showing propensity. . . .

“Finally, we concluded in DeJesus that the admission of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct . . . must be accompanied by an appropriate cautionary instruction to the jury to minimize the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Snelgrove, supra, 288 Conn. 758-59.

Moreover, in Snelgrove, we also considered “whether [the] new rule allowing the admission of propensity evidence in sex related cases [that we adopted in DeJesus] may be applied when [a] defendant has not been charged with a sexual offense.” Id., 759-60. We concluded that it may be. Id., 760. “In DeJesus, we explained that the admission of propensity evidence in sex related cases is supported by two public policy considerations. [F]irst, in sex crime cases generally . . . the offense often is committed surreptitiously, in the absence of any neutral witnesses. Consequently, courts allow prosecutorial authorities greater latitude in using prior misconduct evidence to bolster the credibility of the complaining witness and to aid in the obvious difficulty of proof. . . . Second, because of the unusually aberrant and pathological nature of the crime of child molestation, prior acts of similar misconduct, as opposed to other types of misconduct, are deemed to be highly probative because they tend to establish a necessary motive or explanation for an otherwise *454 inexplicably horrible crime . . . and [to] assist the jury in assessing the probability that a defendant has been falsely accused of such shocking behavior. . . . Moreover, [i]t is inherently improbable that a person whose prior acts show that he is in fact a rapist or child molester would have the bad luck to be later hit with a false accusation of committing the same type of crime or that a person would fortuitously be subject to multiple false accusations by a number of different victims . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In Snelgrove, we concluded that “this rationale for the exception to the rule barring propensity evidence applies whenever the evidence establishes that both the prior misconduct and the offense with which the defendant is charged were driven by an aberrant sexual compulsion, regardless of whether the prior misconduct or the conduct at issue resulted in sexual offense charges. Although we stated in DeJesus that [t]he scope and contours of the propensity [doctrine] . . . [are] rooted in this state’s unique jurisprudence concerning the admission of . . . misconduct evidence in sex crime cases, and must be construed accordingly . . . nothing in [DeJesus] suggested] that it is the specific nature of the charges brought against a defendant that renders the evidence especially probative in such cases. Rather, DeJesus [made] it clear that it is the aberrant and compulsive nature of [a] defendant’s prior misconduct that permits a fact finder to infer that, because [that] defendant previously had engaged in such conduct, it is likely that he did so again. As a matter of pure logic, this rationale applies whenever the state is using the evidence of prior sexual proclivities to establish a necessary motive or explanation for an otherwise inexplicably horrible crime . . . regardless of whether the crime itself was a sexual offense. Because . . . the . . . sexual proclivities [of the defendant in Snelgrove] *455 clearly were aberrant and compulsive, and the state [in that case] sought to introduce evidence of those proclivities to explain why [he] murdered the victim, we conclude[d] that our newly adopted rule allowing propensity evidence in sex related cases applie[d] even though the defendant [in Snelgrove] was not charged with a sex offense.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 760-61.

We conclude that the evidence adduced as to each murder in the present case satisfies the standard established by this court in DeJesus to demonstrate propensity. First, the Quinones, Jimenez and Ford murders were not remote in time. Jimenez was murdered approximately four and one-half months after Quinones was murdered, and Ford was murdered approximately eleven months after Jimenez. Because the three murders occurred within about fifteen months of each other, they were sufficiently proximate in time. Cf. State v. Sanseverino, supra, 287 Conn. 632 (period of approximately one year between acts of prior sexual misconduct fell well within range of time this court has accepted as not too remote for purposes of establishing common plan or scheme in sexual assault cases). Second, each of the three murders shared significant similarities: (1) the defendant had sexual relations with each victim around the time of her death; (2) each victim died of blunt force trauma to the head; (3) each victim was found with her shirt pushed up and her pants pulled down and left dangling off of her left leg, revealing the lower portion of her naked torso; (4) each murder occurred in a publicly accessible yet secluded location within a one mile radius in Hartford; and (5) each victim’s body was discovered in the secondary location of a primary crime scene, and each crime scene could be categorized as organized and active. Finally, each of the three victims was a minority woman in her thirties with a history of prostitution and drug abuse. The three murders, therefore, were not remote in time, and were *456 committed in a similar manner against similar victims. Consequently, they meet the standard of admissibility set forth in DeJesus for use as propensity evidence.

Although the defendant was not charged with a sexual offense, the evidence revealed that each victim had been killed during the course of, or immediately following, sexual relations. The murders also appeared to be sexually related because the victims were found with some of their clothing removed and their genitalia exposed. Each victim, moreover, had a history of prostitution. As in Snelgrove, the state in the present case introduced evidence of similar sexual misconduct by the defendant to explain the defendant’s motive for committing an otherwise inexplicably brutal and horrible set of crimes. 20 Because the defendant’s violent sexual proclivities clearly were aberrant and compulsive, we conclude, as we did in Snelgrove, that “our newly adopted rule allowing propensity evidence in sex related cases applies even though the defendant [in the present case] was not charged with a sex offense.” State v. Snelgrove, supra, 288 Conn. 761.

“Because the [other crimes] evidence was admitted pursuant to the [intent and] common scheme or plan exception^], rather than the propensity exception, [however] we must address the issue of harm.” 21 State *457 v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. 475-76. In the present case, even if the evidence of each murder was not cross admissible to prove intent or a common plan or scheme, the only potential harm that could arise from the admission of that evidence for either of those purposes was that the jury could infer that, because the defendant previously had killed women in the course of satisfying his sexual proclivities, he had done so again. Under DeJesus and Snelgrove, however, that evidence is admissible for that purpose. See State v. Snelgrove, supra, 288 Conn. 766; State v. DeJesus, supra, 476. Accordingly, even if we assume that the evidence was improperly admitted for other purposes, any impropriety was harmless. 22 State v. Snelgrove, supra, 766; State v. DeJesus, supra, 476.

Because the evidence of each murder was admissible to prove the commission of the other two murders, the defendant was not entitled to separate trials on each of the three murder counts. Consequently, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim that a new trial is required as a result of the consolidation of the three counts for trial.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly permitted Lee to testify that the Quinones, Jimenez *458 and Ford murders were “serial killings” connected by the presence of the defendant’s DNA at each crime scene because that testimony (1) embraced an ultimate issue of fact, namely, the identity of the perpetrator of the murders, in violation of § 7-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, 23 and (2) was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.

The following additional procedural history is necessary for our resolution of these claims. On January 20, 2004, the defendant filed a motion, pursuant to Practice Book § 40-11 (a) (4), 24 for the production of a supplemental report detailing the substance and basis of Lee’s expert opinions or, alternatively, to preclude Lee’s testimony. The defendant claimed that Lee’s initial report was inadequate because it was “merely a summary of facts expected to be offered by the state at trial, and . . . [contained] no expert analysis, conclusions, or opinions concerning the reconstruction of the crime scenes where [the bodies of Quinones, Jimenez and Ford] were found.” The defendant therefore claimed *459 that a supplemental report was necessary “to enable the defense ... to prepare an adequate response” to Lee’s anticipated testimony. The defendant claimed, alternatively, that, if Lee’s initial report was deemed adequate to “[represent] the substance of any testimony [that Lee] might provide at trial,” Lee’s expert testimony was not admissible under § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence 25 because such testimony would offer “no insight . . . beyond the capability of ordinary lay persons to understand [the evidence] and would not assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion. At that time, defense counsel conceded that Lee’s initial report contained expert conclusions insofar as it characterized the murders of Quinones, Jimenez and Ford as “serial killings.” Defense counsel maintained, however, that Lee’s initial report was conclusory in nature and lacked a factual basis. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, concluding that Lee’s initial report was adequate to notify the defense of the substance and basis of Lee’s anticipated testimony.

Thereafter, defense counsel sought to preclude Lee from using the terms “serial killer,” “serial killings” or “serial homicide” in his testimony. Defense counsel claimed that, although it was “entirely appropriate for . . . Lee to talk about two or more related cases involving homicid[al] behavior and to describe how he believes [that] they are related, the term ‘serial killer,’ or *460 ‘serial killings’ or ‘serial homicide’ [was] not necessary to his testimony and carrie [d] with it connotations that are broader than the technical definition that a forensic scientist might use.” Defense counsel essentially claimed that the probative value of Lee’s use of the aforementioned terms was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request. Thereafter, Lee testified that, in his opinion, the murders of Quinones, Jimenez and Ford were “serial killings,” as that term is defined in forensic science, because each crime scene shared significant similarities, one of which was the presence of the defendant’s DNA, and because the murders were separated by a cooling off period.

A

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly permitted Lee to testify concerning an ultimate issue of fact in violation of § 7-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. We decline to review this claim because our review of the record reveals that it was not raised in the trial court and, therefore, was not preserved for our review.

“We have stated that [t]he standard for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evidentiary ruling at trial is well settled. This court is not bound to consider claims of law not made at the trial. ... In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly. ... In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose, in order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground asserted. . . .

*461 “These requirements are not simply formalities. They serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there is still time for the court to act. . . . Assigning error to a court’s evidentiary rulings on the basis of objections never raised at trial unfairly subjects the court and the opposing party to trial by ambush. . . . State v. Cabral, 275 Conn. 514, 530-31, 881 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1048, 126 S. Ct. 773, 163 L. Ed. 2d 600 (2005); id., 531 (declining to review claim that tape-recorded statements were inadmissible under coconspirator hearsay exception when objection at trial was on different ground that listener was acting as agent of police when statements were made); see also Practice Book § 5-5. ” 26 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634, 645-46, 945 A.2d 449 (2008); see also Council v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 477, 498, 944 A.2d 340 (2008) (“ ‘[A] party cannot present a case to the trial court on one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different one .... For this court to . . . consider [a] claim on the basis of a specific legal ground not raised during trial would amount to trial by ambuscade, unfair both to the [court] and to the opposing party.’ ”).

Our review of the record reveals that, although defense counsel objected to the admission of Lee’s testimony on various grounds, he failed to make the claim that the defendant now raises on appeal, namely, that Lee’s testimony encompassed an ultimate issue of fact and that it, therefore, was inadmissible under § 7-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Accordingly, we will *462 not review the defendant’s unpreserved evidentiary claim. 27

B

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly allowed Lee to characterize the Quinones, Jimenez and Ford murders as “serial killings” connected by the presence of the defendant’s DNA because this testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree.

“The law defining the relevance of evidence is well settled. Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence .... Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes v. Camel, 283 Conn. 475, 483, 927 A.2d 880 (2007). “One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . . Evi *463 dence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in the proof of the latter. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, [as] long as it is not [unfairly] prejudicial or merely cumulative.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 734-35, 888 A.2d 985, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030, 127 S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1.

“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded by the trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. ... Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to one’s case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be admitted. . . . The test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of the jurfors]. . . . The trial court . . . must determine whether the adverse impact of the challenged evidence outweighs its probative value. . . . Finally, [t]he trial court’s discretionary determination that the probative value of evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. . . . [B]ecause of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process . . . every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only [when] an abuse of discretion is manifest or [when] injustice appears to have been done.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wargo, 255 Conn. 113, 141-42, 763 A.2d 1 (2000); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3.

*464 In the present case, the state’s theory of the case was that Quinones, Jimenez and Ford each had been murdered by the same individual, and that individual was the defendant. “It is black letter law that in any criminal prosecution, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s identity as [the perpetrator or] one of the perpetrators of the crime charged.” State v. Smith, 280 Conn. 285, 302, 907 A.2d 73 (2006). Contrary to the defendant’s claim, Lee’s testimony that the murders of Quinones, Jimenez and Ford were “serial killings” connected by the presence of the defendant’s DNA at each crime scene clearly was relevant to the state’s theory of the case and to the issue of identity.

We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of Lee’s testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We recognize that the terms “serial killer” and “serial killings” are likely to be inflammatory when used colloquially. In the present case, however, Lee provided the jury with the definition of the term “serial killings” as it is used in the field of forensic science. Lee then explained why the murders of Quinones, Jimenez and Ford satisfied that forensic definition. Moreover, Lee was subject to cross-examination concerning his definition of the term and his reasons for its applicability to the present case. In addition, because the trial court previously had concluded that the evidence of the three murders was cross admissible, the jury already was aware of the many similarities that the murders shared, including the fact that the defendant’s DNA had been discovered at each of the three crime scenes. Indeed, in light of our conclusion that the evidence of the three sexually related murders was cross admissible to establish the defendant’s propensity to commit them, Lee’s testimony about the serial nature of the crimes necessarily was less prejudicial than it otherwise would have *465 been if propensity were not a proper consideration. In view of the nature and context of Lee’s testimony with respect to his opinion that the three murders satisfied the forensic definition of the term “serial killings,” we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its broad discretion in permitting the state to adduce that testimony.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.