Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC

     The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.


                                                                 SUMMARY
                                                          December 26, 2024

                               

No. 24CA0190, Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC —
Landlords and Tenants — Warranty of Habitability — Implied
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; Technology — Artificial
Intelligence — Generative AI Tools — Hallucinations; Colorado
Rules of Appellate Procedure — Briefs — Citation to Authorities
— Sanctions for Non-Compliance

     Since the use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) tools has

become widespread, lawyers and self-represented litigants alike

have relied on them to draft court filings. Because the most

commonly used GAI tools were not designed to create legal

documents, a person unfamiliar with the limitations of GAI tools,

such as the appellant in this case, can unwittingly produce text

containing fictitious legal citations, known as “hallucinations.” A

division of the court of appeals considers the novel question in

Colorado of the appropriate sanction when a self-represented

litigant files a brief peppered with hallucinations. Under the facts of
this case, the division declines to impose sanctions against the

appellant, but it puts lawyers and self-represented parties on notice

that future filings containing GAI-generated hallucinations may

may result in sanctions.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                    

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0190
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23CV198
Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge


Alim Al-Hamim,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Star Hearthstone, LLC, and IRT Living,

Defendants-Appellees.


                             JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

                                    Division I
                           Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
                        J. Jones and Sullivan, JJ., concur

                         Announced December 26, 2024


Alim Al-Hamim, Pro Se

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, John R. Mann, Greg S. Hearing II,
Brittney T. Bulawa, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
¶1    The recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), and

 particularly generative artificial intelligence (GAI), technology have

 impacted nearly every aspect of our lives, including the creation of

 text. A GAI tool can produce output that resembles the work of a

 human author. It is becoming increasingly difficult to determine

 whether a human or a GAI tool created a particular document.

¶2    Despite their uncanny writing skills, most commonly used GAI

 tools are currently unable to draft motions, briefs, and other legal

 documents because they were not designed for this purpose and

 cannot conduct legal research. For this reason, a person unfamiliar

 with the limitations of GAI tools can unwittingly rely on them to

 produce what appears to be text filled with citations to legal

 authorities. But these citations may be fictitious. Case names and

 citations that a GAI tool makes up are known as “hallucinations.”

 Snell v. United Specialty Ins. Co., 

 (11th Cir.

 2024) (Newsom, J., concurring) (A GAI tool “‘hallucinates’ when, in

 response to a user’s query, it generates facts that, well, just aren’t

 true — or at least not quite true.”); Matthew R. Caton, Lawyers:

 Rely on ‘Generative AI’ at Your Peril, 39 Me. Bar J. 48, 48 (2024) (A




                                    1
 GAI hallucination “occurs when an AI system provides information

 that is inaccurate or, more bluntly, fake.”).

¶3    Some self-represented litigants, including plaintiff, Alim

 Al-Hamim, have relied on GAI tools to draft court filings, only to

 discover later to their chagrin that their filings contained

 hallucinations. Al-Hamim’s opening brief in this appeal contained

 hallucinations, as well as bona fide legal citations. This case

 provides the first opportunity for a Colorado appellate court to

 address the appropriate sanction when a self-represented litigant

 files a brief peppered with GAI-produced hallucinations.

¶4    Al-Hamim appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims

 for breach of the warranty of habitability and the implied covenant

 of quiet enjoyment for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P.

 12(b)(5) that he asserted against defendants, Star Hearthstone, LLC

 and IRT Living (jointly, the landlords). We affirm the court’s

 judgment against Al-Hamim and put him, the bar, and

 self-represented litigants on notice that we may impose sanctions if

 a future filing in this court cites “non-existent judicial opinions with

 fake quotes and citations.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 

, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (holding that attorneys “abandoned their


                                    2
 responsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicial opinions

 with fake quotes and citations created by the artificial intelligence

 tool ChatGPT”).

                            I.   Background

¶5    Star Hearthstone rented an apartment to Al-Hamim and his

 cotenants in April 2020. Al-Hamim alleged in his complaint that

 IRT Living managed the apartment complex for a portion of the time

 he rented the apartment.

¶6    Al-Hamim pleaded that, in early 2021, shortly after he moved

 into the apartment, he “noticed a full cannister of dander and cat

 hair after vacuuming both bedrooms.” He “surmised it was cat or

 some other animal hair when [he] began to show signs of an allergic

 reaction.” Al-Hamim also alleged that “the wooden carpet tack

 strips around the edges in [his] bedroom closet, as well as the

 actual carpet pad and carpet underside were visibly stained from

 cat urine.”

¶7    Al-Hamim said in his complaint that he reported the condition

 of his carpet to the property manager, who had the carpet cleaned.

 Al-Hamim alleged that, following the cleaning, he noticed “the

 strong ammonia smell of cat urine” in his bedroom and “suggested


                                    3
 to management that the carpet may need replacement.” Although

 the property manager responded that the carpet “would be

 replaced, as soon as possible,” the carpet was not replaced.

¶8    Al-Hamim asserted that “[n]early an entire year passed with no

 action on the part of [the landlords]” and that he “still had not

 actually moved into and settled into the premises.” However,

 despite his concerns about the cat urine odor and carpet stains,

 Al-Hamim renewed his lease through mid-2023.

¶9    Al-Hamim pleaded claims for (1) breach of the warranty of

 habitability; (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment;

 (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 

; (4) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 

-1681x; and (5) violation of the Equal Protection and

 Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado

 Constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 6, 25.

 The landlords filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for

 failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. The court

 granted the motion.




                                    4
          II.   The Court Did Not Err by Dismissing the Case

¶ 10   Al-Hamim contends that the court erred by granting the

  landlords’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, he argues that the court

  erred by determining that the landlords did not breach the warranty

  of habitability and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.

  Additionally, he asserts that the court improperly failed to consider

  four of his other claims.

                        A.    Standard of Review

¶ 11   Because Al-Hamim represented himself throughout the case,

  we must liberally interpret his complaint and response to the

  landlords’ dismissal motion. See People v. Bergerud, 

 (Colo. 2010). But Al-Hamim’s status as a self-represented

  litigant does not excuse his noncompliance with the procedural

  rules that all parties, whether or not represented by counsel, must

  follow. See In re Marriage of Wright, 

, 

.

¶ 12   “We review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss de novo and

  apply the same standards as the trial court.” Norton v. Rocky

  Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 

, 

. In doing so, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint


                                    5
  as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

  party to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged “sufficient facts

  that, if taken as true, show plausible grounds to support a claim for

  relief.” Jagged Peak Energy Inc. v. Okla. Police Pension & Ret. Sys.,

  

, 

, 446 (citing Warne v. Hall, 

, 

). “[W]e are not required to

  accept bare legal conclusions as true.” Norton, ¶ 7, 

. As a general rule, “[w]e will uphold the grant of a C.R.C.P.

  12(b)(5) motion only when the plaintiff’s factual allegations do not,

  as a matter of law, support the claim for relief.” 

                      B.    Warranty of Habitability

¶ 13   “In every rental agreement, the landlord is deemed to warrant

  that the residential premises is fit for human habitation.”

  § 38-12-503(1), C.R.S. 2023. (The Colorado General Assembly

  amended the warranty of habitability statute in 2024. See Ch. 158,

  secs. 3, 5, §§ 38-12-503, -505, 

-17. We

  cite the version of the statute in effect when Al-Hamim filed his

  complaint. Because the General Assembly considers “premises” to

  be a singular noun, so do we.)




                                     6
¶ 14   A landlord breaches the warranty of habitability if the

  residential premises is (1) “[u]ninhabitable,” as defined in section

  38-12-505, C.R.S. 2023, § 38-12-503(2)(a)(I); or (2) “[i]n a condition

  that materially interferes with the tenant’s life, health, or safety,”

  § 38-12-503(2)(a)(II). Section 38-12-505(1) lists the conditions that

  render a residential premises “uninhabitable.” These conditions

  include lack of heating, lack of running water, and lack of working

  locks, but not animal odors or urine stains.

¶ 15   Al-Hamim argues in his opening brief that the landlords

  breached the warranty of habitability by failing to replace the

  carpeting in his apartment. Specifically, he asserts that his

  “inability to use his bedroom due to severe allergies” constituted the

  breach. In his complaint, however, he did not allege that he was

  unable to use the bedroom. Further, in his opening brief,

  Al-Hamim does not cite any authority indicating that the problems

  he experienced at the apartment made it “uninhabitable” within the

  meaning of sections 38-12-503(2)(a)(I) and 38-12-505(1).

¶ 16   Nor did Al-Hamim allege a plausible claim that the conditions

  at the apartment materially interfered with his “life, health, or

  safety.” § 38-12-503(2)(a)(II). We focus on the “health” prong of the


                                      7
statute because Al-Hamim did not allege that the cat odor or urine

stains affected his life or safety. Viewing the allegations in the

complaint in the light most favorable to Al-Hamim, see Jagged Peak

Energy Inc., ¶ 25, 523 P.3d at 446, his allegation that the cat urine

smell and stains impacted his health rested on his assertion that he

“began to show signs of an allergic reaction when emptying the

[vacuum] canister” on the day he moved in. He did not allege in his

complaint that the “signs of an allergic reaction” materially

impacted his health, that the allergic reaction continued past the

day he vacuumed the carpet, or that the smell and stains impacted

his health in any other manner. Cf. Anderson v. Shorter Arms Invs.,

LLC, 

, ¶ 29, 

, 837 (recognizing that

unremedied mold can interfere with a tenant’s life, health, or safety

under section 38-12-503(2)(a)(II)); Kekllas v. Saddy, 

 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 1976) (holding that an odor of cat

urine that permeated the entire premises, forcing the tenant to

vacate the premises due to nausea and burning eyes, combined

with rusty water, leaks, and stuck windows, resulted in a breach of

the warranty of habitability).




                                   8
¶ 17   For these reasons, we hold that the court did not err by

  concluding that Al-Hamim failed to plead an actionable claim for

  breach of the warranty of habitability.

               C.   Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

¶ 18   “[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, there is an

  implied covenant for the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises and

  the tenant is entitled to the possession of the premises to the

  exclusion of the landlord.” Radinsky v. Weaver, 

  (Colo. 1969). The covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached by “any

  disturbance of a lessee’s possession by his lessor which renders the

  premises unfit for occupancy for the purposes for which they were

  leased, or which deprives the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of

  the premises, causing him to abandon them.” W. Stock Ctr., Inc. v.

  Sevit, Inc., 

 (Colo. 1978) (quoting Radinsky,

  

). Although “abandonment is not a required

  element of the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment,” Isbill

  Assocs., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 

 (Colo.

  App. 1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Goodyear Tire &

  Rubber Co. v. Holmes, 

 (Colo. 2008), to establish a

  breach of the covenant, the plaintiff must establish that the


                                    9
  “disturbance of [the] lessee’s possession by his lessor” rendered the

  premises “unfit . . . for the purposes for which they were leased.”

  W. Stock Ctr., Inc., 

 (quoting Radinsky, 

).

¶ 19      Al-Hamim alleged that “[t]he landlord[s’] refusal to replace the

  cat-urine-stained carpet, despite repeated complaints . . . , resulted

  in a significant disruption to [his] quiet enjoyment of the

  apartment.” He asserted that the landlords breached the implied

  covenant of quiet enjoyment because the issues involving the carpet

  resulted in “inconvenience and strain” on his friendships with his

  cotenants, and that he and his cotenants “had not actually moved

  into and settled into the premises” during the first year of the lease.

¶ 20      It is unclear from Al-Hamim’s complaint the extent to which

  the condition of the carpet interfered with his quiet enjoyment of

  the premises, as opposed to his relationship with his cotenants,

  however. Al-Hamim did not allege that he was unable to use any

  part of the premises due to the carpet’s condition. Rather,

  Al-Hamim said that he refrained from moving items into his

  apartment because he did not want to have to move them again

  when the carpet was replaced, not because any room was unfit for


                                      10
  occupancy. (In his response to the landlords’ motion to dismiss and

  in the opening brief, Al-Hamim argued that the carpet problems

  prevented him from using his bedroom. However, he did not

  include this allegation in his complaint and, therefore, we do not

  consider it. See Norton, ¶ 7, 

 (“When considering a

  motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we may consider the

  facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or

  incorporated by reference, and matters proper for judicial notice.”).)

¶ 21   Further, Al-Hamim does not cite any legal authority holding

  that a strain on cotenants’ relationships can result in a breach of

  the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Nor did Al-Hamim allege

  that the carpet odor and staining resulted in a constructive eviction.

  To the contrary, Al-Hamim conceded in his complaint that he

  renewed the lease despite his complaints about the carpet. For

  these reasons, Al-Hamim did not allege the type of “disturbance

  of . . . possession” that could render the apartment unfit for “the

  purposes for which [it was] leased.” W. Stock Ctr., Inc., 

 (quoting Radinsky, 

).

¶ 22   Accordingly, we conclude that Al-Hamim failed to state a claim

  for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.


                                    11
                            D.   Other Issues

¶ 23   Al-Hamim raises the following claims for the first time in his

  opening brief:

       •    The landlords “breached the lease agreement and the

            implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing

            to resolve maintenance issues and by conducting

            arbitrary credit checks.”

       •    “[T]he leasing agent made fraudulent representations

            regarding the credit check process and the legality of a

            durable power of attorney used by [Al-Hamim] to sign for

            his guarantors.”

       •    Al-Hamim “suffered considerable harm as a result of the

            landlord[s’]” negligence.

       •    The landlords’ replacement of the carpet “constitute[d] an

            implicit acknowledgement by the landlord[s] of their

            responsibility to address the habitability issue initially

            reported by the tenant.”

¶ 24   We do not consider these claims, however, because Al-Hamim

  did not plead them in his complaint. “It is axiomatic that in civil

  cases, issues not raised in or decided by the trial court generally


                                    12
  will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.” Brown v. Am.

  Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 

, 

.

           III.     Court Filings with GAI-Produced Hallucinations

           A.       The Hallucinations in Al-Hamim’s Opening Brief

¶ 25   Al-Hamim’s opening brief contains citations to the following

  fake cases:

       •          Beck v. Tibbetts, 

 (Colo. 1998);

       •          Jankowski v. Cross, 

 (Colo. App. 1983);

       •          L&M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 

 (Colo. App. 1970);

       •          Jaramillo v. Cowen, 

 (Colo. App. 1989);

       •          In re Estate of Henry, 

, 

 (Colo.

                  App. 2012);

       •          Jaramillo v. Steiner, 

 (Colo. App. 2009);

       •          Rojas v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 

 (2003);

                  and

       •          Robinson v. Lennox Hill Hospital, 

 (App.

                  Div. 1987).

¶ 26   After we attempted, without success, to locate these cases, we

  ordered Al-Hamim to provide complete and unedited copies of the

  cases, or if the citations were GAI hallucinations, to show cause

                                        13
  why he should not be sanctioned for citing fake cases. In his

  response to our show cause order, Al-Hamim admitted that he

  relied on AI “to assist his preparation” of his opening brief,

  confirmed that the citations were hallucinations, and that he “failed

  to inspect the brief.” He did not address why he should not be

  sanctioned.

       B.     The Risks of Relying on a GAI Tool to Draft a Court Filing

¶ 27        To explain why a GAI tool can produce legal documents filled

  with hallucinations, we briefly review the large language model

  (LLM) underlying GAI technology.

¶ 28        GAI tools are trained using LLMs that, “through a form of

  machine learning known as deep learning, teach the program how

  characters, words, and sentences function together.” Maria E.

  Berkenkotter & Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov, Can Robot Lawyers Close

  the Access to Justice Gap? Generative AI, the Unauthorized Practice

  of Law, and Closing the Access to Justice Gap, 

, 42

  (2024) (hereinafter, Access to Justice). An LLM “learns what words

  are most likely to appear where, and which ones are most likely to

  precede or follow others — and by doing so, it can make

  probabilistic, predictive judgments about ordinary meaning and


                                       14
  usage.” Snell, 

 n.7 (Newsom, J., concurring).

  This training allows the GAI tool to “generate content, such as

  words, images, and a command in a line of code, autonomously in

  response to prompts.” Access to Justice, 53 Colo. Law. at 42.

¶ 29   The limitations of and biases contained in the materials used

  to train an LLM can produce outputs that reflect the shortcomings

  in the LLM’s training. As of mid-2024, popular GAI tools, such as

  OpenAI’s GPT-4, were not “trained with data sets containing

  comprehensive, accurate legal resources.” Id. These widely used

  resources are “not consistently reliable legal research tools because

  they do not always provide the correct answers to legal queries and

  may even make up case names and citations when they do not

  know the answer to a question.” Id.

¶ 30   A GAI system “can generate citations to totally fabricated court

  decisions bearing seemingly real party names, with seemingly real

  reporter, volume, and page references, and seemingly real dates of

  decision[].” Caton, 39 Me. Bar J. at 49 (quoting Smith v. Farwell,

  No. 2282CV01197, at *1, 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2024)

  (unpublished order), https://perma.cc/59CV-C77W). These

  hallucinations “can relate, in whole or in part, to the case name,


                                   15
  case citation, and/or the content or holding of a fake case or a real

  judicial decision.” Id.; see also Eve Ross & Amy Milligan, What Can

  ChatGPT Do, and Should We Let It?, 34 S.C. Law. 34, 36 (2023)

  (“ChatGPT may confidently include authorities in its responses that

  are misleading, incorrect or simply made up. . . . Unfortunately,

  ChatGPT doesn’t always specify what sources it relies on for its

  responses.”); Nicole J. Benjamin, Artificial Intelligence and the

  Future of the Practice, 72 R.I. Bar J. 3, 3 (2024) (“AI

  ‘hallucinations’ — including the unforgiveable creation of case

  law — and the generation of inaccurate answers are enough to give

  us all pause when it comes to the adoption of artificial intelligence

  in the practice.”); Sadie O’Connor, Generative AI, 8 Geo. L. Tech.

  Rev. 394, 401 (2024) (“Since GAI algorithms are capable of

  ‘hallucinating’ false information, users must be cautious of its

  limitations.”).

¶ 31   “Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions.”

  Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 448. These include wasting the opposing

  party’s “time and money in exposing the deception,” taking the

  court’s time “from other important endeavors,” and potentially

  harming the reputations of “judges and courts whose names are


                                     16
  falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions” and the

  reputation of “a party attributed with fictional conduct.” Id.

  Moreover, “a future litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling

  by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.” Id. at

  448-49.

¶ 32   Accordingly, using a GAI tool to draft a legal document can

  pose serious risks if the user does not thoroughly review the tool’s

  output. Reliance on a GAI tool not trained with legal authorities

  can “lead both unwitting lawyers and nonlawyers astray.” Access to

  Justice, 53 Colo. Law. at 43. A self-represented litigant may not

  understand that a GAI tool may confidently respond to a query

  regarding a legal topic “even if the answer contains errors,

  hallucinations, falsehoods, or biases.” Id. (In 2023 and 2024,

  various companies introduced GAI tools trained using legal

  authorities. Those legal GAI tools are not implicated in this appeal,

  and we offer no opinion on their ability to provide accurate

  responses to queries concerning legal issues.)

¶ 33   For these reasons, individuals using the current generation of

  general-purpose GAI tools to assist with legal research and drafting

  must be aware of the tools’ propensity to generate outputs


                                    17
  containing fictitious legal authorities and must ensure that such

  fictitious citations do not appear in any court filing.

¶ 34   Even if Al-Hamim lacked actual knowledge that GAI tools can

  produce fake citations, “[a] pro se litigant who chooses to rely upon

  his own understanding of legal principles and procedures is

  required to follow the same procedural rules as those who are

  qualified to practice law and must be prepared to accept the

  consequences of his mistakes and errors.” Rosenberg v. Grady, 

 (Colo. App. 1992). (We note that Al-Hamim filed his

  opening brief on June 24, 2024 — more than one year after media

  outlets throughout the country reported on the attorneys’

  submission of a brief filled with ChatGPT-generated hallucinations

  in Mata. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Here’s What Happens When

  Your Lawyer Uses ChatGPT, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2023),

  https://perma.cc/H4DC-JWH2; Larry Neumeister, Lawyers

  Submitted Bogus Case Law Created by ChatGPT. A Judge Fined

  Them $5,000, Associated Press (June 22, 2023),

  https://perma.cc/2B27-PHJN. By mid-2024, GAI tools’ propensity

  to produce hallucinations in response to queries regarding legal




                                     18
  issues was not arcana known only to members of the bar and

  judges.)

¶ 35    C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) requires that an appellant’s opening brief

  provide “a clear and concise discussion of the grounds upon which

  the party relies in seeking a reversal . . . of the judgment . . . of the

  lower court or tribunal, with citations to the authorities . . . on

  which the appellant relies.” The submission of a brief containing

  GAI-produced hallucinations runs afoul of this rule.

       C.    Appropriate Sanctions When a Self-Represented Litigant
                Submits a Court Filing Containing Hallucinations

¶ 36    This court has the authority to “dismiss an appeal” or “impose

  other sanctions it deems appropriate, including attorney fees,” if a

  party fails to comply with the Colorado Appellate Rules. C.A.R.

  38(a), 39.1. Until today, no Colorado appellate court has

  considered the consequences for a self-represented litigant who

  submits a brief containing hallucinations.

¶ 37    Other courts, however, have considered an appropriate

  sanction under these circumstances. In Anonymous v. New York

  City Department of Education, the self-represented plaintiff

  submitted a filing containing hallucinations. No. 24-cv-04232,



                                      19


, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2024) (unpublished

opinion). The court noted that “[s]anctions may be imposed for

submitting false and nonexistent legal authority to the [c]ourt.” 

However, the court declined to impose sanctions due to the

plaintiff’s status as a self-represented litigant and, instead, warned

the plaintiff and other self-represented litigants that future

submissions of false citations would likely result in sanctions. 

Other courts have taken a similar approach. See, e.g.,

Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. CV-24-00379, 

, at *2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2024) (unpublished order)

(warning a self-represented litigant whose filings were “replete with

citations to nonexistent caselaw and legal authorities that do not

correspond to her claims, suggesting that [she] may be using AI,

such as ChatGPT, to draft her briefs,” and that “[a]ny future filings

with citations to nonexistent cases may result in sanctions”);

Dukuray v. Experian Info. Sols., No. 23-cv-9043, 

,

at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (unpublished report and

recommendation) (advising the self-represented plaintiff that future

filings containing false citations may result in sanctions), adopted,

 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024) (unpublished order);


                                  20
  Morgan v. Cmty. Against Violence, No. 23-cv-353-WPJ/JMR, 

, at *8 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023) (unpublished opinion)

  (asserting that the self-represented status of a plaintiff who “cited to

  several fake or nonexistent opinions” will “not be tolerated by the

  [c]ourt as an excuse for failing to adhere to this [c]ourt’s rules” and

  warning that “[a]ny future filings with citations to nonexistent cases

  may result in sanctions”); N.E.W. Credit Union v. Mehlhorn, No.

  2023AP2187, 

, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 13,

  2024) (unpublished opinion) (admonishing the appellant for

  submitting false citations but declining to dismiss the appeal as a

  sanction).

¶ 38   The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal where the

  self-represented appellant submitted a filing containing false

  citations, among other violations of the court’s rules. Kruse v.

  Karlen, 

, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024). The appellant’s

  violations included his failure “to file an Appendix,” to provide “an

  []adequate Statement of Facts,” and to include a “Points Relied On”

  section in her brief. Id. at 47-48. The court concluded that

  dismissal was an appropriate remedy because the “[a]ppellant ha[d]




                                     21
  substantially failed to comply with [the] court rules.” Id. at 53

  (emphasis added).

¶ 39   While we conclude that Al-Hamim’s submission of a brief

  containing hallucinations violated C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B), this deviation

  from the Appellate Rules was not as serious as the self-represented

  appellant’s misconduct in Kruse. Further, in his response to our

  show cause order, Al-Hamim acknowledged his use of AI, apologized

  for his mistake, and accepted responsibility for including

  hallucinations in his opening brief. (We rejected his request to

  submit an amended opening brief that only cited real cases,

  however. While we do not impose sanctions against Al-Hamim, his

  inclusion of hallucinations in his original brief does not entitle him

  to a second opportunity to file an opening brief.)

¶ 40   Because until now, no Colorado appellate court has

  considered appropriate sanctions for a self-represented litigant’s

  submission of a brief containing GAI-derived hallucinations, and

  because the record does not show that Al-Hamim previously filed

  court documents containing fake citations, we conclude that

  imposing monetary sanctions or dismissing this appeal would be

  disproportionate to Al-Hamim’s violation of the Appellate Rules.


                                    22
  Further, in their answer brief, the landlords failed to alert this court

  to the hallucinations in Al-Hamim’s opening brief and did not

  request an award of attorney fees against Al-Hamim. Under the

  circumstances, we exercise our discretion not to order Al-Hamim to

  pay the landlords’ attorney fees or to impose another form of

  sanction against him. See Auxier v. McDonald, 

,

  

.

¶ 41   However, we warn Al-Hamim, as well as lawyers and

  self-represented parties who appear in this court, that we will not

  “look kindly on similar infractions in the future.” Anonymous, 

, at *7. A lawyer’s or a self-represented party’s future

  filing in this court containing GAI-generated hallucinations may

  result in sanctions.

                             IV.   Disposition

¶ 42   The judgment is affirmed.

       JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.




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