Utto Inc. v. Metrotech Corp.

Case: 23-1435   Document: 46     Page: 1    Filed: 10/18/2024




   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                       UTTO INC.,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

  METROTECH CORP., AKA VIVAX-METROTECH,
             Defendant-Appellee
           ______________________

                       2023-1435
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Northern District of California in No. 3:22-cv-01904-WHO,
 Judge William H. Orrick, III.
                  ______________________

                Decided: October 18, 2024
                 ______________________

    JAMES DENISON, Aliso Viejo, CA, argued for plaintiff-
 appellant.

    JASON LAO, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Costa Mesa, CA,
 argued for defendant-appellee.   Also represented by
 ANDREA LEVENSON.
                ______________________

   Before PROST, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
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 2                                 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




     UTTO Inc. owns 

 which
 describes and claims methods for detecting and identifying
 what the patent calls “buried assets,” referring to
 underground utility lines. UTTO sued Metrotech Corp.,
 alleging infringement of the patent and tortious
 interference with prospective economic advantage under
 California law. The district court dismissed both counts of
 the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can
 be granted. Regarding patent infringement, we conclude
 that fuller claim-construction analysis and proceedings are
 needed in this case to determine the scope of the disputed
 claim language. Regarding the state-law tort, we see no
 reversible error in the district court’s dismissal.
 Accordingly, we vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand.
                               I
                               A
      UTTO’s ’441 patent is titled “Detection of Buried Assets
 Using Current Location and Known Buffer Zones.” It
 describes variations on a process for detecting and
 identifying “buried assets (i.e., underground utility lines),”
 such as lines for telephones, electricity, natural gas,
 Internet, or wastewater pipes. ’441 patent, col. 1, line 45;
 

 lines 51–54. The core of the process involves using both
 (a) a geographical location provider (e.g., a global
 positioning system (GPS)) to pinpoint a person’s location
 and (b) previously stored buried asset data to locate, and
 generate a buffer zone around, a buried asset; with that
 information, a field technician with a locator device is
 informed whether the technician is inside or outside the
 buffer zone for a particular asset. 

 col. 3, line 58,
 through col. 4, line 2. The patent teaches, among other
 things, using the method in a way that reduces the
 possibility that the desired information about one buried
 asset is clouded by interfering signals from another. 

 col. 4, lines 2–10. Independent claim 1 of the ’441 patent
 reads:
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                                3



    A method on a mobile computing device for locating
    electromagnetic signals radiating from a buried
    asset, the method comprising:
    receiving, via a communications network
    communicatively coupled with the mobile
    computing device, a group of buried asset data
    points corresponding to a particular buried asset
    sought by an operator of the mobile computing
    device;
    reading a predefined value pertaining to a width of
    a buffer zone;
    generating, based on the group of buried asset data
    points, a two dimensional area comprising the
    buffer zone at an above-surface location, wherein a
    width of the buffer zone corresponds to the
    predefined value, and wherein the buffer zone
    corresponds to the particular buried asset;
    iteratively executing the following four steps:
    a) calculating an above-surface location of the
    mobile computing device using spatial processes;
    b) determining whether the above-surface location
    of the mobile computing device is located within the
    two dimensional area;
    c) if the above-surface location is not located within
    the two dimensional area, displaying a first graphic
    in a display of the mobile computing device; and
    d) if the above-surface location is located within the
    two dimensional area, displaying a second graphic
    in the display.
 

 col. 17, line 48, through col. 18, line 16 (emphases
 added).
     Metrotech, a competitor of UTTO’s, sells its RTK-Pro
 locator device, which has a “walk back” feature. That
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 4                                UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 feature allows the device user to connect to a database and
 retrieve one or more location points previously saved in
 that database. When the user selects a point to “walk back”
 to, the RTK-Pro, having information about its own location,
 shows an arrow directing the user to that point. When the
 user (holding the device) is within 10 feet of the point, the
 screen shows a “zero-in” display that consists of a circle
 centered around the point and a symbol representing the
 user’s location in relation to the point. Once the user
 reaches the center of the circle, the device confirms its
 arrival at the walk-back point and displays the point’s
 coordinates.
                              B
     On March 25, 2022, UTTO brought the present action
 against Metrotech, stating two counts in its complaint:
 infringement of the ’441 patent and unfair competition.
 UTTO also moved for a preliminary injunction. Metrotech
 both opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction and
 sought dismissal of UTTO’s complaint under Federal Rule
 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on
 which relief could be granted. Before the district court
 could rule on either motion, UTTO filed a First Amended
 Complaint, alleging infringement and tortious interference
 with prospective economic advantage, and Metrotech
 sought dismissal of the new complaint.
      On June 2, 2022, the district court denied the motion
 for a preliminary injunction. UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech
 Corp., No. 22-cv-01904-WHO, 

, at *6
 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2022) (UTTO Preliminary Injunction
 Denial). In relevant part, the court held that UTTO failed
 to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its
 infringement claim. 

 at *3–5. In so concluding, the court
 set forth the claim construction that is the issue on appeal
 regarding the patent count of the complaint.
     The court construed the claim language “group of
 buried asset data points” in both the “receiving” and
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                               5



 “generating” limitations of claim 1 to require “two or more”
 buried asset data points for each buried asset, adopting
 that construction as reflecting the “ordinary and customary
 meaning.” 

 at *3–4. The court acknowledged that the
 specification in two places refers to “one or more buried
 asset data points” for a given buried asset, but the court
 said that those references to the singular occur “[o]nly
 twice” and “neither supports the ordinary reading of the
 claim language itself.” 

. “Moreover,” the court
 noted, “the figures showing the buffer zone generation
 (Figures 4A to 4G) all depict multiple data points.” 

 The
 court also stated that it was not persuaded by UTTO’s
 argument that a relevant artisan “would understand
 [‘group of buried asset data points’] to ‘encompass one data
 point if that were all that existed.’” 

 UTTO had
 contended that buried assets typically are power lines,
 water pipes, and telephone cables; that “it takes at least
 two points to define a line”; and that a relevant artisan
 would “understand the claim description to reflect that
 reality” and not to mean that the method did not work if
 there were only one data point. 

 The court suggested
 that this argument was self-defeating because, “if it takes
 at least two points to define a line,” a relevant artisan
 would likely interpret the claim language “to mean more
 than one—in other words, ‘two or more.’” 

 Because the
 ’441 patent requires the use of “multiple points” to generate
 a buffer zone and Metrotech’s “walk back feature requires
 only a single point,” the district court concluded, UTTO had
 not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its
 infringement claim. 

     On July 8, 2022, the district court dismissed UTTO’s
 First Amended Complaint, while granting UTTO leave to
 amend it. UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., No. 22-cv-01904-
 WHO, 

, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2022)
 (UTTO First Dismissal). As to patent infringement, the
 court determined that UTTO had not sufficiently pleaded
 facts about Metrotech’s product that could meet the
 “receiving” or “generating” limitations. 

 at *3–4. For the
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 6                              UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 “receiving” limitation, the court relied on its claim
 construction from the UTTO Preliminary Injunction
 Denial, where it had construed “group of buried asset data
 points” to require two or more data points, and it concluded
 the amended complaint did not allege that Metrotech’s
 device receives two or more data points for a particular
 buried asset. 

. For the “generating” limitation, the
 court drew the same conclusion. 

. The court also
 dismissed UTTO’s claim of tortious interference with
 prospective economic advantage, concluding that UTTO
 had failed to allege several required elements of the tort.
 

 at *4–5.
      UTTO then filed a Second Amended Complaint, which
 Metrotech moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). On
 October 4, 2022, the district court dismissed that
 complaint, while again granting UTTO leave to amend.
 UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., No. 22-cv-01904-WHO, 

, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2022) (UTTO Second
 Dismissal). As to patent infringement, the court ruled that
 UTTO had now plausibly alleged that the “receiving”
 limitation was met, based on a Metrotech video (which
 UTTO attached to its complaint) that plausibly showed a
 field technician retrieving multiple data points using
 Metrotech’s locator device. 

 at *3–4. The court
 determined, however, that there still were no facts alleged
 that plausibly supported an inference that the “generating”
 limitation was met. 

. As to the state-law count,
 the court held that UTTO had not adequately alleged two
 elements of its tort claim: that there was an economic
 relationship between UTTO and a third party with the
 probability of future economic benefit to UTTO, 

,
 and that Metrotech’s conduct was independently wrongful,
 

.
    In response to the second dismissal, UTTO filed a Third
 Amended Complaint, and Metrotech moved to dismiss it.
 On December 19, 2022, the district court dismissed UTTO’s
 Third Amended Complaint—this time with prejudice.
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                                7



 UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., 

, 1191
 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (UTTO Final Dismissal). As to patent
 infringement, the court, following its claim construction
 from its preliminary injunction denial, agreed with
 Metrotech that “the buffer zone described in the generating
 limitation is only generated using multiple buried asset
 data points,” stating that the ’441 patent describes the
 generation of a buffer zone from “the ‘union’ of circular two-
 dimensional areas surrounding buried asset data points.”
 

 (emphasis added). After rejecting UTTO’s
 doctrine-of-equivalents argument (a rejection not
 challenged by UTTO in this appeal), the district court
 determined that “[t]he inherent problem with UTTO’s
 argument is that, as alleged, the walk back feature uses
 only one data point at a time and, as explained, the ’441
 Patent requires the use of multiple data points to generate
 the buffer zone.” 

. “As a result,” the court
 concluded, “UTTO has not pleaded infringement, either
 directly or under the doctrine of equivalents.” 

     As to the state-law count, the district court determined
 that UTTO failed to state a claim of tortious interference
 with prospective economic advantage. 

 at 1188–91. The
 Third Amended Complaint makes the following
 allegations: A third party, Honeywell, considering the
 offering of locator services to its customers, expressed
 interest in using UTTO’s software platform, possibly to run
 on Metrotech’s hardware, for such an offering. J.A. 93–94
 ¶¶ 46–47. Starting in October 2021, UTTO engaged in
 “continued negotiations,” “several follow-up telephone
 calls,” and discussion of the terms of a possible software-
 as-a-service agreement with Honeywell. J.A. 93 ¶ 46.
 Representatives of UTTO, Honeywell, and Metrotech met
 together on December 21, 2021, “at Honeywell’s urging to
 see if Metrotech and UTTO could collaborate and whether
 data retrieved by Metrotech’s physical devices could be
 UTTO compliant.” J.A. 94 ¶ 47. According to UTTO, at the
 meeting,
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 8                               UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




     Mr. Burk [of Honeywell] asked if the Honeywell
     data Metrotech was storing could be delivered in
     a format that would work with the UTTO
     software. As understood by UTTO and others
     present, based on the conversations UTTO
     subsequently         had      with        Honeywell
     representatives, Honeywell was aware that either
     UTTO or Metrotech could convert the data into a
     format that would work with UTTO’s software.
     The inquiry was directed to whether converting
     data would be a mechanical process involving
     virtually no effort, or whether UTTO would have
     to be involved. Mr. Drew, speaking for Metrotech,
     said that it was not a question of whether
     Metrotech could provide UTTO compliant data
     and that of course it could, that Metrotech had
     that covered, strongly suggesting that UTTO was
     not necessary and that Metrotech knew how to
     handle anything UTTO could in the way of
     software. He said the question was whether
     Metrotech was willing to provide the data to
     UTTO and that, if it did, he would expect
     Metrotech would charge Honeywell extra. . . . Ms.
     O’Connor of Honeywell said, in words or
     substance, “Isn’t that our data?” . . . Nevertheless,
     Metrotech’s position was clear: Either Honeywell
     would have to abandon plans to contract with
     UTTO, or Honeywell would have to pay Metrotech
     an increased price if it wanted to work with
     UTTO, which Metrotech could determine as it
     saw fit since it had possession of the data, and so
     could it price UTTO out of the competition if it
     wanted to.

 J.A. 94–95 ¶ 51 (omitting sentences immaterial to
 particular allegations now at issue on appeal). Mr. Drew,
 however, “had no reasonable basis” for making the
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                                9



 assertion “that Metrotech had the transfer of UTTO-
 compliant data ‘covered,’” because “within a day or so of the
 December 21, 2021, meeting, [he] contacted [UTTO]
 seeking to obtain various details about UTTO’s technical
 specifications and features, and these discussions indicated
 that Metrotech did not in fact have the level of software
 expertise Metrotech wanted to lead Honeywell to believe it
 had with regard to converting the data.” J.A. 95–96 ¶ 52.
     Reviewing those allegations, the district court
 dismissed the state-law count, without relying on one of the
 grounds of insufficiency that it recited in its previous
 dismissal—namely,      that    the   asserted     economic
 relationship alleged to have been interfered with (with
 Honeywell) was not sufficiently mature for purposes of this
 tort. UTTO Final Dismissal, at 1189. The court noted that
 UTTO had added allegations in the Third Amended
 Complaint “that further support the existence of an
 economic relationship between UTTO and Honeywell with
 the probability of future economic benefit to UTTO,” but
 the court did not determine whether this element of the
 tort claim had now been adequately alleged. 

 Instead,
 the court concluded that UTTO had failed to plausibly
 allege that Metrotech’s conduct was independently
 wrongful, a required element of the asserted tort. 

     The court entered a final judgment of dismissal with
 prejudice on December 19, 2022. J.A. 1. UTTO timely
 appealed.     We have jurisdiction under 

(a)(1).
                                II
     UTTO challenges the district court’s adoption of the
 construction of the “group” phrase—as requiring at least
 two data points per buried asset—in granting the motion
 to dismiss the patent count. Much more briefly, UTTO also
 challenges the district court’s dismissal of its claim for
 tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
 We address the two issues in turn.
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 10                               UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




      We decide the propriety of the dismissals de novo,
 following Ninth Circuit law, taking as true all well-pleaded
 allegations of material fact and construing them in the
 light most favorable to the nonmoving party.             See
 Sanderling Management Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Puri v. Khalsa, 

 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantively, the Supreme Court has
 directed a federal court’s inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) to
 whether the factual allegations of the complaint are not
 merely consistent with but cross the line to support a
 plausible inference of liability under the invoked legal
 standard. See Ashcraft v. Iqbal, 

, 678–80
 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

, 555–
 57, 570 (2007); In re Alphabet, Inc. Securities Litigation, 

 (9th Cir. 2021); K-Tech Telecommunications,
 Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 

, 1282–83
 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The proper claim construction and
 questions about intrinsic evidence are decided de novo, but
 “[s]ubsidiary fact-finding” based on extrinsic evidence is
 sometimes useful, and such fact-finding is “subject to
 appellate review for clear error.” ParkerVision, Inc. v.
 Qualcomm Inc., ___ F.4th ____, 

, at *10
 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2024); see Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
 Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

, 326–27, 331–33 (2015).
                              A
     Regarding patent infringement, we agree in part with
 UTTO. We do not agree that claim construction is
 categorically forbidden at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of a case.
 But we agree that, in this case, additional analysis and
 proceedings are needed to arrive at a proper construction.
                              1
     UTTO argues that a district court may never engage in
 claim construction in deciding a motion to dismiss. It relies
 on portions of our opinion in Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2018), in which we reversed a
 district court’s dismissal of patent-infringement claims as
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                                 11



 resting on a premature resolution of claim-construction
 disputes. One portion, which uses the familiar label for
 claim-construction proceedings based on Markman v.
 Westview Instruments, Inc., 

 (1996), states:
     Defendants’ objections to [plaintiff Nalco’s] theory
     of infringement read like classic Markman
     arguments. Defendants first take issue with
     Nalco’s allegation that “coal combustion flue gas” is
     “the gas that is created during the combustion of
     coal.” But Defendants’ arguments boil down to
     objections to Nalco’s proposed claim construction
     for “flue gas,” a dispute not suitable for resolution
     on a motion to dismiss.
 Nalco, 

 (emphasis added) (citation
 omitted). Another portion states:
     It is not appropriate to resolve these disputes, or to
     determine whether the method claimed in the ’692
     patent should be confined to the preferred
     embodiment, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, without
     the benefit of claim construction. The “purpose of
     a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the
     complaint, not to decide the merits.” Gibson v. City
     of Chi., 

, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990)
     (emphasis added) (citation omitted).              The
     plausibility standard “does not impose a
     probability requirement at the pleading stage; it
     simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
     expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to
     support the plaintiff ’s allegations. Twombly, 

 . . . .
 Id. at 1350.
      Those passages, we conclude, should not be read as
 stating a categorical rule against a district court’s adoption
 of a claim construction in adjudicating a motion to dismiss.
 The passages do not in terms state such a rule. They are
 readily understood to be drawing a conclusion about the
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 12                             UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 need for further proceedings to resolve the particular
 claim-construction issues in that case before a sound
 determination of the appropriateness of dismissal could be
 reached. Nalco should be read in that case-specific way.
      Doing so reflects the logical relationship of claim
 construction to infringement and the normal function of
 courts deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
 Adjudicating a claim of infringement generally requires a
 two-step analysis: “[T]he court first determines the scope
 and meaning of the claims asserted, and then the properly
 construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing
 device (for an apparatus claim) or allegedly infringing act
 (for a method claim).” Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude
 Medical S.C., Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
 (citing CommScope Technologies LLC v. Dali Wireless Inc.,
 

, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). “The first step—
 claim construction—is a question of law we review de novo
 to the extent it is decided only on the intrinsic evidence.”
 

 (first citing Data Engine Technologies LLC v.
 Google LLC, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2021); and then
 citing Teva, 574 U.S. at 331). In many cases, claim
 construction is properly done based on intrinsic evidence
 alone. See Teva, 574 U.S. at 331 (recognizing that claim
 construction “often requires the judge only to examine and
 to construe the document’s words without requiring the
 judge to resolve any underlying factual disputes”);
 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In most situations, an analysis of the
 intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a
 disputed claim term.”). Where claims are construed based
 on intrinsic evidence alone, a decision on claim
 construction is not different in kind from the interpretation
 of other legal standards, which is proper and routine in
 ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
     UTTO’s proposed categorical rule would also be
 inconsistent with our precedents. For example, in the
 context of challenges to eligibility under 

,
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                             13



 we have repeatedly approved the grant of a motion to
 dismiss a patent suit “when there are no factual allegations
 that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility
 question as a matter of law.” Simio, LLC v. FlexSim
 Software Products, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir.
 2020) (quoting Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades
 Software, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see,
 e.g., Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., 

,
 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Aatrix, 

 (citing
 precedents).    The application of eligibility standards
 depends on what is claimed—that is, on the meaning of the
 claims—and thus requires the court to interpret the claims.
 See, e.g., ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 

, 768–69 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
 Graphics Corp., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
 also Brumfield, Trustee for Ascent Trust v. IBG LLC, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (analyzing eligibility based
 on the “claims, understood in light of the specification”);
 Sequoia Technology, LLC v. Dell, Inc., 

,
 1323–26 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (reversing ineligibility ruling
 based on reversal of claim construction).
      As to the scope of necessary proceedings: We have
 explained that a tribunal need not construe all claim terms
 whose meaning is in dispute, but may limit itself to those
 terms whose meaning must be determined to adjudicate
 the matter in issue, such as infringement or invalidity. See
 Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 

, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
 2019); Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. American Science &
 Engineering, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In
 addition, we have said that district courts have “wide
 latitude in how they conduct the proceedings before them,”
 including claim-construction proceedings. Ballard Medical
 Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “[S]ome courts have found it useful
 to hold hearings and issue orders comprehensively
 construing the claims in issue,” but “[s]uch a procedure is
 not always necessary.” 

 “As long as the trial court
 construes the claims to the extent necessary to determine
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 14                             UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 whether the accused device infringes, the court may
 approach the task in any way that it deems best.” 

 Similarly, in the § 101 context, we have explained: “If there
 are claim construction disputes at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage,
 we have held that either the court must proceed by
 adopting the non-moving party’s constructions, or the court
 must resolve the disputes to whatever extent is needed to
 conduct the § 101 analysis, which may well be less than a
 full, formal claim construction.” Aatrix, 

 (citations omitted) (citing Genetic Technologies Ltd. v.
 Merial L.L.C., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). And
 in challenges on appeal, we have repeatedly faulted the
 appellant for not having “explained how it might benefit
 from any particular term’s construction.” Simio, 

; see also Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at 1293–94;
 Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Electronic Communication
 Technologies, LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 

, 1183–84 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Cleveland Clinic
 Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Finally, while recognizing that
 “extrinsic evidence and expert testimony can help to
 educate the court concerning the invention and the
 knowledge of persons of skill in the field of the invention,
 even as we have cautioned against undue reliance on
 experts,” we have said that “[t]he decision as to the need
 for and use of experts is within the sound discretion of the
 district court.” Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile
 USA, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation
 omitted) (citing Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon
 Laboratories Corp., 

 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
     The foregoing authorities make clear that there is no
 procedural error in the mere fact that a court has construed
 claims without conducting a separate Markman claim-
 construction set of proceedings, much less without hearing
 extrinsic evidence or expert testimony. Some case-specific
 circumstances can make it improper for a district court to
 resolve a claim construction dispute in the context of
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                               15



 adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but sometimes a
 claim’s meaning may be so clear on the only point that is
 ultimately material to deciding the dismissal motion that
 no additional process is needed. Nalco does not establish a
 rigid rule in place of the practical, case-specific inquiry.
                                2
     In this case, we conclude, fuller claim-construction
 proceedings and analysis are needed than were provided in
 and by the district court. The claim limitation at issue is
 “generating, based on the group of buried asset data points,
 a two dimensional area comprising the buffer zone.” ’441
 patent, col. 17, lines 58–59. The language, “the group of
 buried asset data points” (emphasis added), refers back to
 the claim limitation, “receiving . . . a group of buried asset
 data points corresponding to a particular buried asset
 sought by an operator of the mobile computing device.” 

 lines 51–55. The issue in dispute is whether “a group of
 buried asset data points corresponding to a particular
 buried asset” must consist of at least two data points. The
 district court gave an affirmative answer in denying the
 preliminary injunction and did not change that answer in
 its rulings on the three dismissal motions. We conclude
 that the analysis supporting that answer is inadequate.
     As a threshold matter, we see no forfeiture of the
 opportunity to present additional claim-construction
 analysis and evidence and no missing explanation of how
 additional proceedings could matter to the result. In its
 Third Amended Complaint, UTTO alleged that “[a] ‘group’
 in the mathematical or computing sense of the word could
 refer to a single set of data upon which operations are
 performed.” J.A. 91 ¶ 32. In opposing dismissal of the
 Third Amended Complaint, UTTO indicated its intent to
 present additional materials for claim construction at an
 upcoming proceeding pursuant to the established schedule
 for claim construction (which the district court did not
 abrogate or alter): “Particularly since the claim
 construction hearing is scheduled to take place in a month,
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 16                              UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 UTTO respectfully urges that the Court avoid premising
 its ruling on Metrotech’s claim construction until all the
 relevant claim construction evidence is considered.” J.A.
 158–59. By that point, UTTO and Metrotech had already
 filed a joint claim-construction and prehearing statement.
 See UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., No. 22-cv-01904-WHO
 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022), ECF No. 40; J.A. 75. In it, UTTO
 pointed to several pieces of extrinsic evidence that it sought
 to present at further proceedings, including encyclopedia
 articles on “group theory” and “group,” the testimony of its
 founder, and the testimony and report of an expert. 

 at
 2–4. Subsequently—and before the district court ruled on
 the final motion to dismiss—UTTO also filed an opening
 claim-construction brief elaborating on its legal arguments
 and extrinsic evidence. UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., No.
 22-cv-01904-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2022), ECF No. 59;
 J.A. 76. And there was never doubt in the district court
 that the correctness of the “at least two” construction was
 crucial to the district court’s basis for dismissing the patent
 count of the complaint.
     On the merits, the basic framework for claim
 construction is familiar. “We generally give words of a
 claim their ordinary meaning in the context of the claim
 and the whole patent document; [and] the specification
 particularly, but also the prosecution history, informs the
 determination of claim meaning in context, including by
 resolving ambiguities”; but “even if the meaning is plain on
 the face of the claim language, the patentee can, by acting
 with sufficient clarity, disclaim such a plain meaning or
 prescribe a special definition.” K-fee System GmbH v.
 Nespresso USA, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
 (alteration in original) (first quoting World Class
 Technology Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 

 (Fed.
 Cir. 2014); and then citing Personalized Media
 Communications, LLC v. Apple Inc., 

, 1339–
 40 (Fed. Cir. 2020)); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 

, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v.
 Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC, 669 F.3d
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                              17



 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Within that framework, we see
 several issues relevant to a proper claim construction that
 would significantly benefit from fuller exploration by the
 parties and the district court.
      We have previously exercised our discretion not to
 resolve a claim-construction dispute ourselves, but instead
 to remand for further proceedings on the dispute, where
 “[t]here has been insufficient exploration in the record,
 both here and in the district court, of too many questions of
 apparent relevance to identifying a proper construction of
 the limitation.” Frans Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v.
 Stopaq Amcorr Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (first
 citing Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and then citing
 MeadWestVaco Corp. v. Rexam Beauty and Closures, Inc.,
 

, 1270 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). We explained
 that those questions “would be better addressed initially by
 more focused analysis—and, if necessary, more focused
 record development—on remand.” Id. at 722. This is such
 a case. We flag the issues, leaving for remand the needed
 additional examination of the case-specific materials and
 of governing claim-construction precedents.
     The district court had good reason to start with the
 premise that the phrase “group of buried asset data
 points,” in its most usual meaning in ordinary parlance,
 calls for two or more such points. But UTTO raises at least
 a question as to whether a relevant artisan would read the
 phrase in light of a recognized meaning of “group” in
 mathematics to mean one or more, not two or more. And
 even aside from that possibility, which we do not explore
 further, there are reasons for more analysis before deciding
 whether the phrase should be assigned the two-or-more
 meaning.
     For one thing, the claim language does not appear to be
 the kind of language that has so “plain” a univocal meaning
 that to give it a contrary construction would require
 meeting the high standard of redefinition or clear
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 18                              UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 disclaimer. See K-fee, 

. Otherwise, speaking
 of a “group of one or more” would be not just unusual but
 flatly impermissible as English because it would be self-
 contradictory—like (say) “pair of one or more.” Yet it does
 not seem to have that character. See IEX Corp. v. Blue
 Pumpkin Software, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir.
 2005) (using phrase “group of one or more agents” without
 noting linguistic impropriety); cf. AlterWAN, Inc. v.
 Amazon.com, Inc., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (same for
 term “set”; involving a claim limitation of “a set of one or
 more” items) (emphasis added).
      Relatedly, to the extent that “group of [plural term]”
 shares the character of plurals, the proper meaning is
 presumptive, but only presumptive—the specification not
 having to rise to the level of redefinition or disclaimer to
 overcome the presumed “two or more” meaning. In
 accordance with ordinary and customary meaning, we have
 stated that “we presume a plural term refers to two or more
 items,” but “[t]hat presumption can be overcome when the
 broader context shows a different meaning applies.” Apple
 Inc. v. MPH Technologies Oy, 

, 261–62 (Fed.
 Cir. 2022) (citing Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs
 Manufacturing Co., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
 “[I]n context, the plural can describe a universe ranging
 from one to some higher number, rather than requiring
 more than one item.” Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag International
 Ltd., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2004). If the plural
 expression “buried asset data points” inside the claim
 expression “group of buried asset data points” can mean
 “one or more buried asset data points,” the claim
 expression would refer to “group of one or more buried
 asset data points”—which, as noted above, seems
 linguistically permissible though unusual. Thus, the
 analysis of the claim term’s proper meaning must go
 beyond a conclusion about the “ordinary and customary
 meaning” of the words. UTTO Preliminary Injunction
 Denial, at *3 (“The claim does not mention ‘one or more’
 data points, or ‘a’ data point. It describes a ‘group’ of ‘data
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                                 19



 points,’ plural. The ordinary and customary meaning
 indicates that more than one data point is necessary to
 create the buffer zone.”). The specification must play a
 central role in arriving at a proper construction here, as it
 generally does. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315–17.1
      When we turn to the specification of the ’441 patent, we
 see seeming support for UTTO’s proposed claim
 construction as including one or more. Two passages
 mention the use of the claimed method in conjunction with
 “one or more” buried asset data points. First, in discussing
 how various types of data for a buried asset may be
 generated and stored in a database, the specification states
 that the database “may store one or more records for each
 buried asset, and each record may include one or more
 buried asset data points.” ’441 patent, col. 5, lines 58–66.
 Second, the specification states that, “[b]ased on the data
 [that the locator device] has received and calculated, [the
 locator device] calculates one or more buried asset data
 points . . . for the target buried asset.” 

 col. 9, line 67,
 through col. 10, line 2. We add that, in a third passage
 (cited by Metrotech but warranting more attention than so
 far given by the parties), the specification seemingly
 describes a single-point-based buffer zone (as well as a
 multi-point-based one): It says that Figure 4C “shows that
 a circular two-dimensional area comprising a buffer zone
 has been created around each buried asset data point,
 wherein the union of all of the circular two-dimensional
 areas comprises the buffer zone around the buried asset
 data points.” ’441 patent, col. 12, lines 16–20. The first
 clause seems to treat the area defined by the circle around
 a single point as a buffer zone (and the union of such buffer
 zones as itself a buffer zone).




     1  The parties have not presented arguments to us
 focused on prosecution history as illuminating claim scope.
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 20                                UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




     The foregoing passages require close scrutiny. On their
 face, they seem to lend support to the idea that the
 invention described covers a technician’s use of a single
 circular buffer zone around a single data point
 corresponding to a utility line—perhaps when the
 technician cares about only a small area, e.g., immediately
 abutting a house, not a large area extending along the line.
 The passages may illuminate the proper claim
 interpretation, including by identifying the invention’s
 “purpose.” See, e.g., Honeywell International, Inc. v. United
 States, 

 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (relying on
 patent-disclosed “purpose”); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
 

 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same); Minnesota
 Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson & Johnson
 Orthopaedics, Inc., 

, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
 (same).
     The district court, in its preliminary-injunction
 decision, stated that “[o]nly twice” does the specification
 refer to the use of “one or more buried asset data points”
 and that “neither [reference] supports the ordinary reading
 of the claim language itself.”             UTTO Preliminary
 Injunction Denial, at *4. But it is not clear why twice is
 not enough to support what may be a permissible, if
 unusual and non-presumptive, meaning of the expression.
 The court also said that “the figures showing the buffer
 zone generation (Figures 4A to 4G) all depict multiple data
 points.” 

 That is true, but the court’s statement does
 not assert that the figures depict only buffer zones based
 on more than one data point, and the above-quoted
 specification passage from col. 12, lines 16–20, seemingly
 does describe a “buffer zone” (in Figure 4C) as based on a
 single data point (along with a broader buffer zone based
 on more than one data point).               More broadly, the
 specification never uses “the present invention requires” or
 similarly limiting language when referring to depicted
 embodiments; in fact, it appears to be meticulous in
 describing embodiments as mere examples. See ’441
 patent, col. 3, lines 48–57; see, e.g., 

 col. 11, lines 32, 65;
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                                21



 col. 12, lines 1, 23, 32, 55, 64–65; col. 13, line 23; col. 14,
 lines 16, 66.
      Finally, on remand, there may be a role for extrinsic
 evidence to play in this case in recognized ways, including
 in coming to understand the invention as disclosed. See,
 e.g., Inpro II Licensing, 

. Here, for example
 (not necessarily only), extrinsic evidence may help to assess
 Metrotech’s argument that there is no indication that the
 ’441 patent allows the operator to turn off the functions
 performed on data points and then to work with only a
 “portion” of the data points retrieved. Metrotech Response
 Br. at 26–27. UTTO has alleged, including in its Third
 Amended Complaint, that its invention does work with one
 data point. J.A. 87 ¶ 19 (alleging that the ’441 patent can
 work with a “portion” of the data points retrieved and “can
 operate on each data point retrieved individually”). That
 assertion is a non-conclusory factual one under the
 standards governing Rule 12(b)(6), Twombly, 

, but to the extent it bears on claim construction, the
 district judge may adjudicate its correctness through
 adequate proceedings and must decide what role it should
 play in drawing the ultimate legal conclusion of the proper
 claim construction, see Teva, 574 U.S. at 331–33.
     We vacate the district court’s dismissal of UTTO’s
 infringement claim and remand for further claim-
 construction proceedings. We do not here decide whether
 the district court’s claim construction is correct.
                                B
      A claim for intentional interference with prospective
 economic advantage under California law requires a
 showing of the following elements: “(1) an economic
 relationship between the plaintiff and some third party,
 with the probability of future economic benefit to the
 plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship;
 (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed
 to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
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 22                              UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff
 proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” Korea
 Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

, 

 (2003) (quoting Westside Center
 Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc., 

,
 521–522, 

 (1996)). In addition, the
 plaintiff must show that “the defendant’s conduct was
 ‘wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of
 interference itself.’” 

 (quoting Della Penna v. Toyota
 Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 

, 

 (1995)). The district court dismissed the Third
 Amended Complaint because it determined that UTTO had
 failed to plead that Metrotech’s conduct was independently
 wrongful. UTTO Final Dismissal, at 1189–91.
     On appeal, UTTO argues that Metrotech’s conduct was
 independently wrongful in two respects: Metrotech
 unlawfully tied its relocating software product to its
 hardware      product,     and   Metrotech    fraudulently
 misrepresented its software capabilities. UTTO Opening
 Br. at 24–26. We conclude that UTTO’s brief assertions on
 appeal on this issue are insufficient to support disturbing
 the district court’s dismissal.
      With respect to tying: UTTO argues that it “alleged
 that the relocating software market consisted of two
 participants, UTTO and Metrotech, and that Metrotech
 had been eliminating its sole competitor from that market
 by tying Metrotech’s hardware product to Metrotech’s
 relocating software and the ‘Walk Back’ feature.” Id. at 25.
 The only legal authority that UTTO cites in support of this
 argument in its opening brief is a portion of a Ninth Circuit
 case where the court discusses a tie that is unlawful under
 a modified per se rule. Id. at 25–26 (citing Epic Games, Inc.
 v. Apple, Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,
 

 (2024), and cert. denied, 

 (2024)); see also Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
 Hyde, 

 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by
 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                            23



 28 (2006). Accordingly, we construe UTTO’s contention to
 be that Metrotech has tied its product in a way that is per
 se unlawful (as opposed to a tie that is unlawful under a
 Rule of Reason analysis).2
     To state a claim for a tie that is per se unlawful, a
 plaintiff must adequately allege, among other things, that
 the defendant has market power in the tying-product
 market. See Epic Games, 

. Here, UTTO is
 asserting that the hardware market is the tying-product
 market and the software market is the tied-product
 market. UTTO Opening Br. at 25. But, although UTTO
 has alleged facts supporting an inference that Metrotech
 has market power in the software market, i.e., the tied-
 product market, J.A. 94 ¶ 50, it has failed to allege that
 Metrotech has market power in the hardware market, i.e.,
 the tying-product market. That deficiency is enough to
 hold that tying has not been adequately alleged, though
 there may well also be other deficiencies—such as,
 perhaps, the absence of an allegation of a Metrotech policy
 beyond the dealing with one customer described by UTTO.
 J.A. 93–97 ¶¶ 44–58.
     With respect to the alleged fraud: UTTO asserts that it
 alleged that Metrotech “made false representations about
 its [software] capabilities” to disrupt UTTO and
 Honeywell’s dealings. UTTO Opening Br. at 24–25; see J.A.
 94–96 ¶¶ 51–55. The sole basis for the allegation is that
 Metrotech’s representative assertedly stated during the
 December 21, 2021 meeting with Honeywell and UTTO
 that “it was not a question of whether Metrotech could



     2UTTO adds a “see also” citation to Epic’s reference to
 an “incipient violation of an antitrust law,” 

, but there is no developed argument on the point, so
 we disregard it. See Game and Technology Co., Ltd. v.
 Wargaming Group Ltd., 

, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir.
 2019).
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 24                             UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.




 provide UTTO compliant data and that of course it could,
 that Metrotech had that covered,” J.A. 94–95 ¶ 51, yet the
 same Metrotech representative called UTTO within a day
 or so of the December 21, 2021 meeting asking for “various
 details about UTTO’s technical specifications and
 features,” J.A. 95–96 ¶ 52. On that basis alone, UTTO
 alleges that Metrotech made “false and misleading
 statements about its software capabilities,” J.A. 96 ¶ 55,
 violating the prohibition against fraudulent business acts
 or practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law,
 California Business & Professions Code § 17200. Id.;
 UTTO Opening Br. at 26.
     We agree with the district court’s conclusion that this
 allegation is insufficient to escape dismissal. UTTO has
 not stated facts that spell out a plausible allegation that
 Metrotech’s statement was fraudulent under the Unfair
 Competition Law. A follow-up communication to ask for
 technical specifications before converting data does not
 allow the drawing of a reasonable inference that Metrotech
 would not be able to provide the data in a compliant format,
 once it had the knowledge of UTTO’s technical
 specifications—which a follow-up call was the first step in
 acquiring. In other words, UTTO has not alleged facts that
 would “nudge[] [its] claims across the line from conceivable
 to plausible.” Twombly, 

; see also 

 (discussing “[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations
 plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” the
 alleged violation of law).
     We therefore discern no reversible error in the district
 court’s dismissal of UTTO’s state-law claim.
                              III
     We vacate the district court’s dismissal of the claim of
 patent infringement and remand for further proceedings
 consistent with this opinion. We affirm the district court’s
 dismissal of the claim of tortious interference with
 prospective economic advantage.
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 UTTO INC. v. METROTECH CORP.                              25



     The parties shall bear their own costs.
    VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND
                 REMANDED