Saline Parents v. Merrick Garland

 United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT



Argued September 22, 2023          Decided December 15, 2023

                        No. 22-5258

SALINE PARENTS, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
                     APPELLANTS

                              v.

    MERRICK B. GARLAND, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
      ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                     APPELLEE



        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                    (No. 1:21-cv-02775)



     Robert J. Muise argued the cause for appellants. With him
on the briefs was David Yerushalmi.

    Mark R. Freeman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, and Mark B. Stern and John S. Koppel, Attorneys.

    Before: RAO and PAN, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
                               2
   Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS.

     EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: On October 4, 2021, the
Attorney General of the United States, Merrick Garland, issued
a one-page memorandum (“Memorandum”) to various units in
the Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “Government”),
expressing concern over a spike in reported incidents involving
harassment, intimidation, and threats of violence against school
administrators, board members, teachers, and staff. The
Memorandum indicated that “[w]hile spirited debate about
policy matters is protected under our Constitution, that
protection does not extend to threats of violence or efforts to
intimidate individuals based on their views.” Supplemental
Joint Appendix (“S.J.A.”) 2. The Memorandum instructed DOJ
staff to investigate the problem and discuss strategies for
addressing the issue. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) subsequently sent an email (“FBI Email”) advising its
agents that it had created an internal mechanism to track
investigations and threat assessments relating to the issues
raised in the Memorandum.

      Appellants in this case include an unincorporated
association (“Saline Parents”) and six individuals who reside
in Saline, Michigan and Loudoun County, Virginia. They filed
suit in the District Court against the Attorney General, claiming
that the foregoing actions by the Government are unlawful
because they are intended to silence Appellants and others who
oppose “progressive” curricula and policies in public schools.
Appellants say that they strongly and publicly voice opposition
to “the divisive, harmful, immoral, destructive, and racist
agenda of the ‘progressive’ Left.” First Amended Complaint
(“Compl.”) ¶ 106, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 28. And they
contend that, because their protest activities include only
constitutionally protected conduct and never threats of criminal
                                3
violence, they have been impermissibly targeted by what they
term the “AG Policy.” Appellants allege the AG Policy directs
the Government “to use federal law enforcement resources to
silence parents and other private citizens” who object to the
“progressive” agenda. Id. ¶ 2, J.A. 6. Appellants seek a
declaration that the purported AG Policy is unlawful, along
with an injunction barring both the alleged policy and any
actions taken to enforce it.

     The Government has acknowledged, both before the
District Court and this court, that the professed activities cited
by Appellants in their Complaint fall outside the scope of the
Memorandum and are fully protected by the Constitution. The
Government has also consistently maintained that Appellants
are not targets of any purported AG Policy.

     The District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing,
holding that Appellants failed to demonstrate injury in fact
from the contested Government actions. See Saline Parents v.
Garland, 

, 205 (D.D.C. 2022). We agree
that Appellants lack standing to pursue this action. See Laird v.
Tatum, 

 (1972). In addition, we agree with the
Government that Appellants’ lawsuit is not ripe for
adjudication. See Trump v. New York, 

(2020) (per curiam) (“At the end of the day, the standing and
ripeness inquiries both lead to the conclusion that judicial
resolution of this dispute is premature.”).

                      I.   BACKGROUND

   A. Factual Background

    As noted above, on October 4, 2021, Attorney General
Garland sent a one-page Memorandum to various DOJ units,
noting “a disturbing spike in harassment, intimidation, and
                                4
threats of violence against school administrators, board
members, teachers, and staff who . . . run[] our nation’s public
schools.” S.J.A. 2. The Memorandum acknowledged that
“[w]hile spirited debate about policy matters is protected under
our Constitution, that protection does not extend to threats of
violence or efforts to intimidate individuals based on their
views.” 

 The Memorandum stated that “[t]hreats against
public servants are . . . illegal,” and “[t]hose who dedicate their
time and energy” to running schools should “be able to do their
work without fear for their safety.” 

 The Memorandum
stated further that, “[i]n the coming days,” the DOJ would
“announce a series of measures designed to address the rise in
criminal conduct directed toward school personnel.” 

 And
the Memorandum instructed the FBI, working with each
United States Attorney, to “convene meetings” in order to
“facilitate the discussion of strategies for addressing threats,”
and to “open dedicated lines of communication for threat
reporting, assessment, and response.” 

    The FBI Criminal Investigative Division and
Counterterrorism Division subsequently sent a joint internal
email to its agents stating that it had created what it called a
“threat tag” for internal tracking of “investigations and
assessments of threats” directed against school personnel.
S.J.A. 4. The FBI Email explained that the tag would “help
scope this threat” and “provide an opportunity for
comprehensive analysis of the threat picture for effective
engagement with law enforcement partners.” 

 Importantly,
neither the Memorandum nor the FBI Email announced any
new regulations or enforcement policies, or purported to issue
any directives outside of the DOJ. And neither the
Memorandum nor the FBI Email mentioned or even obliquely
alluded to Appellants in this case.
                                 5
    Appellants are Saline Parents, an unincorporated
association of parents and “concerned private citizens” in
Saline, Michigan, along with six individual parents who reside
in Saline, Michigan and Loudoun County, Virginia. Appellants
describe themselves as “law-abiding citizens who want to
speak in defense of their children and against the divisive,
harmful, immoral, destructive, and racist agenda of the
‘progressive’ Left.” Compl. ¶ 106, J.A. 28. Appellants claim
they are targeted by the DOJ because they strongly and publicly
oppose these “progressive” policies adopted by school boards.
They argue that as a direct result of the Government’s actions,
their exercise of fundamental rights has been chilled and their
reputations impugned. However, Appellants point to no
concrete facts to support these claims.

    According to Appellants, their advocacy includes: making
their opposition known publicly at school board meetings, id.
¶ 12, J.A. 8; maintaining the website content of Saline Parents,
id. ¶ 14, J.A. 8; passionately addressing the school board, id. ¶
27, J.A. 10; seeking to recall school board members by
collecting signatures, writing letters, and attending press
conferences, id. ¶ 30, J.A. 11; writing a scathing editorial, id.;
clapping instead of using jazz hands, id. ¶ 32, J.A. 11; leading
meeting attendees in singing the National Anthem, id. ¶ 33,
J.A. 11; initiating a student walk out as well as a rally, id. ¶ 34,
J.A. 12; posting on social media, id. ¶ 35, J.A. 12; and
organizing a shoe drop protest, where hundreds of shoes were
left in front of school administrative offices to represent the
mass exodus of students from public schools, id. ¶ 36, J.A. 13.
Appellants assert that their conduct at school board meetings
did not include making threats of criminal violence. Id. ¶ 65,
J.A. 18. Appellants also declare that they intend only to engage
in constitutionally protected conduct. Id. ¶ 39, J.A. 13. The
Government agrees that the activities detailed by Appellants in
their Complaint are constitutionally protected.
                               6

     Appellants claim that, after their advocacy, the National
School Boards Association submitted a letter to President
Biden, alleging that public school educators increasingly faced
threats of violence and acts of intimidation. The letter stated
that “acts of malice, violence, and threats against public school
officials” were “a form of domestic terrorism.” See Saline
Parents, 630 F. Supp. 3d at 208. Appellants assert that this
letter was drafted in conjunction with the Biden administration
“to create the pretext for the AG Policy,” Compl. ¶¶ 75-77,
J.A. 21, and that the letter was the sole basis for the
Memorandum published on October 4, id. ¶ 76, J.A. 21.

    Appellants allege nothing to suggest that they have ever
been hampered in their protest activities by any local or federal
law enforcement agencies or actions, prosecutions, civil suits,
or official notices of any sort. And they make no claims to
suggest that the DOJ generally or the FBI specifically have
done anything directed at them to foreclose their rights to
express their views.

   B. Procedural History

    On October 19, 2021, Appellants filed an action in the
District Court against Attorney General Garland in his official
capacity. As outlined above, the Complaint contends that the
Government adopted an unlawful policy – i.e., the so-called
“AG Policy” – to silence those who oppose the “progressive”
agenda being implemented in public schools. Id. ¶ 2, J.A. 6.
Appellants believe they are the “very targets” of this alleged
AG Policy. Id. ¶ 74, J.A. 20. The Complaint recounts that
school board members have complained about parents
“attacking the board” by calling into question the board’s
integrity and morals. Id. ¶ 89, J.A. 24. The Complaint also
references a photo of one marked Homeland Security vehicle
                               7
outside a school board meeting held in Fairfax, Virginia, id. ¶
87, J.A. 23, although Appellants do not say they personally
were present at that meeting. Finally, the Complaint contends
that the Attorney General is personally and ideologically vested
in silencing opposition to critical race theory and other
“progressive” curricula and policies promoted by local school
boards, and that he is directing the power and resources of the
DOJ to do just that. Id. ¶ 101, J.A. 27.

    The Complaint pleads causes of action based on the First
Amendment, equal protection under the Fifth Amendment,
protection of parental rights under the Fifth Amendment, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. ¶¶ 108-40, J.A. 28-
32. It seeks a declaration that the purported AG Policy is
unlawful, as well as an injunction barring the policy and any
federal actions taken pursuant to it. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, J.A. 6.

    The District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing.
See Saline Parents, 630 F. Supp. 3d at 205. It held that
Appellants failed to allege facts sufficient to show cognizable
injuries from either a threat of enforcement or reputational
harm. Id. Finding an absence of jurisdiction for want of
standing, the District Court had no occasion to consider the
parties’ other arguments and granted the Government’s motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Appellants now appeal that dismissal.

                        II. ANALYSIS

   A. Standard of Review

     We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 

 (D.C. Cir. 2016). On review of
a motion to dismiss, we must “accept the well-pleaded factual
                               8
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from
those allegations in [Appellants’] favor.” Arpaio v. Obama,

 (D.C. Cir. 2015). However, “[t]hreadbare
recitals” and “mere conclusory statements” do not suffice.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 (2009). We do not accept
inferences unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.
Arpaio, 

 (citing Islamic Am. Relief Agency v.
Gonzales, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Nor do we
assume the truth of legal conclusions. 

 (citing Iqbal, 

).

   B. Standing

     The “irreducible constitutional minimum of [Article III]
standing” consists of three elements. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

 (1992). The plaintiff “must show (i) that he
suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the
defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by
judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 

 (2021). As the party invoking the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the
elements of standing. 

. “Since [the standing
elements] are not mere pleading requirements but rather an
indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.” Lujan, 

 (first emphasis added).
Failure to establish any one element requires dismissal of the
action. See, e.g., TransUnion, 

 (dismissing
for lack of standing claims in which plaintiffs failed to show
injury in fact).
                               9
     “This case concerns the injury-in-fact requirement, which
helps to ensure that the plaintiff has a ‘personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.’” Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 

, 158 (2014) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,

 (1975)). Before this court, the Government
contends that Appellants lack standing to pursue this action
because they have failed to allege adequate facts to show any
injury from either the threat of enforcement or reputational
harm. The Government argues that:

    Plaintiffs allege that their peaceful speech objecting to
    school policies is chilled by a purported Department
    of Justice policy that in some way targets them based
    on their viewpoint. The alleged AG Policy does not
    “arguably proscribe[]” plaintiffs’ conduct, Susan B.
    Anthony List v. Driehaus, 

, 162 (2014)
    (quotation marks omitted), because it is not
    “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,”
    Laird v. Tatum, 

 (1972). And even if it
    were, the policy does not apply to plaintiffs’
    constitutionally protected conduct. . . . For similar
    reasons plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing to
    pursue a claim of reputational injury.

Brief for Appellee 15-17.

     As to Appellants’ alleged threat-of-enforcement injury, the
Government’s reliance on Laird v. Tatum, 

 (1972),
is on the mark. In Laird, the Supreme Court made it clear that
a cognizable chilling injury cannot “arise merely from the
individual’s knowledge that a governmental agency was
engaged in certain [investigative and data-gathering] activities
or from the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the
fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take
some . . . action detrimental to that individual.” 

.
                               10
Rather, the Government’s exercise of power must be
“regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory.” 

 Accordingly, the
Court in Laird declined to entertain a suit alleging that an Army
program to gather intelligence on peaceful, civilian political
activity chilled plaintiffs’ lawful exercise of their First
Amendment rights. 

. As in Laird, Appellants here
claim only that their lawful activities are being chilled by the
mere existence of governmental investigation, and at most
indicate a fear that the Government, armed with the fruits of
their data gathering, may take action against them in the future.
This is insufficient to show injury in support of standing.

     The principal Supreme Court cases cited by Appellants to
counter Laird are inapposite, because the plaintiffs bringing
pre-enforcement challenges in those cases proffered factual
allegations that supported concrete threats of enforcement. See,
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 166 (finding a credible
threat of enforcement where petitioners “alleged an intent to
engage in the same speech that was the subject of a prior
enforcement proceeding”); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 

 (2007) (exercising jurisdiction
over a dispute regarding payment obligations, despite
challenger making required payments under protest, because
cessation of payment would expose challenger to liability);
Steffel v. Thompson, 

 (1974) (holding
petitioner’s alleged threats of prosecution not speculative,
because he had “been told by the police” that “he will likely be
prosecuted” if he continued handbilling); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 

 (1965) (finding sufficient injury
from chilling effect where appellant and intervenors had
previously been arrested and charged with violations of the two
statutes being challenged).

     Here, Appellants fail to demonstrate that the Government
has in any way threatened imminent, rather than hypothetical,
                              11
enforcement action against them. See Lujan, 

.
Indeed, Appellants declare they are peaceful, law-abiding
citizens; nothing in the Memorandum suggests otherwise.
Appellants assert they engage only in constitutionally protected
speech; the Memorandum clearly states that the DOJ has no
issue with speech protected by the Constitution. The
Memorandum, which announces initial plans by the DOJ to
investigate and strategize internally, does not threaten
imminent legal action against anyone, and certainly not against
Appellants.

     What is telling here is that Appellants’ allegations simply
do not plausibly support the belief that they are targets of the
DOJ. For example, they allege that school board members have
complained about parents “attacking the board,” but they do
not claim that the DOJ took or threatened to take legal action
against Appellants in response. Appellants also offer a photo of
a marked Homeland Security vehicle parked outside a school
board meeting, held in a city that is neither Saline nor in
Loudoun County. Appellants do not allege they attended this
meeting, nor that any enforcement proceeding was threatened
against those who did. Finally, Appellants assert that the
Attorney General is personally and ideologically vested in
broadly silencing all opposition to “progressive” curricula.
Appellants even go so far as to declare that the Attorney
General issued the Memorandum for personal gain, but they
offer nothing to support this accusation. In sum, Appellants
have not come close to demonstrating that the Government is
focused on them or their peaceful activities.

     Appellants’ theory of reputational injury suffers similar
deficiencies. Appellants allege that the contested Government
actions have impugned their public reputations by designating
them as “criminal threats” and “domestic terrorists.” However,
even on a generous reading of the factual allegations in the
                                12
Complaint, there is nothing to indicate that the DOJ has
designated Appellants as “criminal threats” or “domestic
terrorists,” as they claim. The contents of the Memorandum
and the FBI Email do not pertain to Appellants’ professed
activities. Appellants assert, and the Government does not
dispute, that all their alleged activities are constitutionally
protected. As such, Appellants fail to offer any specific action
that would deem them a “criminal threat.” And there is nothing
in the contested DOJ documents that even refer to a “domestic
terrorism” threat. Rather, this term comes from a letter sent to
the White House by a private organization, the National School
Boards Association. Appellants claim the letter was drafted in
collusion with the Biden administration, and that it served as
the sole basis for the Memorandum. Nothing supports these
conclusory statements of collusion. A letter from a private
entity unaffiliated with the Government, which contains the
only reference in the record to “domestic terrorism,” cannot
plausibly be attributed to the Attorney General. In fact, neither
the Memorandum nor the FBI Email even alludes to the letter.
Ultimately, Appellants have not offered anything to show that
the Government labeled them in any way, let alone impugned
their reputations. Any reputational injury Appellants believe
they have suffered is therefore insufficient to satisfy Article III.
See Arpaio, 

 (noting courts may not “accept
inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the
complaint” (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 

)).

    In addition, the pre-enforcement claim in this case is not
ripe for adjudication. Indeed, the factors discussed above that
undermine Appellants’ claim to standing serve to confirm that
“this case is riddled with contingencies and speculation that
impede judicial review.” Trump, 

. “At the end
of the day, the standing and ripeness inquiries both lead to the
                                13
conclusion that judicial resolution of this dispute is premature.”

.

    C. Ripeness

     We have made clear that “[t]he ripeness doctrine, even in
its prudential aspect, is a threshold inquiry that does not involve
adjudication on the merits and which may be addressed prior
to consideration of other Article III justiciability doctrines.” In
re Aiken Cnty., 

 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Toca
Producers v. FERC, 

, 265 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
As the Supreme Court has explained:

    Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to
    prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
    adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
    disagreements over administrative policies, and also
    to protect the agencies from judicial interference until
    an administrative decision has been formalized and its
    effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
    parties. The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from
    Article III limitations on judicial power and from
    prudential reasons for refusing to exercise
    jurisdiction, but, even in a case raising only prudential
    concerns, the question of ripeness may be considered
    on a court’s own motion.

Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 

, 807-
08 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted).

    A claim is premature and therefore unripe for judicial
review if it depends on “contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Trump,

 (quoting Texas v. United States, 

 (1998)). An unripe claim must be dismissed. Cause of
                               14
Action Inst. v. Dep’t of Just., 

 (D.C. Cir.
2021). To determine whether a dispute is ripe for adjudication,
we evaluate “(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision
and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n, 

.

    There can be little doubt here that the pre-enforcement
issues raised in this case are not fit for adjudication. As noted
above, Appellants’ Complaint is “riddled with contingencies
and speculation that impede judicial review.” Trump, 

. Neither the Memorandum nor the FBI Email
threatens imminent enforcement action generally, much less
against Appellants specifically. The contested DOJ documents
do not establish any regulatory actions or even purport to offer
viable policy statements. The Memorandum simply announces
the Attorney General’s concerns about “a disturbing spike in
harassment, intimidation, and threats of violence” against
school personnel. S.J.A. 2. It proposes nothing more than some
measures to “facilitate the discussion of strategies for
addressing threats,” and to “open dedicated lines of
communication for threat reporting, assessment, and
response.” 

 Likewise, the FBI Email creates a “threat tag”
only for the purpose of “scop[ing] this threat” and “provid[ing]
an opportunity for comprehensive analysis.” S.J.A. 4. Apart
from announcing plans to gather information for discussions,
the Government has not yet directed its agents to take any
concrete action. These initial plans to investigate a matter of
potential concern and to strategize internally are routine
functions of the Government.

    Nevertheless, Appellants invite this court to give credence
to their surmise that the Government will not only decide to
take enforcement action at some point, but that it will take
action against Appellants in particular. We decline the
invitation because this would be anathema to the judicial
                                15
function. A justiciable controversy may not ask a court to
“advis[e] what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts,” but rather must “admit[] of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 

 (1937). Absent a concrete factual
context, determination of the scope and constitutionality of a
purported government policy “in advance of its immediate
adverse effect . . . involves too remote and abstract an inquiry
for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” Int’l
Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Boyd, 

 (1954). “[J]udicial appraisal [of the issue] is likely to
stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific
application of [agency policy] than could be the case in the
framework of [a] generalized challenge.” Cause of Action, 

 (alterations in original) (quoting Am. Tort Reform
Ass’n v. OSHA, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).

    Clearly, in the present case, it is much “too speculative
whether the problem [Appellants] present[] will ever need
solving.” Texas v. United States, 

. Appellants
believe they are targets of the DOJ. But, as detailed above,
there is nothing in the contested Memorandum or in the FBI
Email to support this claim. Whether Appellants will ever
become the subjects of an FBI investigation or enforcement
proceeding remains to be seen. By their own account,
Appellants are not presently threatened with any enforcement
proceeding against them. Indeed, the Memorandum expressly
assures that the Constitution protects “spirited debate,” S.J.A.
2, and Appellants assert they only “intend to engage in
constitutionally protected conduct,” Compl. ¶ 39, J.A. 13,
never threats of criminal violence, id. ¶ 65, J.A. 18. The
Government agrees with Appellants that the activities alleged
in their Complaint comport with the exercise of constitutional
rights, and it confirms that those activities fall outside the scope
of the Memorandum. In short, Appellants’ Complaint contains
                               16
no factual allegations that could plausibly lead to the
conclusion that their advocacy fits within the ambit of the
“disturbing” conduct at issue in the Memorandum.

    Finally, our disposition of this pre-enforcement challenge
will not subject Appellants to any legally cognizable
“hardship.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n, 

.
Appellants have not lost any First Amendment rights. The
Memorandum and the FBI Email impose no obligations outside
of the DOJ. Neither document proscribes any activity.
Appellant “is not required to engage in, or to refrain from, any
conduct” as a result of the challenged DOJ documents. Texas
v. United States, 

. Although Appellants
complain of a chilling effect on their speech, the Government
has not in any way restricted or regulated Appellants’ activities.
Therefore, Appellants have not suffered any “immediate and
significant” hardship sufficient to “outweigh institutional
interests in the deferral of review.” Action All. of Senior
Citizens v. Heckler, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

     At bottom, Appellants’ pre-enforcement claim rests on
hypotheticals that are too remote, speculative, and abstract for
judicial review. The Supreme Court has been clear, time and
again, that a case is unripe for review when “[a]ny prediction
how the [Government] might eventually implement . . . [a]
policy is ‘no more than conjecture.’” Trump, 

(quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

 (1983)). For
us to embrace Appellants’ argument that the Government will
target peaceful protests of school policies, despite the
Memorandum expressly promising otherwise, would require
this court to depart from the land of record evidence and
venture into the thickets of fanciful speculation. “We do not
have sufficient confidence in our powers of imagination[.]”
Texas v. United States, 

. Given the uncertainty
with how events may play out, the matter raised by Appellants
                              17
is not currently fit for our review, and withholding
consideration will not impose hardship on Appellants.

                      III. CONCLUSION

    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the dismissal of
Appellants’ action for lack of Article III standing and want of
ripeness.

                                                   So ordered.