Ryan v. Commissioner of Social Security

Plaintiff-Appellant Karen L. Ryan appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellee, upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her application for Title II disability benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not give full weight to the opinions of two examining psychologists, characterizing their opinions as too heavily based on Ryan’s “subjective complaints,” and as being inconsistent with the records of Ryan’s treating physician, a family practitioner. There was no inconsistency. The records of Ryan’s treating physician, if anything, supported the examining psychologist’s assessment that Ryan was incapable of maintaining a regular work schedule. Because substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits, we reverse.

I. Background

A. The claimant’s medical history.

Prior to filing for disability, Ryan worked for several years as a cashier and *1196attendant at a garbage transfer station. She was placed on administrative leave in October 1999 after failing a random drug test and was ultimately terminated in late 1999. After she was fired, in December 1999 Ryan began to complain to her treating physician, family practitioner Dr. Neva Monigatti-Lake, that she was suffering “feelings of immobility, panic attacks, [and] crying spells.” Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s notes from that early December visit indicated an assessment of “anxiety disorder,” and she increased Ryan’s dosage of antidepressants. When Ryan visited Dr. Mon-igatti-Lake a week later, she continued to assess her with “anxiety disorder, improving” and “depression, improving.” On Ryan’s next visit to Dr. Monigatti-Lake on March 1, 2000, the diagnosis was still “anxiety disorder,” with no indication that Ryan had improved. Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s observation notes indicated that during the March 1 visit Ryan was “coherent' but very agitated. Rapid speaking and hand movements.” Those symptoms persisted. When Ryan visited Dr. Monigatti-Lake on March 15, 2000, she noted again that Ryan was “very agitated but coherent,” diagnosed anxiety disorder, and referred Ryan to counseling. When Dr. Monigatti-Lake saw Ryan again on April 4, 2000, she continued to diagnose anxiety disorder and noted rapid speech. Dr. Monigatti-Lake referred Ryan to the Department of Social Services on May 2, 2000 and enclosed her treatment records.

Ryan underwent a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Rajinder Ran-dhawa on May 27, 2000. Dr. Randhawa observed that Ryan was “very distraught, edgy, nervous, shaky, and keeps shaking her legs throughout the evaluation. She appears to be somewhat anxious.... She speaks in a very rapid manner at times. She is very repetitive and circumstantial and is difficult to redirect.” Dr. Randha-wa diagnosed Ryan with anxiety disorder and depression. Although Dr. Randhawa’s prognosis was that Ryan was “treatable” and “likely to improve,” the clinical notes also indicated that Ryan “continues to experience significant anxiety and continuing depression.” Dr. Randhawa’s functional assessment was that Ryan “would not be able to maintain regular attendance in the work place due to extreme anxiety and continuing depression, especially when faced in a work like situation.... She would not be able to complete a normal workday/workweek without interruptions from her psychiatric condition at present. She is not likely to deal with the usual stressors in a competitive work place.” Dr. Randhawa predicted that Ryan could improve and return to work with “skilled psychiatric treatment with adequate psychiatric medication,” but the assessment as of May 27 was that Ryan was incapable of maintaining a regular work schedule.

Ryan’s treatment records were subsequently reviewed by two non-examining physicians, Drs. Harman and Harrison. On June 30, 2000, after completing check-boxes on a standardized form, Dr. Harman opined without elaboration that “with continued [treatment] anticipate able to do complex in low public with moderate impairments in ability to sustain [concentration and attention] [persistence and pace] and ability to complete regular workweek without interruption from her [psychological symptoms].” Dr Harrison affirmed Dr. Harman’s opinion without comment on October 12, 2000. Drs. Harman and Harrison, however, never examined Ryan or reviewed her records after this assessment.1

*1197Ryan continued to see Dr. Monigatti-Lake with regularity. On January 16, 2001, Dr. Monigatti-Lake observed that Ryan was calmer than normal, but continued to diagnose anxiety disorder. On February 6, 2001, Dr. Monigatti-Lake observed that Ryan was “slightly less anxious,” but again diagnosed “anxiety disorder, slowly improving.” On her next visit to Dr. Monigatti-Lake, on September 25, 2001, the diagnosis was “chronic depression and anxiety,” with no notation that the condition was improving. The last notation in Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s records regarding Ryan’s mental health came on June 13, 2002, when Monigatti-Lake noted that Ryan was still suffering from occasional panic attacks.

The final psychological examination in the record was conducted on January 6, 2003 by Dr. Douglas R. Crisp, a doctor with the Nevada County Behavioral Health Department. Dr. Crisp observed that Ryan was “extremely anxious, hyperventilating, [and] making a lot of grunting noises.” Dr. Crisp recorded Ryan’s description of her daily affairs, noting that she rarely left the small one-room shack where she lives unless to buy food. Dr. Crisp noted that Ryan “talked nonstop from the time she sat down until she left.... Affect was quite constricted with some lability, though, due to the anxiety.” Dr. Crisp’s ultimate diagnosis was “major depression with agoraphobia [and] anxiety.”

B. Procedural history.

Ryan filed for Title II disability benefits on April 26, 2000. After an initial hearing, Ryan was denied benefits in a March 21, 2002 decision. The Appeals Council remanded for further vocational evidence and to allow Ryan to present additional medical evidence. On January 16, 2003, a supplemental hearing was held; Ryan testified, as did a vocational expert proffered by the Agency.

At the hearing before the ALJ, Ryan testified that she had only done laundry twice in the previous year. She cooked only one meal a day and cleaned her home no more than once a month. Ryan testified that she had, essentially, no outside activities beyond her daily subsistence living and watching television. As to her mental condition, Ryan testified: “I have a very difficult time in concentrating and making decisions, or I don’t remember very well. I get very confused and I have trouble understanding instructions. It’s almost like the dots don’t quite connect.” Ryan testified that she was taking prescribed medication for depression and anxiety, but that her “anxiety is very hard to control. I’ve had many episodes of panic attacks.” She testified that since the 2002 hearing, her depression had gotten worse.

The only other witness to testify was the Agency’s vocational expert, Susan C. Clav-el. In response to hypotheticals from the ALJ, Clavel testified that there were more than a million jobs in the national economy that required the ability to lift “40 pounds, no other physical restrictions, [and] only occasional contact with employees and supervisors and no public contact.” On cross-examination, however, Clavel testified that if a person were unable to maintain regular attendance in the workplace due to anxiety, or unable to complete a normal workday or workweek without interruption from a psychiatric condition, *1198that there were no jobs in the national economy that would accommodate those restrictions.

On May 17, 2003 the ALJ issued his written decision. Although he acknowledged that the “record supports a determination that the claimant has been limited as a result of severe anxiety and depressive disorder since the alleged onset date,” he nonetheless did not accord full weight to the testimony of Dr. Randhawa or the most recent psychological examination in the record, Dr. Crisp’s. Specifically, he rejected Dr. Randhawa’s assessment that Ryan would have difficulty maintaining a regular work schedule due to her anxiety and depression. The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Randhawa’s evaluation was “based more upon the claimant’s subjective complaints which are not fully supported in the record. The undersigned has reviewed in detail the claimant’s records from her treating source, Dr. Monigatti-Lake, and while this physician has noted ongoing symptoms of anxiety and depressive symptoms, the claimant has not complained to the same degree as reported to Dr. Randa-wa [sic].” The ALJ likewise concluded that the treating records did not support Dr. Crisp’s agoraphobia and major depression diagnoses. The ALJ thus found that Ryan could perform work “with little or no anxiety” so long as she had only occasional contact with peers and no contact with the public, a finding he described as “consistent with” the opinion of the non-examining state physicians who reviewed Ryan’s records in June, 2000 and October, 2000. Ryan sought review in the district court, and on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court affirmed. The district court adopted the ALJ’s rationale for rejecting the testimony of Dr. Randhawa. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD Of REVIEW

We review the district court’s decision in a social security case de novo. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.2005). The Social Security Administration’s disability determination should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir.2006). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 1211, 1214 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” the ALJ’s decision should be upheld. Id. “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’ ” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.1989)).

In conjunction with the relevant regulations, we have also developed standards that guide our analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.1995)). “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Finally, the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

*1199III. Discussion

Ryan argues that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting the opinion of Dr. Randhawa, an examining physician.2 Dr. Randhawa opined that Ryan would be unable to complete a regular work week due to her mental impairments. The ALJ’s rejection of this testimony led to his determination at step five of the sequential evaluation that Ryan was capable of performing work other than her past relevant work.3 Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ proffered two reasons for rejecting Dr. Randhawa’s opinion: (1) it was based too heavily on Ryan’s “subjective complaints” and (2) it was not supported by the records of Ryan’s treating physician Dr. Monigatti-Lake. Neither is a “clear and convincing reason” supported by substantial evidence necessary to reject the testimony of an examining doctor. Bayliss, 427 F.8d at 1216.

First, Dr. Randhawa’s comprehensive psychiatric evaluation was not based on Ryan’s subjective complaints. Dr. Ran-dhawa did, unsurprisingly, record in a section of his evaluation entitled “History of Present Illness,” the symptoms relayed to him by Ryan, including Ryan’s inability to interact with others or make decisions without experiencing significant anxiety. But in the “Mental Status Examination” portion of the exam he also recorded several of his own clinical observations of Ryan: “Behavior and mannerisms are somewhat odd. She has rapid speech.... She is easily agitated and appears to be very angry.” Randhawa further observed Ryan’s affect as “anxious, distraught, nervous, shaky, and edgy.” An ALJ may reject an examining physician’s opinion if it is contradicted by clinical evidence. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. But an ALJ does not provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting an examining physician’s opinion by questioning the credibility of *1200the patient’s complaints where the doctor does not discredit those complaints and supports his ultimate opinion with his own observations. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.2001) (“In sum, the ALJ appears to have relied on her doubt’s about [the claimant’s] overall credibility to reject the entirety of [the examining psychologist’s] report, including portions that [the psychologist] deemed to be reliable.”). There is nothing in the record to suggest that Dr. Randhawa disbelieved Ryan’s description of her symptoms, or that Dr. Randhawa relied on those descriptions more heavily than his own clinical observations in reaching the conclusion that Ryan was incapable of maintaining a regular work schedule. Regennitter v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir.1999) (substantial evidence did not support AL J’s finding that examining psychologists took claimant’s “statements at face value” where psychologists’ reports did not contain “any indication that [the claimant] was malingering or deceptive”).

Second, the purported inconsistency between Dr. Randhawa’s opinion and Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s records is also not a clear and convincing reason supported by substantial evidence sufficient to discredit Dr. Randhawa’s assessment. The ALJ explained that while “[Dr. Monigatti-Lake] has noted ongoing symptoms of anxiety and depressive symptoms, the claimant has not complained to the same degree of symptoms reported to Dr. Randawa [sic].” But Ryan consistently complained of and Dr. Monigatti-Lake observed — even when Ryan was seeing Dr. Monigatti-Lake for problems unconnected to her anxiety and depression — symptoms consistent with those reported to and by Dr. Randhawa. In five of the six visits with Dr. Monigatti-Lake that preceded her assessment by Dr. Randhawa, she was diagnosed by Dr. Mon-igatti-Lake with either “anxiety disorder,” “depression,” or both. During those visits she complained of: “feelings of immobility, panic attacks, crying spells” (December 14, 1999); an inability to “concentrate very well” (December 21, 1999); was observed as having “[r]apid speaking and hand movements” (March 1, 2000); described as “very agitated but coherent” (March 15, 2000); and “rapidly speaking” (April 4, 2000).4 Although Ryan certainly described her symptoms in more detail during her comprehensive psychological evaluation than she did in regular visits to her family doctor, that does not render Dr. Randha-wa’s opinion inconsistent with Dr. Moni-gatti-Lake’s.5 Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1299 (“Nothing in [one examining doctor’s report] rules out [another examining doctor’s] more extensive findings.”) (error under either “clear and convincing” or “specific and legitimate reasons” standards to reject an examining psychologist’s report on the grounds that it contradicted a less extensive report); Nguyen v. Chafer, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1996) (“Where the purported existence of an inconsistency is squarely contradicted by the record, it may not serve as the basis for the rejection of an examining physician’s conclusions.”). Nor are the references in Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s notes that Ryan’s arud-*1201ety and depression were “improving” sufficient to undermine the repeated diagnosis of those conditions, or Dr. Randhawa’s more detailed report. Holohan v. Massa-nari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir.2001) (“[The treating physician’s] statements must be read in context of the overall diagnostic picture he draws. That a person who suffers from severe panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some improvement does not mean that the person’s impairments no longer seriously affect her ability to function in a workplace.”).6

It is for these reasons that the ALJ also erred by discrediting the most recent mental health assessment by Dr. Crisp, who diagnosed Ryan with major depression and agoraphobia in January, 2003. This diagnosis is not at odds with Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s treating records that characterize Ryan as suffering from chronic depression and anxiety in the visit closest in time to Dr. Crisp’s diagnosis. Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1299; see also cf. Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir.1986) (“Where a claimant’s condition is progressively deteriorating, the most recent medical report is the most probative.”). And like Dr. Randhawa, Dr. Crisp’s diagnosis also relied on his clinical observations of Ryan.

Finally, it is not possible to cure the ALJ’s erroneous rejection of Dr. Randha-wa’s examining opinion with his finding that this rejection was “consistent with” the opinions of the two non-examining physicians, Drs. Harman and Harrison. The weight afforded a non-examining physician’s testimony depends “on the degree to which they provide supporting explanations for their opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). The Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (“MRFCA”) form completed by Drs. Har-man and Harrison contains no supporting explanation whatsoever for their opinion that “with continued [treatment]” Ryan could complete a regular workweek. That was simply their bare conclusion after checking a series of boxes on the MRFCA form, a conclusion that does not outweigh the remaining evidence in the record. Ho-lohan, 246 F.3d at 1207 (opinions supported by explanation and treatment records cannot be outweighed by opinion of nonexamining physician “who merely checked boxes without giving supporting explanations”).

Although the ALJ did not purport to rely on this form as his basis for rejecting Dr. Randhawa’s and Dr. Crisp’s opinions, even if we were to assume that he did, and thus considered their examining *1202opinions controverted, the ALJ still failed to provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting those opinions. “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 881 (emphasis in original). As explained above, Dr. Monigatti-Lake’s treating records do not contradict the opinions of either Drs. Ran-dhawa or Crisp, whose opinions were in turn based as much on their own clinical observations as they were on Ryan’s description of her symptoms. Id. at 833 (“The nonexamining medical advisor’s testimony does not by itself constitute substantial evidence that warrants a rejection of either the treating doctor’s or the examining psychologist’s opinion.”).

Because the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and because the record confirms that, if Dr. Randhawa’s assessment were accepted, Ryan could not make an adjustment to perform any other work, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to remand to the Agency for payment of benefits. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1231-32 (9th Cir.1987).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.