Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi

                     FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS GUILLERMO GONZALEZ-                          No. 21-927
JUAREZ,
                                                  Agency No.
                                                 A201-173-391
                Petitioner,

     v.                                            OPINION

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

            On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                Board of Immigration Appeals
                   Submitted March 4, 2025 *
                     Pasadena, California
                       Filed May 20, 2025
     Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Morgan B. Christen, Circuit
        Judges, and Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge. **

                     Opinion by Judge Ikuta

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
  The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
2                    GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


                          SUMMARY ***


                           Immigration

    Denying Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez’s petition for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal, the panel
held that: 1) the substantial evidence standard of review
applies to the hardship determination in cancellation of
removal cases; and 2) substantial evidence supported the
BIA’s hardship determination in this case.
    For many years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wilkinson v. Garland, 

 (2024), this court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether an alien had
established “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to
a qualifying relative—a requirement for cancellation of
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). In Wilkinson, the
Supreme Court held that the application of this hardship
standard to an established set of facts is a mixed question of
law and fact over which courts have jurisdiction, but did not
expressly state the standard of review.
    In light of Supreme Court precedent, the panel concluded
that, for review of immigration agency determinations on
mixed questions of law and fact that are primarily factual,
the court should adopt the standard of review that it generally
applies to the agency’s finding of facts: the substantial
evidence standard. Under that standard, as relevant here,
“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

***
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                   3


the contrary.” 

(b)(4)(B). The panel wrote
that, in an analogous context presented in Zia v. Garland,

 (9th Cir. 2024), this court applied the
substantial evidence standard to the primarily factual
question of whether a marriage was entered into in good
faith.
    The panel also observed that, since Wilkinson, this court
has applied the abuse of discretion standard in two other
contexts: Martinez v. Clark, 

 (9th Cir. 2024)
(habeas petition where mixed question was whether the alien
was a danger to the community), and Magana-Magana v.
Bondi, 

 (9th Cir. 2025) (motion to reopen
where mixed question was whether the alien qualified for an
exception to the filing deadline). The panel concluded that
neither case dictates the standard of review here, and
observed that there is little practical difference between the
two standards.
    Turning to the meaning of “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship,” the panel drew from dictionary
definitions to conclude that the hardship must be out of the
ordinary and exceedingly uncommon, and must deviate, in
the extreme, from the norm. Thus, the agency must compare
the hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the
ordinary course when an alien is removed.
    Here, Gonzalez challenged the BIA’s conclusion that
country conditions reports on Mexico did not establish the
requisite hardship to his two sons, who planned to
accompany him to Mexico in the event of removal. The BIA
was not persuaded that the relatively high levels of crime and
violence in Mexico established the requisite hardship, and
rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would be
the target of criminal violence due to their perceived
4                  GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


wealth. The panel concluded that substantial evidence
supported these conclusions, explaining that Gonzalez’s
other family members had lived in Mexico without harm and
that a country conditions report that applies equally to a large
proportion of cases does not compel the conclusion that the
hardship standard is met. The panel also rejected Gonzalez’s
argument that the BIA failed to consider the record evidence.
    Accordingly, the panel concluded that substantial
evidence supported the BIA’s determination that Gonzalez
had not met his burden to show that his removal would result
in hardship to his qualifying relatives that is substantially
different from or beyond that normally encountered in the
course of removal.



                         COUNSEL

Roxana V. Muro, Law Offices of Roxana V. Muro, Los
Angeles, California, for Petitioner.
Zachary S. Hughbanks, Giovanni Di Maggio, and Jennifer
P. Williams, Trial Attorneys; Lindsay B. Glauner, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Song Park, Assistant Director; Office of
Immigration Litigation; Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
                  GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                   5


                         OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

    Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez (Gonzalez) petitions
for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) that denied his application for cancellation of
removal. Because the evidence does not compel the
conclusion that his removal would result in “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), we deny the petition.
                               I
    We first consider the law applicable to this case. “The
Attorney General may cancel removal” of “inadmissible or
deportable” aliens in certain circumstances. Id. § 1229b(b).
For an alien such as Gonzalez, who is not a lawful permanent
resident of the United States, the cancellation of removal
statute proceeds in two steps. First, the alien must meet the
requirements of § 1229b(b)(1). Under this section, the alien
must (A) have been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of ten years or more, (B) have been
a person of good moral character during that time, (C) have
not been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, and
(D) “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”                 Id.
§ 1229b(b)(1). Only the fourth criterion, whether the alien
has established “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to a qualifying relative, is at issue in this appeal.
Second, if the alien meets the four requirements and
establishes eligibility under § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D), the
agency may exercise its discretion to cancel the alien’s
6                       GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


removal. 1 See id. § 1229b(b)(1) (“The Attorney General
may cancel removal . . . if the alien [meets the requirements
of subparagraphs (A)–(D)]” (emphasis added)); Wilkinson v.
Garland, 

, 212–13 & n.1 (2024) (describing
“two steps” of cancellation of removal).
                                      A
    For many years, we held that we lacked jurisdiction to
consider whether an alien had established “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative under
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). See, e.g., Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey,

 (9th Cir. 2009); Martinez-Rosas v.


1
    Section 1229b(b)(1) provides, in full:
           (b) Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status
           for certain nonpermanent residents
             (1) In general
             The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and
             adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
             permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible
             or deportable from the United States if the alien—
                (A) has been physically present in the United
                States for a continuous period of not less than 10
                years immediately preceding the date of such
                application;
                (B) has been a person of good moral character
                during such period;
                (C) has not been convicted of an offense under
                section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of
                this title, subject to paragraph (5); and
                (D) establishes that removal would result in
                exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
                alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of
                the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
                permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
                  GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                  7


Gonzales, 

 (9th Cir. 2005). We based this
conclusion on the statutory text. Congress deprived us of
jurisdiction “to review: (i) any judgment regarding the
granting of relief under section . . . 1229b [cancellation of
removal].” 

(a)(2)(B). There is an exception
to this jurisdiction-stripping provision in § 1252(a)(2)(D):
“[n]othing in [§ 1252(a)(2)(B)] . . . shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of
law raised upon a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”
Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Reading these sections together, we
concluded that whether the alien’s qualifying relative
suffered an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
was not a question of law pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(D), but
rather was a subjective question, depending on the identity
and value judgment of the person examining the issue.
Mendez-Castro, 

. We therefore concluded
that we lacked jurisdiction to review an IJ’s application of
the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard
to the facts of a case. 

    But our decision in Mendez-Castro has been superseded
by Supreme Court opinions. First, Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
Barr held that “a question, which has both factual and legal
elements” is a “mixed question of law and fact.” 

 (2020). Therefore, the “statutory phrase ‘questions
of law’” for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(D) “includes the
application of a legal standard to undisputed or established
facts.” Id. at 227. Subsequently, Wilkinson addressed our
jurisdiction over the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship standard, and held that the application of this
standard “to an established set of facts” is a “mixed question
8                    GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


of law and fact,” over which we have jurisdiction under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). 

. 2
                                   B
    Wilkinson did not expressly state what standard of
review applies to our review of the agency’s determination
that an alien had not established exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. We turn to that
question now.
                                   1
    The Supreme Court provided guidance on how to
determine the standard of review for a mixed question of law
and fact in Guerrero-Lasprilla. 

. When
reviewing an “agency decision that applies a legal standard
to underlying facts . . . . [t]he answer to the ‘proper standard’
question may turn on practical considerations, such as
whether the question primarily ‘require[s] courts to expound
on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a
broad legal standard’ (often calling for review de novo), or
rather ‘immerse[s] courts in case-specific factual issues’
(often calling for deferential review).” 

 (quoting U.S.
Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 

, 396


2
  Although we have jurisdiction over the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” standard, the IJ’s second determination, “whether to
exercise his discretion favorably and grant the noncitizen relief in the
particular case,” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 212–13, is not a question of law
under § 1252(a)(2)(D), so our jurisdiction is precluded by
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 218, 225 n.4. Nor do we have jurisdiction over
the IJ’s finding of “facts underlying any determination on cancellation
of removal,” which “remain unreviewable.” Id. at 225. For example, we
may not review “an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of a
family member’s medical condition, or the level of financial support a
noncitizen currently provides.” Id.
                   GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                    9


(2018)). Wilkinson described the exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship determination as one that “requires a court
to immerse itself in facts.” 

; see also 

 (“Because this mixed question is primarily factual, that
review is deferential.”).
     In discussing the standard of review that applies to a
mixed question of law and fact under § 1252(a)(2)(D), both
Wilkinson and Guerrero-Lasprilla relied on U.S. Bank, 

. Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 221–22; Guerrero-
Lasprilla, 

. In U.S. Bank, the Court
considered the standard of review applicable to a bankruptcy
court’s determination that a particular transaction had been
entered at arm’s length, which the Court determined was a
mixed question of law and fact. 

. The Court
first examined “the nature of the mixed question . . . and
which kind of court (bankruptcy or appellate) is better suited
to resolve it[.]” 

. Because “the standard of review
often reflects which ‘judicial actor is better positioned’ to
make the decision,” the Court reasoned, “[t]he standard of
review for a mixed question all depends—on whether
answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” 

 at
395–96. When the answer requires an evaluation of “a raft
of case-specific historical facts,” and “[p]recious little” legal
work, then the inquiry “(primarily) belongs[] in the court that
has presided over the presentation of evidence, that has heard
all the witnesses, and that has both the closest and the
deepest understanding of the record.” 

 at 397–98.
Because the evaluation of case-specific historical facts is a
task better suited to the bankruptcy court than the appellate
court, U.S. Bank held that the appropriate standard of review
of the bankruptcy court’s decision of a mixed question of law
and facts is clear error, which is the same standard of review
10                 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


that an appellate court applies to a bankruptcy court’s factual
findings. 

.
    Less than two years after U.S. Bank, the Supreme Court
decided the standard of review applicable to another
“primarily factual” mixed question in Monasky v. Taglieri,

 (2020). Monasky involved review of a
district court’s determination of a child’s “habitual
residence” under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction. 

 at 70–71. As in U.S.
Bank, the Court asked whether the determination entailed
“primarily legal or factual work,” and found it presented “a
task for factfinding courts, not appellate courts.” 

 at 84–
85 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Again
the Court held that the applicable standard of review was
clear error, the same standard of review that generally
applies to a trial court’s determination of “questions of fact.”

 at 83–84.
    As in U.S. Bank and Monasky, the exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship determination is a mixed
question that “is primarily factual.” Wilkinson, 

. The description used in U.S. Bank fits here:
determining whether a particular alien has demonstrated
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requires a court
to examine “a raft of case-specific historical facts,” and so
“(primarily) belongs[] in the court that has presided over the
presentation of evidence, that has heard all the witnesses,
and that has both the closest and the deepest understanding
of the record.” 583 U.S. at 397–98. Here, the court that has
the closest connection to the facts is the immigration court,
presided over by the IJ.
   Although U.S. Bank held that the clear error standard
applies in reviewing another court’s factual finding, 

 at
                  GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                 11


399, the Supreme Court has made clear that a different
standard of review applies when a court reviews agency
findings of fact (“court/agency” review) than when a court
reviews a court’s findings of fact (“court/court” review), see
Dickinson v. Zurko, 

 (1999). In Dickinson,
the Court held that the court/agency standard of review for
findings of fact is the “substantial evidence” standard from
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), while the
court/court standard is the “clearly erroneous” standard. 

. Both standards “require[] judges to apply logic and
experience to an evidentiary record, whether that record was
made in a court or by an agency.” 

. Dickinson
therefore held that a court should review the finding of facts
made by the Patent and Trademark Office for substantial
evidence. 

.
    The APA does not apply to petitions for review under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.           See Martinez v.
Napolitano, 

 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining
that § 1252(a)(5) provides the “sole and exclusive” means of
judicial review of an order of removal and prohibits APA
claims). Nevertheless, Dickinson suggests that for a
court/agency review of mixed questions of law and fact that
are primarily factual, we should adopt the standard of review
that we generally apply to an agency’s finding of facts in the
immigration context. 527 U.S. at 156–57. This standard of
review for factual findings is the substantial evidence
standard, as defined by statute and case law. Under
§ 1252(b)(4)(B), with exceptions not applicable here, “the
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” 

(b)(4)(B); see also Nasrallah
v. Barr, 

 (2020) (defining the substantial
evidence standard by quoting 

(b)(4)(B));
12                GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 

 (9th
Cir. 2017) (same).
    Applying the substantial evidence standard of review
here is consistent with how we have long reviewed other
eligibility determinations. See, e.g., Sharma v. Garland, 

, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (stating that the agency’s
determination of ineligibility for withholding of removal is
reviewed for substantial evidence); Manzo-Fontes v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f the agency denies relief
because it determines that the alien is statutorily ineligible
for relief, we generally review the agency’s determination
for substantial evidence.”). We have explained that this
highly deferential standard reflects the fact that “‘the law
entrusts the agency to make the basic’ eligibility
determinations.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060 (quoting INS v.
Orlando Ventura, 

 (2002)).
    In an analogous context, we took this approach and
applied the substantial evidence standard of review to a
mixed question of law and fact that is primarily factual. See
Zia v. Garland, 

 (9th Cir. 2024). In Zia,
the alien sought removal of the conditional basis for his
permanent resident status based on the “hardship waiver” set
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). Id. at 1197. To qualify, he
needed to show that he had entered into a qualifying
marriage in good faith.            Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(4)(B)). The agency determined that he had not
done so, and the alien therefore filed a petition for review.
Id. at 1198–99. Zia first held that the good-faith marriage
determination was a mixed question of law and fact over
which the court had jurisdiction under Wilkinson. Id. at
1201. Zia then reviewed the agency’s determination of this
primarily factual question for substantial evidence. See id.
                     GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                          13


at 1202 (“[T]he remaining documentary evidence does not
compel a conclusion that the BIA erred . . . .”).
    Accordingly, we implement Wilkinson’s directive to
apply a deferential standard of review to the primarily
factual mixed question at hand—whether the BIA erred in
applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
standard to a given set of facts—by reviewing for substantial
evidence. 3
                                    2
    Since Wilkinson, we have applied a different standard of
review in two other contexts, but neither is applicable here.
See Martinez v. Clark, 

 (9th Cir. 2024);
Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 

 (9th Cir. 2025).
    Martinez involved a habeas petition from an alien who
was detained pending removal proceedings under 

(c). 

. The district court ordered the
IJ to conduct a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause,
at which the government had to “show by clear and

3
  Our conclusion is consistent with the Third Circuit’s approach. On
remand from the Supreme Court in Wilkinson, the Third Circuit analyzed
U.S. Bank and Monasky and reasoned that “the deference afforded the
agency’s factual findings should also govern” review of the exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship determination. Wilkinson v. Attorney
General, 

 (3d Cir. 2025). The Third Circuit rejected
the alien’s argument that “the INA limits the substantial-evidence
standard [of 

(b)(4)(B)] to findings of fact.” 

 at 140
n.28 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Third Circuit,
this argument “lack[ed] textual support.” 

 The Third Circuit went on
to explain that even if the standard were so limited, “it would not matter
because under U.S. Bank, we identify a standard for the mixed question
by drawing from the standard applicable to factual findings.” 

 The
Third Circuit accordingly held that substantial evidence was the
appropriate standard of review.
14                GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


convincing evidence that [the alien] presents a flight risk or
a danger to the community at the time of the bond hearing.”

 The IJ held the hearing and concluded that the
government had satisfied its burden. 

 at 780–81. The BIA
affirmed, and the alien filed a federal habeas petition under

, seeking release from custody and arguing
that the agency had erred in concluding he was a danger to
the community. 

. The district court denied the
petition for habeas relief. 

 Relying on Wilkinson, we first
concluded that we had jurisdiction over the alien’s claim
because the BIA’s determination that the alien was a “danger
to the community” was a question of law. 

 at 782–84. We
recognized that “as a statutory matter, the detention process
under § 1226(c) doesn’t compare exactly to the cancellation-
of-removal process, which requires the IJ to find the
requisite ‘hardship’ at step one and to exercise discretion at
step two.” Id. at 784.           But we distinguished the
dangerousness determination in that case because it arose in
the habeas context, and the district court had ordered the
bond hearing under the Due Process Clause. Id.
    Turning to the standard of review for a dangerousness
determination, we noted that Wilkinson and Zia confirmed
that we apply a deferential standard of review. Id. We relied
on Konou v. Holder, which considered the standard of
review for a determination that an alien’s convictions
constituted a “particularly serious crime” for purposes of 

(b)(3)(B)(ii). 

, 1126–27 (9th
Cir. 2014). Konou held that the “BIA’s determination that
an alien was convicted of a particularly serious crime is a
discretionary decision, and we review such decisions under
an abuse-of-discretion standard.” 

. Because of
the closeness of the “dangerousness” determination to the
“particularly serious crime” determination, Martinez held
                     GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                         15


that it was appropriate for the district court to review
“dangerousness” under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

. But Martinez’s rationale does not map neatly
onto the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard, which does not arise in the unique contexts of a
habeas petition and court/court review, both of which lend
themselves to review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 28
Carlson v. Landon, 

, 531–32 (1952) (reviewing
an agency’s bail determination under the Internal Security
Act of 1950 for an abuse of discretion); Barapind v. Reno,

 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing a district
court’s decision to dismiss a habeas petition under the
federal comity doctrine for an abuse of discretion).
    The second opinion, Magana-Magana, likewise
involves a distinct context. This case addressed our
jurisdiction over a battered spouse’s application for a motion
to reopen her immigration removal proceedings. 

. The immigration law allows such a motion if it is
“filed within 1 year of the entry of the final order of removal,
except that the Attorney General may, in the Attorney
General’s discretion, waive this time limitation in the case of
an alien who demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or
extreme hardship to the alien’s child.”               8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). 4
    In Magana-Magana, the alien filed a motion to reopen
her removal proceedings “well outside of the one-year filing

4
  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) provides that “Any limitation under
this section [§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)] on the deadlines for filing such
motions shall not apply— . . . if the motion to reopen is filed within 1
year of the entry of the final order of removal, except that the Attorney
General may, in the Attorney General’s discretion, waive this time
limitation in the case of an alien who demonstrates extraordinary
circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child[.]”
16                 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


period provided by statute.” 

. The alien
argued that under § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), the abuse she
suffered “constituted extraordinary circumstances that
should excuse her untimeliness.” Id. The BIA determined
that the alien’s motion was untimely, and the alien had not
demonstrated that she fell within the discretionary exception.
Id. In evaluating the alien’s petition for review, we first
considered whether we had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
“extraordinary circumstances” determination. Id. at 566.
For purposes of this jurisdictional analysis, we held that
“[t]he ‘extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to
the alien’s child’ standard in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is akin
to the due-diligence standard analyzed in Guerrero-
Lasprilla and the ‘exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship’ standard analyzed in Wilkinson,” both of which
involved “a legal standard that is applied to a set of facts.”
Id. at 570. Therefore, in light of Guerrero-Lasprilla and
Wilkinson, we concluded that this determination was a
mixed question of law and fact, and we had jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s determination whether the abuse
constituted “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 567–68.
    Having “assured ourselves of our own jurisdiction,” id.
at 571, we turned to the merits of the question whether the
alien demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances or extreme
hardship     to   the      alien’s   child,”    8   U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). Because we were considering the
denial of a motion to reopen, we relied on the deferential
standard of review that we articulated in Movsisian v.
Ashcroft, which held that “[w]e review the BIA’s denial of a
motion to reopen and remand for abuse of discretion.” 

 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the abuse of
discretion standard of review, we held that the alien in
Magana-Magana could not succeed. 

.
                      GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                          17


Thus, Magana-Magana, like Martinez, does not dictate what
the standard of review should be for the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” standard in § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
    While neither Martinez nor Magana-Magana is directly
contrary to Zia, we recognize that they take different
approaches to applying Wilkinson’s deferential approach.
But there is little practical difference between the abuse of
discretion standard adopted in Martinez and Magana-
Magana and the substantial evidence standard adopted by
Zia. 5 Cf. United States v. Hill, 

 (7th Cir.
1999) (“[W]hether deferential review is denominated for
‘abuse of discretion’ or ‘clear error’ or ‘substantial evidence’
. . . makes little practical difference.”); Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed Rsrv.
Sys., 

, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that
when the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”
standard performs the “function of assuring factual support,
there is no substantive difference between what it requires
and what would be required by the substantial evidence
test”) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, we use the standard
that more closely follows our circuit’s longstanding
approach for eligibility determinations and the Supreme
Court’s guidance in U.S. Bank and Monasky: the substantial
evidence standard.
                                    C
    Having determined our jurisdiction and standard of
review, we next address the meaning of the hardship

5
  Whatever difference exists in this context is not a “compelling reason”
to create a circuit split, Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 

 (9th
Cir. 2017), given the Third Circuit’s decision to review the hardship
determination for substantial evidence, Wilkinson, 

.
18                   GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


standard set forth in § 1229b(b)(1)(D). To qualify for
cancellation of removal, the alien must show that his
removal would result in a certain kind of hardship—
“exceptional and extremely unusual”—to a qualifying
relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). This language is not
ambiguous. “Exceptional” means “out of the ordinary
course, unusual, special.” Exceptional, Oxford English
Dictionary                   (OED)                    (2024),
https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6277146090.     6    “Extremely”
means “[i]n an extreme degree; exceedingly, very much.”
Extremely,                    OED                     (2023),
https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1068785790.            “Unusual”
means “[n]ot usual; uncommon; exceptional.” Unusual,
OED (2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/3122717619.
Their legal definitions are no different. See Exceptional,
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969) (“The rare—the
unusual or extraordinary case or circumstance”); Unusual,
Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (“[u]ncommon; not
usual, rare”); Extreme, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1951) (“[g]reatest, highest, strongest, or the like”). These
definitions are unchanged from when Congress used the
phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual” in enacting the
INA in 1952 and from when Congress enacted the current
provision in 1996. 7 See Exceptional, OED (first published


6
 This definition is unchanged from when it first entered the Oxford
English Dictionary in 1894. Exceptional, OED (2024).
7
  The current statutory regime of cancellation of removal was enacted in
1996. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 

, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, 

-594 (1996).
However, the phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” was
included in the original Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 as the
standard applicable to suspension of deportation. Immigration and
                     GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                       19


1894; not yet revised); Extremely, OED (first published
1894; not yet revised); Unusual, OED (first published 1926;
not yet revised); accord Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 

 (6th Cir. 2024) (discussing dictionary
definitions and concluding that “‘exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship’ means hardship . . . that’s significantly
different from or greater than the hardship that a deported
alien’s family normally experiences”). Drawing from the
dictionary definitions, then, the hardship must be out of the
ordinary and exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the
extreme, from the norm. The agency must compare the
hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the
usual, ordinary course when an alien is removed.
     This is consistent with how the BIA applies this statute.
See In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 

 (BIA
2001) (evaluating whether the alien’s relatives “would suffer
hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond, that
which would normally be expected from the deportation of
an alien with close family members here”). Although we no
longer defer to an agency’s interpretation of the meaning of
a statutory text, we may “seek aid from the interpretations of
those responsible for implementing particular statutes.”
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 

, 394 (2024)
(citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 

 (1944)).
While an agency’s interpretation is not binding, it may be
“especially informative to the extent it rests on factual
premises within the agency’s expertise.” Id. at 402 (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). In this
case, the BIA is “responsible for implementing”
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D), id. at 394, and the factual premises


Nationality Act, 

, 

, 

, 214 (1952).
20                 GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


underlying the cancellation of removal inquiry are “within
the agency’s expertise,” 

 (brackets omitted).
Accordingly, while we are not bound by Monreal-Aguinaga,
we find it instructive here.
    When the BIA applies this statute, it evaluates “the ages,
health, and circumstances” of qualifying relatives. Monreal-
Aguinaga, 

. In Monreal-Aguinaga, the
BIA offered hypothetical examples of hardship that might
meet the standard: elderly parents deprived of support by an
alien on whom they are solely dependent, or a qualifying
child “with very serious health issues” or “compelling
special needs in school” who would be removed from
supportive healthcare or educational environments. 

 But
the BIA also noted: “A lower standard of living or adverse
country conditions in the country of return . . . generally will
be insufficient in themselves to support a finding of
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 

 at 63–64.
The BIA stated that the hardship must be “substantially
beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when
a close family member leaves the country.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted).
    This comparative approach is likewise consistent with
how we applied this test in our circuit before Loper-Bright.
See, e.g., Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 

(9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the emotional suffering that
results from the separation of parents from children is “sadly
common” in the removal context and thus does not satisfy
the exceptional and extremely unusual standard); Chete
Juarez v. Ashcroft, 

, 949 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (the
hardship must be “substantially beyond that which would
ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation”
(citation omitted)).     We continue to apply such a
comparative approach here.
                   GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                   21


                               II
    We now turn to the facts of this case to determine
whether the BIA erred in denying cancellation of removal,
reviewing its hardship determination for substantial
evidence.
    Gonzalez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered
the United States most recently in 1999. After the
government commenced removal proceedings against him,
Gonzalez conceded removability and applied for
cancellation of removal. Relying primarily on country
conditions reports about crime and violence in Mexico, the
IJ granted Gonzalez’s application for cancellation of
removal. The BIA reversed, concluding that Gonzalez was
not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had not
demonstrated his removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative.
    At the time of the IJ’s decision, the record established the
following. Gonzalez had three children. His daughter was
an adult, who intended to stay in the United States to
continue her college education. Gonzalez’s two sons Jacob
and Brian were 15 and 18, respectively, and qualified as
children for purposes of the hardship determination. 

(b)(1) (defining “child” as an “unmarried
person under twenty-one years of age”). The sons planned
to accompany Gonzalez and their mother to Mexico in the
event of removal. The sons spoke some Spanish, though
neither spoke it well, and they were close to their older sister.
Additionally, Jacob had eczema that he treated with a topical
cream.
    On appeal, Gonzalez challenges the BIA’s conclusion
that the country conditions reports did not establish
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Gonzalez also
22                GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI


contends that the BIA inadequately addressed the hardship
that would result to Brian and Jacob given their ages, their
lack of fluency in Spanish, and the financial impact of
removal. These arguments fail.
    First, the BIA stated that it was “not persuaded that the
relatively high levels of crime and violence in Mexico
necessarily establishes the requisite level of hardship to the
qualifying relatives, as such general conditions would apply
to any qualifying relative who accompanies a noncitizen
back to the country to which removal is ordered.” The BIA
also rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would
be the target of criminal violence in Mexico. The BIA
reasoned that Gonzalez’s perceived wealth would not
increase the risk of criminal violence “enough to show that
the hardship faced by the qualifying relatives is
extraordinary.”
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusions. As
the BIA noted, Gonzalez’s other family members had lived
in Mexico without harm. And as we have explained, the
hardship determination requires hardship that deviates, in the
extreme, from the hardship that ordinarily occurs in removal
cases. Thus, a country conditions report that applies equally
to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the
conclusion that the hardship standard is met.
     Second, Gonzalez’s remaining argument—that the BIA
failed to give meaningful consideration to Gonzalez’s
financial concerns, his sons’ lost educational opportunities,
their lack of fluency in Spanish, and their separation from
their older sister—also fails. While the BIA must consider
all the evidence before it, “that does not mean that the Board
must individually identify and discuss every piece of
evidence in the record.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th
                  GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI                  23


757, 770 (9th Cir. 2022). In this case, the BIA recognized
the “lost educational opportunities” that Gonzalez’s sons
would experience as a result of their lack of fluency in
Spanish. It also recognized the sons’ separation from their
older sister. The BIA mentioned Gonzalez’s concerns about
finances, which encompass Gonzalez’s likely inability to
pay for his sons’ college education if removed. Because the
BIA discussed all evidence that was highly probative or
potentially dispositive, we reject Gonzalez’s argument that
the BIA failed to consider the evidence in the record.
     The BIA weighed the hardship to the sons against other
ameliorating circumstances, such as “the presence of other
family members in Mexico, the absence of serious health
problems or special needs affecting the qualifying relatives,
the children’s ability to converse in Spanish, and
approximately $10,000 in assets to help the family transition
to life outside the United States.” Considering the totality of
the evidence, the BIA concluded that Gonzalez had not met
his burden to show that “his removal would result in
hardship to the qualifying relatives that is substantially
different from or beyond that normally encountered in the
course of removal.”
    Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Gonzalez failed to demonstrate
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying
relatives, the BIA did not err when it denied his application
for cancellation of removal.
   PETITION DENIED.