Terrell Esco v. City of Chicago

                               In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-1304
TERRELL ESCO,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 1:22-cv-02324 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
                     ____________________

     ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2024
                ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit
Judges.
   ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Terrell Esco alleges that he was un-
lawfully detained and maliciously prosecuted based on the il-
legal actions of City of Chicago police officers, who arrested
him for weapons and drug violations. After the City dropped
the charges, Esco sued, claiming that the officers seized and
prosecuted him on weapons charges when they knew he was
not the person they saw in possession of a gun. In response to
2                                                              No. 23-1304

Esco’s assertion that the police officers’ body-worn camera
video evidence would incontrovertibly support his claim, the
district court judge viewed the video and held that the officers
had probable cause to detain Esco, eliminating the viability of
any of Esco’s claims. After exploring and approving of the
district court’s reliance on the video evidence in granting the
motion to dismiss, we agree with its assessment that Esco
failed to allege any plausible claims.
A. Probable cause and the facts
    We begin, in a somewhat unusual manner, by setting forth
the law, so that we might spotlight the facts relevant to the
proper legal question, which, at times, gets lost in the shuffle
of Esco’s allegations. This case evolved from an incident in-
volving Esco and a gun. But this case is not about whether
Esco possessed or discarded the gun, or for that matter,
whether he definitively committed any crime. Esco has filed
a federal §1983 suit alleging that police officers infringed on
his civil rights by unlawfully detaining him in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and by maliciously prosecuting him un-
der Illinois law. 1 He argues that the officers who arrested him,
and then initiated acts that led to his detention and prosecu-
tion, had no probable cause to do so. Specifically, he asserts
that at the time the officers arrested Esco they knew that he


    1 In the district court, Esco set forth four claims against the defendants:

Count I: 42 U.S.C. §1983—Unreasonable Seizure/False Arrest; Count II: 42
U.S.C. §1983—unreasonable search; Count III: 42 U.S.C. §1983—Fourth
Amendment unlawful detention; Count IV: state law claim for malicious
prosecution and indemnification by the City of Chicago pursuant to 745
ILCS 10/9-102; and Count V: state law claim against the City of Chicago
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. On appeal, Esco has aban-
doned the claim for false arrest and unreasonable search.
No. 23-1304                                                      3

was not the individual whom they saw throw a weapon un-
der a car, but falsely claimed that he was. This, he alleges, led
to his detention and unwarranted prosecution.
    Because this is a suit against the City and several of its po-
lice officers for unlawful detention and malicious prosecu-
tion, the defendants do not have to prove that Esco possessed
the weapon. The questions in this appeal are whether the of-
ficers had probable cause to detain Esco on a weapons charge,
and whether they reasonably conveyed information that led
to his detention and prosecution. The factual focus, therefore,
must be on what reasonable officers would have surmised,
given the situation surrounding them—not on proving if Esco
was, in actuality, doing what the officers thought he was do-
ing. That is because the determination of probable cause is
based on an objective assessment of what a reasonable officer
could conclude based on information known to officers at the
scene. Moorer v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir.
2024). “In making that assessment, the court must consider
the facts as they reasonably appeared to the arresting officer,
seeing what he saw, hearing what he heard, and so forth.”
Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Est., 

 (7th Cir. 2007).
“An officer has probable cause when, ‘at the time of the arrest,
the facts and circumstances within the [officer’s] knowledge
‘are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reason-
able caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that
the suspect has committed ... an offense.’” Madero v. McGuin-
ness, 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Lawson v. Veruchi,

 (7th Cir. 2011)). “This is a ‘common-sense
inquiry requiring only a probability of criminal activity,”’ not
certainty that a crime has occurred. Braun v. Vill. of Palatine, 

, 548 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Leaver v. Shortess, 

 (7th Cir. 2016)); Moorer, 

.
4                                                      No. 23-1304

    In this case, the assessment of probable cause for detention
is based on the same set of facts as the assessment of probable
cause for an arrest, as the officers used the facts gathered at
the time of Esco’s arrest as support for his continuing deten-
tion and later prosecution. This is not a case in which Esco
accuses the relevant state actors of creating new facts after his
arrest. Cf. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 

, 360–61
(2017) (Plaintiff alleged that after the initial arrest, a police ev-
idence technician lied in his report stating that pills found on
the suspect tested positive for the presence of ecstasy, when
in fact, they had not, thus extending the suspect’s time in cus-
tody). Esco’s complaint asserts that the police officers drafted
false police reports and made false statements to prosecutors
and judges. But all of those allegations assume that the offic-
ers were continuing to use the same false information that
they used for Esco’s initial arrest—that is, that Esco possessed
a handgun and then threw it under a car—even though the
officers knew he was not the person they saw in possession of
the handgun. Consequently, the facts that are relevant to the
determination of probable cause for the detention and mali-
cious prosecution claims, are the same facts that are relevant
to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Esco.
    The relevant facts, therefore, are those that shed light on
whether the police officers were reasonable in thinking that
Esco had likely committed a crime. Gaddis v. DeMattei, 

 (7th Cir. 2022). And as we noted, that means we
must look at the facts known to the officers at the time of
Esco’s arrest, bearing in mind that information that supports
probable cause can come from one officer who relays that in-
formation to others. United States v. Smith, 

(7th Cir. 2021). With that lengthy background legal explana-
tion aside, we recount the facts as follows:
No. 23-1304                                                             5

    On May 9, 2020, officers were conducting remote video
surveillance of a residence on North Pine Avenue in Chicago
using a police observation device (“POD”). While monitoring
activity on the POD, they observed a man—who all parties
agree was not Esco—leave the residence and walk down the
street toward a group of individuals while holding a firearm.
Officers Lopez and Segovia, who are partners, went with Of-
ficer Cledon to the surveilled residence to investigate, but
when they arrived, they found that they had something else
to investigate: a group of individuals in the middle of the
street. As they approached, they saw someone throw a gun
under a vehicle and run. According to Esco, he was not the
person who threw the gun under the vehicle and ran, but ra-
ther it was the person the officers initially saw on the POD
who discarded the weapon. He concedes, however, that he
did, in fact, run. When officers caught up to him, Esco ex-
plained that he ran because he had “a lot of weed,” but he
denied having a gun. R. 8-4 at 2:08–2:27. 2
    In his complaint, Esco asserted that despite knowing that
someone else threw the gun and ran, the officers nevertheless
arrested him and falsely stated in their police reports that he
possessed the weapon. This, he claims, led to the eventual
charges for being an armed habitual criminal, a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm, and for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. 3
Although he did not attach any video exhibits to his com-
plaint, Esco alleged that body-worn camera video revealed


   2 For citations to the video evidence, we note only the start time, un-

less the relevant action or conversations extended across a longer
timeframe.
   3 Esco was not prosecuted on any drug charges.
6                                                     No. 23-1304

the officers discussing the fact that he was not the individual
they saw with the gun. According to Esco’s complaint, these
knowingly false claims continued throughout his criminal
proceedings as officers drafted intentionally false police re-
ports, gave intentionally false information to the state’s attor-
ney’s office, made false statements at a preliminary hearing,
and failed to correct this false information over the course of
his detention, until the court granted the State’s motion to dis-
miss the charges nolle prosequi on May 10, 2021.
     We have begun with the facts as alleged in Esco’s com-
plaint and brief on appeal, (and those that are undisputed),
for when we review a district court’s grant of a motion to dis-
miss, we accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true
and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Bron-
son v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hosp. of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 2023). “[A] well-pleaded complaint may pro-
ceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those
facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007).
Although we accept the well-pleaded facts, we note that dis-
trict courts are free to consider “‘any facts set forth in the com-
plaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim.’” Bogie v. Rosen-
berg, 

 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hamilton v.
O’Leary, 

 (7th Cir.1992)). The court, therefore,
may examine exhibits, including video exhibits, attached to
the complaint, or referenced in the pleading if they are central
to the claim. Id.; see also Tierney v. Vahle, 

 (7th
Cir. 2002) (explaining that a court may consider exhibits re-
ferred to in a complaint, even if not attached to it, lest a “plain-
tiff could evade dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) simply by fail-
ing to attach to his complaint a document that proved that his
claim had no merit.”).
No. 23-1304                                                        7

     Esco did not attach video from the body-worn cameras,
but he relied on it for the allegations in his complaint that the
officers “can be heard on body-worn camera discussing the
fact that Plaintiff was not the individual they saw with the
gun.” R. 1 at 3, ¶12; see also Id. at ¶21 (alleging that video “foot-
age confirmed that Plaintiff was not the individual seen with
the gun.”). The defendants included the video with their mo-
tion to dismiss. Esco concedes that the district court could
consider the video from the body-worn cameras, as Esco ref-
erenced it in his complaint and according to Esco, it was “dis-
positive of the issue of probable cause.” Esco Br. at 7; see also
Reply Br. at 1. Although a district court, in a motion to dis-
miss, must take the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true, when
an exhibit, including a video exhibit, “incontrovertibly con-
tradicts the allegations in the complaint, the exhibit ordinarily
controls, even when considering a motion to dismiss.” Bogie,

. This is because to survive a motion to dismiss,
the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 

. A complaint that contra-
dicts uncontroverted video is not plausible. The plaintiff can
still contest the meaning or significance of the exhibit, but
where the plaintiff’s case depends on contradicting a fact that
seems plain from the exhibit, the plaintiff will “need[] to ex-
plain her position.” Bogie, 

. The district court
judge below described her practice as one in which, on a mo-
tion to dismiss, she considers video evidence that discredits a
plaintiff’s account of the facts but views the video in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. R. 27 at 9; Esco v. City of Chicago,

, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2023). This seems an appro-
priately balanced practice for a district court that must accept
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true, while also not giving
credence to facts that are clearly, definitively, and
8                                                     No. 23-1304

uncontrovertibly contradicted by video footage. Bogie, 

; Scott v. Harris, 

 (2007) (rationaliz-
ing in the context of summary judgment, “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly con-
tradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could be-
lieve it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
    It warrants emphasizing, however, that a district court de-
ciding a motion to dismiss, may not defy the Supreme Court’s
command to accept all facts in the complaint as true, and in-
stead rely on video evidence unless the video “utterly dis-
credit[s]” the non-movant’s version of the facts such that there
could be no reasonable disagreement about what the video
depicts. Scott, 

. Although the Scott court made
its admonishments in the context of summary judgment,
those cautions are equally relevant when a district court judge
relies on video evidence to rule on a motion to dismiss. Bogie,

 (“We also recognize that any photograph or
film shows only one perspective on a scene, so that additional
perspectives, such as eyewitness testimony or photographs or
films from different angles or different times, might reveal ad-
ditional facts that would change the legal analysis.”). This
court has made clear that video and photographic evidence
cannot be used when deciding cases as a matter of law, when
the video does not clearly and definitively discredit the non-
movant’s facts. See Kailin v. Vill. of Gurnee, 

, 481–
82 (7th Cir. 2023) (declining to apply the Scott exception when
video does not clearly show the events in question); Eagan v.
Dempsey, 

, 691 n.56 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that the
Scott exception is a narrow and pragmatic one reserved only
in cases where there is clear and irrefutable video evidence);
Ferguson v. McDonough, 

 (7th Cir. 2021)
No. 23-1304                                                     9

(declining to apply the Scott exception where the video was
open to interpretation and did not utterly discredit the plain-
tiff’s version of the facts); Gupta v. Melloh, 

(7th Cir. 2021) (reversing a grant of summary judgment where
reasonable jurors could have many different and opposing
conclusions about what they saw in video evidence); Jackson
v. Curry, 

 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that a video
tape does not fall within the Scott exception where it is subject
to multiple interpretations); McCottrell v. White, 

,
661 n.9 (7th Cir. 2019) (declining to draw independent factual
conclusions from a poor-quality, black and white video lack-
ing audio).
    We agree with the assessment of both parties and the dis-
trict court that it was appropriate for the district court to con-
sider the body-worn camera video evidence when consider-
ing this motion to dismiss. That video provided the district
court with the following factual information: As Officers
Lopez, Segovia, and Cledon approached the group of individ-
uals in the street, Officer Segovia suddenly exclaimed, “there
he is, he threw the gun!” R. 8-1 at 3:00. As the man to whom
he was referring ran away and the officers pursued him, Of-
ficer Segovia announced on the radio, “we got one running.”
R. 8-1 at 3:04. It is undisputed that the man who ran was Esco.
Esco Br. at 7 (“Plaintiff acknowledged in his response that
BWC footage shows he ran from officers … .”).
   As the rest of the officers continued to pursue Esco, Officer
Segovia stopped to retrieve the discarded weapon and almost
immediately found it under a parked car, announcing into his
radio within seconds, “weapon recovered.” R. 8-1 at 3:19.
Meanwhile, as Officers Cledon and Lopez pursued Esco on
foot, Officer Cledon relayed over his radio, “he’s running
10                                                    No. 23-1304

northbound,” and described the suspect as having “black
shirt, white sleeves. Dreads.” R. 8-2 at 2:00, 2:41. Within about
twenty-five seconds, another officer yelled out, “we got him,”
R. 8-2 at 3:06. Moments later, Officers Cledon and Lopez ar-
rived at the scene to find a swarm of officers detaining and
searching a man matching exactly the description Officer
Cledon sent out over the radio of the suspect who threw a gun
and ran. As the other officers searched Esco, he denied having
a gun and explained that he ran only because he had “a lot of
weed on me.” R. 8-2 at 4:23; R. 8-4 at 2:20. Just after Esco’s
denial, Officer Cledon, informed his fellow-officers, “we got
the gun.” R. 8-2 at 4:25; R. 8-4 at 2:23.
    A few seconds after Officer Lopez arrived at the scene of
the arrest, he let an officer on the scene know that his partner,
Officer Segovia, had recovered the weapon. As the officers
continued to recount to one another what had happened, an
unknown officer approached Officer Cledon and said, “that’s
not the same guy that they were looking at with the cameras.”
R. 8-2 at 4:50. Officer Cledon responded, “he was with him.
We got that guy too. We got the gun.” R. 8-2 at 4:52. Officer
Lopez then made a phone call to Officer Segovia in which the
two exchanged information about what was happening in ei-
ther location, and Officer Segovia confirmed again that he had
recovered the weapon. When the call ended, Officer Cledon
continued to talk with various officers at the scene of Esco’s
arrest and explained, while gesturing toward Esco, “he
walked up to the car. Tossed the gun. He took off running.”
R. 8-2 at 5:37. Shortly after finishing the search of Esco, Officer
Cledon asked Officer Lopez “this guy just has weed?” to
which Officer Lopez responded, “No, he’s the one that tossed
it,” gesturing at Esco. R. 8-2 at 5:58. In sum, by the end of
Esco’s arrest, all of the relevant officers on the scene had heard
No. 23-1304                                                   11

by way of radio communications or direct communications
that their fellow officers saw Esco with a gun, recovered the
weapon, and then pursued and detained the man who threw
it.
    Back at the location where the gun was discarded, Officer
Segovia relayed to arriving officers that he had “watched the
guy put the gun under there,” gesturing to a car. R. 8-1 at 6:09.
He repeated the information about seeing Esco put the gun
under the car to those officers no less than five times. About a
minute later, Officer Segovia answered a phone call and ex-
plained: “The guy that ran, that they grabbed, he’s the one I
watched put the gun under the car. I promise, I saw him right
with my eyes.” R. 8-1 at 10:50. The last minutes of Officer Se-
govia’s body-worn camera video are filled with his relaying
again and again how he watched Esco throw a gun under the
car.
     Viewed as a whole, the video undoubtedly supports a
finding that the officers had probable cause to believe that
Esco was the person who possessed and then discarded the
weapon. At the moment Officer Segovia excitedly exclaimed
to Officers Lopez and Cledon that the man who was running,
and whom they were chasing, just discarded a gun, he not
only demonstrated his own belief that Esco possessed a
weapon, but he also relayed to the two other officers infor-
mation that gave them probable cause to stop Esco. An iden-
tification by even one eyewitness who lacks an apparent
grudge against the accused person is sufficient to demon-
strate probable cause. Moorer, 

. And police of-
ficers can rely on directions and information transmitted from
one officer to the other to establish probable cause. United
States v. Hensley, 

, 233–35 (1985); United States v.
12                                                    No. 23-1304

Parra, 

 (7th Cir. 2005). Esco also did not re-
spond to Officer Segovia’s verbal commands to “come here”
and to “stop.” R. 8-1 at 3:02, 3:04. We cannot know whether
Esco heard the commands or not, but because the reasonable-
ness of an arrest is evaluated from the viewpoint of the officer,
Esco’s failure to heed his commands factored into his reason-
able belief that Esco had committed or was committing a
crime. Illinois v. Wardlow, 

 (2000) (“Headlong
flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion:
It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is cer-
tainly suggestive of such.”)
    The video also shows Officer Segovia quickly recovering
the weapon under the car without much search, verifying for
him that what he thought he saw, did, in fact, happen. Officer
Segovia’s later assertions of certainty, made only minutes af-
ter that first exclamation, lend further support to the notion
that Officer Segovia firmly believed that Esco possessed a
weapon. See, e.g., R. 8-1 at 6:08 (“I watched him put the gun
under there”); R. 8-1 at 6:53 (“I saw him put the gun”); R. 8-1
at 7:06 (“I watched him go like this and put it under there, and
I said hey, that’s them, that’s him”); R. 8-1 at 9:27 (noting that
he witnessed Esco “thr[o]w that shit right under the car too”);
R. 8-1 at 10:26 (“I could literally see, saw him fucking throw
it”). Importantly, he also conveyed this information to the of-
ficers at the arrest scene. See R. 8-1 at 10:50 (“The guy that ran,
that they grabbed, he’s the one I watched put the gun under
the car. I promise, I saw him right with my eyes.”). He then
repeated the story to Officer Lopez several more times when
the latter returned to the squad car. In sum, the video pro-
vides definitive evidence that Officer Segovia believed that
Esco threw the weapon. But more importantly for the objec-
tive probable cause standard, it definitively demonstrates that
No. 23-1304                                                 13

a reasonable officer standing in Officer Segovia’s shoes would
have had reason to believe that Esco had committed a crime.
    The video also supports a finding that a reasonable officer
hearing, seeing, and knowing what the other officers did,
would have had reason to believe that Esco committed a
crime. In addition to hearing Officer Segovia yell that the man
they were chasing discarded a gun and was running, they
heard confirmation that he recovered the weapon, verifying
that Officer Segovia was correct about seeing a discarded
weapon. The arresting officers found Esco running north-
bound and matching the description Officer Cledon gave over
the radio, thus confirming in their minds that Esco was the
same person who had the weapon. Officer Cledon made clear
to the arresting officers, “we got the gun.” R. 8-2 at 4:25.
    Esco’s primary support for his theory that the officers
knew he was not the person in possession of the gun comes
from a statement that can be heard on Officer Cledon’s body-
worn camera video. On that video, an officer not involved in
the original sighting or chase said to Officer Cledon, “hey,
that’s not the same guy that they were looking at with the
cameras.” R. 8-2 at 4:50. The defendants concede that this was
true; Esco was not the “same guy” that the officers were orig-
inally looking at with the POD. There were two distinct
crimes with two distinct weapons in this case. The police ar-
rived at North Pine Avenue to investigate one crime involv-
ing a man with a weapon, but on route, they came upon a sec-
ond crime in which a suspect (Esco) threw a weapon under a
car and ran. Officer Cledon immediately cleared up the un-
known officer’s confusion saying, “he was with him. We got
that guy too. We got the gun.” R. 8-2 at 4:52 (emphasis ours).
The unknown officer answered “oh,” without adding any
14                                                  No. 23-1304

further information that would indicate that Officer Cledon
was incorrect or that he knew something that Officer Cledon
did not. Officer Cledon then continued to talk with various
officers at the scene and explained, while gesturing toward
Esco, “he walked up to the car. Tossed the gun. He took off
running.” R. 8-2 at 5:37.
    Esco also argues that Officer Cledon was confused about
whether Esco had a gun, because he asked Officer Lopez at
the end of the arrest “this guy just has weed?” R. 8-2 at 5:58.
See Esco Br. at 15. We cannot know exactly what Officer
Cledon meant by his question—whether he was inquiring
whether Esco had other drugs too; whether he was clarifying
whether the man detained in the squad car was the same man
he had been chasing, or something else. We need not resolve
whether, during this high adrenaline chase and quick after-
math, there were occasional moments of confusion. Probable
cause depends on the totality of the circumstances. Maryland
v. Pringle, 

 (2003). Temporary confusion by a
bystanding officer who was not involved in the pursuit and
arrest, or requests for assurances about the factual circum-
stances, factor into an assessment of the totality of the circum-
stances but cannot upset other clear indicia of probable cause.
    Long before his question to Officer Lopez, Officer Cledon
appeared confident in his knowledge that Esco tossed the gun
and ran, conveying to the other officers that the suspect they
chased had a weapon and it had been recovered. See R. 8-2 at
5:37 (Officer Cledon gesturing toward Esco and explaining to
the other officers at the scene of the arrest, “he walked up to
the car. Tossed the gun. He took off running.”). And any con-
fusion that the unknown officer had about whether Esco had
a gun was quickly cleared up. Collectively, therefore, the
No. 23-1304                                                                15

officers had more than sufficient knowledge, either firsthand,
or from other officers, to have probable cause to arrest Esco
on the weapons charge. And because the officers had proba-
ble cause to believe that Esco had committed a crime, they
therefore had probable cause to detain him pending criminal
proceedings on that charge. 4
B. Malicious prosecution
    Esco also makes a claim under the highly disfavored Illi-
nois state tort of malicious prosecution. See Levin v. King, 

 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“Illinois courts have
long disfavored actions for malicious prosecution”) (citing
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 

 (Ill. 1937)). To establish
a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show:
“(1) the commencement or continuance of an original crimi-
nal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the ter-
mination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the ab-
sence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence
of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Swick v.
Liautaud, 

 (Ill. 1996); see also Holland v.
City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).


    4    The district court came to the same conclusion that we do. See
R. 27 at 8; Esco, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 922 (finding that “the arresting officers
reasonably believed that plaintiff threw the gun that Officer Segovia recov-
ered from under the car … .”) (emphasis in original). The district court,
however, also relied on the discovery of the cannabis to justify the arrest
on the theory that “[a]n arrest may be supported by probable cause that
the arrestee committed any offense, regardless of the crime charged or the
crime the officer thought had been committed.” R. 27 at 14; Esco, 651
F. Supp. 3d at 924 (quoting United States v. Shields, 

 (7th
Cir. 2015)). Because we find that a reasonable officer could conclude that
Esco had committed a weapons crime, we need not, and do not, rely on
the discovery of the cannabis to justify the full arrest.
16                                                   No. 23-1304

    Because, as step three implies, probable cause is a com-
plete defense to a claim for malicious prosecution, our conclu-
sion above—that the police officers had probable cause to de-
tain Esco for the weapons offense—eviscerates any claim of
malicious prosecution. See Washington v. City of Chicago, 

 (7th Cir. 2024) (noting that the existence of prob-
able cause is a defense to both Fourth Amendment and Illinois
malicious prosecution claims.)
    In any event, Esco also failed to prove, as required by step
two, that the proceeding terminated in his favor. Prior to any
trial on the state court weapons charges, the court granted the
State’s motion to dismiss the charges nolle prosequi. For pur-
poses of Illinois malicious prosecution claims, bare evidence
of a nolle prosequi does not establish that the underlying crim-
inal proceeding was terminated in the defendant’s favor.
Swick, 

. Esco held the burden to demon-
strate that “the nolle prosequi was entered for reasons con-
sistent with his innocence.” 

. “The circumstances
surrounding the abandonment of the criminal proceedings
must compel an inference that there existed a lack of reason-
able grounds to pursue the criminal prosecution.” 

 Esco of-
fers nothing more than the bare evidence that the state court
entered a nolle prosequi order, without explanation of why the
court entered the order. This is insufficient under Illinois law
as evidence of a favorable termination of criminal proceed-
ings.
C. The remaining claims
    Because Esco’s Fourth Amendment and state law mali-
cious prosecution claims have been defeated, the claims for
indemnification by the City and for respondeat superior also
fail. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its
No. 23-1304                                                  17

discretion in dismissing Esco’s complaint without the oppor-
tunity to replead. District courts have broad discretion to
deny leave to amend the pleadings where the amendment
would be futile. Russell v. Zimmer, Inc., 

 (7th
Cir. 2023). And here, our review assures us that any amend-
ment would have, indeed, been futile. We therefore AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court.