Yoram Kahn v. Walmart Inc.

                               In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-1751
YORAM KAHN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                 v.

WALMART INC.,
                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
             No. 1:22-cv-04177 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge.
                     ____________________

      ARGUED JANUARY 10, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 3, 2024
                 ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal turns on what con-
stitutes reasonable consumer behavior for purposes of state
consumer protection law. Plaintiff Yoram Kahn alleges that
the nation’s largest retailer—defendant Walmart Inc.—takes
advantage of consumers in Illinois and nationwide with de-
ceptive and unfair pricing practices. At the heart of the case,
2                                                   No. 23-1751

Kahn alleges, are numerous small discrepancies between the
prices advertised on Walmart’s shelves and the prices actually
charged at the cash register. The individual discrepancies are
small but according to plaintiff add up to hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars each year. Kahn alleges that Walmart is aware
of these discrepancies between shelf prices and register prices
and that its unfair and deceptive pricing practices are perva-
sive and continuous.
    More specifically, Kahn alleges that the discrepancies be-
tween shelf prices and register prices violate the Illinois Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”),
815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (“UDTPA”), 815 ILCS 510/1 et seq., and other
states’ consumer protection statutes. Kahn also brings a claim
for unjust enrichment. Kahn seeks to sue on behalf of a class
of similarly situated consumers.
    The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings and
denied leave to amend the complaint. We reverse because the
complaint states some viable claims. We reject the theory that
providing a customer with a receipt after payment stating the
actual price charged is sufficient, at least as a matter of law, to
dispel any potential deception or unfairness caused by an in-
accurate shelf price. We reverse the dismissal of Kahn’s ICFA
and UDTPA claims for failure to allege a deceptive or unfair
practice or the required intent. We agree with defendant that
plaintiff has not alleged a plausible likelihood of future injury
needed for injunctive relief under the UDTPA, though we
modify dismissal of that claim to give plaintiff an opportunity
to amend his complaint if he believes he can cure that prob-
lem. We reverse the judgment dismissing plaintiff’s other
No. 23-1751                                                    3

individual and class claims. We remand the case for further
proceedings.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
   A. Factual Background
    Defendant Walmart moved to dismiss this case on the
pleadings, so we focus on the facts alleged in plaintiff’s com-
plaint. Walmart’s tactical choice requires us to treat Kahn’s
factual allegations as true. E.g., Goldberg v. United States, 

 (7th Cir. 2018).
   Walmart uses shelf pricing to advertise merchandise
prices, to let consumers compare prices, and to induce them
to buy the advertised merchandise. Walmart’s shelf pricing
does not always reflect the price it charges consumers at the
point of sale, causing consumers to pay higher prices at check-
out. State agencies have imposed fines on Walmart for this
practice. For example, in 2012, California assessed a $2 million
fine against Walmart for violating a 2008 ruling requiring it to
resolve pricing errors at checkout. In November 2021, North
Carolina fined two Walmart stores after an investigation
found repeated and excessive scanning errors that caused
overcharges on three to seven percent of items purchased
each month. In February 2022, five additional Walmart stores
had to pay North Carolina over $15,000 in fines for overcharg-
ing consumers due to price scanning errors.
   Plaintiff Kahn is a citizen of Ohio. He shopped at a
Walmart store in Niles, Illinois, on August 2, 2022. Kahn al-
leges that he read and relied on the shelf pricing in deciding
what to purchase. Ultimately, he bought fifteen items for a
pretax total of $27.69. After paying, Kahn reviewed his re-
ceipt. He determined that Walmart charged him more than
4                                                   No. 23-1751

the listed shelf price on six of the items he purchased. The ad-
vertised shelf prices of these six items ranged from $1.64 for a
candy bar to $3.94 for muffins. When Kahn checked out, the
actual prices of these six items scanned at ten to fifteen percent
markups above the shelf prices. In total, Kahn paid Walmart
$1.89 in overcharges on these six items, nearly seven percent
of the pretax total of his bill. Small change for Kahn as an in-
dividual, no doubt, but keep in mind the volume of Walmart’s
business.
    Kahn’s counsel investigated Walmart’s shelf pricing at
other stores in Illinois and in Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New
Jersey, and New York. They found similar examples of
overcharges. Counsel also found that, despite being fined by
state regulators in February 2022 for overcharges, two
Walmart stores in North Carolina continued to have
overcharges in August 2022.
    B. Procedural History
    After his visit to the Walmart in Niles, Kahn filed this law-
suit in federal court alleging that Walmart’s pricing discrep-
ancies violate the ICFA, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., the Illinois
UDTPA, 815 ILCS 510/1 et seq., and equivalent consumer pro-
tection statutes in other states. Kahn also brought a claim for
unjust enrichment. The number of potential class members
and the financial stakes are sufficient to support federal juris-
diction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 

(d), with minimal diversity of citizenship. Walmart
moved to dismiss the entire case for failure to state a claim.
   The district court granted Walmart’s motion to dismiss,
finding that plaintiff had failed to allege a plausible claim un-
der the ICFA or the UDTPA, and accordingly, that his unjust
No. 23-1751                                                     5

enrichment and class claims also failed. Kahn v. Walmart, Inc.,
No. 1:22-cv-04177, 

, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21,
2023). The district court noted that plaintiff tried to allege both
unfair and deceptive practices under the ICFA. In federal
court, unfair practice claims are usually subject to only the
standard pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 8. But the district court found that all of plaintiff’s
ICFA allegations were premised on “Walmart’s alleged con-
cealment of the actual prices of its items,” even though unfair-
ness and deception are distinct theories under the ICFA. 

. The court treated plaintiff’s allegations “solely as a decep-
tive practices claim” and applied Rule 9(b)’s heightened
pleading requirements. 

 citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
   The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning
that “where Walmart provides its customers with a receipt to
compare the scanned price with the shelf price,” there is “no
possibility for deception.” 

, quoting Killeen v.
McDonald’s Corp., 

 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
Here, “Kahn could, and indeed did, use this receipt to
compare the prices Walmart charged him with the advertised
shelf pricing. This comparison revealed the discrepancy and
dispelled any potential deception.” 

 The district court also
held that plaintiff failed to allege that Walmart intended for
him to rely on the inaccurate shelf pricing. The court held that
providing plaintiff a receipt so he could “compare the shelf
price to the scanned price” rendered it implausible that
Walmart intended for customers to rely on incorrect shelf
prices. Id. at *4.
    The district court then considered Kahn’s remaining
claims, finding that they failed “for the same reasons as his
ICFA claim.” Id. His UDTPA claim required the same two
6                                                     No. 23-1751

elements he failed to plead adequately under the ICFA, “a
deceptive representation, made with the intention that the
consumer rely on the misrepresentation.” Id., citing 815 ILCS
510/2. The court dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment
because it could not stand on its own without a viable
statutory claim. Because all of Kahn’s individual claims had
been dismissed, the district court also dismissed his class
claims. Finally, the district court denied plaintiff leave to
amend his individual claims on the ground that any
amendment would be futile. Id. at *5. Plaintiff has appealed.
II. Analysis
    A. Legal Standard
    We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a case
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. E.g., Proft v.
Raoul, 

 (7th Cir. 2019). We treat the com-
plaint’s factual allegations as true and draw every factual in-
ference in the plaintiff’s favor. Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League,

, 290–91 (7th Cir. 2018). A complaint needs to pre-
sent only “a short and plain statement” of the basis for a claim.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal, the factual allega-
tions in the complaint need not prove the claim. They need to
show only that the claim is “plausible on its face” and that, if
the allegations are true, the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Roldan
v. Stroud, 

 (7th Cir. 2022), citing Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007).
    This pleading standard requires plaintiffs to allege only
enough facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from con-
ceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 

. To be plausi-
ble rather than merely conceivable means that the complaint’s
“factual content … allows the court to draw the reasonable
No. 23-1751                                                     7

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct al-
leged.” Firestone Financial Corp. v. Meyer, 

 (7th
Cir. 2015), quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 (2009).
The factual allegations must present “more than a sheer pos-
sibility” that the defendant’s conduct is unlawful, Iqbal, 

, but a complaint survives a motion to dismiss
“even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts
is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and un-
likely.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 

 (7th Cir.
2013), quoting Twombly, 

.
    We agree with the district court that some of Kahn’s claims
sound in fraud and are thus subject to a higher pleading
standard under Rule 9(b). See Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rule 9(b) applies
to any claim that “sounds in fraud”); Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank
Clothiers, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Rule
9(b) pleading standard to ICFA claim). Rule 9(b) requires a
pleading to “state with particularity the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud.” It is designed “to force the plaintiff to do more
than the usual investigation before filing his complaint.”
Ackerman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 

(7th Cir. 1999). The precise level of particularity required un-
der Rule 9(b) depends on the facts of the case, but the rule
“ordinarily requires describing the who, what, when, where,
and how of the fraud.” AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 

 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Still, even
Rule 9(b) allows malice, intent, knowledge, and other condi-
tions of a person’s mind to be alleged “generally.”
    We focus in Part B on the reasonable consumer standard
as it applies to this case. We explain then in Part C how Kahn
has alleged viable claims for deceptive and unfair practices
8                                                  No. 23-1751

under the ICFA, addressing Walmart’s counterarguments as
we go. We explain in Part D why we reverse the district court’s
dismissal with prejudice of Kahn’s other individual claims
under the UDTPA and for unjust enrichment, as well as its
dismissal without prejudice of his class claims.
    B. Reasonable Consumer Behavior
    The state consumer protection laws at issue here all re-
quire plaintiffs to prove that the relevant acts or practices are
“likely to deceive reasonable consumers.” Bell v. Publix Super
Markets, Inc., 

, 474 (7th Cir. 2020), quoting
Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 

 (7th Cir.
2020). This standard “requires a probability that a significant
portion of the general consuming public or of targeted con-
sumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be mis-
led.” 

 quoting Beardsall, 

; see also Moore v.
Mars Petcare US, Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2020)
(adopting same “reasonable consumer” test for California
consumer protection statute). The qualifier “in the circum-
stances” is significant. Courts considering whether consum-
ers are “acting reasonably” must “take into account all the in-
formation available to consumers and the context in which
that information is provided and used.” Bell, 982 F.3d at 475,
477.
    Reasonable consumer behavior is not a matter of pure
economic theory. Rather, reasonable consumer behaviors are
“matters of fact, subject to proof that can be tested at trial,
even if as judges we might be tempted to debate and speculate
further about them.” Id. at 481. In establishing reasonable
consumer behavior, what matters is “how consumers actually
behave—how they perceive advertising and how they make
decisions.” Id.
No. 23-1751                                                                9

    In applying consumer protection laws, we do not typically
hold consumers to the standard of Adam Smith’s homo eco-
nomicus, a perfectly rational being who gathers and evaluates
the optimal amount of information about options in the mar-
ketplace to maximize utility preferences. See Honorable v. Easy
Life Real Estate System, 

 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(“[T]he economic theories that imply that market prices are
efficient, thus beneficial for consumers, presuppose that con-
sumers are informed, markets are competitive, and the costs
of making transactions are not excessively burdensome. …
[N]eoclassical economics in fact assumes perfect infor-
mation.”). It is well known that human cognitive abilities are
not perfect or infinite. We have limited time, computational
skills, and memories, and we rationally use mental shortcuts
to deal with those limits. 1 The classical economic model often
fails to predict accurately how real humans will behave in
real-life marketplaces. See Carmody v. Board of Trustees of Uni-
versity of Illinois, 

 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting “dec-
ades of behavioral research” demonstrating predictable cog-
nitive biases, citing Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and
Slow (2011)).
    Predictable tendencies in consumer behavior mean that
retail settings can be engineered to influence consumers in
ways they (meaning we) do not fully anticipate or appreciate.
“‘[M]arket outcomes frequently will be heavily influenced, if
not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the
format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in
general, the setting within which market transactions occur,’

1 See generally, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,

A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 

, 1476–77
(1998).
10                                                            No. 23-1751

allowing some to ‘exploit those tendencies for gain.’”
Honorable, 

, quoting Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 

, 635 (1999). The
market itself usually cannot correct for these problems.
Instead, consumer protection regulations are often responses
to inefficiencies enabled by market manipulation. 2
   “We doubt it would surprise retailers and marketers if ev-
idence showed that many grocery shoppers make quick deci-
sions that do not involve careful consideration of all infor-
mation available to them.” Bell, 982 F.3d at 481. 3 “Lots of



2 “Market competitors will, to survive in the long run, ‘discover’ precisely

which situational manipulations most efficiently influence us and how.
Market actors who fail to manipulate situational variables effectively will
sooner or later be supplanted by those who do.” Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 

, 198
(2003).
3 A great deal of market research is likely to be available to plaintiff Kahn

to support his allegations and inferences, and to Walmart in defending its
practices. “A market capable of producing the modern supermarket is a
market capable of untold manipulation.” Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,

, 1444 (1999). Twenty-five years ago, Hanson and
Kysar wrote:
     In large part because the market for groceries in the United
     States is so sizable and competitive, marketing researchers
     have devoted more attention to the supermarket than to any
     other retail environment. The cumulative result of their ef-
     forts is a marketing marvel, a shopping climate scientifically
     calibrated to induce as many unplanned purchases as can
     possibly be wrought from the ‘sovereign’ consumer.
No. 23-1751                                                                11

advertising is aimed at creating positive impressions in buy-
ers’ minds … subtly by implication and indirection.” 

. Only by interpreting the reasonable consumer standard

. Retailers know “that blue color schemes impart calm sensations
and that shoppers walk more slowly and spend more time when the music
is slow in tempo.” 

 (internal quotations omitted). They know
“that piped aromas (fake, of course) can increase bakery sales[,] … that
deli selections can be used to create the illusion of choice and that spraying
water on waxed produce can cause visceral improvements in customer
perception.” 

 Store, aisle, and shelf layouts are designed with scientific
exactitude to maximize sales. “Because the best viewing angle is 15 de-
grees below the horizontal, the choicest elevation on any aisle has been
measured at 51 to 53 inches off the floor.” 

 (cleaned up). “[S]ta-
ples such as milk, bread, and eggs are placed at opposite extremes of the
supermarket to force shoppers to cover as much store real estate as possi-
ble.” 

. “[S]tocking soup cans out of alphabetical order can greatly
increase sales by forcing customers to search through a variety of cans.”

. And “the way a price label is designed, such as whether a dollar
sign is included, can influence how consumers view the actual price.”
Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail,

, 1333 (2015).
    “The aim of atmospherics, like all supermarket sleights-of-hand, is to
maximize unplanned purchases.” Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Mar-
ket Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. at 1446. “[T]he average time to make
buying decisions in a supermarket is a matter of seconds,” and “two out
of every three supermarket purchases are not planned.” Id. “One study
determined that forty percent of supermarket shoppers did not check the
price of goods they chose, and less than half could identify the price of
goods that they had just put in their shopping cart.” Id. at 1450. Advances
in gathering and analyzing data have enabled further engineering of su-
permarkets and other retail settings. See Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware,
163 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1322 (“Mass retailers continually fine-tune their pric-
ing algorithms through advanced behavioral data-mining operations”
and “film customers’ in-store movements, compile loyalty card data, and
conduct many randomized controlled trials that easily provide statistical
significance across thousands of stores and millions of transactions.”).
12                                                           No. 23-1751

in line with actual consumer behavior can consumer protec-
tion laws help address problems posed by unfair or deceptive
market manipulation. Id. (“[T]he reasonable consumer stand-
ard” must “stay[] in touch with real consumer behavior.”).
Our focus in applying the reasonable consumer standard
must include “how real consumers understand the carefully
crafted messages aimed at them.” Id. at 480.
    In considering inferences that can, and at this stage must,
be drawn in Kahn’s favor, we reject Walmart’s arguments that
courts should overlook the realities of attempts to influence
consumer behavior. This case concerns the nation’s largest re-
tailer, which allegedly stands to profit by hundreds of mil-
lions each year from shelf pricing discrepancies. It is reasona-
ble to assume that Walmart can afford to and does hire lead-
ing consumer researchers and experts. 4
    If Walmart invests in designing its stores to influence the
behavior of real consumers, it cannot defeat claims of unfair
and deceptive business practices with arguments that assume
consumer behavior in idealized markets with “perfect
information, perfect competition, and no transactions costs.”
Honorable, 

. “[W]e have often stressed
that consumers are likely to exhibit a low degree of care when
purchasing low-priced, everyday items.” Bell, 982 F.3d at 479.
This low degree of care does not make consumers
unreasonable—it makes them human, and even economically

4 To maintain its profit margins in highly competitive retail markets,

Walmart competes in an “arms race” with other large retailers like Ama-
zon “to hire mathematicians and statisticians to analyze the results of in-
store experiments and to develop behavioral modeling algorithms from
their troves of data.” Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
1331.
No. 23-1751                                                               13

rational when search costs and transaction costs are included
in the utility calculus. But it also makes them vulnerable to
exploitation by unfair and deceptive practices. When
determining reasonable consumer behavior for purposes of
consumer protection law, we should consider the behavior of
real consumers instead of Adam Smith’s homo economicus with
perfect information. 5
    C. Plausibly Alleging a Claim Under the ICFA
    Against this background, we apply the reasonable con-
sumer standard to assess the plausibility of plaintiff’s allega-
tions. He seeks relief under the ICFA, which is “a regulatory
and remedial statute intended to protect consumers …
against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and other un-
fair and deceptive business practices.” Benson v. Fannie May
Confections Brands, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2019), quot-
ing Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 

, 416–
17, 

 (2002). The ICFA prohibits the follow-
ing:


5 Accord, Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2020)

(consumers can be made “susceptible to purchasing because they won’t
have the time or interest to read about the product on the website or the
back of the box” (cleaned up)); Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 

, 883
(9th Cir. 2021) (“reasonable consumer might not be an expert” in food pro-
duction processes); Mantikas v. Kellogg Co., 

 (2d Cir. 2018)
(reasonable consumers not expected “to look beyond misleading repre-
sentations on the front of the box to discover the truth from the ingredient
list in small print on the side of the box” (quoting Williams v. Gerber Prod-
ucts Co., 

 (9th Cir. 2008)); Dumont v. Reily Foods Co., 

, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2019) (“reasonably acting, hazelnut-loving consum-
ers” could rely on product name, “Hazelnut Crème coffee” to conclude
that it contained hazelnut, with “no need to search the fine print on the
back of the package”).
14                                                   No. 23-1751

       unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including
       but not limited to the use or employment of any
       deception[,] fraud, false pretense, false promise,
       misrepresentation or the concealment, suppres-
       sion or omission of any material fact, with intent
       that others rely upon the concealment, suppres-
       sion or omission of such material fact, or the use
       or employment of any practice described in Sec-
       tion 2 of the [UDTPA].
815 ILCS 505/2. The UDTPA in turn declares the following
business practices to be deceptive, among others: “adver-
tis[ing] goods or services with intent not to sell them as ad-
vertised; … mak[ing] false or misleading statements of fact
concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price
reductions; [or] … engag[ing] in any other conduct which
similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstand-
ing.” 815 ILCS 510/2(a)(9), (11), & (12).
    To plead a deceptive practices claim under the ICFA, a pri-
vate plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendant engaged in a
deceptive or unfair practice; (2) with the intent that the plain-
tiff (or others) rely on the deception; (3) that the act occurred
in the course of trade or commerce; and (4) that the deception
caused actual damages. Robinson, 

; see also
Vanzant v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 

 (7th Cir.
2019) (applying Rule 9(b) to ICFA deceptive practices claim);
Benson, 

 (same).
    In the district court and on appeal, Walmart challenged the
first two elements at the pleadings stage. We first explain why
plaintiff has plausibly alleged a deceptive practice under the
ICFA with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) and an un-
fair practice under Rule 8(a). We then explain why plaintiff
No. 23-1751                                                  15

has plausibly alleged that Walmart intended for him and
other customers to rely on its misleading shelf prices.
       1. Deceptive Act or Practice
    Courts apply a “reasonable consumer” standard in evalu-
ating the likelihood of deception and look at this question in
view of the “totality of the information” available to the con-
sumer at the point of deception. Benson, 

; ac-
cord, Davis v. G.N. Mortgage Corp., 

 (7th Cir.
2005). Where, as here, the alleged deceptive practice involves
misleading labels, the ICFA requires plaintiff to allege plausi-
bly “‘that the relevant labels are likely to deceive reasonable
consumers,’ which ‘requires a probability that a significant
portion of the general consuming public or of targeted con-
sumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be mis-
led.’” Bell, 982 F.3d at 474–75, quoting Beardsall, 953 F.3d at
972−73.
    Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Walmart’s inaccurate shelf
pricing is a deceptive act or practice within the meaning of the
ICFA. There is nothing implausible about his allegations that
Walmart’s inaccurate shelf prices are likely to deceive a sig-
nificant portion of reasonable consumers. It is neither “unrea-
sonable” nor “fanciful” for consumers to believe Walmart will
sell them its merchandise at the prices advertised on its
shelves. See Bell, 982 F.3d at 477. Illinois consumer protection
law assumes that consumers will rely on advertised prices.
Both the ICFA and the UDTPA declare “misleading state-
ments of fact concerning the … existence of … price reduc-
tions” to be deceptive acts. 815 ILCS 510/2(a)(11). Here, the
advertised shelf prices are not alleged to have been accompa-
nied by any statements warning they might not be reliable or
16                                                           No. 23-1751

saying they were provisional. If shelf prices are not accurate,
they are likely to mislead reasonable consumers. 6
    The remainder of this subsection proceeds in two parts.
First, we explain why the district court erred in concluding
that providing a receipt after the transaction dispels as a
matter of law any deception created by Walmart’s facially
misleading shelf prices. Second, we explain how plaintiff
alleges what amounts to a form of “bait-and-switch”
deception, a theory that survives dismissal on the pleadings
even when a consumer discovers the price discrepancy before
completing a transaction, let alone after.
    The district court agreed that reasonable consumers
would be misled by Walmart’s inaccurate shelf prices but held
that once those consumers were given receipts with the actual
prices charged, no reasonable consumer would remain de-
ceived. Kahn, 

, at *3 (“[W]here Walmart pro-
vides its customers with a receipt to compare the scanned
price with the shelf price,” it leaves “no possibility for decep-
tion.” (quoting Killeen, 

)). Here, “Kahn
could, and indeed did, use this receipt to compare the prices
Walmart charged him with the advertised shelf pricing. This
comparison revealed the discrepancy and dispelled any po-
tential deception.” 

   We understand the court’s point but respectfully disagree
with the conclusion, especially when we focus on reasonable


6 To be actionable under the ICFA, the misrepresentations must also be

material to reasonable consumers. Smith v. Prime Cable of Chicago, 

, 

 (1995). Price is obviously a mate-
rial term of consumer transactions. On appeal, Walmart wisely does not
challenge the materiality of its alleged misrepresentations regarding price.
No. 23-1751                                                    17

consumer behavior under the totality of the circumstances.
For two reasons, merely providing a receipt is insufficient to
dispel the deception created by Walmart’s inaccurate shelf
prices, at least as a matter of law on the pleadings. First,
Walmart provides receipts to its customers only after their
transactions have concluded. Corrective information pro-
vided to the consumer after the transaction will not neces-
sarily affect the reasonable consumer analysis. “A sales receipt
provided to a consumer after a purchase cannot show what
was supposedly advertised,” here, the shelf price. See Camasta
v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 

, 737–38 (7th Cir.
2014). Rather, to be relevant for our analysis, any correction
“must have been made to [the consumer] before the purchase
of the merchandise.” 

 (emphasis in original); accord,
Benson, 944 F.3d at 646–47 (reversing dismissal on pleadings;
receipt listing net weight of candy did not necessarily dispel
alleged deception created by oversized packaging); Gansberg
v. Kroger, No. 2022-CH-08071, slip op. at 2–3 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook
Cnty. Apr. 7, 2023) (denying motion to dismiss; receipt pro-
vided by grocery store did not dispel deception created by in-
accurate shelf pricing). Because Walmart does not provide a
receipt to its customers until after they pay and close the
transaction, the receipt does not necessarily dispel the decep-
tion created by inaccurate shelf pricing.
    Second, Walmart’s and the district court’s reasoning
would require unreasonable efforts by consumers to protect
themselves from the deception. As the district court acknowl-
edged, a receipt by itself will not dispel deception created by
inaccurate shelf prices. Rather, only plaintiff’s comparison of
the prices actually charged at the register against the adver-
tised shelf pricing dispelled the potential deception. Kahn,

, at *3. Under Walmart’s approach to these
18                                                  No. 23-1751

pricing inaccuracies, consumers must keep track of the adver-
tised shelf prices for all the items they intend to purchase, ei-
ther by memory or by documenting shelf prices while shop-
ping. Next, after paying and obtaining a receipt, consumers
would need to compare the scanned prices with the shelf
prices for all the items. Only then would the “comparison re-
veal[ ] the discrepancy and dispel[ ] any potential deception.”

    Who does that? For obvious reasons, many reasonable
consumers will not undertake such audits. Some consumers
lack smartphones to photograph the shelf prices as they shop,
requiring them to write down or remember dozens of distinct
shelf prices. Others lack the time to retrace their steps through
the store, comparing their receipts against all the shelf prices.
Even if shoppers somehow retain records of each shelf price,
at checkout, many are trying to corral young children, others
are skimming the tabloid headlines displayed to entice them,
and still others are lending a hand to the baggers or pulling
out their wallets. Shoppers can easily miss the split-second
display of a price or two at checkout. Even if consumers do
notice a price discrepancy on a point-of-sale display or on a
receipt, they must then raise the issue to the store’s attention
to resolve it. It is reasonable to infer that many consumers in
that situation would be concerned about holding up the six
shoppers in line behind them, reluctant to trouble a busy store
manager over a few pennies per item, or unable to spare the
time to track that manager down.
    Reasonable consumer behavior does not require shoppers
to audit their transactions and to overcome those additional
hurdles just to ensure that they receive merchandise at the ad-
vertised shelf prices. “What matters most is how real
No. 23-1751                                                  19

consumers understand and react to the advertising.” Bell, 982
F.3d at 476. These consumer protection laws do not expect or
require real consumers to undertake such measures over a
few pennies per item. Nor, as plaintiff plausibly alleges, does
Walmart expect them to. That is precisely why these alleged
price discrepancies may be highly profitable on a large scale
and over the long run. “Consumer-protection laws do not im-
pose on average consumers an obligation to question the la-
bels they see and to parse them as a lawyer might for ambi-
guities” or inaccuracies, “especially in the seconds usually
spent picking a low-cost product.” Id. at 476.
    Walmart’s defense theory tries to impose “a one-size-fits-
all use of economic theory” in circumstances “where the ap-
plicability of [that theory’s] fundamental assumptions to the
facts at hand” is put in question by plaintiff’s allegations
about how real consumers react to Walmart’s shelf pricing.
See Honorable, 

. In the circumstances al-
leged here, consumers’ failure to audit their transactions and
to seek refunds does not, at least as a matter of law, excuse
Walmart from honoring its advertised shelf prices. See Kroger,
No. 2022-CH-08071, slip op. at 3 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cnty. Apr.
7, 2023) (denying motion to dismiss and rejecting as defense
to deceptive practices claim retailer’s argument that consum-
ers must audit transactions to ensure that shelf prices are hon-
ored). These questions cannot be resolved as a matter of law
based on only attorney arguments that reasonable consumers
should audit their receipts. “An undefended assumption,
even if it is part of an economic theory,” cannot prevail on a
motion to dismiss. Honorable, 100 F. Supp. 2d. at 889. Instead,
plaintiffs “are entitled to present evidence on how consumers
actually understand these labels” and respond to Walmart’s
advertising. Bell, 982 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff has alleged
20                                                            No. 23-1751

plausibly that many reasonable consumers will remain una-
ware of price discrepancies even after a receipt is provided.
The district court erred in finding on the pleadings that
providing a receipt dispelled any possibility for deception.7
    Plaintiff has also adequately pled that Walmart’s price
discrepancies constitute a deceptive act or practice even
where the consumer discovers the price discrepancy before
completing a transaction. Plaintiff alleges that Walmart’s
inaccurate shelf prices constitute a form of “bait-and-switch”
pricing scheme in which a retailer “advertised goods with an
intent not to sell them as advertised.” Chandler v. American
General Finance, Inc., 

, 739–40, 

 (2002). Both courts applying Illinois law and federal
regulators have recognized “bait-and-switch” pricing as a
deceptive practice. Id.; see also Trade Regulation Rule on
Unfair or Deceptive Fees, 

, 77432 (proposed
Nov. 9, 2023) (to be codified at 

) (“Pricing
structures that do not initially disclose the total cost of a good
or service are deceptive even if the total cost is disclosed at
some point during the transaction. It has long been the FTC's
position that misleading door openers are deceptive.”). 8

7 We emphasize that we are reviewing only the complaint. Nothing we

say here would prevent Walmart from trying to prove that providing a
receipt or a point-of-sale price display does, as a factual matter, dispel any
deception created by inaccurate shelf prices. See Bell, 982 F.3d at 478 (re-
versing dismissal on pleadings: “nothing we say in this opinion is in-
tended to foreclose defendants from offering evidence to show that con-
sumers are not actually misled by their … labels”).
8 These deceptive pricing structures, also known as “drip pricing,” are the

subject of a current rulemaking by the FTC. Trade Regulation Rule on Un-
fair or Deceptive Fees, 

 (proposed Nov. 9, 2023) (to be
codified at 

); see also Hettinger v. Bozzuto Management Co.,
No. 23-1751                                                             21

    Plaintiff alleges that Walmart’s shelf prices do not disclose
the total price for goods or services, but instead advertise a
lower cost to consumers that is ultimately inflated by manda-
tory charges at the register. Bait-and-switch pricing schemes
like the one alleged here lead to injuries that consumers “can-
not reasonably avoid,” which come “in the form of higher
prices and search costs.” 

. In a “bait-and-switch”
pricing scheme, “either the consumer must spend additional
time searching for full pricing information to engage in com-
parison shopping, or must make an uninformed decision.” 

at 77433–34 (internal citation omitted). “[C]onsumers may
find it too costly to search for total price information for some
or all goods under consideration” for any of a variety of the
real-life reasons noted above. 

. “This leads con-
sumer demand to become less elastic, and consumers will ac-
cept higher prices relative to an efficient equilibrium.” 

 Be-
cause of the unavoidable harms to consumers, “when the ini-
tial contact with a consumer shows a lower or partial price
without disclosing the total cost,” it remains deceptive “even
if the total cost is later disclosed.” 

. In this case,
plaintiff has adequately pled that Walmart’s price discrepan-
cies may operate as a deceptive “bait-and-switch” scheme
even where the consumer discovers the price discrepancy be-
fore completing a transaction. Whether he can prove that ef-
fect is a question for a later stage of the case.

, at *3–5 (D.D.C. April 26, 2024) (Boasberg, C.J.) (collect-
ing cases and holding plaintiff plausibly alleged that drip-pricing scheme
would mislead reasonable consumers), citing David Adam Friedman,
Regulating Drip Pricing, 31 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 51, 53–54 (2020).
22                                                  No. 23-1751

       2. Unfair Act or Practice
     For many of the same reasons, Kahn has adequately al-
leged that Walmart’s inaccurate shelf pricing also constitutes
an “unfair” practice under the ICFA. The district court started
on the wrong foot by assessing Kahn’s unfairness claims un-
der Rule 9(b) instead of Rule 8(a). A deceptive practices claim
under the ICFA must meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
standard, but an unfair practices claim need not if it is not
based on fraud. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2014). The applicable pleading standard
does not turn on a formalistic invocation of the word “unfair.”

 It depends instead on the plaintiff’s factual allegations. See
Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 

 (7th
Cir. 2007). If a claim “sounds in fraud—in other words, … is
premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct”—then Rule
9(b) applies. 

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
   The district court reasoned that all of plaintiff’s claims
sound in fraud since they are premised on “Walmart’s alleged
concealment of the actual prices of its items.” Kahn, 

, at *2, citing Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising,
LLC, 

 (7th Cir. 2018). But Haywood involved
common underlying factual allegations that the defendant
“intentionally misled consumers by hiding information.” 

. In other words, the Haywood plaintiff premised all
of her claims on the defendant’s alleged intent to deceive,
meaning that all of her claims sounded in fraud.
    Here, separate from his allegations of deceptive practices,
Kahn alleges that Walmart’s pricing practices “offend an es-
tablished public policy, and are immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive, and unscrupulous,” in ways that have been “substan-
tially injurious to consumers.” Kahn’s unfairness claim is not
No. 23-1751                                                    23

necessarily premised on intentional deception, as were the
claims in Haywood. Even if all potential for deception were
deemed to have been dispelled by a receipt (a proposition we
reject), Walmart’s inaccurate shelf prices could still constitute
an “unfair” business practice by creating a situation that is
“oppressive” and substantially injures consumers. Batson v.
Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2014)
(Illinois recognizes federal Sperry test for determining
whether conduct is unfair under ICFA), citing Federal Trade
Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 

 (1972). The
district court should have assessed this separate unfairness
claim under the less demanding standard of Rule 8(a).
     Under the proper standard, Kahn adequately alleged that
Walmart’s inaccurate shelf prices constitute an “unfair” prac-
tice within the meaning of the ICFA. To determine whether a
practice is unfair within the meaning of the ICFA, courts look
to three factors: “(1) whether the practice offends public pol-
icy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or un-
scrupulous; [and/or] (3) whether it causes substantial injury
to consumers.” Benson, 

, quoting Robinson, 201
Ill. 2d at 417–18. “A practice may be unfair because of the de-
gree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser
extent it meets all three.” Robinson, 

, quoting
Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 

, 

, 1143–44 (1992).
   As for public policy, both the ICFA and the UDTPA ex-
pressly prohibit “misleading statements of fact concerning the
… existence of … price reductions.” 815 ILCS 510/2(a)(11). In
the context of bait-and-switch schemes under the ICFA, this
court has noted that “[w]hat is deceptive is also unfair.”
24                                                    No. 23-1751

Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture LLC, 

 (7th
Cir. 2014).
    On the second factor, “[w]hether a practice is immoral, un-
ethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous depends on whether it
has left the consumer with little choice but to submit to it.”
Newman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 

, 1002–03 (7th
Cir. 2018). We have recognized that under certain circum-
stances, the existence of sunk costs may create a situation in
which consumers are oppressed. See 

 (increase in
insurance premiums left consumer little choice but to submit
when alternative was forfeiting eight years of sunk costs).
Here, for the reasons already explained, even consumers who
spot a price discrepancy at checkout are left with little choice
but to submit. The alternative is to spend more time and effort
in comparison shopping and rectifying any overcharges.
    On the third factor, explaining how Illinois courts would
determine whether substantial injury existed, this court has
said that “the injury must: (1) be substantial; (2) not be out-
weighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or com-
petition that the practice produces; and (3) be an injury that
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.”
Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 

 (7th Cir. 2010). Small
injuries to many consumers may be substantial for these pur-
poses. See People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 

, 

 (1985) (“While the three sales upon
which this case is premised reflect only a few cents in over-
charges, it is apparent that similar overcharges, if permitted
to continue, could aggregate very substantial losses and in-
jury to the consuming public.”).
   The FTC agrees: “Charging consumers under [these] false
pretenses causes substantial injury, including where the
No. 23-1751                                                   25

injury is a small harm to a large number of people.” Trade
Regulation Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees, 88 Fed. Reg. at
77435. See also Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 

 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (whether defendant’s “con-
duct carries the potential to harm a large number of other con-
sumers” is factor in unfairness inquiry (emphasis in original)),
remanded in part on other grounds, Saccameno v. U.S. Bank
N.A., 

 (7th Cir. 2019). On the second prong, the
FTC reasons that the substantial injury to consumers “is not
outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition” be-
cause “[t]he practice of advertising prices that are not the full
price does not benefit consumers or competition.” Trade Reg-
ulation Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees, 88 Fed. Reg. at
77434. And on the third, we have already explained why the
resulting overcharges are not necessarily avoidable by rea-
sonable consumers.
   Kahn plausibly alleges that Walmart’s inaccurate shelf
prices create an oppressive situation in which a reasonable
consumer is often forced by the circumstances and design of
Walmart’s large retail stores to submit to unexpectedly higher
prices charged at the register. On these allegations, Walmart’s
pricing practices carry the potential to cause substantial injury
to consumers by causing small harms to large numbers of
them. Kahn alleges that Walmart profits on the order of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars from the aggregation of these
small overcharges. We have no trouble seeing how Kahn
plausibly alleges facts showing that Walmart’s inaccurate
shelf prices and the resulting overcharges constitute an unfair
practice under the ICFA, satisfying the usual pleading stand-
ards of Rule 8(a).
26                                                    No. 23-1751

       3. Intent to Rely
    The district court held that plaintiff failed to allege suffi-
ciently that Walmart intended for him to rely on its inaccurate
shelf prices. Kahn, 

, at *4. Again, we respect-
fully disagree. First, the ICFA “eliminated the requirement of
scienter,” so that “innocent misrepresentations are actionable
as statutory fraud.” Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 

, 

 (1992); accord, Ca-
piccioni v. Brennan Naperville, Inc., 

, 

 (2003). To survive a motion to dismiss, plain-
tiff needed to allege only that Walmart intended that he rely
on its shelf prices, not that it intended to deceive him. In this
case, he does both, alleging sufficiently that (1) Walmart in-
tended for him to rely on its inaccurate shelf pricing, and
(2) that Walmart’s shelf pricing is intentionally deceptive.
    Even under the heightened standards of Rule 9(b), the rule
provides that “intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Plaintiff alleges that
“Walmart uses Shelf Pricing to advertise prices for merchan-
dise … to induce consumers to purchase the advertised mer-
chandise.” Plaintiff alleges that “Walmart is well aware that it
is deceiving its consumers,” in part because Walmart stores
have been fined for this practice in multiple states. Plaintiff
also alleges that Walmart “knew and calculated that its prac-
tices would mislead consumers, continuing such practices de-
spite knowledge of the deception and the harm it caused and
causes.” He alleges further that Walmart’s “unfair and decep-
tive pricing practices are company-wide, pervasive, and con-
tinuous,” and that Walmart “continues to allow its stores
across the United States” to overcharge customers and “elects
not to implement institutional systemic controls to prevent
No. 23-1751                                                   27

such practices even after being fined for such practices by lo-
cal agencies.”
    There is nothing implausible about these allegations that
Walmart intends consumers to rely on shelf pricing. The con-
trary proposition seems absurd. Walmart uses shelf pricing to
inform consumers of its prices so they can compare items and
decide what to buy. On the record here, there is no indication
that Walmart alerts consumers with any clear and prominent
disclaimers about inaccurate shelf prices, either on the shop-
ping floor or at checkout. Even if Walmart did provide dis-
claimers regarding its shelf pricing, whether such disclaimers
can actually dispel the deception might be a question of fact
that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment. See Dumont v. Reily Foods Co., 

(1st Cir. 2019) (reversing dismissal on pleadings: “As with any
question of fact, our role is limited to defining the outer
boundaries of its answer—i.e., the point at which a juror could
reasonably find only one way.”).
    Plaintiff also alleges plausibly that Walmart affirmatively
intends to deceive its customers. Several allegations help ren-
der this inference plausible, including Walmart’s size, the
hundreds of millions of dollars in profits allegedly available
from the pricing discrepancies, and the company’s heavy fo-
cus on sales from brick-and-mortar stores. Given the im-
portance of in-store sales for Walmart, as noted above, it is
reasonable to infer that Walmart has available the latest re-
search on how best to design and manage a retail store to
maximize profits and is aware of the obstacles that would de-
ter real consumers from trying to hold it to its advertised shelf
prices. Kahn also alleges plausibly that Walmart, having been
fined repeatedly for these price discrepancies, is aware of
28                                                  No. 23-1751

them but chooses not to take more effective preventive
measures to avoid more fines that plaintiff calls a drop in the
bucket for Walmart.
    We recognize that Walmart sells and must therefore main-
tain current prices for hundreds of thousands of products.
Big, complicated human systems are prone to some errors. We
agree with Walmart and its amici, the Retail Litigation Center,
Inc. and others, that in designing and operating any real-
world system, perfection is impossible. Error rates, on the
other hand, can be managed. See Fueger v. Case Corp., 

, 106 n.1 (Ind. App. 2008). We assume that neither
courts nor regulators can insist on perfection in retail pricing.
They can, however, address how a retailer tries to prevent and
remedy discrepancies like those alleged here. Even if some
low level of price discrepancies is unavoidable, Walmart is not
alleged to have undertaken any preventive or remedial
measures to mitigate overcharges, such as by implementing
systemic controls. Taking all of Kahn’s allegations as true, and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as we must at
this stage, he has plausibly alleged that Walmart intended to
deceive its customers with its inaccurate shelf prices.
       4. Distinguishing Tudor
    When deciding an issue of state law in a diversity action,
“our task is to predict how the Illinois Supreme Court would
decide the issues presented here.” Nationwide Agribusiness Ins.
Co. v. Dugan, 

 (7th Cir. 2015). “Where the Il-
linois Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, decisions of
the Illinois Appellate Courts control, unless there are persua-
sive indications that the Illinois Supreme Court would decide
the issue differently.” 

No. 23-1751                                                   29

    Walmart and the district court have relied on Tudor v. Jewel
Food Stores, Inc., 

, 

 (1997). The
case calls for close attention. In Tudor, a consumer plaintiff
alleged that a defendant grocery store violated the ICFA
because the prices scanned at the cash register differed from
the advertised or shelf prices. The Illinois appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s grant of the grocer’s motion to
dismiss. The appellate court found that the plaintiff had failed
to plead a viable ICFA claim because she had not adequately
pled the same two elements the district court found lacking
here: an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and the
defendant’s intent that plaintiff rely on the misrepresentation.
The Tudor plaintiff had alleged that the store’s internal audits
showed the scanned prices were accurate 96% of the time.
Significantly, the Tudor complaint itself acknowledged that
the store had a “policy providing ‘[i]f the scanned price on
any unmarked item is different from the price on the shelf,
you will get the item free.’” 

. The store also provided
a receipt enabling a customer to audit the accuracy of the
charge for each item. The court found that the “combination”
of these three factors, “the high accuracy rate …, along with
the issuance of a receipt and defendant’s policy of providing
a money-back guarantee …, indicates there was no deception
by defendant.” 

 Nor was defendant’s conduct “unfair,”
since the provision of a receipt and the money-back guarantee
meant that “oppressiveness and lack of meaningful choice
necessary to establish unfairness” were lacking. 

 These
same two factors also indicated that the “defendant did not
intend that plaintiff rely on an incorrectly scanned price.” 

   The district court here took the reasoning of Tudor two
steps farther, finding that Walmart, by providing an accurate
receipt alone, dispelled any possibility of deception. In this
30                                                           No. 23-1751

case, plaintiff Kahn and the State of Illinois as amicus curiae
argue that Tudor is distinguishable and that plaintiff Kahn has
alleged sufficiently that Walmart’s inaccurate shelf pricing is
an unfair and deceptive practice within the meaning of the
ICFA. We agree, and we predict that the Illinois Supreme
Court, if faced with the allegations in this case, would also
agree.
    Tudor held that the plaintiff had failed to allege deceptive
conduct based on the totality of the circumstances. 

 (“[T]he case turns on whether the 96% accu-
racy rate of the scanners, in conjunction with the receipt and
the money-back guarantee, shows a violation” of the ICFA.).
We have twice recognized that Tudor relied on that totality of
information available to consumers rather than on any single
factor. See Davis v. G.N. Mortgage Corp., 

 (7th
Cir. 2005); Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome PLC, 

, 938–39
(7th Cir. 2001). Since a high accuracy rate and a money-back
policy are not alleged here, Tudor does not support dismissal
here. 9
     D. Dismissal of Kahn’s Remaining Claims with Prejudice
   The district court dismissed Kahn’s remaining claims for
the same reasons it dismissed his ICFA claim. For the same

9 The money-back policy in Tudor went beyond a mere refund of the price

difference. Jewel’s policy was to give the consumer the item for free as a
bounty for catching the price discrepancy. Tudor, 

.
That policy went well beyond merely honoring the shelf price and offered
stronger evidence of a retailer’s lack of intent for the consumer to rely on
inaccurate prices than a policy that merely refunds the price difference.
Offering consumers the full value of the item as a bounty gives them an
incentive to look for price discrepancies and shifts the balance of incen-
tives for the retailer closer to optimal deterrence.
No. 23-1751                                                   31

reasons that we reversed the district court’s holdings with re-
spect to Kahn’s ICFA claim, we also disagree with the district
court’s conclusions that he failed to allege plausible claims
under the UDTPA.
    The UDTPA, however, unlike the ICFA, does not author-
ize actual damages. 815 ILCS 510/3. Plaintiff seeks only injunc-
tive relief (plus attorney fees) under the UDTPA. To support
injunctive relief, Kahn needed to allege (and would ultimately
need to prove) a likelihood of future injury. Camasta v. Jos. A.
Bank Clothiers, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 2014); see also
Le v. Kohls Department Stores, Inc., 

(E.D. Wis. 2016) (analyzing plaintiff’s Article III standing to
bring claim for prospective injunctive relief under state con-
sumer protection statute).
    Kahn has not adequately pled a likelihood of future injury
to him sufficient to support Article III standing for his UDTPA
claim. He alleges that Walmart is persisting in its deceptive
and unfair practices. He does not allege, however, that he in-
tends to continue shopping at Walmart in the future or that
he would be unable to avoid future injury after having dis-
covered Walmart’s alleged practices. It may be possible for
plaintiff to plead a likelihood of future harm, particularly in
light of the injuries to consumers routinely caused by bait-
and-switch pricing schemes explained above, such as the time
and mental energy reasonable consumers must expend to
protect themselves from the alleged unfair and deceptive
practices. Plaintiff has not done so in his operative complaint,
but because leave to amend would not necessarily be futile on
the issue of future injury, we also reverse the district court’s
decision to deny Kahn leave to amend.
32                                                   No. 23-1751

     The district court dismissed plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claim, reasoning that he failed to allege deception plausibly
and the claim could not stand on its own, without a viable
statutory claim. Because plaintiff adequately pled the ele-
ments of a deceptive and unfair practice and intent to deceive
under both the ICFA and the UDTPA, we also reinstate
Kahn’s unjust enrichment claim. At this preliminary stage of
the case, we see little daylight between the remedies available
under his statutory consumer protection claims and his unjust
enrichment claim. But at least for now, Kahn may plead and
pursue his unjust enrichment claim in the alternative, such
that if he cannot prove some of his statutory claims later in
litigation, he might still be able to prevail on his claim for un-
just enrichment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3) (“A party may state
as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of
consistency.”). Accordingly, we reverse dismissal of plain-
tiff’s unjust enrichment claim.
    Finally, the district court concluded that because it had
dismissed all of Kahn’s individual claims, he could not pur-
sue claims on behalf of a class. The district court dismissed his
class claims without prejudice. Because the district court
erred in dismissing Kahn’s individual ICFA, UDTPA, and un-
just enrichment claims with prejudice, we also reverse the dis-
missal of his class claims.
    The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and this
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.