United States v. Marrocco

After discovering that Vincent Fallon had purchased a one-way train ticket in cash a short time before his trip, Amtrak police officer Eric Romano concluded that Mr. Fallon fit the profile of a typical drug courier. Shortly before Mr. Fallon’s train was scheduled to depart, Officer Romano and Officer Sterling Terry approached Mr. Fallon in his compartment, where they asked him several questions. After Mr. Fallon admitted that he was carrying $50,000 in a locked briefcase, the officers seized the briefcase, which was found to contain $100,120.00 in cash (the “funds”). The Government subsequently instituted a forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). During that proceeding, Mr. Fallon and Nicholas Marrocco (collectively the “claimants”) filed a motion to suppress the evidence of a dogsniff test that had indicated that the funds carried the odor of drugs. The district court granted the motion. It later determined that Mr. Marrocco was the lawful owner of the funds and ordered the funds returned to him. The Government subsequently filed this appeal. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand this ease for further proceedings.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

On December 6, 2002, Officer Romano performed a search of Amtrak’s reservation computer to determine whether any of the passengers scheduled to depart Chicago’s Union Station on that date had purchased their tickets under suspicious circumstances. He discovered that Mr. Fallon had paid $310.80 in cash for a one-way ticket to Seattle less than 72 hours before his train’s scheduled departure. Officer Romano concluded that the details of Mr. Fallon’s purchase fit a drug-courier profile. Mr. Fallon arrived at the platform twenty minutes before the train’s scheduled departure time. Upon learning of Mr. Fallon’s arrival, Officer Romano and Officer Terry approached Mr. Fallon’s compartment, identified themselves and showed Mr. Fallon their badges. At the officers’ request, Mr. Fallon gave the officers his identification and ticket. He told them that he was traveling to Seattle to visit a girlfriend. The officers asked Mr. Fallon whether he was carrying any drugs, weapons or large sums of money. They noticed that Mr. Fallon was sweating when he replied that he was not car*630rying any of those items. When the officers inquired about the backpack and briefcase in Mr. Fallon’s compartment, Mr. Fallon stated that the bags were his, that he had packed them himself and that no one had given him anything to carry. Mr. Fallon allowed the officers to search the backpack; they found nothing incriminating. Mr. Fallon denied the officers’ request to search the briefcase. Officer Romano then took the briefcase from the compartment and asked Mr. Fallon if he had a key to the briefcase. Mr. Fallon said he did not, and he explained that he had used a knife to open it. He then told Officer Romano that the briefcase contained $50,000.

The officers then asked Mr. Romano to accompany them to the Amtrak police office, and Mr. Fallon complied. Officer Romano used a pocket knife to open the briefcase and discovered that it contained bundles of money. He then quickly shut the briefcase. Officer Terry then called a police dispatcher and requested that a police dog (the “canine unit”) be brought to the office to conduct a sniff search of the briefcase. Later, the canine unit arrived at the office and alerted to the briefcase, indicating that it contained drugs or money contaminated with drugs. The currency was removed from the briefcase, sealed into evidence bags and sent to a bank to be counted. The bank determined that the funds amounted to $100,120.00.

B.

The officers retained the briefcase and the funds; the Government subsequently filed a complaint, alleging that the funds were subject to forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). During the events that followed, Mr. Fallon indicated that the briefcase and its contents belonged to Mr. Marrocco; the claimants asserted that Mr. Marrocco had given the briefcase and the funds to Mr. Fallon and had instructed him to place the funds in a safe deposit box for Mr. Marrocco’s later use.

The claimants moved to suppress the seizure of the funds. The district court granted the motion on March 21, 2005 (the “March 2005 ruling”) and simultaneously set a status hearing for April 1, 2005.1 It concluded that, although reasonable suspicion justified the temporary detention of the briefcase, Officer Romano’s physical search of the briefcase was improper. The Government moved for reconsideration, arguing, among other things, that the suppression of the contents of the briefcase was improper under either the inevitable discovery doctrine or the independent source doctrine. On September 21, 2006, the district court denied the Government’s motion for reconsideration (the “September 2006 ruling”), but did not determine ownership of the briefcase.2

On April 24, 2007, the claimants filed a motion to determine ownership of the funds. The district court held that the evidence that the dog alerted to the briefcase was not admissible against either of the claimants and concluded that, absent the evidence of the dog alert, the Government had failed to demonstrate a substantial connection between the seized funds and illegal narcotics activity. The court concluded — based on Mr. Marrocco’s deposition testimony, his answers to interrogatories and the presumption that the possessor of property that is seized is entitled to its return — that Mr. Marrocco was the lawful owner of the funds. Accordingly, on July 5, 2007, the court ordered the *631funds returned to Mr. Marrocco. The Government filed this appeal within sixty days of that ruling.

II

DISCUSSION

The Government challenges the district court’s order requiring the funds to be returned to Mr. Marrocco.3 It submits that the district court erroneously held that the evidence of the dog’s alert to the briefcase was not admissible against Mr. Marrocco.4 All agree that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the briefcase in the first instance. Nor, on appeal, does anyone contend that the officers could have lawfully opened the brief*632case. The Government claims, however, that the evidence of the briefcase’s contents should have been admitted against Mr. Marrocco because, even without the unlawful search, the officers inevitably would have discovered that the briefcase contained money contaminated by drugs.5

When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo, and we defer to the district court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. United States v. Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.2005). We evaluate the propriety of the officers’ conduct at each stage of the investigation, viewing their actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.6

*633A.

We first consider the officers’ initial encounter with Mr. Fallon to determine whether they were permitted to seize and detain the briefcase and its contents.7 The limited investigative detention of luggage is permissible under the Fourth Amendment where an investigating officer reasonably believes that the luggage contains narcotics. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). The suspicion necessary to justify such an intrusion must amount to “more than a mere hunch,” United States v. LePage, 477 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Ganser, 315 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir.2003)), and cannot be based solely on an officer’s conclusion that a suspect fits a drug-courier profile, United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1083 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam)). Instead, the suspicion justifying such conduct must be based on specific, articulable facts which, judged in light of the officers’ experience, would justify the intrusion. United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 949 (7th Cir.2002). However, even when an officer has reasonable suspicion, his ability to detain a suspect’s baggage is limited: Any such detention must be reasonable in time and scope given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigatory act. See Sterling, 909 F.2d at 1085 (“Even if the decision to detain a suitcase is made on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the duration of the detention may abridge constitutional standards.”).

With these standards in mind, we turn to the officers’ initial questioning of Mr. Fallon. At the time that the officers approached Mr. Fallon’s compartment, they knew that Mr. Fallon had purchased a one-way train ticket with cash within a few days of his scheduled departure. These facts, as Officer Romano noted, fit the profile of a drug courier. Nevertheless, the officers reasonably could not have suspected, based on these facts, that Mr. Fallon was carrying drugs or money associated with drugs.8 Thus, when the officers initially approached Mr. Fallon, they were not permitted to seize or search the briefcase.

Nevertheless, the events that transpired during the officers’ initial encounter with Mr. Fallon gave them sufficient reason to detain the briefcase. The officers noticed that Mr. Fallon began sweating when they asked him whether he was carrying weapons, drugs or large sums of money. Furthermore, Mr. Fallon gave conflicting responses when questioned about the briefcase’s contents: He initially denied that he was carrying large sums of money, but later told Officer Romano that the case contained $50,000. Mr. Fallon’s demeanor and responses to the officers’ questions led the officers to become suspicious not only of Mr. Fallon but also of the contents of the briefcase.9 The officers *634were permitted to consider Mr. Fallon’s responses and mannerisms, the circumstances surrounding his ticket purchase, their own experience and knowledge, and “the characteristics of persons engaged in illegal activities,” when determining whether the briefcase was likely to contain contraband. Sterling, 909 F.2d at 1083-84.10 These facts gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the briefcase contained drugs, or money associated with drugs. United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir.2006) (“The combination of fitting the drug profile and giving a suspicious answer to the question about looking inside his luggage created a reasonable suspicion that the defendant’s luggage contained contraband.” (citations omitted)).11 The officers were therefore permitted to detain the briefcase for a reasonable period of time in order to investigate further.

As we already have mentioned, however, it is not enough for the Government to show that the officers reasonably suspected Mr. Fallon of engaging in illegal activity; it must also show that the officers’ detention of the suitcase was reasonable under the circumstances. The propriety of such a detention is determined by “balancing ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’ ” United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 312 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637). In conducting this analysis, we may consider a number of factors pertaining to both the intrusion and the countervailing government interests. These interests include, among other things, the availability of alternative means of investigation, the extent to which the individual contributed to the intrusion, the significance of the offense at issue and the consequences of delaying the investigation. Goodwin, 449 F.3d at 770-71.

The Government submits that the officers’ detention of the briefcase was reasonable. It does not deny that, as a result of the officers’ actions, the briefcase did not reach its intended destination. Instead, it asserts, the officers’ actions were reasonable despite those consequences because there were no viable alternatives to detaining the briefcase and removing it from the train for a dog-sniff test. Mr. Marroceo, however, disputes the Government’s claim and asserts that a less-invasive alternative was available to the officers. Because Mr. Fallon purchased his ticket two days prior to the train’s scheduled departure, Mr. Marroceo submits that the officers could have investigated the circumstances of the purchase at an earlier time, assessed whether Mr. Fallon fit the profile of a drug courier, and arranged for a canine unit to be present at the station upon Mr. Fallon’s arrival. Mr. Marroceo maintains that the availability of this alternative, less-invasive means of investigation renders the officers’ conduct unreasonable.

In support of this argument, Mr. Marrocco points to our opinion in Goodwin, 449 F.3d at 772. In that case, the arresting officers seized the defendant’s luggage, removed it from the train and subjected it *635to a dog-sniff test because they reasonably suspected the defendant to be carrying contraband; however, the defendant in that case, unlike Mr. Fallon, did not purchase his train ticket until the morning of his departure. Id. at 767-69. In affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, we found the timing of the defendant’s purchase to be significant: Because the defendant bought his ticket an hour before departure, the only feasible means of investigating the luggage was to remove it from the train. Id. at 771.

Mr. Marrocco urges that, under Goodwin, the officers were required to have a canine unit waiting at the platform at the time of Mr. Fallon’s arrival; we disagree. Even if the officers could have arranged for a canine unit to be at the station on the day of Mr. Fallon’s departure, we cannot accept Mr. Marroeeo’s suggestion that our holding in Goodwin required them to do so. In Goodwin, we noted that, “[i]f the defendant had bought his ticket a week in advance and the police had known then that he fit the profile of a drug courier, [the police] could have arranged for [the dog] to be at Union Station when the train was scheduled to depart.” Id. at 771. Contrary to Mr. Marrocco’s arguments, that statement was simply a hypothetical example used to explain why the timing of the defendant’s arrival was important in that case. Although, under the specific facts of Goodwin, we concluded that the defendant’s tardiness excused the officers’ failure to have a canine unit present at the station, it does not necessarily follow that, in any case where a suspect’s travel plans are known in advance, officers must make arrangements to have a canine unit at the ready.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), is not to the contrary. In that case, federal narcotics agents became suspicious of the defendant’s behavior at the Miami International Airport. Because the Miami agents did not have time to search the defendant’s bags prior to his flight’s departure, the agents relayed their information to Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) authorities in New York. Id. at 698, 103 S.Ct. 2637. When the defendant’s flight landed in New York, two DEA agents seized the defendant’s luggage and took it to another airport for a dog-sniff test. Id. at 699, 103 S.Ct. 2637. The Court found the ninety-minute detention between the seizure and the dog-sniff test to be unreasonable. Id. at 709-10, 103 S.Ct. 2637. After stating that, “in assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation,” the Court criticized the officers’ failure to arrange for a drug-sniffing dog to be present at the airport terminal, even though they had the time and opportunity to do so. Id. at 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637.

We do not read Place as requiring that officers must arrange for a canine unit to be present at a particular location whenever they have time to make such arrangements prior to a suspect’s arrival. Indeed, although it may have been reasonable for the officers to have made such arrangements under the facts in Place, it does not necessarily follow that it would have been reasonable for the officers to arrange for a canine unit to be present at the station in this case. In Place, the DEA agents knew, prior to the defendant’s arrival, that the defendant’s actions and statements had caused the Miami agents to suspect that the defendant might have been carrying drugs. Id. at 698, 103 S.Ct. 2637. In this case, by contrast, the only information that the officers had prior to Mr. Fallon’s arrival was that his ticket purchase conformed with a drug-courier profile; they had not had the opportunity to observe his actions or demeanor, and, in fact, they did not *636even know whether Mr. Fallon was carrying luggage.

Rather than setting forth a bright-line rule that a canine unit must be on-hand whenever police have advance notice of a suspected drug courier’s arrival, Place and Goodwin simply recognize that we must assess the reasonableness of a particular seizure by looking to a number of factors that will vary from case to case. Id. at 709-10; Goodwin, 449 F.3d at 771-72. This flexible, fact-based approach allows us to consider the many factors that may impact the reasonableness of an officer's decision to summon- — or not to summon- — a canine unit. We recognize that, even when investigatory officers would prefer to station a canine unit in a particular area, it will not always be possible for them to do so. Many factors could contribute to the availability of a canine unit. See Borys, 766 F.2d at 314. For example, in some jurisdictions, the demand for such units may exceed their availability. Goodwin, 449 F.3d at 771 (“And apparently there aren’t enough of these highly trained dogs to have one tethered at every bus station, train station, and airport in Chicago.”). In addition, officers may have difficulty predicting precisely when and where a canine unit will be required. See Borys, 766 F.2d at 314 (noting that agents cannot “predict precisely when they [will] require the services of a dog, for they do not have cause to suspect passengers on every flight they have under surveillance”). Furthermore, it may be that a particular location would not be suitable for a dog-sniff test. Goodwin, 449 F.3d at 771 (“A sniffer dog might not do his stuff in the unfamiliar setting of a train’s interior.”). Other considerations that are unrelated to the availability of a canine unit may also impact whether it is feasible for an officer to obtain such a unit at a particular time. See, e.g., Sterling, 909 F.2d at 1085 (noting that it was not feasible for an agent to leave to summon a canine unit). This flexible approach allows us to consider these and other factors when considering whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable. See Goodwin, 449 F.3d at 771-72 (recognizing that the need for a stop depends on, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the consequences of delay, the likelihood of the suspect’s involvement in the offense, the risk of imminent departure, the availability of alternative means of investigation and the length of the detention).

We believe that the officers acted reasonably when they removed the briefcase from the train in order to conduct a dog-sniff test. The information that the officers possessed prior to their initial encounter with Mr. Fallon was not so persuasive as to justify having a canine unit at the ready prior to Mr. Fallon’s arrival. The officers knew only that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Fallon’s ticket purchase fit a drug-courier profile; this information, as we already have mentioned, amounted to less than a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Fallon was involved in transporting drugs or drug proceeds. Given law enforcement’s interest in conserving resources and avoiding unnecessary procedures, we do not think that it was unreasonable, in this case, for the officers to refrain from arranging the dog-sniff test until after they had interacted with Mr. Fallon, observed his responses and were able to draw some conclusions about the nature of his activities.12

In addition, the officers acted with reasonable promptness: Although Mr. Fallon purchased his ticket on December 4, the *637officers did not learn of his purchase until December 6, the day his train was scheduled to depart. Shortly after the officers learned of the suspicious nature of Mr. Fallon’s ticket purchase, they investigated further. Once the officers reasonably suspected that Mr. Fallon was carrying money associated with drugs, they removed the briefcase from the train, took it to their office and arranged for the dog-sniff test, which took place within a reasonable time period. There is no suggestion that the officers unnecessarily delayed carrying out that test, nor is there any indication that the officers engaged in any deliberate misbehavior intended to delay Mr. Fallon unnecessarily. We therefore conclude that, based on the information available to the officers, the timeliness of their response, and the serious nature of the suspected crime, the officers behaved reasonably by removing the briefcase from the train and arranging a dog-sniff test soon thereafter.

B.

Our conclusion that the officers were permitted to seize the briefcase and remove it from the train does not end our inquiry. After the officers removed the briefcase, and before they obtained a warrant or even probable cause to search it, Officer Romano opened the briefcase and observed its contents. There is no doubt that this warrantless search was constitutionally impermissible. We therefore must determine the constitutional significance of that unlawful search on our analysis.

Mr. Marrocco contends that, because of the unlawful search, the results of the dog-sniff test and the evidence of the briefcase’s contents, drug-tainted money, must be suppressed. He asserts that there is no way to determine whether the officers would have discovered the funds, or the connection between the funds and any illegal activity, in the absence of the unlawful conduct. The Government, however, maintains that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence of the results of the dog-sniff test. Although it admits that the officer’s visual inspection of the contents of the briefcase was improper, it contends that the challenged evidence should have been admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine.13

The doctrine of inevitable discovery provides that illegally obtained evidence will not be excluded if the Government can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the officers “ultimately or inevitably would have ... discovered [the challenged evidence] by lawful means.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). To satisfy this burden, the Government must demonstrate that two criteria are met: First, it must show that it had, or would *638have obtained, an independent, legal justification for conducting a search that would have led to the discovery of the evidence;14 second, the Government must demonstrate that it would have conducted a lawful search absent the challenged conduct.15 See United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir.1995) (“[W]hat makes a discovery ‘inevitable’ is not probable cause alone ... but probable cause plus a chain of events that would have led to a warrant ... independent of the search.”). The Government submits that it has satisfied both of these criteria: It asserts that, even absent the challenged conduct, there is no doubt that the officers would have subjected the briefcase to a dog-sniff test. It further claims that, after learning the results of that test, the officers certainly would have applied for and obtained a warrant to search the briefcase.

We agree with the Government that the officers inevitably would have discovered both the funds and the evidence that the funds were associated with narcotics. The first prong of the inevitable discovery test has been met because the officers could have obtained, based on the results of the dog-sniff test, an independent legal basis for searching the briefcase; namely, the results of the dog-sniff test16 would have supported the issuance of a warrant. See United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir.2004) (“[W]e have held that a positive alert by a trained drug dog gives rise to probable cause to search a vehicle.” (citations omitted)).17 Mr. Marrocco claims that we cannot rely on the results of the dog-sniff test because it is not clear that the officers would have ordered that test in the absence of the illegal search. We disagree. At the time the search took place, the officers already knew that the briefcase contained a large sum of money; Mr. Fallon had told them this much when he stated that the briefcase contained $50,000. The unlawful search of the briefcase yielded nothing more than a confirmation of Mr. Fallon’s earlier admission.18

This is not a case where the investigating officers learned new information during an illegal search and, based on that information, took investigatory steps that they would not have taken otherwise.19 Instead, after performing the illegal *639search, the officers did no more than they ordinarily would have done when confronted with a suspected drug courier. There is relevant and probative evidence that suggests the officers would have performed the dog-sniff test as a matter of course: First, and most importantly, the officers already had reliable information about the contents of the briefcase; Mr. Fallon had informed them that the case contained a large sum of money. Thus, the purpose of the officers’ investigation was not to discover the contents of the briefcase, but, instead, to determine whether there was a link between those contents and illegal narcotics. Because this link could not be established by merely observing the funds, it is certain that the officers would have conducted some test aimed at establishing that connection.

Furthermore, the officers already had removed the briefcase from the train and taken it back to the office for the purpose of subjecting the briefcase to a dog-sniff test.20 Additionally, although the officers had not summoned the canine unit at the time of the unlawful search, they did do so shortly thereafter. Finally, after Officer Romano impermissibly opened the briefcase, he quickly shut it, an act likely intended to prevent any odor on the funds from dissipating. Officer Romano did not rummage through the contents of the briefcase in search of obvious contraband, nor did he attempt to exploit the results of the unlawful search. We can conclude, based on all of this evidence, that the officers detained the briefcase in order to conduct an investigation that would establish a link between the funds and illegal activity, rather than to determine the contents of the briefcase, which, as we have mentioned, were already known. We therefore have no difficulty in concluding that the dog-sniff test would have been performed absent the illegal search, and that the results of that test would have supported a warrant application.

The fact that the results of the dog-sniff test would have supported a warrant is not sufficient, however; the Government must also show, under the second prong of our inevitable discovery inquiry, that the officers inevitably would have sought the warrant and conducted a lawful search. In this circuit, when the Government seeks “to use the doctrine of inevitable discovery to excuse its failure to have obtained a search warrant,” it must “prove that a warrant would certainly, and not merely probably, have been issued had it been applied for.” United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir.2008).

We are convinced that the Government has satisfied this burden.21 Our case law establishes that the inevitable discovery rule applies in cases, such as this one, where investigating officers undoubtedly would have followed routine, established steps resulting in the issuance of a war*640rant. See, e.g., id. (concluding that the evidence of the container’s contents was admissible, even though the officers did not obtain a warrant to search the container, because there “[was not] even the shadow of a doubt that had they applied for a warrant to search the bag, ... the warrant would have been issued”); United States v. Buchanan, 910 F.2d 1571, 1573 (7th Cir.1990) (determining that the police inevitably would have sought a warrant to search the defendant’s hotel room, pursuant to “proper and predictable police investigatory proceduref ],” where the defendant was arrested on an outstanding murder warrant and the murder weapon had not yet been found (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).22 As we already have discussed, the officers certainly would have subjected the briefcase to a dog-sniff test even absent the illegal search. After the test was performed, the officers would have known (1) that Mr. Fallon fit a drug-courier profile; (2) that Mr. Fallon had admitted that the briefcase contained a large sum of money; and (3) that the dog-sniff test indicated that the briefcase carried the odor of drugs. It would be unreasonable to conclude that, after discovering all of this information, the officers would have failed to seek a warrant. See Buchanan, 910 F.2d at 1573 (concluding that police inevitably would have sought a warrant to search the room, as “it would have been foolish not to want to look for the gun there”); see also United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 841 (4th Cir.1998) (“The inevitable discovery doctrine may apply where additional routine or factually established investigative steps would inevitably lead to discovery of the evidence without undertaking any search.” (citations omitted)). In addition, as we already have recognized, there is no serious question that the warrant would have been issued once sought.23 Therefore, we may conclude that the officers inevitably would have had a lawful basis for discovering both the funds and the link between the funds and illegal narcotics activity.24

*641Indeed, even if the inevitable discovery doctrine was waived or inapplicable, we would have to conclude that the results of the dog-sniff test were admissible. The illegality of Officer Romano’s opening of the briefcase with a knife had no effect on *642the subsequent discovery that the money was tainted by drugs. The officers already knew of the presence of the money. Opening the briefcase gave them no knowledge about whether the money was tainted. That knowledge was completely dependent on the dog-sniff test. Therefore, the causal connection between the illegality of Officer Romano’s search was so far attenuated from the crucial evidence as to make invocation of the suppression doctrine inappropriate. See United States v. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 422-24 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir.1999); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 957 (7th Cir.1990).

Accordingly, we hold that the district court improperly suppressed the evidence of the contents of the briefcase and the results of the dog-sniff test.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand the district court may hear additional evidence as to whether the funds are subject to forfeiture and, if necessary, as to the ultimate ownership of the funds.

Reversed and Remanded.