Courtney Ealy v. Cameron Watson

                               In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-1228
COURTNEY EALY,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

CAMERON WATSON, Warden, DAVID D. FRANK, and ANGELA
MCKITTRICK,
                                 Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                    Central District of Illinois.
            No. 20-cv-03027 — James E. Shadid, Judge.
                     ____________________

       ARGUED MAY 20, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 30, 2024
                ____________________

   Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
   KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Courtney Ealy is
incarcerated in the Illinois prison system and spent five con-
secutive months in segregation beginning in 2019. While in
segregation, inmates are removed from the general prison
population and typically lose various privileges, like yard
time or in-person visits. In Ealy’s case, he not only lost privi-
leges, but also experienced cold temperatures, dirty cells, and
2                                                   No. 23-1228

faulty plumbing resulting in unsanitary conditions, which he
says negatively affected his mental and physical health. Ealy
sued several prison officials, alleging that they violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. During the liti-
gation, Ealy filed successive motions for recruitment of coun-
sel.
    Ealy now appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Cameron Watson,
David D. Frank, and Angela McKittrick, and its denial of his
motions for recruitment of counsel. Because this case rises and
falls on the fact that Ealy received due process before being
placed in disciplinary segregation, his Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim fails. Further, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Ealy’s motions for recruitment of coun-
sel. We therefore affirm.
                          I.   Background
    At this stage, we give Ealy the benefit of all reasonable in-
ferences that may be drawn from the evidentiary record and
resolve any factual disputes in his favor. Adams v. Reagle, 

 (7th Cir. 2024).
    Ealy received a disciplinary report in the fall of 2019 while
imprisoned at Western Illinois Correctional Center. The re-
port stated that multiple inmates located on one wing of West-
ern had tested positive for THC and that three confidential
sources claimed Ealy had provided the drugs. According to
the sources, Ealy had been receiving marijuana from a female
visitor, whom we’ll refer to as T.B., during visitation hours.
Following the inmates’ positive tests, prison officers con-
ducted several interviews with other inmates, listened to
Ealy’s recorded phone calls, and reviewed surveillance
No. 23-1228                                                   3

footage of Ealy’s visits. During one such visit, T.B. was seen
retrieving an item from “the crotch area of her sweatpants”
and placing it among candies on a napkin in front of Ealy.
Ealy was then seen picking up the item and swallowing it. The
disciplinary report also explained how the day before the
visit, Ealy had placed a call to T.B. using another inmate’s PIN
number. During the call, Ealy told T.B. to “[m]ake sure you
got [it]” and reminded T.B. to “be smooth.”
    As a result of this alleged conduct, Ealy was accused of
violating three prison rules. The disciplinary report informed
Ealy that he had “the right to appear and present a written or
oral statement or explanation” at his disciplinary hearing and
that he could request staff assistance to prepare a defense, as
well as a reasonable extension of time to prepare. The report
also included a form for requesting witnesses. Ealy did not fill
out the form and refused to sign the report. He did, however,
file a grievance, and maintains that he later submitted a re-
quest for witnesses on a different sheet of paper. His griev-
ance was ultimately denied, and aside from Ealy’s deposition
testimony, there is no record of his request to call witnesses.
    Western’s adjustment committee held a hearing eight days
after Ealy received the disciplinary report. The adjustment
committee consisted of defendants David Frank and Angela
McKittrick. Ealy admitted to two other violations—neither is
at issue on appeal—but pleaded not guilty to the drug offense.
At the hearing, Ealy presented his defense, stating that he did
not test positive for drugs, that if he had introduced mariju-
ana into Western, he would have used it himself, and that his
phone conversation with T.B. was about smuggling a debit
card into Western, not drugs. During the hearing, Ealy also
requested a continuance to review the surveillance footage of
4                                                   No. 23-1228

his alleged receipt of marijuana in the visitors’ room. The
committee denied that request.
    After considering the evidence before it, the adjustment
committee ultimately found Ealy guilty of bringing marijuana
into Western. In its final report, which was provided to Ealy,
the committee cited the confidential sources’ statements, the
recorded phone call, and the visitors’ room surveillance foot-
age as evidence supporting its finding. Frank later repre-
sented during this litigation that the adjustment committee
viewed the footage and spoke to the investigating officer prior
to the hearing.
    The committee recommended five months of segregation,
six months of “C-grade” status (which meant the loss of cer-
tain privileges), six months of restricted contact visits, and a
disciplinary transfer to another facility as punishment. Cam-
eron Watson, Western’s Warden, approved these disciplinary
recommendations.
    At the root of Ealy’s appeal are the conditions he faced in
segregation at two Illinois prison facilities. Ealy spent a total
of five months in segregation—one month in administrative
segregation while the Western investigation was ongoing and
four months in disciplinary segregation. From the start, con-
ditions were poor. Ealy’s first segregation cell at Western had
faulty plumbing such that other inmates’ waste flowed up
into Ealy’s toilet, causing foul odors. The cell also contained
bugs and spider webs and was “freezing” due to an alleged
lack of heat. Ealy was moved within Western to various seg-
regation cells during this time, but they were consistently
cold, especially as autumn temperatures dropped outside.
While in segregation at Western, Ealy suffered from depres-
sion and was placed on crisis watch after attempting suicide.
No. 23-1228                                                   5

    Ealy was then transferred to Lawrence Correctional Cen-
ter on October 23, 2019, approximately two months into his
segregation sentence. His cell at Lawrence had a “metal cage”
around the outside of the window that partially blocked nat-
ural light from entering the cell. Light was further blocked by
a bird’s nest and feathers that accumulated within the cage.
According to Ealy, he experienced vision problems and was
prescribed eyeglasses due to the lack of natural light. Like his
segregation cells at Western, Ealy’s segregation cell at Law-
rence was “filth[y].” Throughout his stint in segregation, Ealy
was denied in-person visits and recreation time.
    Ealy was released into Lawrence’s general population on
January 26, 2020, after serving his five-month term in segre-
gation. Around that same time, Ealy filed a pro se complaint
under 

 against Frank, McKittrick, and Wat-
son. 1 Ealy alleged, among other things, that his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights were violated during the dis-
ciplinary hearing because he was denied access to the video
surveillance footage, was not given the opportunity to call
witnesses, and did not receive an adequate written explana-
tion of the reasons for his discipline. He further alleged that
the “inhumane cell[s]” made him sick, exacerbated his mental
illness, and caused his eyes to “improperly function.” While
the district court dismissed certain claims and defendants
early on, Ealy’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
survived.
   On the same day he filed his complaint, Ealy also filed the
first of several motions for recruitment of counsel. In support
of his motion, Ealy cited difficulty focusing due to his

   1 Other defendants have since been dismissed.
6                                                    No. 23-1228

antidepressant medication and noted that he had neither
completed high school nor participated in a civil case before.
    The defendants moved for summary judgment on Ealy’s
due process claim, disputing that Ealy was owed due process
at all. The district court granted their motion, holding that
Ealy did not demonstrate a protected liberty interest in his
segregation sentence to trigger due process protection, and
that even if he had, his due process rights were not violated.
    The district court also denied Ealy’s motions for recruit-
ment of counsel, finding that Ealy’s claim was “not complex
and [was] adequately stated in his complaint,” and that de-
spite any alleged side effects from his medication, Ealy
“seem[ed] competent to represent himself based on his fil-
ings.” The district court stated that it would enter a schedul-
ing order “with important information” to assist Ealy during
discovery, and later did so.
   Ealy appeals both the summary judgment decision and
the denial of his motions for recruitment of counsel. He ar-
gues that summary judgment was improper because the rec-
ord supports that his confinement in segregation deprived
him of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.
Ealy also asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motions for recruitment of counsel, and that he
was prejudiced by its denial.
                          II.   Discussion
   We begin with a discussion of whether summary judg-
ment was appropriate on Ealy’s due process claim before
turning to the district court’s denial of Ealy’s motions for re-
cruitment of counsel.
No. 23-1228                                                       7

       A. Ealy’s Due Process Claim
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, “constru[ing] the evidence in the light most favora-
ble to the nonmoving party,” Ealy, and “draw[ing] all reason-
able inferences in his favor.” Gillis v. Litscher, 

(7th Cir. 2006).
    Ealy first argues that he was deprived of a protected lib-
erty interest by being confined in segregation for five months,
and, as such, was owed—but not afforded—due process. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the deprivation “of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and those who seek to
invoke its protection “must establish that one of these inter-
ests is at stake.” See Wilkinson v. Austin, 

(2005). To succeed on a due process claim stemming from a
prison disciplinary proceeding, an inmate must demonstrate
(1) a constitutionally protected liberty interest and (2) defi-
cient procedures attendant to the deprivation of that interest.
Lisle v. Welborn, 

 (2019); see also Wilkinson, 545
U.S. at 220–21. Thus, the question is whether a protected lib-
erty interest exists, and if so, whether Ealy received adequate
process to protect it.
               i.     Liberty Interest
    The district court concluded that Ealy was not deprived of
a liberty interest because his segregation conditions did not
impose an “atypical and significant hardship.” Disciplinary
segregation deprives an inmate of his liberty interest when it
imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.
Conner, 

 (1995). We look to the “combined
8                                                               No. 23-1228

import of the duration of the segregative confinement and the
conditions endured.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 

(7th Cir. 2013).
    It is true that under our precedent, five months in segrega-
tion, standing alone, is not enough to implicate a liberty inter-
est that triggers due process rights. See, e.g., Marion v. Colum-
bia Corr. Inst., 

 (7th Cir. 2009) (Six months in
segregation is “not such an extreme term and, standing alone,
would not trigger due process rights.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Hardaway, 

 (same). Fewer than
six months in segregation, however, may still establish a lib-
erty interest “depending on the conditions of confinement.”
Kervin v. Barnes, 

 (7th Cir. 2015). So, we look
to the conditions of Ealy’s confinement to determine whether
he had a protected liberty interest.
    On this front, Ealy asserts—and indeed, defendants do not
dispute—that he endured cells in segregation that had poor
plumbing and associated odors, were cold and dirty, and con-
tained bugs and spider webs. 2 At oral argument, defense
counsel even referred to “[Ealy’s] cage in Lawrence”—also
undisputed. Ealy testified at his deposition that these condi-
tions differed from those in general population at both West-
ern and Lawrence.




    2 We need not address the defendants’ new contention that Ealy’s lib-

erty interest argument fails because the defendants did not know about
the conditions of his confinement and did not act “deliberate[ly].” Argu-
ments not properly raised before the district court at summary judgment
are waived. See, e.g., United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 

(7th Cir. 2010).
No. 23-1228                                                   9

   Faced with these facts, and drawing all reasonable infer-
ences in Ealy’s favor as we must, we decline to decide this case
by addressing whether Ealy’s segregation amounted to an
atypical and significant hardship. We need only address
whether Ealy was afforded all the process he was due.
              ii.    Process Afforded
   Whether Ealy possessed a protected liberty interest here
does not dictate the outcome of this appeal, because even if
Ealy had established such an interest, he received due process
prior to any deprivation. As the district court found, the rec-
ord below is clear: Ealy did not demonstrate his due process
rights were violated during his disciplinary hearing.
    In reaching its conclusion, the district court applied
Scruggs v. Jordan, 

 (7th Cir. 2007). Our precedent
in Scruggs requires the following due process procedures in
prison disciplinary proceedings: “(1) advance (at least 24
hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation;
(2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision
maker; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present doc-
umentary evidence (when consistent with institutional
safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary ac-
tion.” 

. Ealy received advanced written notice
of the alleged violation (he received the disciplinary report
eight days before his hearing), the opportunity to be heard
before an impartial decision maker (he spoke before adjust-
ment committee members, none of whom were involved in
the investigation or initial disciplinary report), the oppor-
tunity to call witnesses and present evidence (Ealy was pro-
vided with a witness request form, although he did not fill it
10                                                   No. 23-1228

out), and he received the final written adjustment committee
report containing the basis for the committee’s decision.
    Thus, even under a stringent due process standard, Ealy’s
claim cannot survive summary judgment. However, this
court’s recent decision in Adams v. Reagle crystalized the pro-
cess owed to inmates facing only disciplinary action like seg-
regation, rather than disciplinary action affecting the length
of their carceral sentence, like a reduction in good-time credit.
Adams, 

. As set forth in Adams, “an inmate who
is facing transfer to disciplinary segregation is entitled only to
‘informal, nonadversarial due process,’ which ‘leave[s] sub-
stantial discretion and flexibility in the hands of the prison
administrators.’” 

 (quoting Westefer v. Neal, 

,
684–85 (7th Cir. 2012)). This “informal, nonadversarial due
process” standard is the correct one to apply here given that
Ealy did not face disciplinary action that could affect the
length of his sentence.
    A creature of due process, informal due process requires
only that an inmate is provided (1) “notice of the reasons for
the inmate’s placement” in segregation and (2) “an oppor-
tunity to present his views,” for instance, in a written state-
ment or at a hearing. 

 “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear
that ‘[o]rdinarily a written statement by the inmate will ac-
complish this purpose …. So long as this occurs, and the de-
cisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence
against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.’” 

(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 

 (1983)).
    Applying Adams, we reach the same result as the district
court did under Scruggs. Ealy urges that his due process rights
were violated because he (1) was not permitted to view the
visiting room video footage, (2) was not allowed to question
No. 23-1228                                                    11

witnesses, and (3) the adjustment committee’s decision lacked
a sufficient explanation. We disagree.
    Ealy first insists that he was entitled to the visitors’ room
surveillance tape because withholding it limited his ability to
defend himself at the disciplinary hearing. In so arguing, Ealy
relies on Piggie v. Cotton, 

 (7th Cir. 2003). But Pig-
gie is different in several respects.
    In Piggie, an inmate filed a federal habeas corpus petition
challenging a prison disciplinary board’s determinations
against him and alleging he was denied due process when he
was refused access to video footage depicting a battery he al-
legedly committed. 

. In analyzing the due process
claim, we reiterated that the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 

 (1963), requiring the disclosure of material, exculpatory ev-
idence, applies to prison disciplinary proceedings. Piggie, 

. An inmate is entitled to disclosure of “material,
exculpatory evidence” unless its disclosure would “unduly
threaten institutional concerns.” 

 Because the inmate in Pig-
gie demonstrated that the footage was material and poten-
tially exculpatory—including by explaining what he believed
the video showed and by putting forth a prison official’s
memorandum stating that he could not be seen committing
the offense on the video—we vacated and remanded in part.

 at 678–79. On remand, we instructed the district court to
first consider whether the state had a valid security reason for
withholding the video and then whether it contained excul-
patory information as the inmate suggested. 

    Importantly, in Piggie, the inmate faced a potential loss of
good-time credit, which, as we’ve said, triggers a formal, ra-
ther than informal due process analysis. 

 at 676–77. But set-
ting aside whether Brady applies in the informal due process
12                                                 No. 23-1228

context, Ealy still needed to establish—like the inmate in Pig-
gie did—that the footage was potentially exculpatory in order
to be entitled to view it (absent a security concern, which de-
fendants did not raise). 

 at 678–79. On the summary judg-
ment record before us, he has not done so.
   Ealy’s case further diverges from Piggie. Unlike the inmate
in Piggie, Ealy received a written description of the video’s
contents before the disciplinary hearing and never moved to
compel production of the footage during litigation, despite
the district court’s instruction on how to do so. Ealy also does
not dispute that the adjustment committee viewed the video
footage; indeed, the footage is cited as evidence in the com-
mittee’s final report. On this record, neither informal due pro-
cess—nor our decision in Piggie—commands a different result
with respect to the surveillance footage. Adams, 

.
    Ealy next argues that he should have been allowed to call
witnesses at his hearing. But Ealy was provided with the op-
portunity to request witnesses. Ealy admits he received the
witness request form, yet he did not fill it out or return it to
prison officials. While Ealy says he later submitted a separate
sheet of paper containing his request, there is no written rec-
ord of this. In any event, Ealy had the opportunity to “present
his views” at the disciplinary hearing, as informal due process
requires—he did just that with his statements to the adjust-
ment committee. 

 at 895–96.
    Finally, Ealy argues that the adjustment committee’s ex-
planation for its decision was insufficient. Ealy was notified of
the claims against him eight days before the disciplinary hear-
ing and was then provided with a final report explaining the
committee’s findings after it. Moreover, the adjustment
No. 23-1228                                                   13

committee reviewed the charges against Ealy and the availa-
ble evidence. It reviewed the initial disciplinary report, spoke
to the investigating officer, confirmed the reliability of the
confidential informants’ statements (based on corroborating
statements obtained in separate interviews), viewed the sur-
veillance footage, and considered Ealy’s own statements at
the disciplinary hearing. After examining the evidence, the
committee found Ealy guilty. The final report provides the ba-
sis for the decision, evidence relied upon, and a brief record
of the hearing, which includes the statements Ealy made in
his defense.
   Accordingly, Ealy received the process he was due, and
summary judgment was appropriate.
       B. Denial of Ealy’s Motions for Recruitment of
          Counsel
    Finally, we turn to the district court’s denial of Ealy’s mo-
tions to recruit counsel, which we review for abuse of discre-
tion. Pruitt v. Mote, 

 (7th Cir. 2007). We will
find an abuse of discretion only if the record “contains no ev-
idence upon which the court could have rationally based its
decision,” the decision was based on erroneous conclusions of
law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or if the decision
“clearly appears arbitrary.” 

   “There is no constitutional or statutory right to court-re-
cruited counsel in federal civil litigation.” Santiago v. Walls,

 (7th Cir. 2010). We have emphasized that the
decision to recruit counsel “belongs with the district court,”
which has a considerable advantage over reviewing courts
“having seen how the plaintiff handled himself in the pretrial
proceedings.” Pruitt, 

 (cleaned up). The
14                                                    No. 23-1228

question is “not whether [this court] would have recruited a
volunteer lawyer” to assist the plaintiff under the circum-
stances, “but whether the district court applied the correct le-
gal standard and reached a reasonable decision based on [the
available] facts” at the time. Watts v. Kidman, 

(7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Here, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Ealy’s motions.
    In considering a motion to recruit counsel, a court must
first ask whether “the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable at-
tempt to obtain counsel or [has] been effectively precluded
from doing so.” Pruitt, 

. The district court cor-
rectly found that Ealy made reasonable attempts to recruit
counsel, and thus next examined whether “given the diffi-
culty of the case,” Ealy “appear[ed] competent to litigate it
himself.” 

 This, of course, is an individualized and practical
inquiry involving substantial, although not unbridled, discre-
tion. See 

; see also Santiago, 

 (Review of
the denial of a motion to recruit counsel under an abuse of
discretion standard “is not the equivalent of no review at
all.”). Courts may consider factors like the plaintiff’s commu-
nication skills, education level, prior litigation experience,
and performance to date in the ongoing litigation. Pruitt, 

.
   The district court’s text orders denying Ealy’s motions to
recruit counsel cite the correct legal standard outlined in
Pruitt and analyze whether Ealy appeared competent to liti-
gate his case. For example, in finding he was competent, the
court noted that Ealy had only one remaining claim against
defendants, which was “adequately stated in his complaint”
and “not complex,” and that despite Ealy’s contention that his
medication would prevent him from effectively litigating,
No. 23-1228                                                   15

Ealy “seem[ed] competent to represent himself” based on his
filings. Throughout the course of the litigation, the court also
addressed the specific hurdles Ealy’s motions to recruit coun-
sel said he faced and offered solutions—such as filing a mo-
tion to compel discovery that Ealy sought or filing a motion
for a continuance when law library access had been restricted.
A district court “need not address every point raised in re-
cruitment motions,” and the court’s text orders here “specifi-
cally address[ed] [the] certain circumstances” raised in Ealy’s
motions for recruitment “that warranted discussion.” McCaa
v. Hamilton, 

 (7th Cir. 2018).
    We pause to consider the district court’s comments that
Ealy’s case “require[d] [no] medical testimony” and its sug-
gestion that Ealy may have “confused [his] cases” when seek-
ing counsel to assist with potential medical expert discovery
related to Ealy’s eye injury. It does not appear that Ealy con-
fused cases; he alleged an eye injury caused by the conditions
at Lawrence from the start. In fact, if Ealy’s liberty interest
were central to the disposition of this case (and it is not), re-
cruitment of counsel may have been necessary to help Ealy
establish specific injuries stemming from the alleged atypical
conditions. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655–56 (While there are no
“hard and fast rules” for evaluating the factual and legal dif-
ficulty of a plaintiff’s claim, “[w]e have previously observed
that some cases—those involving complex medical evidence,
for example—are typically more difficult for pro se plain-
tiffs.”). Because Ealy received all the process he was due, even
accepting his alleged injuries as true, we need not address this
point further.
   Our task is not to determine whether we would have re-
cruited counsel, but rather whether the district court abused
16                                               No. 23-1228

its discretion in denying Ealy’s motions. We conclude that it
did not.
                       III.   Conclusion
    For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the dis-
trict court is AFFIRMED.