United States v. Richardson
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antony RICHARDSON, Defendant-Appellant
Attorneys
ARGUED: Caryll S. Alpert, Federal Public Defenderâs Office, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Blanche B. Cook, Assistant United States Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Caryll S. Alpert, Michael C. Holley, Federal Public Defenderâs Office, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Blanche B. Cook, Assistant United States Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appel-lee.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
COHN, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BOGGS, C.J., joined.
McKEAGUE, J. (pp. 628-30), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
OPINION
This is a criminal case. Defendant-Appellant Antony Richardson (âRichardsonâ) appeals from his sentence of 120 months of imprisonment after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) for possessing a firearm in connection with âanother felony offense.â For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
I.
The background relevant to the appeal pertains to events taking place on July 16, 2005. On that day, Nashville Police Officers Michael Eby and Matthew Valiquette responded to a call involving underage drinking and drug use at a motel in Nashville, Tennessee. The officers saw two female juveniles leaving a motel room. They knocked on the door to the room. Richardson answered the door with his hands behind his legs. The officers smelled marijuana. When Officer Eby instructed him to place his hands in plain view, Richardson dropped a burning marijuana cigarette. Officer Eby also asked Richardson if he had anything on his person. He told police that he had a gun in his pocket. The officers recovered a stolen gun from his pocket and a small bag containing two to three grams of marijuana, less than a felony amount. Richardson told police that the gun belonged to Lena Moore (âMooreâ).
Moore was in the room with Richardson. She was an 18-year-old with whom he had a sexual relationship. Apparently, Moore lived with Richardson and the mother of his children, Raushanah Hasan (âHasanâ), from about May 2005 to June 2005. Moore gave the officers permission to search her purse. Inside the purse, officers found 116.5 grams (approximately a quarter of a pound) of marijuana and a set of digital scales. Moore stated the marijuana was hers. Both were arrested. At some point after her arrest, Moore, outside of Richardsonâs presence, told a federal agent that all of the items in the hotel room, including the marijuana, scales, and gun, belonged to Richardson.
The state of Tennessee charged Richardson for possession of the gun. Moore was charged with possession of the marijuana in her purse, although the charge was subsequently dropped.
Moore was released from custody the next day while Richardson remained in jail. At some point thereafter, Moore called Hasan and told her that the marijuana in her purse belonged to Richardson.
In August 2005, after being released from state custody, Richardson and Moore got into an argument during which Moore claims Richardson physically assaulted her. They also allegedly argued about whether Moore should accept the charge against her. Moore pursued criminal charges and Richardson was convicted of misdemeanor assault.
On April 12, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against
II.
A.
This court accepts the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall âgive due deference to the district courtâs application of the guidelines to the facts.â United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1481 (6th Cir.1996). However, â[wjhether the facts found by the district court warrant the application of a particular guideline provision is a legal question and is to be reviewed de novo by the appellate court.â United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Hill, 79 F.3d at 1481).
B.
Richardson argues that the district court erred in applying the four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with the sale of controlled substances. He argues that the government failed to establish a connection between the gun and the marijuana found in Mooreâs purse because he did not possess the marijuana.
Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(l),
If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense, increase by four levels.
The commentary accompanying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, note 14(B)(ii), states that § 2K2.1(b)(6) applies âin the ease of a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia ... because the presence of the firearm has the potential of facilitating another felony offense or another offense, respectively.â Thus, this section applies if
In interpreting the âin connection withâ language of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), this court has adopted the âfortress theory,â which holds that a connection is established if âit reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction.â United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir.2001) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989)).
C.
Before applying the enhancement, the district court held a sentencing hearing. Officers Eby and Yaliquette testified as to the events of July 16, 2005. Clara Himel, Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, also testified as to conversations she had with Moore in which Moore stated the items in her purse belonged to Richardson. Moore did not testify.
The circumstances in the motel room indicate they were there together. Both had marijuana on them, and they were jointly involved in the felony offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession being joint and at a minimum constructive. And that the gun was in connection with that offense, and the gun served the role mentioned in the guideline application note that firearms have the potential of facilitating other offenses or indeed the fact of facilitating by providing protection for the presence of drugs and to be prevention from robbery.
J.A. at 100.
D.
The district courtâs findings are not clearly erroneous. First, the fact that the gun was found in close proximity to the drugs is, as the district court noted, particularly compelling evidence that it was used to facilitate drug trafficking under the fortress theory. This Court has stated that â[t]he fact that the firearm was found in the same room where the [drugs were] stored can lead to the justifiable conclusion that the gun was used in connection with the felony.â Hardin, 248 F.3d at 498-99. Additional case law supports our conclusion. See United States v. Burns, 498 F.3d 578, 580-81 (6th Cir.2007) (upholding
Here, Richardsonâs possession of the gun was neither accidental nor coincidental. Richardson was found in a hotel room with marijuana on his person. Mooreâs purse contained a large quantity of marijuana and digital scales. The presence of the gun had the potential of protecting the marijuana. Also, it would not be reasonable to assume that he was carrying around a gun in his pocket to casually hang out with friends in a motel room.
Second, contrary to Richardsonâs argument, the district court did not err in concluding that Richardson possessed the marijuana in Mooreâs purse. Although the district court found that the possession was âjoint,â it also noted that at a minimum, Richardson constructively possessed the marijuana. We agree. âConstructive possession of an item is the âownership, or dominion or controlâ over the item itself, âor dominion over the premisesâ where the item is located.â United States v. Johnson, 344 F.3d 562, 565 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 649 (6th Cir.1998)). â[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used âduring and in relation toâ a drug trafficking crime.â United States v. Covert, 117 F.3d 940, 947 (citing United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.1989)).
Here, the facts are sufficient to establish constructive possession. The proximity of the gun in Richardsonâs pocket to the marijuana in Mooreâs purse, and the evidence of drug distribution in the motel room, namely the digital scale and the large quantity of marijuana, indicate that Richardson had dominion and control over the whole room. Richardson and Moore, who shared an intimate relationship at the time, were in a motel room together, a small and private space. They had a common interest in that both had marijuana in a marijuana smoke-filled room.
Richardson, however, says he did not know Moore had drugs in her purse and therefore he could not be deemed to have possessed them. This argument lacks merit. Richardson cites United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845 (D.C.Cir.1993) and United States v. Beverly, 750 F.2d 34 (6th Cir.1984) in support. Neither case is analogous. In Zeigler, the defendant was charged with drug possession, including cocaine. The defendant was arrested at her boyfriendâs apartment and admitted to possessing a small amount of marijuana found near a bed. Cocaine was found locked in a briefcase in the laundry room of the apartment, which was also locked. Defendantâs boyfriend shared the apartment with others. The apartment contained several rooms with multiple floors. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that defendant did not possess the cocaine, noting that there was no evidence that defendant had access to the locked room or briefcase.
Zeigler is inapposite because it was addressing the issue of constructive possession under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, instead of a preponderance-of-evidence standard. More importantly, however, is that the facts are distinguishable. Richardson was in a single rented room with someone with whom he had an admitted intimate relationship. Also, the drugs were found in Mooreâs purse, which was readily accessible to Richardson.
In addition, there are other facts in the record which support a finding that Richardson used the gun in connection with drug trafficking. Richardson had two pri- or convictions for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and less than four months after the instant offense, he was convicted again for possession and distribution of marijuana. In other words, he had an established knowledge and participation in drug trafficking activity.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Richardson possessed the drugs in Mooreâs purse, and further to conclude that the gun was used in connection with drug trafficking. The four-level enhancement was properly applied.
E.
As an alternative, the government argues that the enhancement can be upheld on the grounds that Richardson possessed the gun in connection with the felony of possession of marijuana, based on the amount of marijuana found on his person. The government says that under 21 U.S.C. § 844, his mere possession of marijuana, regardless of the amount, is a felony because Richardson has two prior felony drug convictions. It is well-established that this court âmay affirm on any grounds supported by the record, even though they may be different from the grounds relied on by the district court.â City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir.1994). Although the government could have presented this ground to the district court in arguing for the enhancement, it did not. Because the enhancement is proper on the grounds raised in the district court, and the governmentâs new argument is not fairly presented in the record, we decline to consider this alternative basis for affirming the district courtâs decision.
III.
For the reasons stated above, Richardsonâs sentence is AFFIRMED.
. Richardson has an extensive criminal record. The relevant convictions noted in the government's brief and detailed in the Presen-tence Investigation Report are as follows: On March 20, 1996, Richardson was convicted of the Sale of Less Than 0.5 Grams of Cocaine. On March 19, 2001, Richardson pled guilty to felony drug possession involving 6.1 grams of marijuana. On November 1, 2005, less than four months after the events in question, Richardson was arrested and convicted for Possession/Exchange of a Controlled Substance, for which he received a suspended sentence of 11 months and 29 days.
. Prior to November 1, 2006, this provision was known as U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).
. Although Moore was subpoenaed, she did not appear at the hearing. According to Agent Himel, Moore was afraid to testify.
. Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B), a district court is required to either make a finding on each matter controverted or determine that no finding is necessary because the matter will not affect sentencing. Because Richardson challenged the application of § 2K2.1(b)(6), it was necessary for the district court to articulate its findings on the enhancement.