In Re Amy

Petitioner, proceeding under the pseudonym “Amy,” seeks a writ of mandamus directing the district court to enter an order requiring defendant Doyle Randall Paroline (“Paroline”) to pay victim restitution to her in the amount of $3,367,854. Alternatively, petitioner asks us to remand this case to the district court for reconsideration of its order declining to impose restitution against Paroline. Because the district court’s conclusion1 that the government failed to establish that any of the defendant’s conduct related to this offense proximately caused Amy’s damages is not indisputably wrong, we DENY the writ of mandamus.

The standard of review is the usual standard for mandamus petitions, as set forth in In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir.2008). “A writ of mandamus may issue only if (1) the petitioner has ‘no other adequate means’ to attain the desired relief; (2) the petitioner has demonstrated a right to the issuance of a writ that is ‘clear and indisputable;’ and (3) the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, is satisfied that the writ is ‘appropriate under the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 394 (quoting In Re United States, 397 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir.2005)).

In this case, the first requirement is fulfilled because the petitioner likely has no other means for obtaining review of the district court’s decision not to order restitution. See United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308, 1311-16 (10th Cir.2008) (holding that a victim may not bring an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case asserting that her rights under § 3771 were violated). However, we are not persuaded that the second requirement is met.

*794Approximately a decade ago, when petitioner was 8 or 9 years old, her uncle took a series of photographs depicting her in sexually abusive poses. Her uncle distributed the sexually abusive images to third parties and, over the ensuing decade, those images were distributed widely via the internet and other electronic means. Defendant Doyle Randall Paroline (“Paroline”) pleaded guilty to a single count of possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of children in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) & 2252(b)(2), stemming from the large number of images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct that were found on Paroline’s computer. Two of the sexually abusive images were those made of Petitioner when she was 8 or 9 years old.

The Government moved in the district court on petitioner’s behalf, and petitioner moved through her own counsel, for restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259. The statute provides that the district court “shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter,” which includes the offenses for which Paroline was convicted. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a). “The order of restitution under this chapter shall direct the defendant to pay the victim ... the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court.” Id. § 2259(b)(1). A “victim” for purposes of the statute “means the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.” Id. § 2259(c). “The full amount of the victim’s losses,” for purposes of the statute, “includes any costs incurred by the victim for—

(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;

(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;

(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;

(D) lost income;

(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and

(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.”

Id. § 2259(b)(3).

Section 2259(b)(3) therefore arguably requires the government to establish that recoverable damages must proximately result from the “offense”.

We agree with the district court that

[I]f the Court were to adopt Amy’s reading of section 2259 and find that there is no proximate cause requirement in the statute, a restitution order could hold an individual liable for a greater amount of losses than those caused by his particular offense of conviction. This interpretation would be plainly inconsistent with how the principles of restitution and causation have historically been applied.

The crux of Amy’s petition is the legal argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2259 permits a victim to receive mandatory restitution irrespective of whether the victim’s harm was proximately cause by the defendant. The government agreed with the district court that Section 2259 requires a showing of proximate cause between the victim’s losses and the defendant’s conduct. Courts across the country have followed and applied the proximate-cause requirement in imposing restitution under Section 2259. United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir.1999); United States v. Searle, 65 Fed.Appx. 343, 346 (2d Cir.2003); United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Estep, 378 F.Supp.2d 763, 770-72 (E.D.Ky.2005); United States v. Raplinger, No. 05-CR-49-LRR, 2007 WL 3285802, *2, *6 (N.D.Iowa Oct. 9, 2007). Although this circuit has not yet construed the proximate cause requirement under Section 2259, it is neither clear nor indisputable that Amy’s *795contentions regarding the statute are correct.2

The district court permitted extensive briefing and conducted two evidentiary hearings on the issue of restitution, giving Amy a full opportunity to be heard through her able representative. The court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order reflects careful and thoughtful consideration of the law and the facts, as well as sensitivity to Amy and other victims of child pornography. Despite the government’s contrary position to the court’s ultimate factual finding on proximate causation, the district court did not “so clearly and indisputably abuse[] its discretion as to compel prompt intervention by the appellate court.” In re United States, 397 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir.2005).

We, therefore, DENY the petition for writ of mandamus.