Guardian Flight v. Health Care Service
Citation140 F.4th 271
Date Filed2025-06-12
Docket24-10561
Cited12 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Case: 24-10561 Document: 91-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/12/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
June 12, 2025
No. 24-10561 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Guardian Flight, L.L.C.; Med-Trans Corporation,
PlaintiffsâAppellants,
versus
Health Care Service Corporation,
DefendantâAppellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:23-CV-1861
______________________________
Before Smith, Clement, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Guardian Flight, LLC, and Med-Trans Corporation, two
air ambulance providers (âProvidersâ), appeal the dismissal of their
complaint against Appellee Health Care Service Corporation (âHCSCâ)
for HCSCâs alleged failure to timely pay dispute resolution awards under
the No Surprises Act (âNSAâ). Because we agree with the district court that
the NSA does not contain a private right of action, and because Providers
have failed to allege facts sufficient to state a derivative claim under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (âERISAâ) or for quantum
meruit under Texas law, we affirm.
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No. 24-10561
I
A
Congress enacted the NSA in 2022 to protect patients from surprise
medical bills incurred when they receive emergency medical services from
out-of-network healthcare providers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-111, 300gg-112.
The NSA achieves this by, inter alia, relieving patients from financial liability
for surprise bills and creating an Independent Dispute Resolution (âIDRâ)
process for billing disputes between providers and insurers. Id. § 300gg-
111(c)(1)â(5); see generally Tex. Med. Assân v. United States Depât of Health &
Hum. Servs., 110 F.4th 762, 767â78 (5th Cir. 2024) (discussing the NSA). 1
Under the IDR provisions, the provider and insurer first try to agree
on a price for the services. Id. § 300gg-111(c)(1)(A). If the negotiation fails,
the provider or payor has four days to initiate IDR proceedings. Id. § 300gg-
111(c)(1)(B). If the parties pursue IDR, either the parties or the Department
of Health and Human Services (âHHSâ) selects a certified independent
dispute resolution entity (âCIDREâ) to referee. Id. § 300gg-111(c)(4).
The CIDRE determines the amount the payor owes the provider. Id.
§ 300gg-111(c)(5). The CIDRE sets that amount via âbaseball-styleâ
dispute resolution where the provider and insurer each submit an offer, and
the CIDRE selects one partyâs offer as the award. Id. §§ 300gg-112(b)(5). In
selecting which offer to award, the CIDRE must consider the insurerâs
âqualifying payment amount,â a heavily regulated rate that reflects the
âmedian of the contracted rates recognized by the plan or issuer . . . for the
_____________________
1
The regulations invalidated by Texas Medical Association have no effect on this
case.
2
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same or a similar item or serviceâ offered in the same insurance market and
geographic area. Id. § 300gg-111(a)(3)(E)(i).
In the absence of a fraudulent claim or evidence of a misrepresentation
of facts to the CIDRE, the IDR award âshall be binding upon the parties
involved,â and payment of the award âshall be made . . . not later than 30
days after the date on which such determination is made.â Id. § 300gg-
112(b)(5)(D) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(E)); id. § 300gg-
112(b)(6). Patients are not involved in open negotiations or the IDR process,
and payors are directed to issue any IDR award payments directly to the
provider. See id.§ 300gg-112(b)(1)(A), (b)(5)(B), (b)(6).
The NSA also provides that an IDR award âshall not be subject to
judicial review, except in a case described in any of paragraphs (1) through
(4) of section 10(a)â of the Federal Arbitration Act (âFAAâ). Id. §§ 300gg-
112(b)(5)(D), 300gg-111(c)(5)(E). HHS has the authority to enforce
provider and payor non-compliance with the NSAâs provisions. Id. § 300gg-
22(b)(2)(A) (providing for HHS enforcement against some payors for NSA
non-compliance); id. § 300gg-134(b) (providing for HHS enforcement
against providers for NSA non-compliance).
B
In this case, Providers initiated IDR under the NSA to resolve their
billing disputes with HCSC. After IDR concluded, Providers sued HCSC
alleging it (1) failed to timely pay Providers thirty-three IDR awards in
violation of the NSA; (2) improperly denied benefits to HCSCâs
beneficiaries in violation of ERISA by failing to pay Providers; and (3) was
unjustly enriched because Providers conferred a benefit on HCSC that
HCSC has never paid.
The district court granted HCSCâs motion to dismiss the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It dismissed the NSA claim after
3
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concluding that the NSA contains no private right of action. The court
dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of standing because Providers, as
assignees of HCSCâs individual plan beneficiaries, did not show the
beneficiaries suffered injury given that the NSA shields them from liability
and removes them from the IDR process. Finally, the court dismissed
Providersâ quantum meruit claim because they did not perform their air
ambulance services for HCSCâs benefit. The district court also ruled that
granting Providers leave to amend would be futile. Providers timely appealed.
II
We review de novo a district courtâs âdismissal for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim pursu-
ant to Rule 12(b)(6).â Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
704 F.3d 413, 421(5th Cir. 2013). âLegal questions relating to standing and mootness are also reviewed de novo,â ibid., as are questions of statutory in- terpretation. Seago v. OâMalley,91 F.4th 386
, 389 (5th Cir. 2024).
III
Providers argue that the district court erred in dismissing their NSA,
ERISA, and quantum meruit claims. We address each claim in turn.
A
The district court correctly dismissed Providersâ claim against
HCSC for its failure to timely pay dispute resolution awards obtained under
the NSA because the NSA provides no private right of action.
First, as the district court correctly observed, the NSA contains no
express right of action to enforce or confirm an IDR award. The only right
of action provided derives from the incorporated vacatur sections of Section
10(a) of the FAAânone of which applies to this dispute, as Providers
concede. So, we begin with the presumption that Congress did not intend to
4
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create any private cause of action. Sigmon v. Sw. Airlines Co., 110 F.3d 1200,
1205 (5th Cir. 1997).
To overcome this presumption, Providers must show âthat Congress
affirmatively contemplated private enforcement when it passed the relevant
statute.â Ibid. (cleaned up); see also Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 521â22 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting plaintiffsâ âheavy burdenâ to âovercome the familiar presumption that Congress did not intend to create a private right of actionâ); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Justice Scalia, Implied Rights of Action, and Historical Practice,92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2077
, 2090 (2017)
(â[H]istorically federal courts did not supply private rights of action for
federal statutory violations independently of congressional authority.â).
Providers do not carry their heavy burden of showing Congress
contemplated a private right of action in the NSA. Indeed, the NSAâs text
and structure point in the opposite direction. The NSA expressly bars
judicial review of IDR awards except as to the specific provisions borrowed
from the FAA (sections which, again, Providers concede are inapplicable).
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(E)(i)(II) (IDR awards âshall not be subject to
judicial review, except in a case describedâ in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (emphasis added));id.
§ 300gg-112(b)(5)(D) (incorporating the same). 2 The district
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2
Those provisions authorize a court to vacate an arbitral award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
5
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court correctly reasoned that this bar on judicial review strongly suggests
Congress did not insert a private right of action into the statute.
Providers counter that they seek only judicial enforcement of an IDR
award, not judicial review of one. That is a distinction without a difference.
The term âjudicial reviewâ is broad enough to include a courtâs order to
enforce an IDR award. âReviewâ includes â[p]lenary power to direct and
instruct an agent or subordinate, including the right to remand, modify, or
vacate any action by the agent or subordinate, or to act directly in place of the
agent or subordinate.â Review, Blackâs Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024) (emphasis added). 3
Furthermore, courts interpreting other statutes, including the FAA,
have held that âjudicial reviewâ includes actions that seek to confirm or
enforce a dispute resolution award. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal.,
Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (explaining
ERISA âprovides for judicial review of the arbitratorâs decision by an action
in the district court to enforce, vacate, or modify the awardâ (emphases
_____________________
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)â(4).
3
It follows that judicial review also encompasses the power to vacate IDR
determinations. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (âThe
Federal Arbitration Act . . . provides for expedited judicial review to confirm, vacate, or
modify arbitration awards.â). That disposes of the slightly different argument made in the
other NSA case we decide today. See Guardian Flight, L.L.C. v. Med. Evaluators of Tex.
ASO, L.L.C., No. 24-20051, --- F.4th --- (5th Cir. , 2025). As we explain in that case,
the provider there asserts that the NSAâs bar on judicial review does not touch a courtâs
power to declare an IDR determination void. We reject that argument for the same reason
we reject the Providersâ argument here: it artificially narrows the term âjudicial reviewâ
that Congress used in the NSA.
6
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added)). 4 And Congress uses the term âjudicial reviewâ when referring to
private causes of action. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2236(b)(2) (creating private right of âaction to seek judicial reviewâ);42 U.S.C. § 10139
(c) (referring to
a âcivil action for judicial reviewâ).
In sum, Providersâ enforcement action depends on the availability of
a private right of action not present in the NSA. As a result, the NSAâs plain
text bars this suit. We will not find an implied right of action where Congress
expressly forecloses it. See Sigmon, 110 F.3d at 1206 (holding a statuteâs
âexpress barâ on lawsuits âcompel[led] the conclusion that Congress did
not intend to provide a private remedyâ).
Congress could have done otherwise. Section 9 of the FAA empowers
courts to confirm or enforce arbitration awards, see 9 U.S.C. § 9, but Congress chose not to incorporate § 9 into the NSA. It incorporated only parts of § 10. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(E)(i)(II). By contrast, in other statutes, Congress has incorporated § 9 to create a private right of action. See5 U.S.C. § 580
(c) (âA final award is binding on the parties to the arbitration
proceeding, and may be enforced pursuant to sections 9 through 13 ofâ the
FAA (emphasis added)). 5 So, Congress knew how to create a private right of
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4
See also Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 578(interpreting âjudicial reviewâ in the FAA to include âconfirm[ing]â an arbitral award); Mid Atl. Cap. Corp. v. Bien,956 F.3d 1182
, 1194 (10th Cir. 2020) (same); Med. Shoppe Intâl, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc.,614 F.3d 485, 488
(8th Cir. 2010) (same).
5
In a 28(j) letter, Providers point out that a federal district court recently found an
implied private right of action in the NSA, reasoning it would be absurd to interpret the
statute otherwise. See Guardian Flight LLC v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:24-cv-680-MPS,
2025 WL 1399145, at *8â9 (D. Conn. May 14, 2025). The court also tried to explain
Congressâs decision to omit the FAAâs express private right of action from the NSA:
Unlike âbindingâ IDR awards, FAA arbitration awards are not self-enforcing, so an
express private right of action is necessary to confirm them. Id. at *8. We are unconvinced.
We follow the NSAâs plain text and structure in concluding Congress created no general
private right of action in the NSA. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(E)(i)(II). We are
7
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action in the NSAâand has done so elsewhereâbut declined to do so.
Howard Univ. Hosp. v. D.C. Depât of Emp. Servs., 952 A.2d 168, 174 (D.C. 2008) (âWhere a statute, with reference to one subject, contains a given provision, the omission of such [a] provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show [that] a different intention existed.â (alterations in original) (quoting Smith v. D.C. Depât of Emp. Servs.,548 A.2d 95
, 100 n.13 (D.C. 1988)); Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans,284 F.3d 1282, 1296
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (âWhen Congress omits from a statute a provision found in similar statutes, the omission is typically thought deliberate.â (citing I.N.S. v. Phinpathya,464 U.S. 183, 190
(1984))); 2B Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 51:2 (7th ed. 2024) (â[C]ourts presume
a different intent when a legislature omits words used in a prior statute on a
similar subject.â).
Instead, Congress took a different tack: it empowered HHS to assess
penalties against insurers for failure to comply with the NSA. See
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(2)(A); 45 C.F.R. § 150.301 et seq. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within HHS, has acted
on that authority by soliciting provider complaints and compelling payors to
pay IDR awards where appropriate. 6 CMS maintains an online portal
through which providers may submit complaints regarding the IDR process.
See No Surprises Complaint Form, CMS, https://perma.cc/HHD2-8HW7.
_____________________
likewise unpersuaded by the district courtâs ERISA analysis; like Providers, the court
relied on precedent that predates the NSAâs enactment. See infra Section III.B; N.
Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2015).
6
See U.S. Govât Accountability Off., GAO-24-106335, Private
Health Insurance: Roll out of Independent Dispute Resolution
Process for Out-Of-Network Claims Has Been Challenging 35 (2023).
8
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The inference from the NSAâs broader structure, then, is plain. The
âexpress provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests
that Congress intended to preclude others.â Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 290 (2001); Sigmon, 110 F.3d at 1206 (holding the âexistence of [an]
administrative scheme of enforcement is strong evidence that Congress
intended the administrative remedy to be exclusiveâ (quotations omitted)).
The NSAâs structure conveys Congressâs policy choice to enforce the statute
through administrative penalties, not a private right of action.
Providers insist that without a private right of action, ânot only would
the purpose of the NSA be frustrated, the very structure of the NSA would
fall apart.â But our interpretation is compelled by the NSAâs text and
structure, both of which exclude a general private right of action. Nor does
that interpretation obviously âfrustrateâ the NSAâs purpose. Congress may
have had good reasons to provide only a general administrative remedy,
together with a strictly limited form of judicial review.
For example, in the first calendar year the NSA was operational,
providers filed more than thirty times the number of IDR disputes HHS
anticipated. See Brief for Americaâs Health Insurance Plans as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee at 5â7, Guardian Flight, L.L.C. v. Health Care
Serv. Corp., No. 24-10561 (5th Cir. argued Feb. 24, 2025). By 2023, providers
had initiated nearly 680,000 disputes. Ibid. Congress may have judged it
better to have an administrative enforcement mechanism handle most award
disputes instead of throwing open the floodgates of litigation.
Understandably, Providers would prefer a different mechanism for resolving
9
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provider-insurer disputes. But the wisdom of Congressâs policy choice is
beyond our judicial ken. 7
In sum, Providers have not shown that, despite the NSAâs express
bar on judicial review in cases like this, Congress âaffirmatively
contemplatedâ a private right of action to enforce IDR awards.
B
We turn next to Providersâ ERISA claim, which the district court
dismissed for lack of standing.
To demonstrate standing for a derivative ERISA claim as healthcare
providers, Providers must first obtain an assignment of benefits from
individual plan beneficiaries. See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., 781 F.3d
at 191â92. Providers satisfy this requirement, as several HCSC beneficiaries
assigned their rights to Appellants.
Providers must also show, however, that the individual plan
beneficiaries for whom they are assignees suffered a concrete injury, had
those beneficiaries brought the claim themselves. See Quality Infusion Care,
Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 729(5th Cir. 2010) (â[A]n assignee . . . stands in the same position as its assignor stood.â (ellipses in original) (quoting Houk v. Commâr of Internal Revenue,173 F.2d 821, 825
(5th Cir. 1949))); see also Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A.,590 U.S. 538
, 547 (2020)
(âThere is no ERISA exception to Article III.â).
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7
Amici American Hospital Association, et al., suggest that declining to find an
implied private right of action in the NSA âraises the question whether it is constitutional
to wholly abrogate a core common-law right without providing a reasonable alternative
remedy.â But amici fail to present any authority that directly addresses this concern
beyond mere suggestion, and, in any case, neither amici nor HCSC has explained why the
NSAâs administrative remedy is so inadequate as to violate the Constitution.
10
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Providers claim the beneficiaries suffered concrete injuries when
HCSC refused to provide them with out-of-network coverage benefits under
the partiesâ contracts. We disagree. The NSA shields the beneficiaries from
liability for any out-of-network coverage costs, so the beneficiaries have not
sufferedâand could not sufferâany concrete injury from HCSCâs failure
to cover medical bills that fall within the scope of the NSA. 8 Further, the
beneficiaries had nothing to gain or lose in the IDR proceedings between
Appellants and HCSC. That process exists entirely outside and
independent of ERISA.
Providers argue the injury to beneficiaries is nonetheless cognizable
because the beneficiaries have suffered a breach of contract and so have been
denied a benefit of their bargain with HCSC. We disagree. This technical
violation, if it amounts to one, does no actual harm to the beneficiaries and is
consequently an abstract theory insufficient for Article III injury. See
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427 (2021) (âArticle III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.â (quoting Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs.,926 F.3d 329, 332
(7th
Cir. 2019)); Thole, 590 U.S. at 541 (âIf [plaintiffs] were to win this lawsuit,
they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits that they are already
slated to receive, not a penny more. The plaintiffs therefore have no concrete
stake in this lawsuit.â).
_____________________
8
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-135 (non-participating air ambulance providers âshall not
bill, and shall not hold liable, [the] participant, beneficiary, or enrollee for a payment
amount for such service furnished by such providerâ beyond the patientâs cost-sharing for
the service).
11
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In short, because the beneficiaries would lack Article III standing if
they brought an ERISA claim on their own, Providers lack standing to bring
a derivative ERISA claim as their assignees. See Thole, 590 U.S. at 547. 9
C
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Providersâ quantum-
meruit claim because they failed to allege that they provided a direct benefit
to HCSC. Providers admit that Texas courts have held in other contexts that
because healthcare services are undertaken for the patientâs benefit, not the
insurerâs, the patient is the proper target of a healthcare providerâs quantum-
meruit claim. See Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc., 659
S.W.3d 424, 437 (Tex. 2023). Providers merely argue that this is âa debatable
proposition,â and that the district court was âtoo hastyâ in dismissing their
quantum-meruit claim because it leaves them without a judicial remedy.
The district court was right. Providers did not render any services for
HCSCâs benefit. Instead they provided âair ambulance transports for
[HCSCâs] beneficiaries.â Those beneficiaries are not plaintiffs in this case,
so Providers plainly fail to allege facts that could satisfy the elements of a
quantum-meruit claim under Texas law. See Tex. Med. Res., LLP, 659 S.W.3d
at 436 (â[I]t is not enough to show that [the plaintiffâs] efforts benefited [the
defendant]. Rather, the plaintiffâs efforts must have been undertaken for the
person sought to be charged.â (cleaned up) (emphasis and second and third
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9
Providers contend that every circuit to consider this ERISA issue, including this
court, has determined that the beneficiary suffered a concrete injury. Not so. Each of
Providersâ cited cases predates the NSA and is therefore inapposite. See, e.g., Springer v.
Cleveland Clinic Emp. Health Plan Total Care, 900 F.3d 284 (6th Cir. 2018).
12
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alterations in original) (quoting Bashara v. Baptist Memâl Hosp. Sys., 685
S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985))). 10
IV
The district courtâs judgment is AFFIRMED.
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10
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Providersâ request for
leave to amend. Providers have no cause of action under the NSA and do not explain which
facts they could allege in an amended complaint to satisfy the elements of their ERISA or
quantum-meruit claims. See Porretto v. City of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 491 (5th Cir. 2024) (â[A] âbare bonesâ request to amend pleadings âremains futile when it âfail[s] to apprise the district court of the facts that [the plaintiff] would plead in an amended complaint.âââ (quoting Edionwe v. Bailey,860 F.3d 287, 295
(5th Cir. 2017))).
13