Rosa v. Doe
Citation86 F.4th 1001
Date Filed2023-11-20
Docket21-2628
Cited76 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
21-2628 (L)
Rosa v. Doe
1 United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit
3 August Term, 2023
4 Argued: September 18, 2023
5 Decided: November 20, 2023
6
7 Docket No. 21-2628(L), 21-2851(Con)
8 ALEXANDER ROSA,
9 Plaintiļ¬-Appellant,
10 v.
11 JOHN DOE, COMMISSIONER, JOHN DOE, WARDEN, VIKI S. BLUMBERG,
12 MEDICAL DOCTOR, BARONE, WARDEN, VIKTORIA STORK, ROSE, NURSE,
13
14 Defendants-Appellees.
15 _____________________________________
16 Before: CALABRESI, LEE, and PĆREZ, Circuit Judges.
17 Alexander Rosa brought this action alleging that he received
18 constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the
19 Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed
20 with his case, Rosa, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a
21 ļ¬ling fee of $402. Rosa believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the
22 necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28
23 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915, which would allow Rosa to bring his suit without having to prepay
24 the full ļ¬ling fee. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
25 denied Rosaās motion, ļ¬nding that the prison provided Rosaās necessities of life.
26 Rosa moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion.
27 On reconsideration, the district court found that Rosa had the resources to pay for
28 both the necessities of life and the ļ¬ling fee but had instead chosen to prioritize
1
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1 contributions to his family members for their necessities. Rosa argues that both
2 conclusions are the result of legal error. We agree and conclude that Rosa has
3 demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his
4 own necessities of life and those of his dependents. We therefore REVERSE,
5 ļ¬nding that Rosaās motion meets the standard of 28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915(a), and remand 6 for consideration of the rest of Ā§ 1915ās requirements. 7 8 _____________________________________ 9 10 RACHEL ZHU, Rule 46.1(e) Law Student (Michael W. 11 Martin, Ian Weinstein, Lincoln Sq. Legal Serv., Inc., on the 12 brief), New York, NY, for Plaintiļ¬-Appellant Alexander 13 Rosa. 14 15 _____________________________________ 16 17 CALABRESI, Circuit Judge: 18 Plaintiļ¬-Appellant Alexander Rosa appeals from a judgment of the United 19 States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Merriam, J.). Rosa believed 20 that the Connecticut Department of Correction violated his Eighth Amendment 21 rights by providing him with insuļ¬cient medical care. So, Rosa, acting pro se, 22 sought relief in federal court by ļ¬ling this suit. 23 Like all civil litigants, however, Rosa had to pay a ļ¬ling fee before the court 24 could proceed with his case. See28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1914
. Believing that payment of the 25 $402 ļ¬ling fee would render him unable to pay for essentials, Rosa moved for leave 26 to proceed in forma pauperis under28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915
. In forma pauperis status allows
2
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1 prisoners like Rosa to bring suits without the obligation to prepay certain fees,
2 including the $402 ļ¬ling fee, and allows non-incarcerated litigants to proceed
3 entirely without paying such fees. The district court denied Rosaās motion,
4 reasoning that the prison provided for Rosaās necessities of life and that Rosaās
5 account contained more than the $402 required to pay the ļ¬ling fee. On
6 reconsideration, the district court again ruled against Rosa, further reasoning that
7 funds Rosa chose to give his mother and son, even if for their essentials, could
8 have instead been used to pay the ļ¬ling fee in his suit. On appeal, Rosa argues
9 that the district court erred in two ways: ļ¬rst, by considering only Rosaās
10 necessities of life and not the necessities of life of Rosaās dependents, and second,
11 in concluding that the prison provided all of Rosaās necessities. We agree with
12 Rosa as to both mistakes and therefore reverse.
13 BACKGROUND
14 Alexander Rosa is an inmate in the custody of the State of Connecticut at
15 Osborn Correctional Institution. In January 2019, Rosa entered Connecticut State
16 custody at Bridgeport Correctional Center. Shortly thereafter, Rosa reported to
17 prison medical staļ¬ that he had recently suļ¬ered a broken collarbone in a car
18 accident. He also notiļ¬ed medical staļ¬ that he had long-running pain in both
3
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1 shoulders and his right knee, and that he had been injured in two shootings years
2 prior. Over the ensuing months, Rosa asserts that he repeatedly sought medical
3 care to little eļ¬ect. Eventually, Rosa received some medical care, including the
4 removal of bullet fragments from his shoulder. Still, allegedly, Rosaās pain
5 persisted, and a bullet lodged near Rosaās lower femur brought him signiļ¬cant
6 discomfort.
7 On April 5, 2021, Rosa ļ¬led a pro se complaint in the United States District
8 Court for the District of Connecticut. The complaint charged that Rosa received
9 insuļ¬cient medical care in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
10 rights and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Ā§ 1983. The complaint also sought
11 injunctive relief requiring further medical treatment and an order āto be cuļ¬ed in
12 front and a permanent bottom bunk pass.ā Appāx 12.
13 But ļ¬ling a lawsuit in federal court is an expensive process. For his
14 complaint to be deemed received, a civil claimant like Rosa must pay the court
15 $402 in fees. 1 Unfortunately, 63% of adults in the United States report not having
1 The civil filing fee is $350. 28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1914(a). The Schedule of Fees set out following the statute
also requires an additional administrative fee of $52 for filing any civil case. District Court
Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-
court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule (last visited Nov. 16, 2023).
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1 the savings to cover that unexpected expense. 2 Report on the Economic Well-Being
2 of U.S. Households in 2022, Bd. Governors Fed. Res. Sys. (May 2023),
3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2023-economic-well-being-of-us-
4 households-in-2022-executive-summary.htm. To remedy the risk that litigants
5 with meritorious claims but without ļ¬nancial resources might be denied their day
6 in court, American law has a well-established tradition of allowing impoverished
7 litigants to proceed in forma pauperis and bring their suit without prepayment of
8 court fees. Accordingly, Rosa submitted a motion for leave to proceed in forma
9 pauperis along with his complaint, requesting that the court allow him to proceed
10 without prepayment of the $402 ļ¬ling fee.
11 The in forma pauperis tradition in the United States builds on a long English
12 tradition of fee waivers for impoverished litigants, codiļ¬ed by statute in England
13 in 1495. See An Acte to Admytt Such P[er]sons as Are Poore to Sue In Forma
14 Paup[er]is, 11 Hen. 7 c. 12 (1495). The 1495 statute was preceded by a common-
2 Incarcerated people like Rosa may well face even greater obstacles to securing the finances
necessary to bring a claim in federal court. On average, incarcerated people earn between $0.86
and $3.45 per day working prison jobs. Wendy Sawyer, How much do incarcerated people earn in
each state?, Prison Policy Initiative (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/. Imprisoned in Connecticut, Rosa
might expect to earn between $0.75 and $1.75 per day. Conn. Gen. Assemb. Off. Legis. Rsch.,
Inmate Wages, 2018-R-0179, at 1 (2018); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ā§ 18-85 (2023) (capping inmate
pay at $10 per week).
5
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1 law right to proceed in forma pauperis. See Brunt v. Wardle (1841) 133 Eng. Rep.
2 1254, 1257; 3 Man. & G. 534, 542 (Chief Justice Tindal: ā[A]fter all, is the 11 H[en].
3 7, c. 12, any thing more than conļ¬rmatory of the common law?ā). Indeed, even
4 earlier, by 1295 the English ecclesiastical courts had statutorily codiļ¬ed an
5 expansive in forma pauperis procedure. Statuta Rob. Cantuar. Archiep. De Consistorio
6 (1295), in 2 CONCILIA MAGNAE BRITANNIAE ET HIBERNIAE, A SYNODO
7 VEROLAMIENSI A.D. CCCXLVI AD LONDINENSEM A.D., MCCCXLIX 206 (David
8 Wilkins ed., 1737).
9 Our own in forma pauperis tradition is similarly well-established. In 1892,
10 Congress codiļ¬ed the ability of federal courts to allow litigants to proceed in forma
11 pauperis. The language regarding eligibility for in forma pauperis status enacted by
12 this statute remains essentially the same today: litigants can proceed āwithout
13 being required to prepay fees or costs, or give security thereforā if the litigant
14 submitted an aļ¬davit representing that ābecause of his poverty, he is unable to
15 pay.ā 3 Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, Ā§ 1, 27 Stat. 252, 252. Moreover, before this
16 federal codiļ¬cation, many states had either passed in forma pauperis statutes or had
3 By its terms, the 1892 statute extended in forma pauperis status for āplaintiffsā and āUnited States
citizensā only, but the statute has been amended several times since 1892. The statute was
amended to include appellants, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435, Ā§ 1, 36 Stat. 866, 866, and noncitizens,
Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590.
6
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1 held that they had inherited in forma pauperis as part of their adoption of the
2 English common law. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36
3 HARV. L. REV. 361, 381-90 (1923).
4 The federal in forma pauperis statute represents a signiļ¬cant eļ¬ort to ensure
5 the ability of impoverished litigants to prosecute meritorious claims or defenses
6 without disadvantage. The Supreme Court has described the 1892 statute as
7 aiming āto lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.ā Denton v. Hernandez, 504
8 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). The House Report accompanying the statute labels it as 9 confronting the problem that āpersons with honest claims may be defeated, and 10 doubtless often are, by wealthy adversaries.ā H.R. Rep. No. 52-1079, at 1 (1892). 11 The House Report suggests that without this statute, āthe Government allow[s] its 12 courts to be practically closed to its own citizens, who are conceded to have valid 13 and just rights, because they happen to be without the money to advance pay to 14 the tribunals of justice.āId. at 2
. 15 Rosaās motion was submitted under the current in forma pauperis statute, 2816 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915
. This statute allows litigants to bring a suit āwithout prepayment of
17 fees or security thereforā so long as the litigant submits an aļ¬davit āthat includes
18 a statement of all assetsā that the litigant possesses. Ā§ 1915(a)(1). The statute has
7
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1 somewhat diļ¬erent requirements for prisoners, reļ¬ecting amendments made to it
2 as part of the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act (āPLRAā). As a result of these
3 amendments, 28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915now requires prisoner-litigants to āsubmit a 4 certiļ¬ed copy of the trust fund account statement . . . for the 6-month periodā 5 before the commencement of the suit. Ā§ 1915(a)(2). Additionally, prisoners are 6 eligible only for a payment plan for court costs rather than a full waiver. Ā§ 1915(b). 7 Nonetheless, the statute relieves prisoners, if otherwise eligible, of their obligation 8 to prepay court fees before the court can consider the complaint received. 9 Though the PLRA instituted substantial changes to Section 1915, it did not 10 change the substantive Section 1915(a) standard that movants must meet in order 11 to qualify for in forma pauperis status. The Supreme Court, interpreting the same 12 āunable to payā language still found in Section 1915(a), laid out that eligibility 13 standard in Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,335 U.S. 331
(1948): A litigant 14 need not be āabsolutely destituteā to qualify for in forma pauperis status but need 15 demonstrate only that they ācannot because of [their] poverty pay or give security 16 for the costs and still be able to provide [themselves] and dependents with the 17 necessities of life.āId. at 339
(internal quotations omitted); see also Potnick v. E. State 18 Hosp.,701 F.2d 243, 244
(2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (applying the Adkins standard
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1 to hold that the ļ¬nancial condition of a plaintiļ¬ whose income was less than the
2 federal poverty level warranted leave to proceed in forma pauperis).
3 The PLRA did, however, require that an incarcerated movant for in forma
4 pauperis status demonstrate that their complaint does not present an obviously
5 fatal defect. See 28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915(e)(2) (providing that āthe court shall dismissā a
6 case in which āthe allegation of poverty is untrueā or the action or appeal āis
7 frivolous or malicious,ā āfails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,ā or
8 āseeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such reliefā).
9 Thus, a determination of whether an incarcerated movant qualiļ¬es for in forma
10 pauperis status now requires district courts to engage in two distinct tasks: ļ¬rst,
11 they must evaluate whether the movant has met Section 1915ās substantive
12 standard, Ā§ 1915(a), and second, they must review the merits of the movantās
13 complaint, Ā§ 1915(e)(2).
14 Rosa moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by submitting the form
15 provided by the District of Connecticut Clerkās Oļ¬ce for prisoners seeking to
16 proceed in forma pauperis in a civil action. The form asked, inter alia, for Rosaās
17 income and any other sources of money, the current balance of his inmate account,
18 the total value of property that he owned, and his approximate monthly
9
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1 contributions to support family members. Appāx 100-02. Rosaās answers
2 indicated that he had no income, supported his mother and son with monthly
3 payments totaling $86.66, and had an account balance of $576.98 at the time of
4 ļ¬ling. Rosa attached a certiļ¬cation from a prison oļ¬cial indicating that, over the
5 last six months, Rosaās inmate account had an average balance of $601.64 and
6 average monthly deposits of $74.41. Rosa also attached screenshots showing his
7 inmate account transactions over a period of about ten months. These screenshots
8 show frequent debits for commissary purchases and postage and credits for
9 inmate pay (usually between $5 and $25). The screenshots also show three much
10 larger credits for stimulus payments and several debits coded by the account
11 system as āspecial requests,ā ranging from less than $100 to as much as $600.
12 Alongside his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Rosa moved for
13 the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. Ā§ 1915(e). As with Rosaās in forma
14 pauperis motion, Rosaās motion for appointment of counsel was submitted using a
15 form provided by the District of Connecticut. Both motion forms ask for detailed
16 ļ¬nancial information. Rosaās motion for appointment of counsel reaļ¬rmed that
17 his income was limited, that his prison account had a balance of $576.98 at the time
18 of ļ¬ling, and that his mother and his son were his ādependents.ā Additionally,
10
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1 the motion form for appointment of counsel asked for an itemized list of debts.
2 Rosa listed more than $1,500 in debts, the vast majority of which were fees for
3 ambulance services.
4 The district court denied Rosaās motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the
5 basis of the information submitted in his motion form. The district court noted
6 that Rosa reported receiving $1,200 in income from federal COVID stimulus funds
7 and had an average balance of about $600 over the last six months in his prison
8 account. The district court further noted that ā[a]s a prisoner, Rosa does not pay
9 for room or board.ā Appāx 123-24. Following previous decisions of the District of
10 Connecticut, the district court evidently concluded that the prison provided Rosaās
11 necessities of life. Accordingly, because Rosaās inmate account contained more
12 than the $402 required to pay the ļ¬ling fee, and because Rosaās room and board
13 were provided by the prison, the district court held that it could ādiscern no reason
14 why requiring Rosa to pay the ļ¬ling fee of $402 would force him to forego the
15 necessities of life or abandon this action.ā Appāx 124.
16 Rosa ļ¬led several additional documents with the district court contesting
17 this ruling. In these ļ¬lings, Rosa provided further details of his ļ¬nancial situation.
18 He responded to the district courtās analysis of his receipt of stimulus funds by
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1 explaining that he sent those funds to his mother and son to pay for their housing
2 and other necessities. The district court construed Rosaās additional ļ¬lings as a
3 motion for reconsideration and denied the motion. 4 On reconsideration, the
4 district court noted that the federal stimulus funds Rosa received were āmore than
5 enough to pay the ļ¬ling feeā and concluded that ā[w]hile the desire to help his
6 family is admirable, plaintiļ¬ still made a choice to do so rather than paying the
7 ļ¬ling fee.ā Appāx 148.
8 Rosa timely appealed to this Court. 5 On appeal, Rosa argues that the district
9 court erred in requiring Rosa to choose between spending his funds on his familyās
10 necessities of life and using that money to ļ¬le this suit. Rosa further argues that
11 the district court erred in concluding that the prison provided his necessities of
12 life. On these facts, Rosa contends that the record demonstrates that his ļ¬nancial
13 condition meets Section 1915(a)ās standard. We agree with Rosa, reverse the
14 district courtās order and remand for further proceedings.
4 Until this point in the litigation, the case had been before Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer, who issued
the initial ruling on Rosaās motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The case was then transferred to
Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam, who ruled on the motion for reconsideration.
5 We appointed counsel for purposes of this appeal.
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1 DISCUSSION
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal because a district court order denying
3 an application to proceed in forma pauperis is immediately appealable. See Fischer
4 v. N.Y. State Depāt of L., 812 F.3d 268, 275(2d Cir. 2016) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Dist. 5 Ct.,339 U.S. 844, 845
(1950)). Additionally, Rosaās motion for reconsideration was 6 ļ¬led within twenty-eight days of the underlying ļ¬nal judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 7 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). As a result, on appeal, we review both the district courtās ruling on 8 reconsideration and the underlying ļ¬nal judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5)(B); cf. 9 Bailey v. Interbay Funding, LLC, No. 21-146,2022 WL 852851
(2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2022) 10 (reviewing only the ruling on reconsideration where a movantās reconsideration 11 motion was ļ¬led more than three months after the underlying ļ¬nal judgment). 12 We review the denial of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis for abuse of 13 discretion. See Potnick,701 F.2d at 244
. āAn abuse of discretion exists if the district 14 court (1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly 15 erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be 16 located within the range of permissible decisions.ā City of New York v. Golden 17 Feather Smoke Shop, Inc.,597 F.3d 115, 119-20
(2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and
18 citations omitted).
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1 I
2 As a preliminary matter, the State of Connecticut argues for aļ¬rmance of
3 the district courtās orders on the ground that, for procedural reasons, we cannot
4 consider Rosaās argument that he spent funds to support his family members. 6
5 Connecticut presents two arguments: (1) that Rosa improperly āattempt[s] to
6 present new factsā in his motion for reconsideration in describing that he sent the
7 stimulus funds he received to his dependents, Conn. Br. 16, and (2) that this Court
8 can only consider facts, and arguments reliant on facts, listed in the aļ¬davit
9 required by Section 1915(a), Conn. Br. 20-22.
10 We disagree. The in forma pauperis law is not meant to be a series of traps
11 and travails for pro se litigants, nor does it aim to dismiss potentially meritorious
12 arguments because of the particularities of federal practice. And ā[i]t is well
13 established that a court is ordinarily obligated to aļ¬ord a special solicitude to pro
14 se litigants.ā Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101(2d Cir. 2010) (citing Estelle v. 15 Gamble,429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). This special solicitude āmost often consists of 16 liberal construction of pleadings, motion papers, and appellate briefs,āid.
at 101
6 The State of Connecticut would have represented the various defendants had process been
served in this case. Because process has not been served, Connecticut appeared at this stage only
as an amicus. Brief Amicus Curiae State of Connecticut in Support of Affirmance at 1 (hereinafter
āConn. Br.ā).
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Rosa v. Doe
1 (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94(2007) (per curiam)), and includes leniency 2 in the application of procedural rules, LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc.,239 F.3d 3 206, 209
(2d Cir. 2001). 7 See generally Tracy,623 F.3d at 101-02
(collecting cases 4 aļ¬ording procedural leniency to pro se litigants). 5 Here, āconstrued liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments 6 that they suggest,ā Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,470 F.3d 471, 474
(2d Cir.
7 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted), Rosaās submissions certainly
8 present the claim that Rosa needed funds to support his family and had a history
9 of supporting his family. Rosa listed his mother and son as dependents on his
10 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and again on his motion for
11 appointment of counsel. Rosaās motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis listed
12 monthly payments he made to support his mother and son. And the screenshots
13 of his inmate account show withdrawals in amounts similar to those that Rosa
14 claimed as the monthly support he provided his mother and son. Liberally
15 construing the pattern of debits to Rosaās inmate account from funds sent to his
7 We are especially loathe to construe strictly procedural rules against a pro se litigant where the
motion in question was submitted according to a form provided by the court. If, as here, the form
fails to ask for potentially relevant information, it would be perverse to hold that failure against
the litigant. As the author of the form, the court can easily add additional instructions or
questions ensuring that necessary information is submitted. A litigant who earnestly responds
to the questions that the court asks should not be penalized by the courtās failure to ask for basic
information the court in fact requires.s
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1 mother and son, we hold that Rosaās assertion that he utilized his inmate account
2 funds to support his dependents was suļ¬ciently presented in Rosaās original
3 motion. 8
4 II
5 We turn next to the issue of whether the district court properly analyzed
6 Rosaās motion under Section 1915(a)ās standard. Rosa ļ¬rst argues that the district
7 court erred in limiting its analysis to his own necessities of life and failing to
8 consider his dependentsā necessities of life in its Section 1915(a) determination. On
9 reconsideration, the district court recognized that Rosaās choice to send funds to
10 his family members was āadmirable,ā but noted that those funds could have
11 instead been used to pay the costs of his suit. Appāx 148. Rosa contends that this
12 was error because Section 1915(a)ās substantive standard contemplates that the
13 necessities of life of the movant and those of his dependents are to be considered
14 in determining in forma pauperis eligibility.
15 We agree with Rosa. An in forma pauperis motion meets Section 1915(a)ās
16 standard when it demonstrates that the applicant cannot āpay or give security for
8 Because we find that Rosaās original motion and accompanying affidavit sufficiently raised the
arguments in question, we need not consider whether a court can consider information submitted
outside the affidavit required by Section 1915(a).
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1 the costs and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of
2 life.ā Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). To 3 require in forma pauperis applicants to āhave sworn to contribute to payment of 4 costs[] the last dollar they have . . . and thus make themselves and their 5 dependents wholly destitute[] would be to construe the statute in a way that 6 would throw its beneļ¬ciaries into the category of public charges.āId.
Adkins 7 explicitly acknowledges that others might ļ¬nancially depend on litigants and thus 8 incorporates support of dependents into the Section 1915(a) standard. The district 9 court thus erred in denying Rosa in forma pauperis status without considering his 10 dependentsā necessities of life. 11 Connecticut argues that Rosaās claims that his mother is a dependent and 12 that he sent her funds to help her pay rent are implausible because she is non- 13 elderly and because there was a federal eviction moratorium in place at the time. 14 Conn. Br. 33-34. Connecticutās argument would have us apply a level of factual 15 skepticism to Rosaās aļ¬davit that the Supreme Court disfavors in Section 1915(a) 16 analyses. See Adkins,335 U.S. at 339
(providing that allegations made in
17 satisfaction of Section 1915ās procedural requirements āshould ordinarily be
18 accepted . . . particularly where unquestioned and where the judge does not
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1 perceive a ļ¬agrant misrepresentationā). Here, Connecticut's challenges are based
2 on unsupported speculation that we ļ¬nd unpersuasive. Thus, we accept Rosaās
3 claims for purposes of the Section 1915(a) evaluation.
4 Connecticut further notes that no prior court has addressed whether a
5 movantās parents may qualify as Adkins dependents. Conn. Br. 33-34. It is
6 unnecessary for us to determine the outer bounds of who may be considered a
7 dependent to resolve this case. Because of the unrestricted usage of the word
8 ādependentā in Adkins and Congressās broad intent to enable poor litigants to
9 access the courts in enacting this statute, at a minimum, immediate family
10 members such as parents must be understood to qualify. Moreover, any
11 reasonable deļ¬nition of dependent includes the potential for dependent parents.
12 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. Ā§ 152 (deļ¬ning the word ādependentā for tax code purposes as
13 ā(1) a qualifying child, or (2) a qualifying relativeā who meets certain statutory
14 criteria); Dependent, WEBSTERāS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 604 (1966)
15 (deļ¬ning ādependentā as āone relying on another for supportā).
16 Second, Rosa argues that the district court erred by failing to consider that
17 Rosa, while incarcerated, might nonetheless require funds for his own necessities
18 of life. Appellantās Br. 20-23. Connecticut instead contends that it provides
18
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1 prisoners like Rosa with all the necessities of life. Conn. Br. 23-27. And it was on
2 this basis that the district court denied in forma pauperis status. The court found
3 that the prison provided for Rosaās room and board and considered no other
4 necessities that Rosa might require. On reconsideration, the district court likewise
5 failed to discuss any necessities that might require Rosaās funds. In view of this
6 holding, the court concluded that any funds in Rosaās inmate account were not
7 required for Rosaās necessities of life.
8 This was error. Despite their incarceration, prisoners maintain their own,
9 often complex, economic lives. Adkins explains that the aim of in forma pauperis
10 status is to prevent individuals from becoming āpublic chargesā because of the
11 costs of a suit. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. It made clear that it would be anathema to
12 the statuteās purpose of ālower[ing] judicial access barriers to the indigent,ā
13 Denton, 504 U.S. at 31, to require litigants to choose between bringing a suit and
14 meeting their familial support or loan payment obligations. But, in additionāand
15 implicit in what the reasoning of Adkins asks courts to recognizeāprisoners may
16 well have ļ¬nancial obligations that warrant consideration in a Section 1915(a)
17 evaluation: medical debts, court ļ¬nes, student loans, support orders, among other
18 examples. Moreover, prisons all too frequently fail to provide necessary hygiene
19
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1 essentials and often charge substantial rates for postage and phone calls that
2 prisoners need to maintain relationships with family and friends. 9
3 It follows that an inquiry into whether a movant meets Section 1915(a)ās
4 standard may not simply presume that, because incarceration provides food and
5 lodging, the movant does not need any ļ¬nancial resources to secure necessities.
6 And a court may not simply assume that an incarcerated movant with more than
7 $402 in their inmate account requires no resources for their own necessities of life
8 and hence is ineligible for in forma pauperis status. Courts must instead carefully
9 consider whether the motion and the attached inmate account details demonstrate
10 a need for the applicant to maintain some of their own funds for necessities.
11 III
12 Having found that the district court erred because prisoners like Rosa may
13 still have economic needs and because Adkins understands Section 1915(a)ās
14 standard to consider support for dependents, we turn to Rosaās contention that his
15 motion in fact meets Section 1915(a)ās standard. We hold that it does and, in
9 See Tiana Herring, For the poorest people in prison, itās a struggle to access even basic necessities,
Prison Policy Initiative (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/11/18/indigence/; Timothy Williams, The High
Cost of Calling the Imprisoned, New York Times (Mar. 30, 2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/us/steep-costs-of-inmate-phone-calls-are-under-
scrutiny.html.
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Rosa v. Doe
1 particular, that Rosa demonstrated that his ļ¬nancial condition precludes him from
2 prepaying the costs of this suit while still providing the necessities of life for
3 himself and his dependents.
4 Rosaās motion to proceed in forma pauperis demonstrated that he supported
5 his family members with monthly payments of $86.66. At the time the motion was
6 ļ¬led, Rosaās inmate account had a balance of $576.98. Though the in forma pauperis
7 form that the court provided failed to inquire into Rosaās debts, his motion for the
8 appointment of counsel lists more than $1,500 in debt. If denied in forma pauperis
9 status, Rosa would be left with less than $200 in his inmate account to pay for
10 service of process and any other future costs associated with this suit, as well as
11 his debts and support of his dependents. As this court has held, āSection 1915(a)
12 does not require a litigant to demonstrate absolute destitution; no party must be
13 made to choose between abandoning a potentially meritorious claim or foregoing
14 the necessities of life.ā Potnick, 701 F.2d at 244(citing Adkins,335 U.S. at 339
).
15 Though Rosa would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402
16 ļ¬ling fee, he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated
17 with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his
18 dependents. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and direct the court to
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21-2628 (L)
Rosa v. Doe
1 consider whether Rosa, having met the standard of Section 1915(a), meets Section
2 1915ās other requirements and is thus deserving of in forma pauperis status.
3 CONCLUSION
4 For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court,
5 and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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