Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America

     21-2919-cv
     Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America




 1                                             In the
 2                 United States Court of Appeals
 3                                for the Second Circuit
 4
 5
 6
 7                                      AUGUST TERM 2022
 8
 9                                         No. 21-2919-cv
10
11                                     ANITA EISENHAUER,
12                                      Plaintiff-Appellant,
13
14                                                 v.
15
16                            CULINARY INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
17                                  Defendant-Appellee.
18
19
20                 On Appeal from the United States District Court
21                     for the Southern District of New York
22
23
24                                ARGUED: JANUARY 26, 2023
25                                DECIDED: OCTOBER 17, 2023
26
27
28   Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, LEVAL, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

29

30
 1         This case presents the questions of what a defendant must prove
 2   to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under
 3   federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act, 

(d), (“EPA”)
 4   and New York Labor Law § 194(1). Plaintiff Anita Eisenhauer alleges
 5   that defendant Culinary Institute of America violated these equal-pay
 6   laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary
 7   Institute responds that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral
 8   compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining
 9   agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Eisenhauer argues that the
10   compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because
11   it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job
12   and her colleague’s job.

13         Eisenhauer’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job
14   related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA
15   indicates the opposite. We hold that to establish the EPA’s “factor
16   other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay
17   disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor
18   except for sex. But Eisenhauer’s position is correct as to New York
19   Labor Law § 194(1). A recent amendment to § 194(1) explicitly added
20   a job-relatedness requirement. We thus hold that to establish § 194(1)’s
21   “factor other than sex” or “status” defense, a defendant must prove
22   that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on
23   a job-related factor. The District Court did not consider the divergent
24   requirements imposed by the EPA and § 194(1) when assessing
25   Eisenhauer’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.




                                        2
 1         Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART insofar as the United States
 2   District Court for the Southern District of New York (Paul E. Davison,
 3   Magistrate Judge) granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
 4   EPA claim. We VACATE IN PART and REMAND insofar as the
 5   District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
 6   claim under New York Labor Law, § 194(1).

 7   CHIEF JUDGE LIVINGSTON concurs in the judgment in part and files a
 8   separate opinion.

 9

10                            STEVEN M. WARSHAWSKY, The Warshawsky
11                            Law Firm, Mount Kisco, N.Y., for Plaintiff-
12                            Appellant.

13                            REBECCA M. MCCLOSKEY (Greg Riolo, on the
14                            brief), Jackson Lewis P.C., White Plains,
15                            N.Y., for Defendant-Appellee.

16                            JAMES DRISCOLL-MACEACHRON (Christopher
17                            Lage, Deputy General Counsel; Jennifer S.
18                            Goldstein, Associate General Counsel;
19                            Elizabeth E. Theran, Assistant General
20                            Counsel; Julie L. Gantz, Attorney, on the
21                            brief), Equal Employment Opportunity
22                            Commission, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
23                            Curiae U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
24                            Commission.




                                       3
 1

 2   JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

 3          This case presents the questions of what a defendant must prove
 4   to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under
 5   federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act, 

(d), (“EPA”) 1
 6   and New York Labor Law § 194(1). 2 Plaintiff Anita Eisenhauer alleges
 7   that defendant Culinary Institute of America violated these equal-pay
 8   laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary
 9   Institute responds that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral
10   compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining
11   agreement (“CBA”)—justifies the pay disparity. Eisenhauer argues
12   that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex”
13   because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between
14   her job and her colleague’s job.

15          Eisenhauer’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job
16   related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA
17   indicates the opposite. We hold that to establish the EPA’s “factor
18   other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay
19   disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor




            1   See text accompanying notes 16–17, post, for the text of 

(d)(1).
            2See text accompanying notes 89–94, post, for the text of New York Labor
     Law § 194(1).




                                                  4
 1   except for sex. 3 But Eisenhauer’s position is correct as to New York
 2   Labor Law § 194(1). A recent amendment to § 194(1) explicitly added
 3   a job-relatedness requirement. We thus hold that to establish § 194(1)’s
 4   “factor other than sex” or “status” defense, a defendant must prove
 5   that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on
 6   a job-related factor. The District Court did not consider the divergent
 7   requirements imposed by the EPA and § 194(1) when assessing
 8   Eisenhauer’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.

 9          Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART insofar as the United States
10   District Court for the Southern District of New York (Paul E. Davison,
11   Magistrate Judge) granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
12   EPA claim. We VACATE IN PART and REMAND insofar as the
13   District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
14   § 194(1) claim. 4

15                                 I.     BACKGROUND

16                               A. Factual Background

17          Anita Eisenhauer, a female professor at the Culinary Institute,
18   alleges that she is a victim of pay discrimination in violation of the EPA
19   and New York Labor Law § 194(1). Since 2017, the Culinary Institute—
20   a private, non-profit college and culinary school—has paid Eisenhauer

            3   If the pay disparity results from the employer’s job-classification system,
     the job-classification system must also serve a “legitimate business-related” purpose.
     Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 

 (2d Cir. 1992).
            4  Magistrate Judge Davison conducted all proceedings and ordered the
     entry of a final judgment with the parties’ consent. See 

(c).




                                               5
 1   a lower salary than it has paid Robert Perillo, a male professor carrying
 2   a similar course load. 5 In 2019, for example, Eisenhauer’s salary was
 3   $111,263, while Perillo’s was $118,080.

 4          The Culinary Institute pays Eisenhauer and Perillo according to
 5   the sex-neutral terms of a CBA and employee handbook (together,
 6   “compensation plan”). 6 The compensation plan requires fixed pay
 7   increases triggered by time, promotion, and degree completion. It does
 8   not provide for “equity” adjustments. 7 Each year, in accordance with
 9   the compensation plan, all faculty members receive the same
10   percentage increase in their salaries. As a result, the pay disparity
11   between Eisenhauer and Perillo continues to grow.

12          The pay disparity between Eisenhauer and Perillo exists because
13   their salaries differed when they were hired and have formulaically
14   increased over time. When the Culinary Institute hired Eisenhauer and


            5The Culinary Institute also paid Eisenhauer a lower salary in 2011 and
     2012. We use the terms “salary” and “pay” interchangeably, excluding
     consideration of any overtime, stipend, or tuition-reimbursement payments that
     Eisenhauer and Perillo may have received.
            6 The CBA is a contract between the Culinary Institute and the Culinary
     Teachers Association, the union to which Eisenhauer and Perillo belong. The
     Culinary Institute has recognized the Culinary Teachers Association as the
     exclusive representative and bargaining agent of its Hyde Park, New York faculty.
     The CBA governs faculty members’ wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
     of employment.
            7Under the CBA, the Culinary Institute may not diverge from the terms of
     the CBA absent a written agreement between it and the Culinary Teachers
     Association.




                                            6
 1   Perillo as learning instructors—at starting salaries of $50,000 in 2002
 2   and $70,000 in 2008, respectively—they had different experience and
 3   education levels. Eisenhauer had fifteen years of culinary experience
 4   and had served as the executive chef in two New York City
 5   restaurants. Perillo had twenty-three years of culinary experience,
 6   previous teaching experience, and an associate’s degree. He had also
 7   received higher scores on the cooking- and lecture-demonstration
 8   components of his job application. Eisenhauer does not contend that
 9   her starting salary was the product of sex-based pay discrimination.

10          Over the years, both Eisenhauer and Perillo received
11   promotions and attained further education. Each earned the titles of
12   assistant   professor;   associate    professor;    and,   ultimately,    full
13   professor—she in 2013 and he in 2017. Along the way, Eisenhauer and
14   Perillo also received their bachelor’s and master’s degrees—she in
15   2009 and 2016, and he in 2012 and 2015. Each of these achievements
16   prompted a fixed-dollar increase in compensation. 8 The amounts of
17   the increases differed somewhat because the precise raises required by
18   the compensation plan changed over time. For example, Eisenhauer’s
19   salary increased by $4,000 upon her promotion to assistant professor
20   in 2008, while Perillo’s rose by $4,410 upon his promotion in 2016.




            8  Under the CBA, the Culinary Institute partially reimburses full-time
     faculty members for tuition. Both Eisenhauer and Perillo took advantage of the
     tuition reimbursement program. Under the terms of the employee handbook,
     faculty members benefiting from the tuition reimbursement program are eligible
     for a pay increase upon earning their degrees.




                                           7
 1                                B. Procedural Background

 2          Eisenhauer filed suit against the Culinary Institute on
 3   November 26, 2019, alleging sex-based pay discrimination in violation
 4   of both federal and state law: the EPA, 

(d), and New
 5   York’s equal-pay law, New York Labor Law § 194(1). The District
 6   Court evaluated her federal- and state-law claims “under the same
 7   standard” 9 and granted summary judgment for the Culinary Institute
 8   on November 3, 2021. 10 It concluded, as a matter of law, that
 9   (1) although Eisenhauer had established a prima facie case of sex-based
10   pay discrimination, (2) the Culinary Institute had justified the pay
11   disparity with its compensation plan, a “factor other than sex” that
12   (3) Eisenhauer failed to show was a pretext for discrimination. This
13   appeal followed. 11

14                              II.       STANDARD OF REVIEW

15          Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall
16   grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
17   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
18   as a matter of law.” 12 A dispute as to any “material fact is genuine ‘if

            9  J.A. 270 (quoting Moccio v. Cornell Univ., 

 (S.D.N.Y.
     2012), aff’d, 

 (2d Cir. 2013)).

             In doing so, the District Court also denied Eisenhauer’s motion for
            10

     summary judgment.
            11 We have jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal of a final decision by the
     District Court under 

.
            12   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).




                                               8
 1   the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
 2   the nonmoving party.’” 13 We review de novo a district court’s order
 3   granting summary judgment. 14 In conducting our review, we must
 4   resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor the nonmoving
 5   party. 15

 6                                     III.    DISCUSSION

 7           We consider in turn the requirements for establishing
 8   affirmative defenses to claims under the EPA, 

(d), and
 9   New York Labor Law § 194(1). As to the EPA, we hold that to establish
10   a “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove that the pay
11   disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor
12   except for sex. As to New York Labor Law § 194(1), we hold that to
13   establish a “factor other than sex” or “status” defense, a defendant
14   must prove that the pay disparity in question results from a
15   differential based on a job-related factor.




             Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 

 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
             13

     Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

 (1986)).
             14See, e.g., Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Delta Air Lines, 

 (2d
     Cir. 2001).
             15See, e.g., Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 

     (2d Cir. 1994).




                                                  9
 1          A. The Equal Pay Act’s “Factor Other Than Sex” Defense

 2                                  1. 

(d)(1)

 3           The EPA prohibits pay discrimination on the basis of sex. It
 4   provides that

 5           [n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between
 6           employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
 7           employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which [it] pays
 8           wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work
 9           on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
10           effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
11           similar working conditions. 16

12   It also sets forth four exceptions to this prohibition, for pay disparities
13   resulting from “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system
14   which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or
15   (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 17 Each
16   exception operates as an affirmative defense. 18 The meaning of the
17   fourth exception—“a differential based on any other factor other than
18   sex,” which is often truncated to “factor other than sex”—is the focus
19   of our inquiry.



             16   

(d)(1).
             17   

 § 206(d)(1)(i)–(iv) (emphasis added).
             18 See Ryduchowski v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 

 (2d Cir. 2000).
     “The burden of establishing one of the four affirmative defenses is ‘a heavy one.’”
     

 at 143 (quoting Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of Com., 

 (6th Cir. 1997)).




                                                 10
 1    2. Job-Classification Systems Under Aldrich v. Randolph Central
 2                                        School District

 3          Arguing that a “factor other than sex” must be job related,
 4   Eisenhauer relies on Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District, decided
 5   more than thirty years ago. 19 There, we faced the novel question of the
 6   circumstances under which a job-classification system qualifies as a
 7   “factor other than sex.” 20 We held that a facially sex-neutral job-
 8   classification system alone is insufficient to constitute a “factor other
 9   than sex,” citing concern over potential pretexts for discrimination. 21

10          The defendant in Aldrich had sought to justify the pay disparity
11   between the plaintiff, a female “cleaner,” and two male “custodians”
12   by invoking its sex-neutral job-classification system. 22 The system
13   classified as “custodians” those required to take a civil-service
14   examination; “cleaners” faced no such requirement, and the defendant
15   paid them less. 23 We rejected the invocation of a sex-neutral job-
16   classification system “without more,” observing that


            19   

 (2d Cir. 1992).
            20See 

 (“We have not yet faced the question under what
     circumstances a civil service classification system qualifies as a factor-other-than-
     sex.”).
            21   See 

 at 525–26.
            22   

.
            23 

 After taking the civil-service examination, candidates for a custodian
     position appeared on a ranked eligibility list. See 

 The employer could hire as a
     custodian only those candidates ranked among the top three on that list. See 

                                                11
 1          Congress intended for a job classification system to serve
 2          as a factor-other-than-sex defense to sex-based wage
 3          discrimination claims only when the employer proves
 4          that the job classification system resulting in differential
 5          pay is rooted in legitimate business-related differences in
 6          work responsibilities and qualifications for the particular
 7          positions at issue. 24

 8   Eisenhauer draws on this observation to argue that the Culinary
 9   Institute’s compensation plan cannot justify the pay disparity at issue
10   here. She does not contend that the compensation plan is a job-
11   classification system. 25 She nevertheless maintains that the observation
12   applies. In her view, the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor
13   other than sex” because it results in a pay disparity unconnected to
14   “differences in work responsibilities and qualifications.” 26 In
15   opposition, the Culinary Institute argues that Aldrich requires only job-
16   classification systems, not all “factor[s] other than sex,” to be connected
17   to such differences. 27 We agree with the Culinary Institute.



     Plaintiff Cora Aldrich had never earned a top-three score and had never been
     offered a custodian position. See 

            24   

 (emphasis added).
            25  We therefore do not consider any such argument. See Britt v. Garcia, 

, 268 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to decide an issue because a party did not
     raise it below or before us).
            26   Aldrich, 

.
            27The Culinary Institute does not contend that its compensation plan falls
     within one of the EPA’s exceptions for seniority, merit, or productivity systems. See




                                                12
 1          Eisenhauer, like others, misconstrues Aldrich. 28 Considering the
 2   EPA’s legislative history, we reasoned that a job-relatedness
 3   requirement is necessary to ensure that a job-classification system is
 4   not a pretext for sex discrimination. 29 Jobs are, after all, the principal
 5   feature of job-classification systems. We did not hold that all “factor[s]
 6   other than sex” must be job related. 30 Nor do we do so today. Aldrich’s
 7   underlying suggestion is that we should interpret “factor other than
 8   sex” so as to guard against pay disparities intentionally or
 9   unintentionally based on sex. 31

10                                3. Statutory Interpretation

11          Basic principles of statutory interpretation demonstrate that the
12   term “any other factor other than sex” refers to any factor except for
13   those based on sex. The term has sowed needless uncertainty and



     

(d)(1)(i)–(iii). We therefore do not consider any such argument. See
     Britt, 

 n.2.
            28 See, e.g., Rizo v. Yovino, 

 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
     (incorrectly interpreting Aldrich as holding that “only job-related factors provide
     affirmative defenses to EPA claims”).
            29   Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 524–26.
            30  As noted, in Aldrich, we faced the novel question of the circumstances
     under which a job-classification system qualifies as a “factor other than sex.” See id.
     at 524; note 20 and accompanying text, ante. Thus, we read Aldrich to bear only on
     job-classification systems. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
     Waste Mgmt. Auth., 

, 261 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that we must
     interpret a case “in context, not in a vacuum”).
            31   Id. at 525; note 30, ante.




                                                13
1   confusion among our sister circuits. 32 Its meaning, we think, is about
2   as simple as it sounds.

3          “Our starting point in statutory interpretation is the statute’s
4   plain meaning, if it has one.” 33 To identify a statute’s plain meaning,
5   we afford words “their ordinary, common-sense meaning” 34 and
6   “draw[ ] on ‘the specific context in which that language is used.’” 35 The
7   words “differential based on any other factor other than sex” appear in
8   the context of three preceding exceptions to the EPA’s prohibition: pay
9   disparities resulting from “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;

           32  The circuits are split in numerous directions on the meaning of “factor
    other than sex.” Compare Fallon v. Illinois, 

 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The
    fourth affirmative defense . . . is a broad ‘catch-all’ exception and embraces an
    almost limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex.”), with Rizo,
    

 (“[W]e conclude that the fourth affirmative defense comprises only
    job-related factors, not sex.”), with Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. J.C. Penney Co.,
    

 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he ‘factor other than sex’ defense does not
    include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for
    a legitimate business reason.”), with Riser v. QEP Energy, 

 (10th
    Cir. 2015) (noting that pay-classification systems are only an affirmative defense
    when pay differences are “rooted in legitimate business-related differences in work
    responsibilities and qualifications for the particular positions at issue.” (quoting
    Aldrich, 

)), with Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

 (11th
    Cir. 1988) (“[T]he ‘factor other than sex’ exception applies when the disparity
    results from unique characteristics of the same job; from an individual’s experience,
    training, or ability; or from special exigent circumstances connected with the
    business.”).
           33   United States v. Dauray, 

 (2d Cir. 2000).
           34   

           35  Williams v. MTA Bus Co., 

 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting United
    States v. Rowland, 

 (2d Cir. 2016)).




                                                14
1   [or] (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
2   production.” 36

3           Upon reflection, we conclude that the meaning of “any other
4   factor other than sex” is unambiguous:

5           We begin with the first half of the term “any other factor other
6   than sex.” “Any” means “every”; 37 its meaning is “expansive” rather
7   than restrictive. 38 “Other” means “additional.” 39 And read in context,
8   “any other factor” refers to “every” 40 “additional” 41 factor, beyond a
9   seniority, merit, and productivity system, 42 “other than sex.”


            36   

(d)(1).
            37   Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1963).
            38United States v. Gonzales, 

 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New
    International Dictionary 97 (1976)); see also Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

 (2008) (interpreting the word “any” expansively); Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
    

, 588–89 (1980) (same).

            “Of course, other circumstances may counteract the effect of expansive
    modifiers[,]” including the modifier “any.” Ali, 522 U.S. at 220 n.4. The Supreme
    Court has construed such modifiers narrowly when they “included a term of art
    that compelled that result[,] . . . when another term in the provision made sense
    only under a narrow reading[,] . . . and when a broad reading would have
    implicated sovereignty concerns.” Id. (citations omitted). None of the circumstances
    that required these narrow constructions is present here.
            39   Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1963).
            40   Id. at 97.
            41   Id. at 1598.
            42   See 

(d)(1)(i)–(iii).




                                                   15
1             The meaning of the second half of the term “any other factor
2   other than sex” is also plain. “Other than” means “except for.” 43
3   Together, then, “any other factor other than sex” means “every”44
4   “additional” 45 factor “except for” 46 those based (intentionally or
5   unintentionally 47) on sex. Accordingly, to establish the EPA’s “factor
6   other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove that the pay disparity
7   in question results from a differential based on any factor except for
8   sex. 48


              Other Than, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
              43

    webster.com/dictionary/other%20than (last visited June 28, 2023); see also Theodore
    M. Bernstein, The Careful Writer: A Modern Guide to English Usage 320–21 (1965)
    (equating “other than” with the preposition “except”).
              44   Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, note 37, ante.
              45   Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, note 39, ante.
              46   Other Than, note 43, ante; see also Bernstein, note 43, ante.

              See Ryduchowski, 

 (“[T]he EPA does not require a plaintiff
              47

    to establish an employer’s discriminatory intent.”).

              A variety of factors are based on sex and thus cannot constitute an
              48

    affirmative defense. Among those factors are (1) pretexts for sex-based pay
    discrimination or factors that otherwise intentionally or unintentionally mask such
    discrimination, cf. Ryduchowski, 

 (observing that a plaintiff may
    counter a defendant’s affirmative defense to an EPA claim with evidence of pretext
    and that the plaintiff need not establish an intent to discriminate); (2) factors that
    are not sex neutral; (3) differentials that “perpetuate the effects” of historic sex-
    based pay discrimination by an employer, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 

 (1974); (4) “claimed differences between the average cost of employing
    workers” of different sexes as groups, 

; and (5) collective
    bargaining agreements to “unequal rates of pay,” 

, meaning
    agreements to rates established on the basis of sex, see The Equal Pay Act;




                                                    16
 1          The requirement that a “factor other than sex” be job related
 2   appears nowhere in the EPA’s text and, in our view, conflicts with the
 3   statute’s plain meaning. If Congress had intended all “factor[s] other
 4   than sex” to be job related, it would have said so. As discussed below,
 5   New York State’s legislature did say so. 49 And Congress explicitly
 6   referenced job relatedness in the provision of Title VII of the Civil
 7   Rights Act of 1964 50 prohibiting employment practices that disparately
 8   impact protected classes. Under that provision, which New York’s
 9   equal-pay law emulates, 51 a plaintiff establishes a disparate-impact
10   claim “only if . . . the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
11   challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
12   consistent with business necessity.” 52 Yet Congress “could not have



     Interpretations, 

 (Aug. 20, 1986) (explaining that 

 “make[s] clear that an employer or labor organization cannot escape the
     requirements of the EPA merely by including allegedly negotiated unequal rates of
     pay in a collective bargaining agreement”). This list is not necessarily exhaustive.
     The key, as Aldrich suggests, is that we must interpret “factor other than sex” to
     avoid “loopholes” that would sanction sex-based pay discrimination. Aldrich, 

. A job-relatedness requirement for all “factor[s] other than sex” is not
     necessary to avoid such “loopholes.”
            49   See Section III.B, post.
            50   42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i).
            51 See New York Sponsors Memorandum, 2015 S.B. 1, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess.
     (Mar. 26, 2015) (“[A] factor [other than sex] could not be based on a sex-based
     differential, and must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. This
     standard would mirror the current defense afforded to employers in disparate
     impact cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”).
            52   42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).




                                                17
1   chosen a more all-encompassing phrase” 53 than “any other factor other
2   than sex” when it passed the EPA. As the Supreme Court has
3   described it, the exception for “any other factor other than sex” is a
4   “catch-all exception” 54: it catches all remaining factors that are not
5   based on sex.

6          Although the plain meaning of the “catch-all exception” 55
7   “trumps any resort to legislative history,” the legislative history
8   “strongly supports our interpretation.” 56 According to the Senate
9   Report on the EPA bill, 57 the statute was “designed to eliminate any

           53   Ali, 

.
           54   Corning Glass Works, 

 (emphasis added).
           55   

           56 Lawrence + Mem'l Hosp. v. Burwell, 

 (2d Cir. 2016); see also,
    e.g., Gonzales, 

 (“Given the straightforward statutory command, there
    is no reason to resort to legislative history.”); United States v. Oregon, 

 (1961) (observing that if a provision is “clear and unequivocal on [its] face,”
    there is “no need to resort to . . . legislative history”).

            That the legislative history supports our interpretation is unsurprising. “[I]f
    the language of a rule plainly appears to address a specific problem, one naturally
    would expect legislative history (if it exists) to confirm this plain meaning.”
    Bourjaily v. United States, 

 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
           57  “[T]he authoritative source [within legislative history] for finding the
    Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the
    considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
    drafting and studying proposed legislation.’” Garcia v. United States, 

    (1984) (third alteration in original) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 

 (1969));
    see also Charles Tiefer, Congressional Practice and Procedure 181 (1989) (“Externally,
    the committee report serves . . . as the central guide for courts and agencies looking
    into the ‘legislative history’ of a bill for clues on interpreting it.”).




                                               18
 1   wage rate differentials which are based on sex. Neither the committee
 2   nor anyone proposing equal-pay legislation intend[ed] that other
 3   factors [could not] be used to justify a wage differential.” 58 And, as
 4   noted in the House Report, “the broad general exclusion [was] . . .
 5   included” because “it [was] impossible to list each and every
 6   exception.” 59

 7          Statements made during congressional debate further reinforce
 8   our interpretation. A colloquy between two members of the House
 9   committee that reported the EPA bill 60—Representative Charles
10   Goodell of New York, a primary sponsor of the bill, and
11   Representative Robert Griffin of Michigan—is representative:

12          Mr. Goodell. . . . [W]e want the private enterprise system,
13          employer and employees and a union, if there is a union, and
14          the employers and employees if there is not a union, to have a
15          maximum degree of discretion in working out . . . how much
16          [employees] should be paid for [their work].

17          Mr. Griffin. So long as pay differentials are not based on sex. 61

            58   S. Rep. No. 88-176, at 4 (1963).
            59   H.R. Rep. No. 88-309, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689.
            60  See generally United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 

, 276–
     77 (1947) (suggesting that the statements of members of a committee that reports a
     bill carry more weight than those of members who were not part of the committee).
            61See also, e.g., 109 Cong. Rec. 9203 (1963) (statement of Rep. Griffin)
     (“[R]oman numeral iv . . . makes clear and explicitly states that a differential based
     on any factor or factors other than sex would not violate this legislation.”); 

     (statement of Rep. Griffin) (“Roman numeral iv is a broad principle, and those




                                                    19
1          Mr. Goodell. Yes, as long as it is not based on sex. That is the sole
2          factor that we are inserting here as a restriction. 62

3          The EPA’s legislative history is more than merely compatible
4   with our interpretation. It confirms that to establish the “factor other
5   than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that a pay disparity in
6   question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex.
7   Nothing in the legislative history suggests that a “factor other than
8   sex” must be job related. Nor is there anything to suggest that the term
9   must be limited in in any other way. 63



    preceding it are really examples: such factors as a seniority system, a merit system,
    or a system which measures earnings on the basis of quality or quantity of
    production.”).
           62   109 Cong. Rec. 9198 (1963) (emphasis added).
           63  The Supreme Court’s observations about the EPA in County of Washington
    v. Gunther support our view that the term “any other factor other than sex” really
    means any such factor. 

 (1981). Repeated references to the exception do
    not suggest any limiting principle. See 

 (“[T]he Act’s four affirmative
    defenses exempt any wage differentials attributable to seniority, merit, quantity or
    quality of production, or ‘any other factor other than sex.’”); 

 (“The fourth
    affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act . . . was designed differently, to confine
    the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination.”);
    

 at 170–71 (“Under the Equal Pay Act, the courts and administrative agencies are
    not permitted to ‘substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer . . .
    who [has] established and applied a bona fide job rating system,’ so long as it does
    not discriminate on the basis of sex.” (alteration and omission in original) (emphasis
    added) (quoting 109 Cong. Rec. 9209 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell))); 

 at 171
    n.11 (noting Representative Griffin’s statement that the “factor other than sex”
    defense “is a ‘broad principle,’ which ‘makes clear and explicitly states that a
    differential based on any factor or factors other than sex would not violate this
    legislation’” (quoting 109 Cong. Rec. 9203 (1963))).




                                              20
 1                                     a. Ambiguity

 2          Our interpretation would remain unchanged even if the term
 3   “factor other than sex” were ambiguous, requiring our resort to canons
 4   of statutory interpretation to discern its meaning. 64

 5          Beyond Aldrich, Eisenhauer’s argument that every “factor other
 6   than sex” must be job related relies on Rizo v. Yovino, in which the
 7   Ninth Circuit resorted to interpretive canons to discern the term’s
 8   meaning. 65 The Ninth Circuit did not assert that the term “factor other
 9   than sex” is ambiguous, much less explain why. Yet it resolved some
10   assumed ambiguity by applying the canons of ejusdem generis and
11   noscitur a sociis. 66 The canon of ejusdem generis dictates that we should


            64 See Spadaro v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 

 (2d Cir. 2020)
     (“[W]e rely upon canons of construction only if the language of the statute is
     ambiguous . . . .”); cf. Rubin v. United States, 

 (1981) (“When we find
     the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except ‘in rare and
     exceptional circumstances.’” (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 

, 187
     n.33 (1978))); In re Price, 

 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If the statutory
     language is unambiguous, then our ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” (quoting Rubin,
     

)).
            65  See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1224–25 (discussing canons of statutory
     interpretation).
            66   See 

             Resort to these canons is anomalous because the Supreme Court has
     instructed that they are useful only for resolving ambiguity. See Harrison, 

 (1980) (“The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an
     instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is
     uncertainty.” (quoting United States v. Powell, 

 (1975))); Russell Motor
     Car Co. v. United States, 

 (1923) (“‘Noscitur a sociis’ is a well-




                                               21
1   interpret a general term that follows specific ones to refer only to items
2   of the same “class” as the specific ones. 67 And the canon of noscitur a
3   sociis instructs that “a word is known by the company it keeps.” 68 In


    established and useful rule of construction, where words are of obscure or doubtful
    meaning, and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to remove the obscurity or
    doubt by reference to the associated words.” (emphasis added)).

            Beyond resorting to the canons of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, the
    Ninth Circuit relied on the principle that we must give effect to every part of a
    statute. It reasoned that “any other factor other than sex” must be job related
    because “[i]f any factor other than sex could defeat an EPA claim, the first ‘other’”
    and the three enumerated exceptions “would be rendered meaningless.” Rizo, 

. We disagree. “Other” has a meaning even though any “factor other than
    sex” defeats an EPA claim: It refers to the fact that “bona fide,” Gunther, 

 (emphasis added), seniority, merit, and productivity systems are “additional,”
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, note 39, ante, “factor[s] other than sex.”
    The three enumerated exceptions also have meanings even though any “factor other
    than sex” defeats an EPA claim: They refer to “specifically contemplated” factors
    that defeat an EPA claim. Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 

 (2009); see also 

    (“[T]he whole value of a generally phrased residual clause . . . is that it serves as a
    catchall for matters not specifically contemplated—known unknowns . . . .”); H.R.
    Rep. No. 88-309, at 3 (“[T]he broad general exclusion [was] . . . included” because
    “it [was] impossible to list each and every exception . . . .”). “In any event, we do
    not woodenly apply limiting principles every time Congress includes a specific
    example along with a general phrase.” Ali, 552 U.S at 227. Nor do we use
    interpretive principles to introduce ambiguity where there is none. See Conn. Nat’l
    Bank v. Germain, 

, 253–54 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that
    courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
    in a statute what it says there. . . . When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
    then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” (quoting Rubin,
    

)).
              67   Cleveland v. United States, 

 (1946).
              68   Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 

    (1995).




                                                    22
 1   the Ninth Circuit’s view, “any other factor other than sex,” a general
 2   term, kept company with three specific terms—seniority, merit, and
 3   productivity systems—and should be interpreted to refer only to job-
 4   related factors. 69 Job relatedness, it declared, is “obvious[ly]” 70 the
 5   relevant “class.” 71

 6          It is not at all “obvious” to us that the three specific exceptions
 7   are job related. 72 Seniority systems are not necessarily job related,
 8   regardless of whether merit and productivity systems deserve such a
 9   descriptor. Seniority systems afford employees rights and benefits
10   according to the length of their employment, not necessarily their
11   employment in a particular job. 73 Any pay disparity resulting from a
12   seniority system could therefore be unrelated to differences in two
13   employees’ “work responsibilities and qualifications.” 74 For example,
14   Employee A could earn more than Employee B, who has served twice
15   as long in the position that Employee A also holds, merely because




            69 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1224–25 (applying the canons of ejusdem generis and
     noscitur a sociis).
            70   Id. at 1225.
            71   Cleveland, 

.
            72   Rizo, 

.
            73 See Cal. Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant, 

, 605–06 (1980) (“A ‘seniority
     system’ is a scheme that . . . allots to employees ever improving employment rights
     and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase.”).

            74   Aldrich, 

.




                                              23
 1   Employee A has worked for her employer in different capacities for
 2   twice as long as Employee B.

 3           We cannot think of a fitting “class” 75 or unifying descriptor
 4   beyond the one the plain meaning of the EPA provides: “factor[s] other
 5   than sex.” The most commonsensical assessment of the EPA’s
 6   exceptions, in our view, is that no such “class” or descriptor exists. 76
 7   To shoehorn seniority, merit, and productivity systems into a
 8   manufactured label or category would be to overinterpret the EPA and
 9   distort Congress’s intent. The canons of statutory interpretation are
10   merely tools to aid our understanding. 77 When the tools prove
11   “unhelpful,” we may abandon them. 78

12           The canons prove “unhelpful” here. 79 Even if we were to
13   determine that the term “factor other than sex” is ambiguous, we
14   would then turn to the EPA’s legislative history as our remaining



             75   Cleveland, 

.
             76   

             77See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 

 (2001) (“[C]anons are
     not mandatory rules. They are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’” (quoting
     Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 

 (2001))).
             78Snell Island SNF LLC v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 

 (2d Cir. 2009),
     vacated on other grounds, 

 (2010), and abrogated on other grounds by New
     Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 

 (2010); see also Ali, 

 (declining to apply the canons of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis where “it
     [was] not apparent what common attribute connect[ed] the specific items”).
             79   Snell Island, 

.




                                                   24
 1   interpretive guide. 80 As discussed above, that legislative history
 2   “strongly supports” our interpretation. 81 All routes lead us to the same
 3   conclusion: To establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a
 4   defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results
 5   from a differential based on any factor except for sex.

 6                   4. The Culinary Institute’s Compensation Plan

 7           We return, at last, to the compensation plan to determine
 8   whether the Culinary Institute was entitled to summary judgment on
 9   Eisenhauer’s EPA claim. We conclude that it was.

10           The EPA’s “basic structure and operation are . . .
11   straightforward.” 82 A plaintiff must establish a prima facie EPA case by
12   demonstrating that “i) the employer pays different wages to
13   employees of the opposite sex; ii) the employees perform equal work
14   on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and iii) the jobs




             80 See Blum v. Stenson, 

 (1984) (“Where . . . resolution of a
     question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look
     first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory
     language is unclear.”); Dauray, 

. (“When the plain language and
     canons of statutory interpretation fail to resolve statutory ambiguity, we will resort
     to legislative history.”).
             81   Lawrence + Mem'l Hosp., 

; see text accompanying notes 55–
     62, ante.
             82   Corning Glass Works, 

.




                                                 25
1   are performed under similar working conditions.” 83 If the plaintiff has
2   established a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the


            83Belfi v. Prendergast, 

 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Tomka v. Seiler
    Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington
    Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 

 (1998); accord Corning Glass Works, 

.

            The Culinary Institute argues that the District Court erred in concluding
    that Eisenhauer established a prima facie case of sex-based pay discrimination. It
    contends that she could not have established a prima facie case by identifying a
    single male-comparator employee who earns more than her while ignoring all other
    employees who perform substantially equal work. In support of its argument, the
    Culinary Institute identifies five other comparators that it claims illustrate that no
    sex-based pay disparity exists.

            The question of how many comparators are necessary to establish a prima
    facie EPA case is a source of disagreement among our sister circuits. Compare Equal
    Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Md. Ins. Admin., 

 (4th Cir. 2018)
    (holding that one comparator is sufficient), and Price v. Lockheed Space Operations Co.,
    

 (11th Cir. 1988) (same), with Hein v. Or. Coll. of Educ., 

 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in a professional setting such as a college, the
    proper comparison is to the average of wages paid to all similarly situated
    employees of the opposite sex). And it is a question that we need not answer today
    because we affirm the order granting summary judgment for the Culinary Institute
    on Eisenhauer’s EPA claim on other “grounds supported in the record.” Thyroff v.
    Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 

 (2d Cir. 2006); see text accompanying
    notes 85–88, post.

            The separate question of how many comparators are necessary to establish a
    prima facie case under New York Labor Law § 194(1) is one that the District Court
    did not consider. As we explain in Section III.B, the District Court improperly
    assessed Eisenhauer’s § 194(1) claim “under the same standard” as her EPA claim.
    J.A. 270; see text accompanying notes 95–101, post. “Ordinarily, we ‘will not review
    an issue the district court did not decide.’” Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network,
    Inc., 

 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 

 (2d Cir. 1996)). Thus, should the District Court decide to invoke its
    supplemental jurisdiction over Eisenhauer’s § 194(1) claim on remand, it must




                                               26
1   employer to show that one of the EPA’s affirmative defenses justifies
2   the pay disparity. 84 To establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex”
3   defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in
4   question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex.

5          We assume without deciding that Eisenhauer has established a
6   prima facie EPA case and that the Culinary Institute consequently had
7   the burden to establish its affirmative defense. We may affirm the


    determine whether a single male comparator is sufficient to establish a prima facie
    case under § 194(1). See text accompanying notes 98–101, post.
           84   See Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at. 196; Belfi, 

.

             The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as amicus curiae, argues
    that the District Court improperly conflated the burdens imposed by the EPA with
    those imposed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

 (1973), which
    applies to disparate-treatment claims under Title VII. The burden-shifting
    framework applicable to such claims does differ from the one applicable to EPA
    claims. See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 

, 309 n.7 (2d Cir. 2015)
    (recognizing the distinction); Md. Ins. Admin., 

 n.6 (same); Taylor v.
    White, 

 (8th Cir. 2003) (same). Under the McDonnell Douglas
    burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
    disparate treatment. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 

 (1981).
    If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer ‘to
    articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s’”
    disparate treatment. 

 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 

). If the
    employer carries its burden, “the plaintiff must then come forward with evidence
    that the defendants proffered, non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for
    actual discrimination.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 

 (2d Cir. 2000).

           Even if the District Court arguably conflated the burdens imposed by the
    EPA with those imposed by McDonnell Douglas, the “record” demonstrates that the
    Culinary Institute carried its burden under the EPA. Thyroff, 

; see text
    accompanying notes 85–88, post.




                                                 27
 1   order granting summary judgment for the Culinary Institute if it
 2   showed that there is no “genuine factual dispute” that the pay
 3   disparity was based on any factor except for sex. 85 We conclude that
 4   the Culinary Institute made such a showing.

 5         The Culinary Institute’s records regarding compensation leave
 6   no room for “genuine factual dispute.” 86 As both parties agree, the pay
 7   disparity resulted entirely from (1) disparate starting salaries and (2)
 8   the formulaic application of the compensation plan, which it also
 9   applied uniformly to other faculty members, male and female. The
10   terms of the compensation plan are sex neutral. In addition, the
11   Culinary Institute provided undisputed explanations for its fixed-
12   dollar pay increases: The raises recognized the skill, experience, or
13   added value associated with additional degrees or academic
14   promotions. The Culinary Institute’s justification produces neither a
15   whiff of pretext nor anything else to raise a jury’s doubt or suspicion.
16   As it happens, Eisenhauer never even argues that the compensation
17   has any basis in sex. Her appeal rests entirely on a misinterpretation
18   of the term “factor other than sex.”




           85   Anderson, 

.
           86   

                                             28
 1          In short, no “reasonable jury” 87 could find that the pay disparity
 2   was based on sex, intentionally or otherwise. 88 Accordingly, we affirm
 3   the decision of the District Court as to Eisenhauer’s EPA claim.

 4     B. New York Labor Law’s “Factor Other Than Sex” Or “Status”
 5                                             Defense

 6          Turning next to New York’s equal-pay law, New York Labor
 7   Law § 194(1), we consider whether its catch-all exception includes a
 8   job-relatedness requirement. We conclude that it does.

 9          In some respects, the EPA and § 194(1) are similar. Like the
10   EPA, § 194(1) prohibits pay discrimination on the basis of sex. Until
11   October 2019, it provided that

12          [n]o employee [would] be paid a wage at a rate less than
13          the rate at which an employee of the opposite sex in the
14          same establishment [was] paid for equal work on a job
15          the performance of which require[d] equal skill, effort
16          and responsibility, and which [was] performed under
17          similar working conditions. 89




            87   Id.
            88 See Ryduchowski, 

 (“[T]he EPA does not require a plaintiff
     to establish an employer’s discriminatory intent.”).
            89   

(1) (2016) (effective until Oct. 8, 2019).




                                                 29
 1   Since October 2019, it has prohibited pay discrimination on the basis
 2   of “status within one or more protected class or classes” instead of
 3   “sex.” 90

 4          Section 194(1) also similarly sets forth four exceptions to its
 5   prohibition. Before January 2016, the statute excluded pay disparities
 6   “made pursuant to a differential based on: (a) a seniority system; (b)
 7   a merit system; (c) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
 8   quality of production; or (d) any other factor other than sex.” 91 New
 9   York State’s legislature then amended the fourth exception from “any
10   other factor other than sex” to “a bona fide factor other than sex,” 92
11   and later, to “a bona fide factor other than status within one or more
12   protected class or classes.” 93

13          Despite their similarities, the EPA and § 194(1) differ in at least
14   one key respect. Since January 2016, § 194(1) has required the “bona

            90 Id. § 194(1) (2019) (effective Oct. 8, 2019). In addition, the provision now
     covers both “equal work on a job the performance of which requires equal skill,
     effort and responsibility, and which is performed under similar working
     conditions” and “substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill,
     effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.” Id.
            91  

(1) (1966) (emphasis added) (effective until Aug. 18,
     1980); 

 § 194(1) (1980) (emphasis added) (effective until Jan. 19, 2016).
            92   

 (emphasis added).
            93   

 (emphasis added).

             The recent amendments to § 194(1) are not retroactive. See Thomas v.
     Bethlehem Steel Corp., 

 (N.Y. 1984) (“An amendment will in
     general have prospective effect only, unless its language indicates that it should
     receive a contrary interpretation.”).




                                              30
 1   fide factor other than sex” or “status” to “be job-related with respect to
 2   the position in question.” 94 As we have explained, the EPA’s “factor
 3   other than sex” defense imposes no such requirement. By contrast,
 4   under New York Labor Law § 194(1), to establish the “factor other
 5   than sex” or “status” defense, a defendant must prove that the pay
 6   disparity in question results from a differential based on a job-related
 7   factor.

 8          The District Court evaluated Eisenhauer’s EPA and § 194(1)
 9   claims “under the same standard.” 95 Until January 2016, this approach
10   may have been the proper one. 96 Since at least January 2016, however,
11   the relevant standards have differed at least because § 194(1) has
12   included a job-relatedness requirement. Neither Eisenhauer nor the
13   Culinary Institute identified or acknowledged this difference before
14   the District Court. 97 The District Court thus understandably

            94  

(1) (2016) (emphasis added) (effective until Oct. 8,
     2019); 

 § 194(1) (2019) (emphasis added) (effective Oct. 8, 2019).
            95   J.A. 270 (quoting Moccio, 

).
            96See Talwar v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 

, 30 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015)
     (summary order) (“An equal pay claim under New York Labor Law § 194 is
     analyzed under the same standards applicable to the federal Equal Pay Act.”
     (quoting Pfeiffer v. Lewis Cnty., 

, 98 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. 2004))).
            97 On appeal, Eisenhauer also fails to identify any difference between the
     EPA and New York’s equal-pay law. We may nevertheless exercise our discretion
     to consider the standard under which to evaluate § 194(1) claims. See generally
     United States v. Gomez, 

 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We are ‘more likely to exercise
     our discretion (1) where consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest
     injustice or (2) where the issue is purely legal and there is no need for additional
     fact-finding.’” (quoting Baker v. Dorfman, 

 (2d Cir. 2000))).




                                                31
 1   overlooked it. Nonetheless, we hold that the District Court did not
 2   consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and New
 3   York Labor Law § 194(1) when assessing Eisenhauer’s claims and the
 4   Culinary Institute’s affirmative defense. The District Court should
 5   have assessed Eisenhauer’s § 194(1) claim as altogether distinct from
 6   her EPA one.

 7          We therefore vacate the order granting summary judgment as
 8   to Eisenhauer’s § 194(1) claim and remand the cause for the District
 9   Court to decide whether to invoke its discretion to exercise
10   supplemental jurisdiction over that state-law claim. 98 If it decides to
11   exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, it must assess Eisenhauer’s
12   § 194(1) claim anew. In doing so, it must consider whether
13   (1) Eisenhauer established a prima facie case under § 194(1) 99 and
14   (2) the Culinary Institute showed that there is no “genuine factual
15   dispute” 100 that its compensation plan is job related. 101



            98 See generally 

(c) (“The district courts may decline to
     exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state-law] claim . . . if . . . the district
     court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”).
            99   See note 83, ante.
            100   Anderson, 

.
            101A pay disparity between Eisenhauer and Perillo existed in 2011 and 2012
     and has persisted since 2017. See note 5 and accompanying text, ante. Since the New
     York State legislature only imposed a job-relatedness requirement in 2016, the
     District Court need not consider whether the compensation plan was job related in
     2011 and 2012. The Culinary Institute has established its affirmative defense as to
     the pay disparities in 2011 and 2012.




                                               32
 1                            IV. CONCLUSION

 2         To summarize, we hold as follows:

 3         (1) Under the Equal Pay Act, 

(d), to establish a
 4            “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove
 5            only that the pay disparity in question results from a
 6            differential based on any factor except for sex.
 7
 8         (2) The defendant showed that there is no genuine factual
 9            dispute that its sex-neutral compensation plan—which
10            incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—is a “factor
11            other than sex” that justifies the pay disparity between the
12            plaintiff and her male colleague.

13         (3) Under New York Labor Law § 194(1), to establish the “factor
14            other than sex” or “status” defense, a defendant must prove
15            that the pay disparity in question results from a differential
16            based on a job-related factor.

17         (4) The District Court did not consider the divergent
18            requirements imposed by the EPA and § 194(1) when
19            assessing the claims and affirmative defense presented.

20         For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART insofar as the
21   District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
22   EPA claim. We VACATE IN PART and REMAND insofar as the
23   District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
24   § 194(1) claim.




                                       33
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment:

      I concur in the majority’s decision to vacate and remand the grant of
summary judgment to the Defendant-Appellee Culinary Institute of America
(“CIA”) on Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Eisenhauer’s state law claim pursuant to
New York’s equal pay law, which requires that a defendant seeking to prove that
a pay disparity results from a “bona fide factor other than [sex]” show that the
factor is “job-related” and “consistent with business necessity.” 

(1)(b)(iv)(B). Given this statutory language, which is facially distinct from the
analogous provision of the federal Equal Pay Act, see 

(d)(1)(iv), the
district court erred in assuming that Eisenhauer’s state and federal claims may be
evaluated under the same standard.

      I write separately because, though I concur in the majority’s disposition of
Eisenhauer’s federal Equal Pay Act claim, I respectfully cannot join in the
majority’s statement that to establish an affirmative defense under § 206(d)(1)(iv)
of the Act, an employer may rely on a differential based on literally any factor
except for sex. That reading of the statute contradicts our prior precedents as well
as the statute’s plain meaning. As this Court held more than three decades ago, a
basis for a differential “may qualify under the factor-other-than-sex defense only
when [it is] based on legitimate business-related considerations.”         Aldrich v.
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 

 (2d Cir. 1992). I decline to join the
majority in abandoning this long-standing interpretation of the Act here.

                                          I

      In the years following World War II, the United States faced a “serious and
endemic” problem—a “wage structure” in which men were “paid more” than
women although their “duties [were] the same.” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,




                                          1


 (1974) (quoting S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963)). 1
The problem was a complicated one, emerging from “ancient but outmoded
belief[s]” about men and women’s respective “role[s] in society.” 

 Despite this
complexity, Congress’s “solution . . . was quite simple in principle: to require that
‘equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.’” 

 (quoting S. Rep. No. 176).
Hence, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 

(d), was enacted. 

       To effectuate its end, the EPA empowers a plaintiff to recover damages
when paid less than colleagues of the opposite sex who performed “equal work.”

(d)(1), (3). To constitute “equal work,” a job must “require[] equal
skill, effort, and responsibility.” 

 § 206(d)(1). “[T]he EPA does not require” a
plaintiff to provide “proof of intentional discrimination.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 

 (2007). Rather, an employer is found to be
presumptively liable once the plaintiff makes an initial showing of unequal pay.
Corning Glass, 

. The majority assumes that Eisenhauer has made out
this prima facie showing based on the pay disparity between herself and one of her
colleagues, Robert Perillo, and I do the same.

       The Act also creates an affirmative defense for an employer who can prove
that an otherwise unlawful pay gap is due to “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 

(d)(1). Only the fourth affirmative defense—sometimes referred to as
the “catchall” exception—is at issue in this case. Corning Glass, 

.
Specifically, the CIA argues that it is relieved of any liability by the catchall
exception on account of the fact that the persistent pay differential between
Eisenhauer and Perillo is the result of a formulaic compensation plan, established
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, which provides for fixed-dollar



       1 Unless otherwise indicated, this opinion omits all internal citations, quotation marks,
alterations, and footnotes from citations.


                                               2
increases in compensation upon the attainment of certain promotions or academic
degrees as well as across-the-board annual percentage increases.

      Addressing whether the CIA can take refuge within the bounds of the fourth
exception requires considering the defense’s scope. As is always the case, we
begin with the text, considering “not only . . . the language itself,” but also “the
specific context in which [the] language is used[] and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” Yates v. United States, 

, 537 (2015) (plurality
opinion). Here, the affirmative defense permits reliance on “any other factor other
than sex,” 

(d)(1)(iv),” a somewhat cumbersome linguistic construct.
At its heart is the phrase “any other,” which conveys its reference to a thing
“specified or understood contextually.” See Other, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(3d ed. 2004). Thus, to understand the reach of the fourth defense, we must look
to the defenses with which it appears—the exceptions for seniority, merit, and
production, respectively.

      That the fourth defense’s “catchall” must be construed in light of these three
specific defenses derives further support from the familiar linguistic canons. Most
pertinent is the canon of ejusdem generis, which provides that “where, as here, a
more general term follows more specific terms in a list, the general term is usually
understood to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
by the preceding specific words.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 

(2018). “The principle of ejusdem generis essentially . . . implies the addition of
similar after the word other.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 199 (2012) (emphasis in original); see also In
re Bush Terminal Co., 

 (2d Cir. 1938) (“The words ‘other’ or ‘any
other’ following an enumeration of particular classes ought to be read as ‘other
such like’ and to include only those of like kind or character.”). Thus, for example,
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, which lists “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 

 (emphasis
added), to include only transportation workers, not workers in literally any

                                          3
industry. See 

, 114–15 (2001). 2 Likewise, it follows that “any other
factor other than sex” in the catchall exception should be read to extend to factors
similar to the three enumerated—and not literally any other factor. 3

       So what then is the common feature that unites the three specific exceptions?
Seniority rewards an employee for her “heightened value” to her employer
accrued through “personal work experiences” over time.                      Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Pfeifer, 

 (1983). Merit rewards greater ability. And quality
and quantity of production reward the employee’s output. Each of these defenses
allows an employee to be paid more when proximate measures indicate she is
“more valuable to [her] employer”—that is, when her value as an employee
exceeds merely fulfilling the minimum qualifications to perform her job. 

 Three
decades ago, this Court, relying in part on the Act’s legislative history, offered a
somewhat broader gloss, stating that a basis for a differential “may qualify under


       2 As this example makes clear, the presence of the word “any”—which the majority relies
on to give the fourth defense a more expansive reach—does not weigh against the application of
the principle of ejusdem generis. The majority also suggests the canon is inappropriate in light of
the Supreme Court’s characterization of this defense as a “catch-all.” Majority at 18 (quoting
Corning Glass Works, 

). But the canon applies precisely “when a drafter has tacked
on a catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 199.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court regularly applies the canon to narrow what it characterizes as a
“catchall” exception. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp., 

 (“[T]here is no textually sound
reason to suppose the final catchall term should bear such a radically different object than all its
predecessors.” (emphasis added)).
       3   While similarly arriving at its conclusion regarding the not unlimited scope of the fourth
defense, the Ninth Circuit relied both on the canon of ejusdem generis and its cousin canon, noscitur
a sociis, which teaches that “a word is to be understood by the company it keeps.” Yates, 574 U.S.
at 543; see Rizo v. Yovino, 

 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“Other well-settled rules of
statutory construction reinforce the conclusion that the fourth affirmative defense includes factors
of the same type as the ones Congress specifically identified. The first is the noscitur a sociis canon
. . . .”). However, “[a]lthough judges often use these two Latin canons interchangeably, it is
ejusdem generis (rather than noscitur a sociis) that more squarely applies to figure out how to read
[a] general term at the end of [a] series.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER
ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 77 (2016).



                                                  4
the factor-other-than-sex defense only when [it is] based on legitimate business-
related considerations.” Aldrich, 

; see also Belfi v. Prendergast, 

 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]o successfully establish the ‘factor other than sex’
defense, an employer must also demonstrate that it had a legitimate business
reason for implementing the gender-neutral factor that brought about the wage
differential.”). While I can postulate adopting a narrower construction of the
statute’s language, it is not clear to me that this more general interpretation is
mistaken. 4

        “[T]his level of generality question” is typical when applying the ejusdem
generis canon, with one identified “commonality” perhaps offering a “tighter fit
with the . . . specific items . . . on the list” while another “dovetails [more neatly]
with statutory purpose.” ESKRIDGE, supra, at 78. Not surprisingly, although most
of our sister circuits to address the scope of the catchall have adopted a limiting
interpretation—like Aldrich’s—focused on the employer’s legitimate business
interests, the exact contours have differed.                 Compare Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. J.C. Penney Co., 

 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he ‘factor other
than sex’ defense does not include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a
minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.”), and Riser v. QEP
Energy, 

 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[A] classification system serves as a

        4 Indeed, I tend to agree that the legislative history, to the extent it is relevant, marshals in
favor of the Aldrich Court’s broader reading of the catchall to include all business-related reasons.
In particular, the House Report on the EPA bill—which the majority selectively quotes for the
proposition that the fourth defense is a “broad general exclusion”—identifies a number of
examples of “exceptions” that would fall within the catchall, which primarily consist of job-
related differences, such as “shift differentials, restrictions on or differences based on time of day
worked, hours of work, lifting or moving heavy objects, differences based on experience, training,
or ability,” but also include “certain special circumstances, such as ‘red circle rates.’” H.R. Rep.
No. 88-309, at 3 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689. “[R]ed circle rates” refers to
when an employer moves employees to “less demanding jobs but . . . continues[] to pay them a
premium rate in order to have them available when they are again needed for their former jobs.”

 Notably, the Supreme Court seems to have recognized that “red circle rates” may, in some
circumstances, fall within the “factor other than sex” defense, see Corning Glass, 

,
and the EPA’s implementing regulations provide for the same, see 

.

                                                   5
defense only where any resulting difference in pay is ‘rooted in legitimate
business-related differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the
particular positions at issue.’” (quoting Aldrich, 

)), with Glenn v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 

 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the “‘factor other
than sex’ exception applies when the disparity results from unique characteristics
of the same job; from an individual’s experience, training, or ability; or from
special exigent circumstances connected with the business”), and Rizo, 

 (“[W]e conclude that the fourth affirmative defense comprises only job-
related factors, not sex.”).

      In the decades since the EPA’s enactment, cases have arisen that have
required parsing these differing standards, see Rizo, 

 (discussing
the “circuit split” on the use of “prior pay as an affirmative defense to a prima facie
EPA claim”). But fortunately, this is not such a case. That is because, even when
adopting a narrow reading of the factor-other-than-sex defense, it is clear that the
district court here did not err in awarding the defendant summary judgment.

      As neither party disputes, the pay disparity between Eisenhauer and Perillo
is a function of two factors: their starting salaries and the CIA’s formulaic system
of raises. When Eisenhauer was hired in 2002, she was offered a starting salary of
$50,000 based on her resume, job application, and interview performance. Six
years later, Perillo was hired at a starting salary of $70,000, which—when adjusted
to account for annual pay increases—exceeded Eisenhauer’s starting salary by
approximately $6,000. As Eisenhauer acknowledges, this difference reflected
Perillo’s formal culinary training and his exemplary performance during the mock
lecture and cooking demonstration portions of his interview.

      Once hired, both Eisenhauer and Perillo took advantage of the opportunities
provided by the CIA’s compensation plan to increase their annual pay. Both
progressed through the ranks and obtained the title of “Professor,” and both
attained bachelor’s and master's degrees. When combined with the annual across-
the-board raises, these salary enhancements were substantial: Eisenhauer earned


                                           6
approximately $115,000 in 2020, while Perillo earned approximately $122,000 that
year. Nevertheless, a pay gap has persisted—roughly $7,000 in 2020—largely as a
remnant of their differences in starting salary.

      Eisenhauer asserts no illegality with regard to her and Perillo’s respective
starting salaries, acknowledging that the differential was lawfully premised on
Perillo’s greater educational experience and interview performance.            In that
regard, this case is unlike those in which a defendant has been found in violation
of the EPA for relying on a facially neutral compensation system that
“perpetuate[d] the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice[s].” Corning
Glass, 

. Nevertheless, Eisenhauer argues that the CIA’s system of
formulaic increases from a starting salary fails to account for the possibility that
any differences in qualifications that justified a pay disparity at the moment of
hiring may well have dissipated over time. In essence, she argues that the CIA’s
compensation system is unlawful because it fails to include any mechanism for
adjusting an employee’s pay based on an individualized assessment of her merit.

      But the EPA demands no such individualized assessment. To the contrary,
the affirmative defenses found in the statute contemplate reliance in setting pay
on proxies for an employee’s value to the employer, such as seniority, which may
well fail to align with what a more particularized evaluation of an employee’s
worth might dictate. See 

(d)(1). Here, the CIA utilized a system
that formulaically increased each instructor’s pay in a way that depended on the
attainment of certain objective criteria—namely, promotions or academic
degrees—that the CIA used to identify those instructors positioned to add greater
value to the institution.

      Such a system falls squarely within the scope of § 206(d)(1)(iv)’s exception
for “any other factor other than sex.” And because Eisenhauer makes no argument
that this facially neutral system of pay raises perpetuates an initially unlawful
disparity, it follows that she has failed to make out a viable claim. See Hein v.
Oregon Coll. of Educ., 

 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[S]alary differentials based


                                          7
on unequal starting salaries do not violate the Equal Pay Act if the employer can
show that the original disparity was based on a legitimate factor other than sex.”).
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that we should affirm the district court’s
award of summary judgment to the CIA—though I do so on narrower grounds.

                                          II

      Rather than follow the straight path through the statute’s text and our
precedent, the majority wipes the slate clean and devises a new interpretation of
the EPA’s factor-other-than-sex defense that would permit an employer to rely on
a differential based on literally any factor except for sex—or at least any factor that
would not function as a “‘loophole[]’ that would sanction sex-based pay
discrimination.” Majority at 16 n. 48 (quoting Aldrich, 

). This
conclusion, the majority argues, is demanded by the “unambiguous” text of the
statute. Id. at 15. I am unconvinced. As set forth in the previous section, a careful
reading of the statute suggests § 206(d)(1)(iv)’s “catchall” exception ought to be
read more narrowly in light of the specific exceptions that precede it. But even if
this were not the case, I would still have concerns that would prevent me from
joining the majority’s opinion in full.

      First, the majority’s opinion is in substantial tension with —if not outright
violation of—our rule that “[a] panel is bound to adhere to the earlier precedent of
this Court in the absence of a decision by the Supreme Court or an en banc panel
of this Court calling that precedent into question.” Oneida Indian Nation of New
York v. Cnty. of Oneida, 

 (2d Cir. 2010). In Aldrich, we explicitly
rejected the unbounded interpretation adopted by the majority here, holding that
an employer could not rely on its use of a “facially neutral civil service examination
and classification system [merely] because it was literally a factor other than sex,”
instead requiring that the system “ha[d] some grounding in legitimate business
considerations.” 963 F.2d at 526–27. The majority responds by suggesting that
Aldrich was a narrow case about job classification systems and should not be read
more broadly. Maybe so—though I have my doubts. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim


                                          8
Henson Prods., Inc., 

 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Dictum” refers only to “a
statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding”).

      Regardless, our subsequent precedents have declined to adopt such a
narrow reading, instead explaining time and again that a “legitimate business
reason” is necessary to establish any “factor other than sex.” Belfi, 

;
see also Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 1995) (“An employer who
attempts to justify a pay differential based on a ‘factor other than sex’ must also
prove that the gender-neutral factor was adopted for a legitimate business
reason.”); see also Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 

 (2d Cir. 2003)
(summary order) (same). As I suggested above, there may well be genuine
questions regarding the exact contours of the factor-other-than-sex exception
found in § 206(d)(1)(iv), questions that are not fully answered by our prior
precedent demanding a “legitimate business reason.” But I see no ambiguity in
our precedent that would permit the interpretation the majority adopts here.

      Second, I fear the majority’s novel “loophole” test for policing the bounds
of the EPA’s exceptions may fail to provide sufficiently meaningful guidance to
future litigants, creating uncertainty for both employees and employers. The
majority states that while a defendant may cite any factor except for sex to establish
a § 206(d)(1)(iv) defense, a court assessing such a defense must do so with an eye
towards    “avoid[ing]    ‘loopholes’   that   would     sanction   sex-based     pay
discrimination.” Majority at 16 n. 48 (quoting Aldrich, 

). But how
does a court recognize such a “loophole”? The majority’s opinion gives little
guidance. Rather than offer some principle for identifying a “loophole” in the
statute, the majority confines to a footnote a list of five examples, taken from cases
and regulations, of impermissible factors—noting however that the “list is not
necessarily exhaustive.” 

 Thus, having identified a non-exhaustive set of dots,
the majority leaves to the reader the work of connecting them.




                                          9
      In essence, the majority tasks the employer with proving some ill-defined
negative—that deeming its compensation system lawful would not “sanction sex-
based pay discrimination.” Majority at 16 n. 48. In contrast, the Aldrich test
identifies a positive characteristic of the system that the employer must prove—
namely that it is justified by a “legitimate business reason”—in order to avoid
liability. Belfi, 

. The Aldrich test thus renders the factor-other-than-
sex defense akin to the specifically enumerated exceptions—seniority, merit, and
production—which        similarly   identify   the   attributes   of   the   challenged
compensation system that the employer may point to in order to make out an
affirmative defense. See 

(d)(1). Such has been the law of this Circuit
(and many others) for decades and I am wary of abruptly changing course without
a clear direction forward.

      In sum, the majority breaks with our precedent and adopts a seemingly
broader reading of the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense that is out of step with
many of our sister circuits. It does so without clear support from the statute’s text,
and it does so unnecessarily—as I have explained, the present case fits neatly into
the scope of the factor-other-than-sex defense even narrowly construed.
Accordingly, as to the disposition of Eisenhauer’s EPA claim, I respectfully concur
only in the judgment.




                                          10