Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

22-76-cv (L)
Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                         ____________________________________

                                     August Term 2022
                                    Argued: May 3, 2023
                                 Decided: September 8, 2023

                         Docket Nos. 22-76-cv (L), 22-496-cv (Con)
                         ____________________________________

    MIRIAM FULD, INDIVIDUALLY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATOR
      OF THE ESTATE OF ARI YOEL FULD, DECEASED, AND AS NATURAL GUARDIAN OF
    PLAINTIFF NATAN SHAI FULD, NATAN SHAI FULD, MINOR, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND AND
     GUARDIAN MIRIAM FULD, NAOMI FULD, TAMAR GILA FULD, AND ELIEZER YAKIR
                                       FULD,

                                    Plaintiffs – Appellants,

                             UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                    Intervenor – Appellant,

                                            —v.—

  THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
(A/K/A “THE PALESTINIAN INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY,” AND/OR “THE
  PALESTINIAN COUNCIL,” AND/OR “THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY”),

                                 Defendants – Appellees. *
                          __________________________________

*   The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as set forth above.
     Before: LEVAL AND BIANCO, Circuit Judges, AND KOELTL, District Judge. **

       The plaintiffs, several family members of a United States citizen killed in an
overseas terrorist attack, appeal from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) dismissing their claims
against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian
Authority (“PA”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Government, as intervenor
in accordance with 

(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(c),
also appeals from that judgment. On appeal, both the plaintiffs and the
Government argue that the district court erred in finding unconstitutional the
Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”),

(c), 

, 3082, the statute on which the plaintiffs
relied to allege personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The PSJVTA specifically
provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed to have consented to personal
jurisdiction” in any civil action pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 

, irrespective of “the date of the occurrence of the act of international
terrorism” at issue, upon engaging in certain forms of post-enactment conduct,
namely (1) making payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of
incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or
killed a United States national, or (2) undertaking any activities within the United
States, subject to a handful of exceptions. 

 § 2334(e). We conclude that the
PSJVTA’s “deemed consent” provision is inconsistent with the dictates of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
______________

                           ALLON KEDEM, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,
                           Washington, D.C. (Kent A. Yalowitz, Avishai D. Don,
                           David C. Russell, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,
                           New York, NY, Dirk C. Phillips, Stephen K. Wirth,
                           Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C.,
                           Jeffrey Fleischmann, The Law Office of Jeffrey
                           Fleischmann, P.C., New York, NY, Samuel Silverman,



** Judge John G. Koeltl, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
                                           2
                 The Silverman Law Firm PLLC, New City, NY, on the
                 brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

                 MITCHELL R. BERGER, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP,
                 Washington, D.C. (Gassan A. Baloul, Squire Patton
                 Boggs (US) LLP, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for
                 Defendants-Appellees.

                 BENJAMIN H. TORRANCE, Assistant United States
                 Attorney, Of Counsel for Damian Williams, United States
                 Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New
                 York, NY (Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                 Attorney General, Sharon Swingle, Attorney, Appellate
                 Staff, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
                 Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Intervenor-Appellant
                 United States of America.

                 Tejinder Singh, Sparacino PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
                 Amici Curiae Abraham D. Sofaer and Louis J. Freeh in
                 Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Intervenor-Appellant.

                 J. Carl Cecere, Cecere PC, Dallas, TX, for Amici Curiae Sen.
                 Charles E. Grassley, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Rep. Jerrold
                 Nadler, Rep. Claudia Tenney, Rep. Bradley E. Schneider, Sen.
                 James Lankford, Sen. Marco Rubio, Rep. Kathleen Rice, Rep.
                 Lee Zeldin, Rep. Theodore Deutch, and Rep. Grace Meng in
                 Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Intervenor-Appellant.

                 Joshua E. Abraham, Abraham Esq. PLLC, New York, NY,
                 for Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars Philip C.
                 Bobbitt, Michael C. Dorf, and H. Jefferson Powell in Support
                 of Plaintiffs-Appellants.



______________



                                 3
KOELTL, District Judge:

      The plaintiffs, several family members of a United States citizen killed in an

overseas terrorist attack, appeal from a judgment of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) dismissing their claims

against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian

Authority (“PA”). The district court dismissed those claims for lack of personal

jurisdiction over the defendants. The Government, as intervenor in accordance

with 

(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(c), also appeals

from the judgment.

      At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the Promoting Security and

Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”), 

(c), 

, 3082, the federal statute on which the plaintiffs relied to

allege personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The PSJVTA was enacted for the

precise purpose of preventing dismissals based on lack of personal jurisdiction in

cases just like this one — civil actions against the PLO and the PA pursuant to the

Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 

, which provides a damages remedy

for United States nationals injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism,”

 § 2333(a).



                                         4
      Congress crafted the PSJVTA in response to a series of judicial decisions, all

arising out of civil ATA cases related to terrorist activity abroad, which held that

federal courts had no general or specific personal jurisdiction over the PLO and

the PA. The resulting statute reflects a legislative effort to create personal

jurisdiction over those entities based on alleged consent, which, when validly

given, may constitute an independent constitutional basis for subjecting a

nonresident defendant to litigation in a particular forum. The PSJVTA specifically

provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed to have consented to personal

jurisdiction in [any] civil [ATA] action,” irrespective of “the date of the occurrence

of the act of international terrorism” at issue, upon engaging in certain forms of

post-enactment conduct, namely (1) making payments, directly or indirectly, to

the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively,

whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertaking

any activities within the United States, subject to a handful of exceptions.

Id. § 2334(e).

      The district court determined that this “deemed consent” provision was an

unconstitutional attempt to create personal jurisdiction over the defendants where

none existed, and it accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs’ civil ATA action for lack



                                          5
of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2).

Both the plaintiffs and the Government (together, “appellants”) challenge that

conclusion on appeal, arguing principally that the exercise of this “deemed

consent” jurisdiction under the PSJVTA satisfies the Fifth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause.

      We conclude that the PSJVTA’s provision for “deemed consent” to personal

jurisdiction is inconsistent with the requirements of constitutional due process.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing this case.

                               I. BACKGROUND

      The plaintiffs are the widowed spouse and children of Ari Yoel Fuld, a

United States citizen who was fatally stabbed during a September 2018 terrorist

attack outside a shopping mall in the West Bank. In the aftermath of Fuld’s death,

the plaintiffs commenced this action against the PLO and the PA, alleging that

these defendants had “encouraged, incentivized, and assisted” the nonparty who

committed the attack on Fuld. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. The PA, established in 1993

pursuant to the Oslo Accords, is the non-sovereign and interim governing body of

parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (collectively referred to here as

“Palestine”). The PLO, an entity founded in 1964, conducts Palestine’s foreign



                                        6
affairs and serves as a Permanent Observer to the United Nations (“UN”) on behalf

of the Palestinian people. The plaintiffs seek monetary relief from both defendants

pursuant to the ATA, 

, which, as relevant here, provides

United States nationals “injured . . . by reason of an act of international terrorism”

with a civil damages remedy against “any person who aids and abets, by

knowingly providing substantial assistance [to],” the perpetrator of the attack.

 § 2333(a), (d)(2).

       Several years before these plaintiffs initiated their case, and prior to the

passage of the PSJVTA, this Court decided Waldman v. Palestine Liberation

Organization, 

 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Waldman I”), cert denied sub nom.

Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 

 (2018) (mem.), which

arose out of litigation involving civil ATA claims similar in key respects to those

asserted here. 1 The Waldman plaintiffs, a group of United States citizens injured

or killed during terror attacks in Israel and the estates or survivors of such citizens,

sued the PLO and the PA for money damages pursuant to the ATA, alleging that

the defendants had provided material support to the nonparties who carried out



1 The procedural history of the Waldman litigation (captioned Sokolow v. Palestine
Liberation Organization, No. 04-cv-397 (S.D.N.Y.) in the district court) is set forth in
greater detail in Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, ___ F.4th ___, No. 15-
3135 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (“Waldman III”) (per curiam), which we also decide today.
                                           7
the attacks. After more than a decade of litigation and a substantial jury verdict in

favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants filed their appeal in this Court, where they

reasserted their longstanding objection that the claims against them should be

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

      This Court ultimately agreed with the defendants, concluding that dismissal

was required because, notwithstanding the “unquestionably horrific” nature of

the attacks underlying the plaintiffs’ claims, “[t]he district court could not

constitutionally exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over the

defendants.” Waldman I, 

. We explained, as a threshold matter, that

while sovereign governments lack due process rights, “neither the PLO nor the PA

is recognized by the United States as a sovereign state,” and accordingly, both

defendants are entitled to due process protections. 

. Moreover, we noted

that our precedents established that the “due process analysis” in the personal

jurisdiction context “is basically the same under both the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments,” except that “under the Fifth Amendment the court can consider

the defendant’s contacts throughout the United States, while under the Fourteenth

Amendment only the contacts with the forum state may be considered.” 

 at 330

(quoting Chew v. Dietrich, 

, 28 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998)).



                                         8
      With these background principles in mind, we concluded that the district

court lacked general personal jurisdiction over the defendants “pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s recent decision” in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

 (2014),

because neither defendant’s contacts with the forum were “so constant and

pervasive as to render [it] essentially at home” in the United States. Waldman I,

, 335 (quoting Daimler, 

). We rejected the notion that

the defendants could be considered “essentially at home” in this country based on

their activities in Washington, D.C., which were “limited to maintaining an office

[there], promoting the Palestinian cause in speeches and media appearances, and

retaining a lobbying firm.” Id. at 333. Rather, both the PLO and the PA “are ‘at

home’ in Palestine, where these entities are headquartered and from where they

are directed.” Id. at 334 (citing Daimler, 

 n.20).

      This Court likewise held that the district court could not properly exercise

specific personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA, in view of the absence of

any “substantial connection” between “the defendants’ suit-related conduct —

their role in the six terror attacks at issue — [and] . . . the forum.” 

 at 335 (citing

Walden v. Fiore, 

 (2014)). We explained that the terrorist attacks

themselves took place outside the United States, that “the defendants’ [related]



                                            9
activities in violation of the ATA occurred outside the United States,” and that

none of these acts were “specifically targeted” or “expressly aimed” at the United

States. 

, 337–38. Indeed, the attacks in question were “random,” such that

they “affected United States citizens only because [those citizens] were victims of

indiscriminate violence . . . abroad.” 

. Thus, the actions for which the

defendants had been sued “were not sufficiently connected to the United States to

provide specific personal jurisdiction,” and the “limits prescribed by

[constitutional] due process” required that the case be dismissed. 

.

In a series of comparable cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusions. See Livnat v. Palestinian Auth.,

, 54–58 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding, in a civil ATA case arising out of

overseas terror attacks, that exercising general or specific jurisdiction over the PA

would not “meet the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause”), cert. denied, 

 (2018) (mem.); see also Shatsky v. Palestine

Liberation Org., 

, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (same as to both the PLO

and the PA); Est. of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 

, 1123–26 (D.C. Cir.

2019) (“Klieman”) (same), judgment vacated on other grounds, 

(2020) (mem.), opinion reinstated in part, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (mem.).



                                         10
      Congress responded to Waldman I and similar decisions with federal

legislation known as the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (“ATCA”), 

 Stat. 3183, which modified an existing ATA provision, 

, to include a new subsection (e) concerning the “[c]onsent of certain parties

to personal jurisdiction.” See ATCA § 4, 132 Stat. at 3184. This new subsection

provided that “regardless of the date of the occurrence of the act of international

terrorism upon which [a] civil action [pursuant to the ATA] was filed,” a

defendant would “be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in such

civil action if,” after more than 120 days following the ATCA’s enactment, the

defendant (1) “accept[ed]” certain “form[s] of assistance” from the United States,

or (2) “maintain[ed]” an office “within the jurisdiction of the United States” while

“benefiting from a waiver or suspension” of 

, a statutory

provision expressly barring the PLO from operating any such office. ATCA § 4,

132 Stat. at 3184.

      Before the expiration of the 120-day period, both the PLO and the PA

formally terminated their acceptance of any relevant assistance from the United

States, and the PLO shuttered its diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C. — its




                                        11
only office operating in the United States pursuant to a waiver of 

. 2

See Klieman, 923 F.3d at 1128–30.

       This Court subsequently denied a motion to recall the mandate in

Waldman I based on the ATCA, because neither of the statute’s “factual

predicates” for personal jurisdiction could be satisfied. Waldman v. Palestine

Liberation Org., 

, 574–75 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Waldman II”) (per curiam),

cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org.,

 (2020) (mem.). Around the same time, the D.C. Circuit Court of

Appeals made a similar finding. See Klieman, 

 (dismissing ATA




2The PLO had previously maintained this Washington, D.C. office pursuant to an express
waiver of 

, which expired around the time of the office’s closure. At that
point, no waivers or suspensions of this provision remained in effect. See Klieman, 

. The PLO has continued to operate its UN Permanent Observer Mission in
New York, but it does so without any need for a waiver or suspension of 

,
which forbids the PLO from “maintain[ing] an office . . . within the jurisdiction of the
United States.” 

(3); see Klieman, 923 F.3d at 1129–30. That statutory
prohibition “does not apply . . . to the PLO’s Mission in New York,” because the PLO’s
UN office falls beyond the jurisdiction of the United States in light of the UN
Headquarters Agreement. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione
Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 

 (2d Cir.
1991) (“[T]he PLO’s participation in the UN is dependent on the legal fiction that the UN
Headquarters is not really United States territory at all, but is rather neutral ground over
which the United States has ceded control.”); see also United States v. Palestine Liberation
Org., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The PLO Mission to the United Nations is
an invitee of the United Nations under the Headquarters Agreement and its status is
protected by that agreement.”).


                                            12
claims against the PLO and the PA for lack of personal jurisdiction and explaining,

in relevant part, that the ATCA’s “factual predicates” had not been “triggered”).

      While petitions for writs of certiorari from Waldman II and Klieman were

pending, Congress stepped in again, this time enacting the PSJVTA on December

20, 2019. See 

(c), 

, 3082 (2019). Section 903(c)

of the PSJVTA superseded the relevant portions of the ATCA, resulting in various

amendments to the personal jurisdiction provisions of 

(e). 3 133

Stat. at 3083–85. Those amendments included a narrowed definition of the term

“defendant,” which now refers exclusively to the PLO, the PA, and any

“successor[s]” or “affiliate[s]” thereof. 

(e)(5). In drafting the

PSJVTA, Congress also specified new post-enactment conduct that would be

“deemed” to constitute “consent” to personal jurisdiction in “any civil action”

under the ATA, “regardless of the date of the occurrence of the act of international

terrorism upon which such civil action was filed.” 

 § 2334(e)(1).




3The PSJVTA also includes a number of additional provisions, but only the jurisdictional
amendments of § 903(c) are at issue in this case. We do not pass on the constitutionality
of any portion of the PSJVTA other than § 903(c). However, for purposes of clarity, this
opinion refers to § 903(c) as the PSJVTA, which is consistent with the nomenclature used
in the district court’s decision and the parties’ briefs on appeal.
                                           13
      As amended pursuant to the PSJVTA, 

(e)(1) includes two

subparagraphs that list the circumstances under which “a defendant shall be

deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in a civil ATA case.

Subparagraph (A) provides, first, that a defendant “shall be deemed to have

consented” to such jurisdiction if, “after . . . 120 days” following the enactment of

the PSJVTA (that is, after April 18, 2020), the defendant “makes any payment,

directly or indirectly”:

      (i) to any payee designated by any individual who, after being fairly
      tried or pleading guilty, has been imprisoned for committing any act
      of terrorism that injured or killed a national of the United States, if
      such payment is made by reason of such imprisonment; or

      (ii) to any family member of any individual, following such
      individual's death while committing an act of terrorism that injured
      or killed a national of the United States, if such payment is made by
      reason of the death of such individual.

 § 2334(e)(1)(A). This subparagraph refers, in the words of other federal

legislation on the subject, to a “practice of paying salaries to terrorists serving in

Israeli prisons[] [and] to the families of deceased terrorists,” Taylor Force Act, 

, 

, 1143 (2018), which Congress has previously

condemned as “an incentive to commit acts of terror.” 

                                          14
      Subparagraph (B) of the PSJVTA provides that “a defendant shall be

deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in a civil ATA action if, “after

15 days” following the PSJVTA’s enactment (that is, after January 4, 2020), the

defendant “continues to maintain,” “establishes,” or “procures any office,

headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments in the United States,”

or otherwise “conducts any activity while physically present in the United States

on behalf of the [PLO] or the [PA].” 

(e)(1)(B). The PSJVTA exempts

“certain activities and locations” from the reach of subparagraph (B), including

facilities and activities devoted “exclusively [to] the purpose of conducting official

business of the United Nations,” 

 § 2334(e)(3)(A)–(B), specified activities related

to engagements with United States officials or legal representation, id.

§ 2334(e)(3)(C)–(E), and any “personal or official activities conducted ancillary to

activities listed” in these exceptions, id. § 2334(e)(3)(F).

      The PSJVTA includes a “rule[] of construction,” which provides that the

legislation’s terms “should be liberally construed to carry out the purposes of

Congress to provide relief for victims of terrorism.” PSJVTA § 903(d)(1)(A), 133

Stat. at 3085. Congress also specified that the PSJVTA “shall apply to any case




                                           15
pending on or after August 30, 2016,” id. § 903(d)(2), 133 Stat. at 3085, referring to

the date just one day before this Court’s decision in Waldman I.

      On April 27, 2020, several months after the PSJVTA’s enactment, the

Supreme Court granted certiorari in Waldman II and Klieman, vacated both

judgments, and remanded the cases “for further consideration in light of the

[PSJVTA].” Sokolow, 

; see Klieman, 

. Three days

later, on April 30, 2020, the plaintiffs commenced this action. The plaintiffs

invoked the PSJVTA as the sole basis for personal jurisdiction, and their amended

complaint alleged that both prongs of the statute’s “deemed consent” provision

had been satisfied. With respect to the first prong, the plaintiffs alleged that, after

April 18, 2020, the defendants continued an existing practice of making payments

to (1) the designees of incarcerated terrorists who were fairly convicted of attacks

that killed or injured United States nationals, and (2) the families of deceased

terrorists who died while committing attacks that killed or injured United States

nationals. See 

(e)(1)(A). For the second prong, the plaintiffs alleged

that, after January 4, 2020, the defendants (1) used an office maintained in the

United States, namely their UN Permanent Observer Mission in New York City,

for purposes other than official UN business, and (2) engaged in various activities



                                          16
on their own behalf while in the United States, including providing consular

services, holding press conferences, and publishing various online and print

materials designed to influence American foreign policy. See 

 § 2334(e)(1)(B).

      The PLO and the PA moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint

for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), respectively. In connection with

their Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the

PSJVTA, arguing that the statute’s provision for “deemed consent” to personal

jurisdiction violated due process requirements. The district court certified this

constitutional challenge to the United States Attorney General, and the

Government intervened in the action to defend the PSJVTA. See 

(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1.

      In a January 6, 2022 decision, the district court granted the defendants’ Rule

12(b)(2) motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not validly exercise personal

jurisdiction under the PSJVTA’s “deemed consent” provision. See Fuld v. Palestine

Liberation Org., 

, 580, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). The court noted at

the outset that “a defendant’s knowing and voluntary consent, whether express or

implied,” can serve as an “independent” basis for personal jurisdiction, separate



                                          17
and apart from “general jurisdiction[] . . . [and] specific jurisdiction.” 

.

Moreover, the court observed that the PLO and the PA did “not dispute” the

plaintiffs’ allegation that they had made payments triggering the PSJVTA’s first

“deemed consent” prong. 4 

. Nevertheless, the district court concluded

that “deemed consent” under the PSJVTA could not “constitutionally provide for

personal jurisdiction over [the] [d]efendants.” 

. The court reasoned that

the predicate activities under the PSJVTA do not “even remotely signal[] approval

or acceptance of,” or an “inten[t] to submit to,” jurisdiction in the United States,

 (internal quotation marks omitted), that the statute “push[es] the concept of

consent well beyond its breaking point,” 

, and that “legislature[s] [cannot]

simply create [personal] jurisdiction out of whole cloth by deeming any conduct

[whatsoever] to be ‘consent,’” 

. In short, the district court concluded that

“deemed consent jurisdiction” under the PSJVTA is not “consistent with the




4The defendants did, however, “contest [the] [p]laintiffs’ allegations that the PSJVTA’s
second ‘deemed consent’ prong ha[d] been met.” Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 583 n.3. The
defendants argued that to the extent they had conducted activities within the United
States after the relevant post-enactment date, all of those activities fell within the
exceptions for UN-related undertakings and “ancillary” conduct. 

(e)(3).
In light of its finding that “the PSJVTA’s first prong ha[d] been met,” the district court
declined to consider “whether [the] [d]efendants’ conduct also implicate[d] the second
prong.” Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 583 n.3. It is also unnecessary to address that question
on this appeal.
                                           18
requirements of due process,” and accordingly, the action had to be dismissed for

lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

      The district court entered final judgment on January 7, 2022. Both the

plaintiffs and the Government timely appealed.

                                II. DISCUSSION

      We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction de

novo, construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and

resolving all doubts in the plaintiffs’ favor. V&A Collection, LLC v. Guzzini Props.

Ltd., 

 (2d Cir. 2022). Likewise, we review de novo questions of

law, including challenges to the constitutionality of a statute. United States v.

Wasylyshyn, 

 (2d Cir. 2020).

      “Before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, three

requirements must be met: (1) ‘the plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant

must have been procedurally proper’; (2) ‘there must be a statutory basis for

personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective’; and (3) ‘the

exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process

principles.’” Schwab Short-Term Bond Mkt. Fund v. Lloyds Banking Grp. PLC, 

, 121 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Waldman I, 835 F.3d at 327–28). In this case,

the parties do not dispute that the first and second requirements were waived and
                                         19
satisfied, respectively. 5 See Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 583. We therefore consider only

the third requirement — “whether jurisdiction over the defendants may be

exercised consistent with the Constitution.” Waldman I, 

.

      The principle that a court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant

“recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest” flowing from the

Constitution’s guarantees of due process. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee, 

 (1982). As we explained in Waldman I, that

principle extends to both the PLO and the PA, each of whom enjoys a due process

right “to be subject only to [a court’s] lawful power.” 835 F.3d at 328–29 (citing

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 

 (2011) (plurality opinion)). In

particular, constitutional due process ensures that a court will exercise personal

jurisdiction over a defendant only if “the maintenance of the suit does not offend

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 

 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 

(1940)). The Supreme Court’s precedents discussing that requirement, including

its canonical opinion in International Shoe, have arisen under the Due Process



5Specifically, the defendants “waived any defenses regarding proper service of process,”
and with respect to the second requirement, the defendants do not dispute that they
“made payments” sufficient to satisfy the PSJVTA’s first statutory prong for “deemed
consent.” Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 583.
                                          20
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment — a constraint on the power of state

tribunals. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Int’l Shoe, 

. But

we have previously explained that the personal jurisdiction analysis is “basically

the same” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which limits the

power of the federal courts and governs the inquiry here. 6 Waldman I, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.

      The Supreme Court has recognized three distinct bases for exercising

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-forum defendant in accordance with the

dictates of due process: general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, and consent. See,

e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

, 472–73 & 472 n.14 (1985);

J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. at 880–81 (plurality opinion). The first two bases,

“general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes

called case-linked) jurisdiction,” “giv[e] content” to the holding of International

Shoe, which established that a court may hear claims against a defendant who has

not submitted to its authority only where the defendant has certain “contacts”




6As noted above, the “principal difference” between these due process standards arises
in the context of a minimum-contacts inquiry: the analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment is limited to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, while the Fifth
Amendment permits consideration of the defendant’s contacts with the United States as
a whole. Waldman I, 

 (citing Chew, 

 n.4).
                                          21
with the forum. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 

(2021); see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 

, 923–

24 (2011); Int’l Shoe, 

. General jurisdiction, as its name suggests,

allows a court to hear “any and all claims” against a defendant — but, for

businesses and organizations, only when that defendant is “essentially at home”

in the forum. Ford, 

 (quoting Goodyear, 

); see

Daimler, 

. Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, covers a “narrower class

of claims,” Ford, 

, and depends “on the relationship among the

defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” Walden, 

 (internal

quotation marks omitted). In particular, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction

if the defendant has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum,” Hanson v. Denckla, 

 (1958), or if the

defendant has intentionally directed wrongdoing at the forum, Calder v. Jones,

 (1984). Even then, the court’s authority is limited solely to claims

that “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum contacts. Ford, 

 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 

(2017)); see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73.




                                         22
      Neither of those two bases for personal jurisdiction is at issue here. In the

proceedings before the district court, the plaintiffs never argued for general or

specific jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA. Nor do they contest the district

court’s conclusion that “[a]ny such argument would be foreclosed by . . .

Waldman I.” Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 584. Instead, the plaintiffs rely exclusively

on consent, the third independent basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over

an out-of-forum defendant. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

; Burger King,

 & n.14. The plaintiffs contend that the PLO and the PA are deemed

to have consented to personal jurisdiction in this civil ATA action pursuant to the

PSJVTA, because engaging in the statute’s predicate conduct amounts to

“implied” or “constructive” consent. See, e.g., Pls.’ Br. at 13. Both the plaintiffs and

the Government argue that the PSJVTA establishes consent-based jurisdiction in

accordance with due process principles, and that the district court erred in

holding otherwise.

      We disagree. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the PSJVTA’s

“deemed consent” provision is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment. Because the statute does not establish a federal court’s

authority over the PLO and the PA consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s



                                          23
requirement of due process, this case against those defendants was properly

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

                                         A.

      Consent to personal jurisdiction is a voluntary agreement on the part of a

defendant to proceed in a particular forum. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.

Szukhent, 

 (1964) (a defendant “may agree . . . to submit to the

jurisdiction of a given court”); J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. at 880–81 (plurality

opinion) (“explicit consent” is among the “circumstances, or . . . course[s] of

conduct, from which it is proper to infer . . . an intention to submit to the laws of

the forum”); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 1990)

(“A defendant may voluntarily consent or submit to the jurisdiction of a court

which otherwise would not have jurisdiction over it.”). In several of its decisions,

including, most recently, Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 

(2023), the Supreme Court has explained why such consent suffices to establish

personal jurisdiction: “Because the [due process] requirement of personal

jurisdiction [is] first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be

waived.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

; see Burger King, 

 n.14

(“[T]he personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right[.]”); Mallory, 143 S.



                                         24
Ct. at 2043 (plurality opinion) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is a personal defense that

may be waived or forfeited.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 2051 (Alito, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“If a person voluntarily

waives th[e] [personal jurisdiction] right, that choice should be honored.”). Thus,

when a defendant has validly consented to personal jurisdiction, a court may

exercise authority over that defendant in conformity with the Due Process Clause,

even in the absence of general or specific jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mallory, 143 S. Ct.

at 2039 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “consent can . . . ground personal

jurisdiction” apart from a defendant’s forum contacts (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Knowlton, 

.

      The Supreme Court has recognized a “variety of legal arrangements [that]

have been taken to represent express or implied consent” to personal jurisdiction

consistent with due process. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

; see Mallory, 143

S. Ct. at 2038 n.5 (majority opinion). For example, a defendant’s consent to

personal jurisdiction may be implied based on litigation-related conduct, or where

a defendant accepts a benefit from the forum in exchange for its amenability to suit

in the forum’s courts. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703–05; Mallory,

143 S. Ct. at 2033 (majority opinion); id. at 2041 n.8 (plurality opinion). In such



                                          25
cases, it is often fair and reasonable to infer the defendant’s voluntary agreement

to submit itself to a court’s authority. But consent cannot be found based solely on

a government decree pronouncing that activities unrelated to being sued in the

forum will be “deemed” to be “consent” to jurisdiction there. 

(e)(1); cf. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

 (distinguishing between

litigation-related conduct that establishes personal jurisdiction and “mere

assertions of . . . power” over a defendant (quoting Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry,

 (1917))). A prospective defendant’s activities do not signify consent

to personal jurisdiction simply because Congress has labeled them as such.

      Thus, while “[a] variety of legal arrangements . . . [may] represent . . .

consent to . . . personal jurisdiction,” id. at 703, the PSJVTA is not among them.

The PSJVTA’s provision for consent-based jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA,

in which Congress has “deemed” the continuation of certain conduct to constitute

“consent,” falls outside any reasonable construction of valid consent to proceed in

a particular forum’s courts.

                                         1.

      We begin with some of the “various ways” in which “consent may be

manifested,” either “by word or [by] deed.” Mallory, 143 S. Ct. at 2039 (plurality



                                         26
opinion). It is well-established that a defendant may expressly consent to personal

jurisdiction in a particular court by contract, usually through an agreed-upon

forum-selection clause. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703–04; see also

Szukhent, 

 (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in advance to submit

to the jurisdiction of a given court.”). So long as such “forum-selection provisions

have been obtained through ‘freely negotiated’ agreements and are not

‘unreasonable and unjust,’ their enforcement [against a defendant] does not offend

due process.” Burger King, 

 n.14 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-

Shore Co., 

 (1972)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 

 (1991) (“[F]orum selection clauses . . . are subject to judicial scrutiny

for fundamental fairness.”). Likewise, a court may exercise authority over a

defendant on the basis of express consent provided in a stipulation. See Ins. Corp.

of Ireland, 

; Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Sec. Co., 

 (1956)

(per curiam) (“[The] respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert a

lack of personal jurisdiction over it.”).

      The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a defendant may, in certain

circumstances, impliedly consent to personal jurisdiction through litigation-

related conduct. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703–05. Such conduct



                                            27
includes a defendant’s voluntary in-court appearance, see id. at 703, unless the

defendant has appeared for the limited purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction

(in which case, the defendant typically preserves the defense), see Mallory, 143 S.

Ct. at 2044 (plurality opinion). Moreover, in keeping with the principle that “[t]he

expression of legal rights is often subject to certain procedural rules,” a

defendant’s “failure to follow [such] rules” with regard to personal jurisdiction

may “result in a curtailment of [its] right[]” to enforce that requirement. Ins. Corp.

of Ireland, 

. “Thus, the failure to enter a timely objection to personal

jurisdiction constitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of the objection.” 

Similarly, a defendant’s failure to comply with certain pretrial orders concerning

jurisdictional discovery may justify a “sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) consisting

of a finding of personal jurisdiction.” 

 The Supreme Court has found that other

litigation activities can subject a litigant to personal jurisdiction as well. See, e.g.,

; Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 

 (1932). 7



7 Among these other examples, the only instances in which findings of “implied consent”
have been premised on a defendant’s omission are those where the defendant “fail[ed] to
follow” litigation rules and orders related to personal jurisdiction, Ins. Corp. of Ireland,

, and thereby “forfeited” — rather than waived — the defense. See,
e.g., City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 

, 133–34, 135 (2d Cir.
2011) (“Personal jurisdiction . . . can . . . be purposely waived or inadvertently forfeited.
. . . [A] defendant forfeits its jurisdictional defense if it appears before a district court to
press that defense but then willfully withdraws from the litigation and defaults[.]”);
                                              28
       The Supreme Court has also recognized that a prospective defendant may

be subject to personal jurisdiction if it has accepted a government benefit from the

forum, in return for which the defendant is required to submit itself to suit in the

forum. See Mallory, 143 S. Ct. at 2044 (plurality opinion) (explaining that personal

jurisdiction may exist where the defendant has “accept[ed] an in-state benefit with

jurisdictional strings attached”). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mallory

highlighted such an arrangement: Mallory approved the exercise of consent-based

jurisdiction pursuant to a state business registration statute that “require[d] an

out-of-state firm to answer any suits against it in exchange for status as a registered



Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 

, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Whereas forfeiture is
the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right. . . . [The defendant] participated in pretrial
proceedings but never moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction despite several
clear opportunities to do so during the four-year interval after filing its answer. These
circumstances establish a forfeiture.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). It
can be said that in failing to follow such rules or orders, a defendant effectively concedes
the issue. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

 (where noncompliance with
litigation rules and orders supports a “presumption of fact” as to the “want of merit in
the asserted [personal jurisdiction] defense,” “[t]he preservation of due process [is]
secured” (quoting Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 

, 350–51 (1909))).
While forfeiture of a personal jurisdiction defense may be the product of mistake or
inadvertence, rather than affirmative conduct evincing agreement, the Supreme Court
has counted such forfeitures among the “legal arrangements [that] have been taken to
represent . . . implied consent to . . . personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 703. But beyond these
forfeitures in the context of litigation, the existing precedent suggests that the conduct
necessary to support an inference of implied consent, whether related to the litigation or
not, must be some “intentional[]” act that can reasonably be construed as a waiver of the
personal jurisdiction requirement. Id. at 704.
                                             29
foreign corporation and the benefits that entails.” Id. at 2033 (majority opinion). A

plurality of the Justices noted that this sort of “exchange” between the defendant

and the forum — in other words, “consent to suit in exchange for access to a State’s

markets” — “can signal consent to jurisdiction” in at least some cases. Id. at 2041

n.8 (plurality opinion) (alterations adopted).

      The litigation-related activities or reciprocal bargains described above, just

like “explicit consent,” can supply a basis “from which it is proper to infer . . . an

intention to submit” to the forum, J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. at 880–81 (plurality

opinion), or are otherwise “of such a nature as to justify the fiction” of consent to

a court’s authority, Int’l Shoe, 

; see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

 (explaining, with regard to litigation conduct, that “due process [is]

secured” where the conduct supports a “presumption of fact” as to the existence

of personal jurisdiction). Under such circumstances, the assertion of consent-based

personal jurisdiction does “not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice,” and is therefore consistent with constitutional due process.

Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702–03 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 

).




                                          30
                                           2.

      The appellants argue that the PSJVTA’s “deemed consent” provision

subjects the PLO and the PA to personal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with

due process limits. But the statute’s terms are insufficient to establish the

defendants’ valid consent, either express or implied, to waive their constitutional

right not to be sued in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

      It is undisputed that this case does not involve a defendant’s express consent

in any form — and for that reason, the plaintiffs’ argument that a finding of

consent “follows a fortiori from” Carnival Cruise is misplaced. See Pls.’ Br. at 12–

13, 28–29. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a specific forum-selection

clause in a cruise ticket was enforceable against the parties who had assented to

the agreement at issue. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 587–89. The decision in

Carnival Cruise did not “infer[] consent” at all, see Pls.’ Br. at 27–29, but instead

enforced the express jurisdiction-conferring language of a contract after

accounting for considerations of notice and fundamental fairness. 8 See Carnival

Cruise, 499 U.S. at 593–95.


8The plaintiffs also rely on Szukhent, 

. But Szukhent concerned the validity
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a contract provision that expressly
appointed an agent for service of process. 

. As in Carnival Cruise, Szukhent
enforced the express terms of a contract. No express contract is at issue here.
                                          31
      The appellants characterize the PSJVTA as establishing implied consent, but

the statute provides no basis for a finding that the defendants have agreed to

submit to the jurisdiction of the United States courts. The PSJVTA does not purport

to determine that any litigation-related conduct on the part of the PLO or the PA

constitutes implied consent to jurisdiction. Nor does the PSJVTA require

submission to the federal courts’ jurisdiction in exchange for, or as a condition of,

receiving some in-forum benefit or privilege. Instead, Congress selected certain

non-litigation activities in which the PLO and the PA had already engaged (or

were alleged to have engaged) and decreed that those activities, if continued or

resumed after a certain date, “shall be deemed” to constitute “consent[] to personal

jurisdiction.” 

(e)(1); see, e.g., Klieman, 923 F.3d at 1123–24, 1127,

1129–30 (describing allegations of PLO and PA activity in the United States);

Taylor Force Act § 1002, 132 Stat. at 1143 (discussing the relevant payments). The

defendants’ support for terrorism not targeted at the United States and their

limited activities within the United States have already been found to be

insufficient to establish general or specific jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA in

similar ATA cases, see, e.g., Waldman I, 835 F.3d at 339–42, and those same

activities cannot reasonably be interpreted as signaling the defendants’ “intention



                                         32
to submit” to the authority of the United States courts, see J. McIntyre Mach., 

 (plurality opinion). Rather, such activities allegedly constitute

“consent” under the PSJVTA only because Congress has labeled them that way.

Thus, under the statute, the defendants incur a jurisdictional penalty for the

continuation of conduct that they were known to partake in before the PSJVTA’s

enactment — conduct which, on its own, cannot support a fair and reasonable

inference of the defendants’ voluntary agreement to proceed in a federal forum.

This declaration of purported consent, predicated on conduct lacking any of the

indicia of valid consent previously recognized in the case law, fails to satisfy

constitutional due process.

      Pursuant to the PSJVTA’s first prong, the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed

to have consented to personal jurisdiction” for “mak[ing] any payment” to the

designees of incarcerated terrorists, or to the families of deceased terrorists, whose

acts of terror “injured or killed a national of the United States.” 

(e)(1)(A). This specific non-litigation conduct cannot reasonably be

understood as signaling the defendants’ agreement to submit to the United States

courts. Accordingly, the effect of the first prong is to subject the defendants to a

jurisdictional sanction — “deemed consent” to the federal courts’ authority — for



                                         33
continuing to make the payments at issue. Illustrating the point, the appellants

themselves repeatedly emphasize that the PSJVTA’s first prong serves to deter a

congressionally disfavored activity. See, e.g., Pls.’ Br. at 11 (the first prong

“incentivizes [the] [d]efendants to halt the universally condemned practice of

making [the] payments” at issue); Intervenor Br. at 25–26 (the first prong

“discourage[s]” payments that Congress has linked to terrorist activity). But

Congress has a variety of other tools at its disposal for discouraging the payments

in question. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2378c-1(a)(1)(B) (barring certain U.S. foreign aid

that “directly benefits” the PA until both the PLO and the PA have “terminated”

the relevant payments). Imposing consent to personal jurisdiction as a

consequence for those payments, and thereby divesting the defendants of their

Fifth Amendment liberty interest, is not among them.

      The second prong of the PSJVTA similarly specifies predicate conduct that

does not evince the defendants’ agreement to subject themselves to the jurisdiction

of the United States courts. This prong provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be

deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” for “maintain[ing] any office”

or “conduct[ing] any activity while physically present in the United States,” with

a limited set of exceptions. 

(e)(1)(B). The appellants repeatedly



                                         34
suggest that this prong is consistent with relevant precedents because it

“[c]ondition[s] permission” for the defendants to engage in such activities, and to

receive the attendant benefits of doing so, “on their consent to personal jurisdiction

in ATA actions.” Intervenor Br. at 24; see Pls.’ Br. at 48 (the defendants’ “receipt of

[certain] benefits” is “condition[ed] . . . on their consent”). But this characterization

is inaccurate, given that the statute does not provide the PLO or the PA with any

such benefit or permission. With the exception of UN-related conduct and offices,

which are protected pursuant to international treaty (and which, as set forth in 

(e)(3), are exempt from the PSJVTA’s second prong), federal law has

long prohibited the defendants from engaging in any activities or maintaining any

offices in the United States, absent specific executive or statutory waivers. 9 See,


9For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 imposes a “wide gauged restriction of PLO
activity within the United States [that], depending on the nature of its enforcement, could
effectively curtail any PLO activities in the United States, aside from the Mission to the
United Nations.” Palestine Liberation Org., 

; accord Klinghoffer, 

 (“[W]ere the PLO not a permanent observer at the UN, it would not be entitled
to enter New York at all.”); see Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 

tit. X, §§ 1002–
1005, 

, 1406–1407 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5203) (stating Congress’s
“determin[ation] that the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization . . . and should
not benefit from operating in the United States,” 

(b), and prohibiting
various activities related to the PLO, including “expend[ing] [PLO] funds,” 

 § 5202).
Similar restrictions apply to the PA. See, e.g., Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006
(“PATA”), 

(a), 

, 3324 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2378b
note) (barring the PA from “establish[ing] or maintain[ing] an office, headquarters,
premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States”
absent a specified certification). The Government acknowledges that these restrictions
                                             35
e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille

Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 

 (2d Cir. 1991)

(explaining that “the PLO is prohibited from engaging in any activities in this

country other than the maintenance of a mission to the UN”). The PSJVTA does

not purport to relax or override these prohibitions, and the appellants have not

identified any other change in existing law (for example, a statutory or executive

waiver) that would otherwise authorize the restricted conduct. Thus, the statute’s

second prong cannot reasonably be construed as requiring a defendant’s consent

to jurisdiction in exchange for permission to engage in the predicate activities,

because the defendants have not been granted permission to engage in those

activities at all. 10 Instead, the second prong exacts “deemed” consent as a price to



can be lifted or relaxed only through the execution of formal waivers or suspensions
under statutorily required procedures. See Intervenor Br. at 24–25 (citing relevant waiver
provisions); see also Klieman, 923 F.3d at 1129–31 (describing the “formal . . . waiver
procedure” applicable to 

).
10 The appellants do not dispute that the defendants are statutorily barred from
conducting activities in the United States. Rather, the plaintiffs suggest that the
Government has historically permitted certain activities as “a matter of grace,” thereby
allowing the Government to require consent in return. Pls.’ Reply Br. at 25. But the
Government retains the authority to enforce the relevant prohibitions and could exercise
it at any time. See 

 (authorizing the Attorney General to take any
“necessary steps,” including “legal action,” to enforce the restrictions as to the PLO);
PATA § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 3324 (same as to the PA). Turning a blind eye to prohibited
conduct that remains subject to sanction or curtailment is not the same as authorizing
such conduct. Cf. Klieman, 

 (rejecting an attempt to “equate [a]
                                           36
be paid upon “conduct[ing] [such] activit[ies],” 

(e)(1)(B), without

conferring any rights or benefits on the defendants in return.

       The appellants argue that the PSJVTA is constitutionally sound because it

gives the defendants “fair warning” of the relevant jurisdiction-triggering conduct

and “reasonably advances legitimate government interests in the context of our

federal system.” Pls.’ Br. at 11. They derive this standard from a variety of cases

describing basic principles of due process, including the Supreme Court’s

decisions on specific jurisdiction in Ford Motor Co., 

, and Burger

King, 

. However, the concepts of “fair warning” and “legitimate

government interests” establish only minimum due process requirements. These

generalizations about due process do not resolve the precise issue in this case,

which is whether the defendants have consented to suit in the absence of general

or specific jurisdiction. None of the cases on which the appellants rely to support

their broad due process test purported to answer that question. 11



government ‘failure to prosecute’” certain activities under 

 with the
“waiver or suspension” of the restrictions of those activities, for purposes of an analysis
under the ATCA).
11The plaintiffs also argue that the district court’s analysis was flawed because it referred
to the right at issue here, the due process right not to be haled into a forum lacking
personal jurisdiction, as a “fundamental constitutional right.” See Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d
at 580, 591. The Supreme Court has recognized that “certain fundamental rights” trigger
“heightened” scrutiny, Washington v. Glucksberg, 

 (1997), and
                                             37
       Tellingly, the appellants have cited no case implying consent to personal

jurisdiction under circumstances similar to those in this action. Instead, all of the

appellants’ authorities concerning such implied consent involved a defendant’s

litigation-related conduct, or a defendant’s acceptance of some in-forum benefit

conditioned on amenability to suit in the forum’s courts. Those cases premised

consent on activities from which it was reasonable to infer a defendant’s

submission to personal jurisdiction, but that is not the situation here.

       For example, in Insurance Corporation of Ireland, a decision that the

appellants have relied on extensively, a defendant appeared before the district

court to assert a personal jurisdiction defense, but then repeatedly failed to comply

with discovery orders “directed at establishing jurisdictional facts” related to its

contacts with the forum. 

; see 

 at 698–99. The district court

accordingly imposed a discovery sanction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), which provides that certain facts may “be taken as

established” when a party “fails to obey a[] [discovery] order” concerning those




accordingly, the plaintiffs suggest that the district court must have applied an unduly
strict standard in this case. These arguments are without merit. The district court was
plainly using the phrase “fundamental” in a colloquial sense, not as a formal classification
or a term of art, and we see no indication that the district court applied an inappropriately
rigorous standard of scrutiny.
                                             38
facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Consistent with that Rule, the district court treated

the nonresident defendant’s forum contacts as having been proven, which in turn

established personal jurisdiction. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

.

      The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that this discovery

sanction violated due process. 

. Relying on its previous decision in

Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 

 (1909), the Supreme Court

explained that the “preservation of due process was secured by the presumption

that the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due process

was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense.” Ins. Corp. of

Ireland, 

 (quoting Hammond Packing, 212 U.S. at 350–51). In other

words, the defendant’s “failure to supply the requested information as to its

contacts with [the forum],” after “[h]aving put the issue in question,” could fairly

be construed as a tacit acknowledgment that the sought-after facts would establish

personal jurisdiction. 

.

      The current case bears no resemblance to Insurance Corporation of Ireland.

In contrast to the “actions of the defendant” at issue there, 

, the relevant

conduct under the PSJVTA takes place entirely outside of the litigation. Moreover,

the Supreme Court made clear that the application of the Hammond Packing



                                           39
presumption in Insurance Corporation of Ireland, along with the exercise of

personal jurisdiction that followed from it, was appropriate only because the

defendant’s litigation conduct related to whether personal jurisdiction existed. To

underscore the point, the Supreme Court distinguished Hovey v. Elliott, 

 (1897), which held that due process was violated where a court rendered

judgment against a defendant “as ‘punishment’ for failure” to pay a certain fee —

conduct plainly unrelated to any “asserted defense” in that case. Ins. Corp. of

Ireland, 456 U.S. at 705–06. The effect of the PSJVTA is similar: the statute subjects

the defendants to the authority of the federal courts for engaging in conduct with

no connection to the establishment of personal jurisdiction, and indeed with no

connection to litigation in the United States at all.

      With respect to non-litigation conduct, the appellants rely heavily on cases

finding consent to jurisdiction based on business registration statutes, which the

plaintiffs described at oral argument as “no different” from the PSJVTA. However,

the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mallory makes plain why those statutes

are readily distinguishable. Mallory arose out of a Virginia resident’s lawsuit in

Pennsylvania state court against his former employer, a Virginia railroad

corporation, for damages sustained as a result of work in Virginia and Ohio. See



                                          40
143 S. Ct. at 2032–33. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had consented to

personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania when it registered as a foreign corporation

under Pennsylvania law, which “requires out-of-state companies that register to

do business in the [state] to agree to appear in its courts on ‘any cause of action’

against them.” 

 at 2033 (quoting 

(a)(2)(i), (b) (2019)); see

also 

 (noting that the Pennsylvania statute “explicit[ly]” provides for

general jurisdiction over registered foreign corporations). The defendant did not

dispute that it had registered under the Pennsylvania statute, but it “resisted [the

plaintiff’s] suit on constitutional grounds,” raising the question of “whether the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from requiring

an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business

there.” 

.

      The Supreme Court rejected this due process challenge and held that the

defendant was subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania based on the state’s business

registration statute. See 

, 2037–38. The majority reasoned that the case

fell “squarely within [the] rule” of Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue

Mining & Milling Co., 

 (1917), see Mallory, 143 S. Ct. at 2038, which, in

the words of the plurality, established that the type of business registration statute



                                          41
at issue “comport[s] with the Due Process Clause,” id. at 2033 (plurality opinion).

Pennsylvania Fire specifically upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction

pursuant to a Missouri state law “requir[ing] any out-of-state insurance company

desiring to transact any business in the State to . . . accept service on [a particular

state] official as valid in any suit.” Id. at 2036 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In that case, “there was ‘no doubt’ [the out-of-state insurance

company] could be sued in Missouri by an out-of-state plaintiff on an out-of-state

contract,” because the corporation “had agreed to accept service of process in

Missouri on any suit as a condition of doing business there.” Id. (plurality opinion)

(quoting Pennsylvania Fire, 

).

      That language — “as a condition of doing business there” — explains why

the statutes at issue in both Pennsylvania Fire and Mallory could support a finding

of implied consent to personal jurisdiction. Consent may be fairly inferred when a

prospective defendant “voluntarily invoke[s] certain [in-forum] benefits . . .

conditioned on submitting to the [forum’s] jurisdiction,” because the acceptance

of the benefit implicitly signals the defendant’s agreement to appear in the forum’s

courts. Id. at 2045 (Jackson, J., concurring). Put differently, a defendant may give

its consent as part of a bargain: the defendant seeks and obtains a benefit that the



                                           42
forum has to offer, and the defendant agrees to be sued in that jurisdiction in

exchange. Thus, the statute at issue in Mallory supported a finding of consent to

jurisdiction because it “gave the [defendant] the right to do business in-state in

return for agreeing to answer any suit against it.” 143 S. Ct. at 2041 (plurality

opinion). Indeed, in discussing why such statutes count among the “legal

arrangements [that] may represent . . . implied consent . . . consistent with due

process,” both the majority and the plurality referred repeatedly to this sort of

“exchange.” 12 Id. at 2044 n.10 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks

omitted and alterations adopted); see also id. at 2044 (plurality opinion)

(“[A]ccepting an in-state benefit with jurisdictional strings attached . . . can carry

with [it] profound consequences for personal jurisdiction.”). The plurality also

stressed the fundamental fairness of Mallory’s outcome, given the scale of the


12 See, e.g., Mallory, 143 S. Ct. at 2041 n.8 (plurality opinion) (“[T]hese arrangements can
include state laws requiring consent to suit in exchange for access to a State’s markets.”
(internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted)); see also id. at 2033 (majority
opinion) (“Pennsylvania law . . . requires an out-of-state firm to answer any suits against
it in exchange for status as a registered foreign corporation and the benefits that entails.”);
id. at 2037 (majority opinion) (explaining that the registered defendant obtained “both
the benefits and burdens shared by domestic corporations — including amenability to
suit in state court on any claim,” and that the defendant “has agreed to be found in
Pennsylvania and answer any suit there”); id. at 2035 (plurality opinion) (describing a
long history of state statutes “requiring out-of-state corporations to consent to in-state
suits in exchange for the rights to exploit the local market and to receive the full range of
benefits enjoyed by in-state corporations”).


                                              43
defendant’s operations in the state. See id. at 2041–43. Because the defendant “had

taken full advantage of its opportunity to do business” in the forum, the plurality

found no due process concern in enforcing its consent to jurisdiction against it. Id.

at 2041.

      Mallory therefore underscores the lack of merit in the appellants’ asserted

analogy between the PSJVTA and business registration statutes. The PSJVTA does

not require that the PLO and the PA consent to jurisdiction as a condition of

securing a legal right to do business in the United States, which remains prohibited

under current law, or to conduct any other presently unauthorized activity.

Indeed, the statute does not offer any in-forum benefit, right, or privilege that the

PLO and the PA could “voluntarily invoke” in exchange for their submission to

the federal courts. Mallory, 143 S. Ct. at 2045 (Jackson, J., concurring). The

defendants in this case cannot be said to have accepted some in-forum benefit in

return for an agreement to be amenable to suit in the United States. 13



13 The plaintiffs contend that we would “break new ground” if we endorsed the
“unprecedented” proposition that an in-forum benefit is required to establish a
defendant’s consent to jurisdiction based on non-litigation conduct. Pls.’ July 26, 2023
Supp. Br. at 5, 6. But this argument misses the point. The receipt of a benefit from the
forum is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding that a defendant has consented to
personal jurisdiction there. Rather, as in Mallory, this sort of “arrangement[]” — that is,
a defendant’s voluntary acceptance of an in-forum benefit conditioned on amenability to
suit — can suffice under the circumstances to “signal consent to jurisdiction.” 

       The appellants’ other examples of consent statutes are distinguishable on

the same grounds. For example, the plaintiffs point to the state law at issue in Hess

v. Pawloski, 

 (1927), which provided that a nonresident motorist’s use

of the public roads “shall be deemed equivalent” to appointing an agent for service

of process in actions “growing out of any accident or collision in which said

nonresident may be involved.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such

a statute conditions “the use of the highway,” an in-state benefit from which states

may “exclude” nonresidents, on the nonresident’s “consent” to personal

jurisdiction. 

 at 356–57. Indeed, the statute itself was phrased in those terms: it

stated that “[t]he acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges”

associated with “operating a motor vehicle . . . on a public way in the [state]”

would be a “signification of his agreement” to service. 

 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The same logic applies to state statutes providing that state courts,

in certain classes of cases, can exercise consent-based jurisdiction over nonresident

officers and directors of a business incorporated under that state’s laws. See Pls.’



at 2041 n.8 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, such
an exchange can serve as a proxy for consent, from which it may be reasonable and fair
to infer an agreement to submit to the forum. There are other means of demonstrating
consent, such as certain litigation-related conduct. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S.
703–05. But “deemed consent,” absent some exchange of benefits, has never been
recognized as a means of valid consent to personal jurisdiction.
                                              45
Br. at 29 (citing Hazout v. Tsang Mun Ting, 

 (Del. 2016)). In

“accepting and holding” the position of officer or director, Hazout, 

, a “privilege” that carries with it “significant [state-law] benefits and

protections,” 

 at 292 n.66 (quoting Armstrong v. Pomerance, 

(Del. 1980)), a nonresident can be said to have signaled an agreement to the

jurisdictional consequences. 14



14 Relying on other cases outside of the personal jurisdiction context, the plaintiffs
compare the PSJVTA to “implied consent laws that require motorists . . . to consent to
BAC [(blood alcohol content)] testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on
suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.” Missouri v. McNeely, 

 (2013)
(plurality opinion); see, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 

 (1983) (describing
one such statute as “declar[ing] that any person operating a vehicle in [the state] is
deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if
arrested for driving while intoxicated”). But these statutes, which implicate the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches, see McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148–
51, are distinguishable for a variety of reasons, including those set forth above with
regard to Mallory and Hess. Like the service-of-process statute considered in Hess, the
“implied consent laws” for suspected drunk drivers require a motorist’s consent to a
particular obligation (specifically, “cooperation with BAC testing”) as “a condition of the
privilege of driving on state roads.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 

, 447–48
(2016); see McNeely, 

 (plurality opinion) (noting that “all 50 states” have
adopted laws requiring drivers to consent to BAC testing “as a condition of operating a
motor vehicle within the State”). That is very different from the statute at issue here,
which does not condition the defendants’ consent on any in-forum privilege at all.
       Further, the Supreme Court has never actually upheld these so-called implied
consent laws under a consent theory. Rather, the Court has assessed the constitutionality
of these laws on a case-by-case basis, relying on the exigency exception to the probable
cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin,

, 2532–33 (2019) (“But our decisions have not rested on the idea that these
laws . . . create actual consent to all the searches they authorize.”); see also 

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (underscoring that the Supreme Court did not address whether
                                             46
       In short, when a potential defendant accepts a government benefit

conditioned on submitting to suit in the forum, such conduct may fairly be

understood as consent to jurisdiction there. The same is often true when a

defendant engages in litigation conduct related to the existence of personal

jurisdiction. But in the PSJVTA, Congress has simply declared that specific

activities of the PLO and the PA — namely, certain payments made outside of the

United States, and certain operations within the United States (which remain

unlawful) — constitute “consent” to jurisdiction. No aspect of these allegedly

jurisdiction-triggering activities can reasonably be interpreted as evincing the

defendants’ “intention to submit” to the United States courts. J. McIntyre, 

 (plurality opinion). Congress cannot, by legislative fiat, simply “deem”

activities to be “consent” when the activities themselves cannot plausibly be

construed as such. Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 

 (1917) (noting that, in

“exten[ding] . . . the means of acquiring [personal] jurisdiction,” “great caution

should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a

pretty close adhesion to fact”).




implied consent was sufficient to authorize the search). These cases, therefore, shed little
light on when a constitutional right may be waived by implied consent.


                                            47
      Like the district court, we need not decide whether, “under different

circumstances, Congress or a state legislature could constitutionally ‘deem’ certain

conduct to be consent to personal jurisdiction.” Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 587. But

for such a statute to pass muster, “the predicate conduct would have to be a much

closer proxy for actual consent than the predicate conduct at issue” here. Id.

Because the PSJVTA’s predicate activities cannot reasonably be understood as

signifying the defendants’ consent, the statute does not effect a valid waiver of the

defendants’ due process protection against the “coercive power” of a foreign

forum’s courts. Goodyear, 

; see Waldman I, 

.

                                         B.

      Our conclusion also follows from College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 

 (1999). That decision

concerned a federal statute, the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (“TRCA”),

which provided that states would forgo their Eleventh Amendment immunity

from federal Lanham Act litigation if they committed “any violation” of the

Lanham Act’s prohibitions on false and misleading advertising. 

 at 670 (quoting

(b)). As relevant here, the petitioner argued that a state could be

said to have “‘impliedly’ or ‘constructively’ waived its immunity” upon engaging



                                         48
in the relevant predicate conduct — namely, “the activities regulated by the

Lanham Act” — after “being put on notice by the clear language of the TRCA that

it would be subject to [suit] for doing so.” 

.

      The Supreme Court rejected that proposition. It concluded that even with

“unambiguous[]” advance notice from Congress, a state’s “voluntarily elect[ing]

to engage in the federally regulated conduct” at issue would not suffice to render

the state suable. 

 at 679–81. Such conduct, the Supreme Court explained,

supplied no basis “to assume actual consent” to suit in federal court. 

. To

hold otherwise would ignore the “fundamental difference between a State’s

expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity” (in which case, one can “be

certain that the State in fact consents to suit”) and “Congress’s expressing

unequivocally its intention that if the State takes certain action it shall be deemed

to have waived that immunity.” 

 at 680–81. The decision explained:

      In the latter situation, the most that can be said with certainty is that
      the State has been put on notice that Congress intends to subject it to
      suits brought by individuals. That is very far from concluding that the
      State made an altogether voluntary decision to waive its immunity.

 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme

Court also saw no merit in the notion that a state could be “deemed to have

constructively waived its sovereign immunity” simply because “the asserted basis

                                           49
for [the] waiver [was] conduct that the State realistically could choose to abandon.”

. This fact, the decision noted, “ha[d] no bearing upon the

voluntariness of the waiver.” 

.

      This reasoning underscores the unconstitutionality of the PSJVTA’s

“deemed consent” provision. The statute purports to extract consent to personal

jurisdiction using the very same template that College Savings Bank condemned

in the sovereign immunity context: it identifies activities that, in Congress’s

judgment, the PLO and the PA “realistically could choose to abandon,” and it

“express[es] unequivocally [Congress’s] intention that if [either defendant] takes

[those] action[s] it shall be deemed to have” consented to a federal court’s

authority. 

. The appellants repeatedly contend that this statutory

framework gives rise to constructive consent because the predicate conduct is itself

“voluntary,” and the defendants “knowing[ly]” continued such conduct with

“notice” of the statute’s terms. Pls.’ Br. at 19–20; see Intervenor Br. at 2–3. But

College Savings Bank rejected that precise theory of constructive consent, making

clear that the ability to “abandon” the relevant predicate conduct “ha[s] no bearing

upon the voluntariness of the [asserted] waiver.” 

. Instead, as

College Savings Bank explained with regard to the state respondent, “the most



                                            50
that can be said” about the defendants here “is that [each] has been put on notice

that Congress intends to subject it to [certain] suits” in federal court. 

.

That is a “very far” cry from an “altogether voluntary decision” on the part of

either defendant to submit to a court’s jurisdiction. See 

      The appellants argue that the logic of College Savings Bank is inapplicable

here because the decision concerned the “special context” of state sovereign

immunity, where the standard for waiver is “particularly strict.” Pls.’ Br. at 30–31

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Coll. Sav. Bank, 

 (describing

the “test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity” as a “stringent

one” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But the relevant aspects of the Supreme

Court’s reasoning were not so cabined. To the contrary, the decision emphasized

that “constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the

surrender of constitutional rights,” and it noted that constructive waivers like the

one considered there — a close match for the sort of “deemed consent” at issue

here — “are simply unheard of in the context of . . . constitutionally protected

privileges.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration

adopted). The Supreme Court illustrated this point with an analogy to an entirely

different constitutional context:



                                         51
       [I]magine if Congress amended the securities laws to provide with
      unmistakable clarity that anyone committing fraud in connection
      with the buying or selling of securities in interstate commerce would
      not be entitled to a jury in any federal criminal prosecution of such
      fraud. Would persons engaging in securities fraud after the adoption
      of such an amendment be deemed to have “constructively waived”
      their constitutionally protected rights to trial by jury in criminal
      cases? After all, the trading of securities is not so vital an activity that
      any one person's decision to trade cannot be regarded as a voluntary
      choice. The answer, of course, is no. The classic description of an
      effective waiver of a constitutional right is the intentional
      relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

 at 681–82 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations adopted).

      This example was pertinent, the Supreme Court explained, because the

Eleventh Amendment privilege of “[s]tate sovereign immunity, no less than the

[Sixth Amendment] right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally

protected.” 

. The same is true with regard to the “due process right not

to be subjected to judgment in [a foreign forum’s] courts,” J. McIntyre Mach., 

 (plurality opinion), which, like the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, is

a “legal right protecting the individual,” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

. The

plaintiffs nevertheless suggest that we should ignore the lessons of College

Savings Bank because its general statements regarding waivers of constitutional

rights are nonbinding “dicta.” Pls.’ Br. at 13, 30, 32. But “it does not at all follow

that we can cavalierly disregard” those statements. United States v. Bell, 

 (2d Cir. 1975). Even if Supreme Court dicta do not constitute established

law, we nonetheless accord deference to such dicta where, as here, no change has

occurred in the legal landscape. United States v. Harris, 

 (2d Cir.

2016) (citing Newdow v. Peterson, 

, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014)); Bell, 

 (noting that Supreme Court dicta “must be given considerable

weight”). That deference is especially warranted in this case, given the close

parallels between the PSJVTA and the statutory framework that College Savings

Bank rejected.

      Indeed, the voluminous briefing in this case makes clear that the PSJVTA’s

approach to deemed consent is “simply unheard of,” Coll. Sav. Bank, 

, because those papers, while extensive, fail to identify a single case approving

a similar constructive waiver of the personal jurisdiction requirement. The briefs

instead rely entirely on personal jurisdiction cases that are inapposite or

distinguishable, for all of the reasons discussed above.

      The appellants also cite various cases involving waivers of other

constitutional rights, but those cases do not support the constitutionality of the

“deemed consent” imposed in the PSJVTA. For example, in arguing that waiving

a constitutional right does not require any exchange of benefits, the appellants



                                        53
point to United States v. O’Brien, 

 (2d Cir. 2019). In O’Brien, however,

the defendant had expressly consented to the warrantless searches of his

properties, in writing, rendering that case a plainly inapt comparison on the

question of constructive consent. 15 

. The appellants’ authorities concerning

valid waivers of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination are

similarly far afield. See Moran v. Burbine, 

 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad,

 (1985). The criminal suspects’ actions in those cases, taken upon

receiving clear and comprehensive warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (1966), left “no doubt” (in Moran) or “no question” (in Elstad) that each

had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment protections. See

Moran, 475 U.S. at 417–18, 421–22 (respondent executed “written form[s]

acknowledging that he understood his [Miranda] right[s],” and then gave a free

and uncoerced confession); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314–15, 315 n.4 (respondent gave

affirmative verbal responses confirming that he understood his Miranda rights,

then provided a free and uncoerced description of his offense).




15The Supreme Court’s decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

 (1973), a case
that the plaintiffs cited at oral argument, is likewise distinguishable because it focused on
an instance of express consent — in particular, to the warrantless search of a vehicle. See

.
                                             54
      The PSJVTA also finds no support in the plaintiffs’ cases concerning implied

waivers of a litigant’s right to proceed before an Article III court. See Wellness Int’l

Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 

 (2015); Roell v. Withrow, 

 (2003).

In these decisions, the Supreme Court explained that such waivers could be fairly

inferred based on specific litigation conduct, namely, “voluntarily appear[ing] to

try [a] case before [a] non-Article III adjudicator” after “[being] made aware of the

need for consent and the right to refuse it.” Wellness Int’l Network, 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing implied consent to a bankruptcy

judge’s resolution of certain claims); Roell, 

 n.3, 591 (discussing

implied consent to a magistrate judge’s disposition of an action). Those authorities

are unlike this case, where the defendants have not engaged in any conduct

(litigation-related or otherwise) evincing an “intention of . . . submitting to the

court’s jurisdiction.” Roell, 

 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      In sum, Congress cannot take conduct otherwise insufficient to support an

inference of consent, brand it as “consent,” and then decree that a defendant, after

some time has passed, is “deemed to have consented” to the loss of a due process

right for engaging in that conduct. This unprecedented framework for consent-

based jurisdiction, predicated on conduct that is not “of such a nature as to justify



                                          55
the fiction” of consent, cannot be reconciled with “traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 

 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, the PSJVTA’s “deemed consent” provision is incompatible with

the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

                                         C.

      The appellants and their amici make various other arguments in support of

the constitutionality of the PSJVTA and the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this

case, none of which is persuasive.

      The Government defends the constitutionality of the PSJVTA on the

grounds that the predicate conduct at issue is “closely linked to the only claim for

which personal jurisdiction is permitted, a civil ATA action concerning attacks on

Americans.” Intervenor Br. at 30. But the relevant question here is not whether the

predicate conduct identified in the statute bears some relation to the activities

proscribed under the ATA, or to Congress’s interest in remediating the harms that

flow from those activities. Rather, the question is whether such conduct

demonstrates the defendants’ valid consent to the authority of a United States

court. No basis exists to conclude that it does.




                                         56
      Also unpersuasive is the Government’s contention that Congress, in

furtherance of an important legislative purpose, narrowly tailored the PSJVTA to

establish jurisdiction over only the PLO, the PA, and their “successors or

affiliates.” Intervenor Br. at 24. Such singling out does not cure a constitutional

deficiency. Where, as here, a statute impinges on constitutional rights, it cannot be

salvaged on the basis that it violates the rights of only a handful of subjects.

      Relatedly, the Government contends that this Court must defer to

Congress’s choices in crafting the PSJVTA because the statute is “centrally

concerned with matters of foreign affairs,” a realm in which the political branches

enjoy “broad authority.” Intervenor Br. at 27. Invalidating the statute, the

Government argues, would frustrate legislative and executive efforts to give full

effect to the ATA’s civil liability provisions, which comprise part of the nation’s

“comprehensive legal response to international terrorism.” 

 at 22–23 (internal

quotation marks omitted). It is true, of course, that when “sensitive interests in

national security and foreign affairs [are] at stake,” the policy judgments of both

Congress and the Executive are “entitled to significant weight.” Holder v.

Humanitarian Law Project, 

 (2010). But it is equally true that the

Government’s broad “foreign affairs power . . . , ‘like every other governmental



                                          57
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the

Constitution.’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 

, 416 n.9 (2003) (quoting

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 

 (1936)). Indeed, “[o]ur

deference in matters of policy cannot . . . become abdication in matters of law,”

and “[o]ur respect for Congress’s policy judgments . . . can never extend so far as

to disavow restraints on federal power that the Constitution carefully

constructed.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 

 (2012).

      Thus, a statute “cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution

forbids it.” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 

 (2d Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Samantar v.

Yousuf, 

 (2010); accord Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai

Harnarain Co., 

 (9th Cir. 2002); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Because the PSJVTA purports to

provide consent-based jurisdiction in a manner at odds with constitutional due

process, the statute cannot stand, notwithstanding the policy concerns that

motivated its enactment. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 

 (“[T]here

can be no question that it is the responsibility of th[e] Court to enforce the limits

on federal power by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits.”).



                                         58
      The appellants also urge us to depart from our prior holding that the due

process analyses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments parallel one

another in civil cases, see Waldman I, 

, and to embrace instead the

view that the Fifth Amendment imposes comparatively looser requirements for

the exercise of personal jurisdiction. For its part, the Government argues that

Congress, as compared to state legislatures subject to the Fourteenth Amendment,

should be permitted under the Fifth Amendment to authorize “a greater scope of

personal jurisdiction” where it wishes to facilitate federal adjudication of certain

“legal claims.” Intervenor Br. at 39–40. As the basis for this position, the

Government contends that the Supreme Court “has tied the limitations of its

Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction jurisprudence” to interstate

federalism concerns, which do not similarly constrain the exercise of Congress’s

legislative power. 

 at 37–38. Under the Government’s theory, the Fifth

Amendment subjects Congress to a more lenient due process standard, allowing

it to enact the sort of “deemed consent” provision featured in the PSJVTA —

“[e]ven if,” due to their limited sovereignty, “state[s] could not enact similar

legislation consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 40.




                                        59
      The short answer to this argument is that the panel’s opinion in Waldman I

is the law of the Circuit and cannot be changed unless it is overruled by the

Supreme Court or by this Court in an en banc or “mini-en banc” decision. See

United States v. Peguero, 

, 158 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2022). In any event,

federalism is not the only constraint on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See

Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (en

banc), cert. denied sub nom. Douglass v. Kaisha, 

 (2023) (mem.);

Livnat, 

 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is not just about federalism.”).

Fundamentally, the Constitution’s personal jurisdiction requirements represent a

“restrict[ion] [on] judicial power” — and, as a corollary, a restriction on the

legislative ability to expand that power — “not as a matter of sovereignty, but as

a matter of individual liberty.” J. McIntyre Mach., 

 (plurality

opinion) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

). Thus, to the extent that the

need for personal jurisdiction operates as a limit on a state’s sovereign authority,

that effect “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest

preserved by the Due Process Clause.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

 n.10.

Relatedly, the Supreme Court’s precedents make clear that one of the “vital

purpose[s] of personal-jurisdiction standards,” whether applied in state or federal



                                          60
court, “is to ensure fairness to the defendant.” Livnat, 

 (internal

quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted).

      For these very reasons, several courts of appeals, including ours, have

rejected the notion that federalism’s irrelevance in the Fifth Amendment context

justifies a “more lenient” standard for personal jurisdiction. Waldman I, 835 F.3d

at 329–30; see, e.g., Livnat, 851 F.3d at 54–55; see also Douglass, 46 F.4th at 236–38

(“Because the Due Process Clauses use the same language and guarantee

individual liberty in the same way, it makes sense that the standards developed in

the Fourteenth Amendment context must govern under the Fifth Amendment.”).

No basis exists to conclude that the same argument, rooted in the absence of

federalism-related restrictions on national power, would warrant relaxing due

process constraints on Congress’s ability to “deem[] certain actions . . . to be

consent to personal jurisdiction.” Intervenor Br. at 40. Whether premised on

contacts or consent, subjecting a nonresident defendant to the power of a

particular forum implicates compelling concerns for fairness and individual

liberty, and those “strong justifications for personal-jurisdiction limits apply

equally in Fifth Amendment cases.” Livnat, 

. 16


16 Moreover, “[j]urisdictional rules should be ‘simple,’ ‘easily ascertainable,’ and
‘predictable.’” Livnat, 

 (alterations adopted) (quoting Daimler, 

       The plaintiffs take a somewhat different approach to this Fifth Amendment

issue: they ask us to invoke our “‘mini en banc’ process,” overrule Waldman I

entirely, and embrace the broader Fifth Amendment standard used for personal

jurisdiction in criminal cases, so that the district court may assert “specific

jurisdiction” over the defendants irrespective of whether the PSJVTA gives rise to

valid consent. Pls.’ Br. at 16, 49. Together with their amici, the plaintiffs raise a host

of historical, structural, and practical considerations, including many of the same

federalism-related arguments already rejected above, in an attempt to secure a

more permissive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process limits.

       These arguments, however, provide no persuasive basis for disturbing a

binding decision of this Court, especially where that decision accords with existing

Circuit case law and the overwhelming weight of authority from the other federal

courts of appeals. 17 See Douglass, 

, 239 & n.24 (collecting cases from


137). The Government’s proposal meets none of those criteria. While the Government
assures us that not every conceivable “deemed consent” provision would pass muster
under a relaxed Fifth Amendment standard, it fails to identify any workable limitation
on the “greater scope” of jurisdiction that would be permitted. Intervenor Br. at 39.
17 See, e.g., Douglass, 

 (“We . . . hold that the Fifth Amendment due process

test for personal jurisdiction requires the same ‘minimum contacts’ with the United States
as the Fourteenth Amendment requires with a state. Both Due Process Clauses use the
same language and serve the same purpose, protecting individual liberty by
guaranteeing limits on personal jurisdiction.”); Herederos de Roberto Gomez Cabrera,
LLC v. Teck Res. Ltd., 

 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[C]ourts should analyze
personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment using the same basic standards and
                                            62
the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, Federal, and D.C. Circuits); see also Livnat,

851 F.3d at 54–55 & 55 n.5 (similar). Moreover, Waldman I was not the first




tests that apply under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 

 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding “no merit” in the contention that the Fifth Amendment
“relaxes the minimum-contacts inquiry”); Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 

 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Fifth Amendment due process test “parallels” the
Fourteenth Amendment analysis); Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto
Innovations Found., 

 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concluding that the Fourteenth
Amendment “minimum contacts” standard “articulated in International Shoe . . . and its
progeny” applies in “Fifth Amendment due process cases”). In contending that several
federal courts of appeals have held otherwise, see Pls.’ Br. at 59–60, the plaintiffs rely on
outdated authorities, chief among them a vacated decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, see Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 

 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), opinion vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 

 (5th
Cir. 2021) (mem.), which subsequently concluded that the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the same personal jurisdiction analysis, see 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The plaintiffs also misstate the holdings of other cases,
which nowhere suggested that the personal jurisdiction requirements of the Fifth
Amendment are less stringent than those applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 

, 370–71 & 370 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002)
(invoking Fourteenth Amendment due process “minimum contacts” standards where
the Fifth Amendment applied); see also Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 

, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2000) (similarly borrowing Fourteenth Amendment standards to
conduct a Fifth Amendment inquiry).
        The Supreme Court has never “expressly analyzed whether the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment standards differ,” instead reserving decision on the issue.
Livnat, 

; see, e.g., Bristol-Meyers, 582 U.S. at 268–69 (“[S]ince our decision
concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave
open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.”). Other courts of appeals have
observed that on at least one occasion, the Supreme Court appears to have “instinctively
relied on its Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction jurisprudence” in the Fifth
Amendment context. Douglass, 

 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc., 

 (1992), in turn quoting Burger King, 

); accord Livnat,

.
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decision of this Court to apply Fourteenth Amendment due process principles in

a Fifth Amendment context; the analysis there followed from prior Circuit

precedents that “clearly establish[ed] the congruence of [the] due process analysis

under both the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.” 

 (citing, among

other authorities, Chew, 

 n.4, and In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11,

2001, 

, 673–74 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Porina v. Marward Shipping

Co., 

, 127–29 (2d Cir. 2008). Therefore, we decline the invitation to

abandon our prior ruling and upend settled law on the due process standards

under the Fifth Amendment.

      To the extent the plaintiffs ask us to revisit any other aspect of our decision

in Waldman I, we decline that invitation as well. After explaining that the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment due process analyses parallel one another in civil

actions, Waldman I faithfully applied the Supreme Court’s binding due process

precedents, including its then-recent decision in Daimler, to conclude that the PLO

and the PA could not be subjected to general or specific jurisdiction under the

circumstances presented. In three separate cases involving similar ATA claims, the

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. See Shatsky, 955 F.3d at 1036–37; Klieman,




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923 F.3d at 1123–26; Livnat, 851 F.3d at 56–57. No aspect of the present dispute

affects our decision in Waldman I as to what constitutional due process requires.

                                   *      *      *

      We reiterate the district court’s closing observation that just “[a]s in

Waldman I, the killing of Ari Fuld was ‘unquestionably horrific’ and [the]

[p]laintiffs’ efforts to seek justice on his and their own behalf are morally

compelling.” Fuld, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 595 (quoting Waldman I, 

).

But “the federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction in a civil case beyond the

limits” of the Due Process Clause, “no matter how horrendous the underlying

attacks or morally compelling the plaintiffs’ claims.” 

 at 595–96 (quoting

Waldman I, 

). The PSJVTA provides for personal jurisdiction over

the PLO and the PA in a manner that exceeds those constitutional limits. Because

the statute violates due process, the defendants cannot be “deemed to have

consented” to personal jurisdiction in this case. 

(e)(1).

                                  CONCLUSION

      We have considered all of the arguments of the parties and their amici. To

the extent not specifically addressed above, those arguments are either moot or

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the PSJVTA’s provision



                                         65
regarding “deemed” consent to personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with

constitutional due process. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ complaint against the PLO

and the PA was properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(2). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.




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