Clearing House Association, LLC v. Cuomo

Judge CARDAMONE concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.

The National Bank Act (“NBA” or “Act”) authorizes national banks to engage in a broad range of business activities, and also limits the exercise of “visitorial powers” over such banks.1 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) is the agency Congress has entrusted to implement the NBA and to oversee the national banks’ exercise of their powers. This appeal concerns the residual authority of state officials in regards to laws pertaining to real estate lending, one of the banking activities governed by the NBA and OCC regulations.

I

In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating evidence of possible racial discrimination in the residential real estate lending practices of several national banks and their operating subsidiaries. The Attorney General’s investigation was prompted by data that the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) requires lenders to make public. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10. The Attorney General observed that recent HMDA data appeared to indicate that a significantly higher percentage of high-interest home mortgage loans are issued to African-American and Hispanic borrowers than to white borrowers.

On the basis of these apparent racial disparities, the Attorney General sent “letters of inquiry” to mortgage lenders implicated by the data, including several national banks and their operating subsidiaries.2 The letters stated that such disparities “are troubling on their face, and unless legally justified may violate federal and state anti-discrimination laws such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its state counterpart, New York State Executive Law § 296-a.”3 “In lieu of issuing a formal subpoena,” the letters requested that lenders voluntarily produce certain nonpublic information regarding their mortgage policies and practices, as well as data concerning loans related to real property in New York State.

Soon afterwards, the OCC sued to enjoin the Attorney General’s investigative and enforcement efforts. A recently promulgated OCC regulation expansively interpreted the NBA’s visitorial powers provision, 12 U.S.C. § 484, to preclude state officials from enforcing national banks’ compliance with state or federal laws that concern activities authorized or permitted under the NBA. See 12 C.F.R. *110§ 7.4000(a)(2)(iv). On the strength of this regulation, the agency took the position that any efforts by the Attorney General to investigate or to enforce provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and New York State Executive Law § 296-a against national banks or their operating subsidiaries were an unlawful exercise of visitorial powers.

The Clearing House Association (“Clearing House”) — a consortium of national banks, including several that received letters of inquiry from the Attorney General- — filed a similar complaint, seeking to enjoin the Attorney General from “investigating, requesting or issuing subpoenas for information concerning, or taking any other action to enforce federal and state discrimination-in-lending laws” against its national bank members and their operating subsidiaries.

The Attorney General counterclaimed, arguing that the OCC’s regulation was unlawful and should be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706.4 In his Answer, the Attorney General asserted that racial disparities reflected in the HMDA data “established a prima facie case, under the federal Fair Housing Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), as well as under New York State Executive Law § 296-a. The Attorney General contended that his investigation was not a prohibited exercise of visitorial powers, and that the OCC was not acting aggressively in this area. Alternatively, the Attorney General contended that he was empowered, as par-ens patriae, to sue under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and that even if such a suit were considered a “visitation” it would come within § 484(a)’s exception for “visi-torial powers ... authorized by Federal law.”

Following a trial on the merits, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stein, J.) deferred to the OCC’s interpretation of the statute, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and concluded that the Attorney General’s investigation was prohibited. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d 383 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“OCC v. Spitzer”). In a separate opinion, the court agreed with Clearing House that the FHA does not create an exception authorizing the exercise of visitorial powers otherwise prohibited under § 484(a). Clearing House Ass’n, L.L. C. v. Spitzer, 394 F.Supp.2d 620 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Clearing House v. Spitzer”). Accordingly, in both cases the court issued the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the OCC and Clearing House.

We affirm the district court’s judgment in OCC v. Spitzer. We affirm in part and vacate in part the district court’s separate judgment in Clearing House v. Spitzer. We affirm that part of the Clearing House judgment granting Clearing House the in-junctive relief provided in OCC v. Spitzer. We vacate, however, that part of the Clearing House judgment granting permanent injunctive relief against the Attorney General’s enforcement of the FHA. We hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim, and we remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss that claim.

II

The NBA provides for the creation of national banks, and authorizes them to exercise certain enumerated powers, as well as “all such incidental powers as shall *111be necessary to carry on the business of banking.” 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh. The OCC is the federal agency primarily responsible for overseeing “the business of banking” under the statute. NationsBank of N.C., N.A v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995). To that end, the OCC has been granted broad authority by Congress “to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the office.” 12 U.S.C. § 93a. This includes the authority “to define the ‘incidental powers’ of national banks beyond those specifically enumerated in the statute.” Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.2005); see also NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 257-59, 115 S.Ct. 810.

Section 484 provides, in part, that “[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law [or] vested in the courts of justice.” 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). The Supreme Court has defined visitation as “the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to examine into its manner to conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and regulations.” Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158, 26 S.Ct. 4, 50 L.Ed. 130 (1905) (internal quotation marks omitted). We recently observed that the purpose of the visitorial powers restriction is to “prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation from impairing the national system.” Burke, 414 F.3d at 311; see also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1568, 167 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007).

In 1996, the OCC adopted a regulation clarifying that, under § 484(a), “the exercise of visitorial powers over national banks is vested solely in the OCC.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (1997); 61 Fed.Reg. 4862, 4869 (Feb. 9, 1996) (final rule). The OCC revised this regulation in 1999 “to clarify the extent of the OCC’s visitorial powers” and to “codifiy] the definition of visitorial powers and illustrate[] what vistitorial powers include by providing a non-exclusive list of these powers.” 64 Fed.Reg. 60092, 60094 (Nov. 4, 1999) (final rule). The previous version of the rule had indicated that “[s]tate officials have no authority to conduct examinations or to inspect or require the production of books or records of national banks, except for the limited purpose[s]” specified in § 484(b).5 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (1997). The revised rule added “prosecuting enforcement actions” against such banks as an example of prohibited state visitorial powers. See 64 Fed.Reg. at 60100.

In its present form, Section 7.4000 lists several examples of prohibited visitations, including “(i) Examination of a bank; (ii) Inspection of a bank’s books and records; (iii) Regulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law; and (iv) Enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those activities.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2) (emphasis added).

The regulation also addresses the exceptions included in § 484(a) for visitorial powers “authorized by Federal law” and “vested in the courts of justice.” The OCC construes the courts-of-justice exception as “pertaining] to the powers inherent in the *112judiciary” and “not granting] state or other governmental authorities any right to inspect, superintend, direct, regulate or compel compliance by a national bank with respect to any law, regarding the content or conduct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal law.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2); 69 Fed Reg. 1895, 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (final rule). OCC regulations do not directly interpret the “authorized by Federal law” exception, but rather provide a non-exclusive list of federal “laws vesting visitorial power in other governmental entities,” including state officials, to engage in particular visitorial acts. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(1). These include, for example, “[v]erify[ing] payroll records for unemployment compensation purposes,” pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 3305(c); “[ajscer-tain[ing] the correctness of Federal tax returns,” under 26 U.S.C. § 7602; and “[e]nforc[ing] the Fair Labor Standards Act,” under 29 U.S.C. § 211. Id. §§ 7.4000(b)(1)(iii), (iv), (v).

Ill

We review a district court’s grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 214 (2d Cir.2004). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Id.; S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.2001). Although the parties disagree about the facts underlying the Attorney General’s investigation — especially the significance of the HMDA data as evidence of possible racial bias in mortgage lending — those facts are not at issue here. The only questions before us are legal ones.

A

Central to the parties’ dispute is the meaning of the term “visitorial powers” in § 484(a). The OCC argues that its interpretation of “visitorial powers” should be afforded Chevron deference while the Attorney General denies that the OCC’s interpretation is entitled to such deference. Under Chevron, we first ask whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If Congress’s intent is clear, both the court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If, however, “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” we proceed to the second step of the Chevron analysis, in which “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.

The Attorney General raises an initial argument that the Chevron framework does not apply to the OCC’s interpretation of the statute at issue here. The Attorney General argues that by limiting the visito-rial powers that apply to national banks, Congress clearly did not intend to divest states of the authority to enforce their own otherwise non-preempted laws against such banks. Such authority, the Attorney General contends, is an intrinsic aspect of state sovereignty and its exercise cannot be curtailed in the absence of a clear statement of Congressional intent. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (“If Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (“[T]he power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal is one of the quintessential *113functions of a State.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Attorney General urges us not to afford Chevron deference to the OCC’s interpretation of the statute, as the district court did.

The first question is whether a presumption against preemption applies to the OCC’s regulation interpreting § 484(a). Federal preemption can be express or implied, but in either case is primarily a question of Congressional intent. See Barnett Bank of Marion County., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 81, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996). “Preemption can generally occur in three ways: where Congress has expressly preempted state law, where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law, or where federal law conflicts with state law.” Burke, 414 F.3d at 313; see also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). “Federal regulations have no less pre-emp-tive effect than federal statutes.” de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014.

Ordinarily, a presumption against preemption applies in areas of regulation traditionally allocated to the states. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). In Wachovia v. Burke, we observed that this presumption “disappears” in the context of national bank regulation, which has been “substantially occupied by federal authority for an extended period of time.” Burke, 414 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir.2005). Historically, the Supreme Court has “interpret[ed] grants of both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empt-ing, contrary state law.” Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32, 116 S.Ct. 1103. The district court, therefore, did not err in determining that no presumption against preemption applies to the regulation at issue here.

For essentially the same reason, we also reject the Attorney General’s reliance on the somewhat broader principle that — whether or not a presumption against preemption applies — “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.” Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (“SWANCC”). That broader principle is rooted in the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which the Supreme Court has recognized may, in some instances, trump the deference typically afforded to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers. See id.; Edward J. DeBarto-lo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). The concern about reaching constitutional issues unnecessarily, and the corresponding demand for a clear statement from Congress, is “heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 675.

*114The Attorney General has not demonstrated that acceptance of the OCC’s interpretation of § 484 would cast doubt on the constitutionality of the underlying statute. Cf. id.; DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575-76, 108 S.Ct. 1392. Nor do we see any reason to believe that such interpretation invokes the outer limit of Congress’s power so as to trigger a clear statement requirement. National banks, as creatures of federal statute, are subject first and foremost to federal law. As a result, the exercise of “traditional” state power in the context of national banking regulation is already substantially qualified. While national banks do not operate entirely free of state law obligations, “[s]tates can exercise no control over them, nor in any wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit.” Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34, 23 L.Ed. 196 (1875); see Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1567. Where, as here, Congress has already expressed its intent to limit the role of the states in regulating national banks — especially when such conduct involves the exercise of powers granted to the banks by federal statute and regulation — we do not perceive the need for any further statement of intent to achieve the limitation at issue here. On this basis, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that a clear statement was not required to justify the OCC’s interpretation of § 484(a).

B

We turn next to the Attorney General’s contention that § 484(a) is clear, and that the statute precludes the interpretation the OCC has adopted.6 As we have already noted, the first question we ask in reviewing an agency’s construction of the statute it administers is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The two questions at issue here both concern the scope of visitorial powers encompassed by § 484(a). They are: (1) whether Congress intended to preclude state officials from enforcing non-preempted state laws that, like New York’s discrimination-in-lending law, concern the federally authorized activities of national banks; and (2) whether Congress intended to permit state officials to exercise otherwise prohibited visitorial powers by bringing actions in the “courts of justice.”

(i)

In construing § 484(a), we do not write on a blank slate. The Supreme Court interpreted “visitorial powers” in the context of the NBA for the first time in Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 26 S.Ct. 4, 50 L.Ed. 130 (1905). At issue in Guthrie was whether the NBA precludes an individual shareholder from inspecting the books and records of a national bank. The Court examined various dictionary definitions of the term “visitorial,” and summarized its common law history. Based on these various sources, the Court concluded that the visitorial powers restricted by Congress in the NBA do not include “the common-law right of the shareholder to inspect the books of the corporation.” Id. at 157, 26 S.Ct. 4. This conclusion followed from the Court’s ac*115knowledgment that “[t]he right of visitation [is] a public right, existing in the state for the purpose of examining into the conduct of the corporation with a view to keeping it within its legal powers.” Id. at 158-59, 26 S.Ct. 4 (emphasis added).

The Attorney General suggests that although Guthrie involved a lawsuit brought by a private plaintiff, the Court’s opinion is consistent with the understanding that “visitation” refers primarily to examination of a corporation’s books and records for the limited purposes of managerial oversight and monitoring compliance with a bank’s charter, and that the term does not encompass enforcement of state laws of general applicability. This understanding, the Attorney General maintains, is reinforced by the text and structure of the NBA.

In its current form, the NBA details the OCC’s specific examination powers over national banks in a different section from the visitorial powers restriction. See 12 U.S.C. § 481. Originally, these two provisions were set forth in the same section of the Act, which provided that national banks “shall not be subject to any other visitorial powers than such as are authorized by this act.” Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 54, 13 Stat. 99, 116 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the NBA’s subsequent reorganization, the Attorney General argues that the visitorial powers language currently found in § 484(a) simply forbids the states from usurping those regulatory powers that the statute grants explicitly to the OCC. In this interpretation, § 484(a) would act mainly as a constraint on the administrative powers exercised by state banking officials.

As the court below pointed out, the Attorney General’s proposed reading ignores the fact that the NBA, both as originally enacted and in its present version, authorizes the OCC to sue in its own name to redress certain violations — a power that might itself be considered visitorial. See OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d at 394; Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 53, 13 Stat. 99, 116 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 93(a)); see also Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 157, 26 S.Ct. 4 (“The visitation of civil corporations is by the government itself, through the medium of the courts of justice.”); Roscoe Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction Over Corporations In Equity, 49 Harv. L.Rev. 369, 372 (1936) (noting that at common law, visitorial powers were executed primarily by “the King act[ing] through his courts”).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Watters v. Wachovia casts further doubt on the Attorney General’s interpretation. Watters involved the State of Michigan’s effort to enforce two statutes concerning mortgage lending against a national bank’s operating subsidiary, Wachovia Mortgage. The statutes imposed registration and disclosure requirements on mortgage lenders, including national bank operating subsidiaries and other state-chartered institutions. Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1565-66. They also granted to the commissioner of Michigan’s Office of Insurance and Financial Services “inspection and enforcement authority over registrants,” and “authorize[d] the commissioner to take regulatory or enforcement actions against covered lenders.” Id. at 1566. The State argued — contrary to another recent OCC regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 — that operating subsidiaries are not themselves national banks, and that state laws regulating such subsidiaries are therefore applicable and enforceable. Id.

The powers granted to the commissioner under the Michigan statutes, the Court observed, were undeniably “visitorial” and thus, as the parties conceded, could not be applied to national banks themselves. “State laws that conditioned national *116banks’ real estate lending on registration with the State,” the Court explained, “and subjected such lending to the State’s investigative and enforcement machinery would surely interfere with the banks’ federally authorized business.” Id. at 1568 (emphasis added). Citing § 484(a), as well as the OCC’s definition of visitorial powers in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2), the Court concluded that Michigan “cannot confer on its commissioner examination and enforcement authority over mortgage lending, or any other banking business done by national banks.” Id. at 1569. Because the banks’ “authority to engage in the business of mortgage lending comes from the NBA ... as does the authority to conduct business through an operating subsidiary,” the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers under § 484(a) extend to operating subsidiaries engaged in mortgage lending just as to their parent national banks.7 Id. at 1572.

In this regard, the Court in Watters concluded that the level of deference owed to the OCC’s regulation, § 7.4006, “is an academic question,” since that regulation “merely clarifies and confirms what the NBA already conveys: A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law.” Id. at 1572; cf. Burke, 414 F.3d at 321 (upholding § 7.4006 on the basis of a Chevron analysis).

Watters does not directly address the questions at issue here. Nevertheless, the Court implied that investigation and enforcement by state officials are just as much aspects of visitorial authority as registration and other forms of administrative supervision, and that the OCC was not clearly wrong to include in its definition of visitorial powers “[e]nforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning” a national bank’s authorized banking activities. 12 C.F.R. § 7.400(a)(2)(iv); see Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1568-69. Even more significantly, Watters emphasized that “in analyzing whether state law hampers the federally permitted activities of a national bank, [the Court] ha[s] focused on the exercise of a national bank’s powers.” Id. at 1570.

The Watters dissent maintained, as the Attorney General does here, “that nondiscriminatory laws of general application that do not ‘forbid’ or ‘impair significantly’ national bank activities should not be preempted.” Id. at 1574 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The premise of the majority opinion, however, is that enforcement of a state law purporting to regulate a national bank’s exercise of the powers it has been granted under the NBA may constitute a prohibited visitation under § 484(a), whether or not the law itself directly conflicts with a federal statute or regulation.8

*117Although the precise scope of “visitorial” powers is not entirely clear from the text of § 484(a), or the common law background of the term, we cannot agree with the Attorney General that the statute clearly precludes the interpretation the OCC has adopted. It seems clear to us, after Watters, that investigative and enforcement powers of the type the Attorney General has sought to exercise here are at least in some sense “visitorial,” whether or not they unambiguously fall within the scope of § 484(a). Cf. Nat’l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 989 (3d Cir.1980) (concluding that while “[i]t is not clear just what ‘visitorial’ powers include ... they do encompass examination of the bank’s books and records,” and thus enforcement of an otherwise non-preempted state “antiredlining” statute was barred by § 484(a), since such enforcement “no doubt would require examination of bank records”). Moreover, we are not prepared to conclude, as the Attorney General urges us to, that simply because a state statute is not substantively preempted by a contrary federal law, enforcement of that statute by state officials against national banks is necessarily permitted under § 484(a).

(ii)

The Attorney General maintains that even if his investigation may be construed as a visitation, it is nonetheless permitted under § 484’s express exception for visito-rial powers “vested in the courts of justice.” To support this argument, the Attorney General relies primarily on what might be read as an alternative holding in Guthrie. Having concluded that the NBA’s visitorial powers restriction did not foreclose a shareholder from seeking to enforce his common law right of inspection against a national bank, the Court in Guthrie observed that such inspection, “even if included in visitorial powers as the terms are used in the statute,” would nevertheless “belong to that class ‘vested in the courts of justice’ which are expressly excepted from the inhibition of the statute.” Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 159, 26 S.Ct. 4.

The Attorney General’s proposed interpretation of the “courts of justice” exception cuts too broadly. If a state official could sidestep the Act’s restriction on the exercise of visitorial powers simply by filing a lawsuit, the exception would swallow the rule. Moreover, as we note above, the sovereign’s bringing of an action in court was a primary means of exercising visitorial powers at common law. Because Guthrie involved a suit initiated by a private plaintiff, the only possible exercise of visi-torial powers would have been by the court itself. See Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 158-59, 26 S.Ct. 4 (“The right of visitation [is] a public right .... ” (emphasis added)). Whatever the scope of the courts of justice exception, it cannot be as broad as the Attorney General suggests, since that interpretation would provide no effective restriction on the exercise of a state’s visito-rial powers over national banks.

C

Since “Congress has not directly addressed the precise question[s] at *118issue,” we proceed to step two of the Chevron framework, under which we ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We will defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation, so long as it is reasonable and does not conflict with Congress’s expressed intent. See id. at 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 336 (2d Cir.1997). An agency’s interpretation may be reasonable, and thus worthy of deference, “even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005); see also G & T Terminal Packaging Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 468 F.3d 86, 95 (2d Cir.2006) (“[U]nless we find the [agency’s] construction of the statute to be arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, we must yield to that construction of the statute even if we would reach a different conclusion of our own accord.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The Attorney General makes two preliminary arguments for why we should not defer to the OCC’s interpretation of § 484(a). Both were properly rejected by the district court. First, the Attorney General argues that the OCC’s regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000, falls outside the scope of its delegated rulemaking authority. This argument fails because, as the district court pointed out, Congress conferred broad authority on the OCC to implement the NBA. See 12 U.S.C. § 93a. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has routinely deferred to the OCC’s interpretations of that statute where Congress’s intent is ambiguous:

It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.

NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 256-57, 115 S.Ct. 810 (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no reason to depart from this settled principle here.

Second, the Attorney General contends that no deference is owed to the regulation because it interprets purely legal concepts, as opposed to technical matters within the OCC’s expertise. This contention is significantly more troublesome. We have previously observed that “an [administrative] agency has no special competence or role in interpreting a judicial decision.” New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The administrative record here consists almost entirely of the agency’s interpretation of case law, legislative history, and statutory text. See, e.g., 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1897-1900 (Jan. 13, 2004) (final rule); 64 Fed.Reg. 31749, 31751 (June 14, 1999) (NPRM). These are not subjects on which the OCC holds any special expertise, nor has the OCC identified any particularly technical aspect of the regulatory subject matter that the agency is “ ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996)); see also Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1584 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To warrant Chevron deference, we ordinarily require administrative agencies to “articulate a logical basis for their decisions, including a *119rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.” Skubel, 113 F.3d at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the OCC does not appear to have found any facts at all in promulgating its visitorial powers regulation. It ac-cretes a great deal of regulatory authority to itself at the expense of the states through rulemaking lacking any real intellectual rigor or depth. Indeed, there is very little about the OCC’s rather cursory analysis that, in a different context, could justify this Court’s deference under Chevron. The OCC’s analysis is at or near the outer limits of what Chevron contemplates.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that an agency’s attempts to harmonize its rule-making with judicial precedent — as the OCC has done here, see, e.g., 69 Fed.Reg. 1895, 1897-1900 — necessarily invalidate that rulemaking. Cf. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2339, 2350-51, 168 L.Ed.2d 54 (2007). We remain bound to uphold the agency’s rule so long as it is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Because we conclude that the rule the OCC adopted is not inconsistent with judicial precedent, the Attorney General’s argument is unavailing.

Rather than analyzing the OCC’s regulation in the abstract, we begin by emphasizing that the investigation and threatened enforcement action it would preclude in this instance concern real estate lending — precisely the same banking activity that was at issue in Watters. The authority of national banks to engage in that activity is a power that Congress has expressly granted under the NBA, subject to rules prescribed by the OCC. 12 U.S.C. § 371. It is thus “[bjeyond genuine dispute” that “state law may not significantly burden a national bank’s own exercise of its real estate lending power, just as it may not curtail or hinder a national bank’s efficient exercise of any other power, incidental or enumerated under the NBA.” Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1567.

In 2004, the OCC adopted a separate regulation detailing certain categories of preempted state law limitations on a national bank’s real estate lending powers, including laws that concern licensing and registration, loan-to-value ratios, disclosure and advertising, and interest rates. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a). That same regulation also sets forth categories of state laws that “are not inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent that they only incidentally affect the exercise of national banks’ real estate lending powers.” Id. § 34.4(b). These include contracts, torts, criminal law, zoning, and other broad subject areas that do not relate specifically to the business of banking. Id.

In addition to being unencumbered by state laws that are preempted, either by the NBA itself or by OCC regulations, “real estate lending, when conducted by a national bank, is immune from state visito-rial control” as a result of § 484(a). Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1567. Such immunity attaches not because of any specific conflict between state and federal law, but because “[t]he NBA specifically vests exclusive authority to examine and inspect in [the] OCC.” Id. In this regard, the NBA’s restriction on visitorial powers reflects Congress’s overall judgment that, in the context of national bank regulation, “confusion would necessarily result from control possessed and exercised by two independent authorities.” Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 232, 23 S.Ct. 288, 47 L.Ed. 452 (1903); see Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1568.

Likewise, the OCC’s regulation is “consistent with the intent of creating a national banking system that is subject to cohesive, uniform supervision by the primary *120regulator of national banks.” 64 Fed.Reg. at 60095. In our reading, § 7.4000 does not, as the Attorney General suggests, claim for the OCC unfettered authority to preempt the states from enforcing their own laws or otherwise alter the role that states have traditionally occupied in our “dual banking system.” Cf. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 221, 117 S.Ct. 666, 136 L.Ed.2d 656 (1997); Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nor does the regulation change the extent to which national banks remain “subject to state laws of general application in their daily business.” Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1567; see also Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33, 116 S.Ct. 1103 (recognizing the power of states to regulate national banks “where ... doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers”). Rather, the OCC’s regulation simply confirms that where, as here, a state law specifically concerns “activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law,” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2), its enforcement by state officials may constitute a prohibited visitation.

In drawing the lines that it did in § 7.4000(a), the OCC reached a permissible accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to it by the statute. As we have described above, the OCC’s regulation furthers Congress’s intent, through § 484(a) and other provisions of the NBA, to shield national banks “from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation” in the exercise of their federally authorized powers, such as real estate lending. Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1567. At the same time, it preserves state sovereignty by leaving state officials free to enforce a wide range of laws that do not purport to regulate a national bank’s exercise of its authorized banking powers, as well as by not preempting state laws— including New York State Executive Law § 296-a — that do not directly conflict with such powers. Such laws, we note, remain enforceable by private parties, as well as by the OCC itself.9

Furthermore, as the district court pointed out, the OCC’s interpretation of § 484(a) as restricting the authority of states to enforce certain otherwise non-preempted laws finds support in another recent Congressional enactment, the Rie-gle-Neal Interstate Branch Banking and Efficiency Act of 1994. The Riegle-Neal Act permits national banks to establish interstate branches, and provides that such branches remain subject to “[t]he laws of the host State regarding community reinvestment, consumer protection, [and] fair lending,” except when such laws are federally preempted or determined by the OCC to have a discriminatory effect on national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A). However, the Act specifies that insofar as such state laws remain applicable, they “shall be enforced ... by the Comptroller of the Currency.” Id. § 36(f)(1)(B). We need not determine today whether, by this provision, Congress intended to make the OCC’s enforcement authority exclusive with regard to interstate branches- — -a matter about which the OCC and the Attorney General, predictably, hold opposite views. It is sufficient to note that the Riegle-Neal *121Act, when read in conjunction with § 484(a), highlights the reasonableness of the OCC’s interpretation concerning the scope of its exclusive visitorial powers.

Finally, we agree with the district court that the OCC permissibly interpreted the “courts of justice” exception under § 484(a) as pertaining only “to the powers inherent in the judiciary” and as not “grant[ing] state or other governmental authorities any right to inspect, superintend, direct, regulate or compel compliance by a national bank with respect to any law, regarding the content or conduct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal law.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2); see OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d at 404-06. As we have indicated, the Attorney General’s proposed interpretation of this exception would swallow the rule. The notion that the exception was intended to permit lawsuits, as opposed to administrative actions, appears particularly misguided since at the time the NBA was enacted, visitorial powers were primarily exercised through the bringing of actions in court. See, e.g., Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 157, 26 S.Ct. 4 (“The visitation of civil corporations is by the government itself, through the medium of the courts of justice.”); see also OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d at 405.

By contrast, the OCC has put forth a more reasonable interpretation that comports with the text of the statute, as well as Congress’s overall intent. The exception, as the OCC interprets it, confirms that § 484(a) does not strip the courts of any inherent authority they possess to issue subpoenas, for example, against a national bank, or to exercise jurisdiction over such a bank where it is otherwise proper to do so, simply because such acts in and of themselves might be considered “visito-rial.” See, e.g., NLRB v. N. Trust Co., 148 F.2d 24, 29 (7th Cir.1945); Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 113 F.2d 6, 12 (3d Cir.1940). At the same time, the OCC properly determined that this exception does not positively grant authority to state officials to accomplish what § 484(a) otherwise forbids “by invoking the power of the courts.” OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d at 406.

We conclude that the district court did not err in deferring to the OCC’s interpretation of § 484(a), as set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000. Because we are not prepared to conclude that the OCC’s interpretation was arbitrary or otherwise not in accordance with law, the Attorney General’s Administrative Procedure Act counterclaim fails. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). We therefore affirm the declaratory and in-junctive relief ordered by the district court in OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d at 407-08.

IV

The Attorney General argues that even if he is precluded from enforcing New York State law against the national banks, under § 484(a) and § 7.4000, he nevertheless is permitted to bring an action against such banks to enforce the federal Fair Housing Act, in a parens patriae capacity.10 The Attorney General first mentioned the FHA in his Answer to the OCC’s complaint, and only later clarified that the basis for a potential suit under that statute might be his parens patriae *122authority. The district court concluded that whether or not a state attorney general has standing to sue under the FHA as parens patriae, such an action would constitute a visitation and would not fall within the exception in § 484(a) for visitorial powers “authorized by Federal law.” Clearing House v. Spitzer, 394 F.Supp.2d at 620.

We note at the outset that the OCC did not address the issue of whether the FHA creates a federally authorized exception under § 484(a), and declined to take a position on this issue in the court below on the ground that it was not ripe for adjudication. In its brief to this Court, the OCC purports to have changed its mind regarding ripeness, and now aligns itself with Clearing House on the merits of the claim. We also note that while no party contested our jurisdiction over Clearing House’s claim, the Attorney General did argue below that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, we have an independent obligation to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and we therefore raise the issue nostra sponte. Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir.2006); Palmieri v. Allstate Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir.2006).

We perceive two aspects to this question of jurisdiction. The first is whether Clearing House has properly grounded its complaint in a federal question, consistent with the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. See Fleet Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883, 886 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that the rule “requires a complaint invoking federal question jurisdiction to assert the federal question as part of the plaintiffs claim, and precludes invoking federal question jurisdiction merely to anticipate a federal defense” (internal citations omitted)). The second is whether the FHA issue is ripe for adjudication. See United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir.2002) (observing that “[rjipeness is a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

With regard to the first aspect, the district court correctly noted that “[i]t is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); see also Fleet Bank, 160 F.3d at 888. Thus, the fact that the claim Clearing House is asserting might also serve as the basis for a defense to a potential state court action has no bearing on whether it has satisfied the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Clearing House v. Spitzer, 394 F.Supp.2d at 624-25. Moreover, since Clearing House seeks to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing one federal statute (the FHA) because such enforcement would conflict with another federal statute (the NBA), the issue of whether a federal question has been presented is even more straightforward than in cases such as Fleet Bank and Shaw, which involved actions brought to challenge the threatened enforcement of state laws by state officials.11 See id. at 624; see also Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 650-51, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (Souter, J., concurring).

Somewhat more difficult is the issue of ripeness, which the district court did not address, but which we find necessary to consider given that the Attorney Gener*123al has not yet filed a lawsuit against any national banks on the basis of the FHA. Under Article III, our jurisdiction “extend[s] to all Cases ... [or] Controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill § 2. We have observed that the purpose of the ripeness requirement is to ensure that a dispute has generated injury sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III. See Quinones, 313 F.3d at 58 n. 5. This requirement “prevents a federal court from entangling itself in abstract disagreements over matters that are premature for review because the injury is merely speculative and may never occur.” Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d at 90.

The Supreme Court has advised that ripeness questions are “best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Whether the Attorney General may sue to enforce the FHA against national banks depends on our interpretation of that statute’s grant of standing, along with our understanding of § 484(a). Those questions might be viewed as purely legal ones which would not be significantly clarified by further factual development. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507.

As to the second factor, however, we have serious doubts regarding any hardship that Clearing House might suffer were we to defer consideration of this issue. If this were only a prudential matter, we might be inclined to afford greater weight to the first aspect of the ripeness inquiry. Cf. Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 814-15, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). In this case, however, the question of hardship for ripeness purposes coincides with the question of whether an “imminent injury in fact” has been established for purposes of standing. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genen-tech, Inc., — U.S. - n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 764, 772 n. 8, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). The latter is an independent constitutional requirement. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

The district court held that Clearing House and its members had suffered injury because “[t]he threat of litigation in this case is not merely conjectural or hypothetical.” Clearing House v. Spitzer, 394 F.Supp.2d at 626 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-97, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). Although no enforcement action has yet been filed, the district court noted the Attorney General’s stated intention to file such an action in the absence of an injunction, as well as his belief that the HMDA data are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under both federal and state fair lending laws. See id.

The Supreme Court has recognized that “where threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat— for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced.” MedImmune, 127 S.Ct. at 772; see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (holding that where a threat of prosecution is concrete and not merely speculative, “it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights”). However, the various factors giving rise to *124that principle are mostly absent here. Because Clearing House challenges the Attorney General’s right to enforce the FHA against its members, but does not contest the validity of the federal statute itself or its applicability to national banks, there is no risk that the threat of enforcement would chill conduct in which the banks could otherwise legally engage. Cf. Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 478-79 (2d Cir.1999); St. Martin’s Press, Inc. v. Carey, 605 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.1979).

Nor are Clearing House’s members faced with the dilemma confronted in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), where to test the validity of an allegedly unconstitutional state regulation, the company would have been required to find an agent or employee to disobey the regulation at the risk of a fine or imprisonment. Id. at 145-46, 28 S.Ct. 441; see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 437-38, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). Nor is this a situation in which compliance with a challenged law, prior to its enforcement, would force Clearing House’s members to incur immediate expenses, make changes in their daily activity, or otherwise would affect their “primary conduct.” Cf. Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 810, 123 S.Ct. 2026; Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53, 87 S.Ct. 1507. As we have already emphasized, Clearing House and its members are required to abide by the fair lending provisions of the FHA regardless of whether the New York Attorney General has the authority to enforce those provisions.

Finally, we see no risk that, in the absence of an injunction, the Attorney General will continue to investigate Clearing House’s members prior to filing an enforcement action. Under state law, the Attorney General has broad authority to investigate illegality as well as the power to issue subpoenas. McKinney’s Exec. Law § 63(12); see OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F.Supp.2d at 388. No analogous pre-en-forcement mechanism exists under the FHA, however, and the Attorney General does not contend otherwise. Should the Attorney General ultimately decide to pursue an action to enforce the federal statute, Clearing House could assert its objection immediately before a court, without subjecting itself to any punitive consequences.

For similar reasons, we see no contradiction between our decision to affirm the relief granted by the district court in OCC v. Spitzer and our determination that the FHA claim at issue is not ripe for adjudication. Although the Attorney General had not filed a lawsuit to enforce Executive Law § 296-a, the threat that he might do so became imminent when he issued letters of inquiry to the banks and their subsidiaries. Those letters — in which the Attorney General threatened to invoke his subpoena power — required the banks to take affirmative steps in response or else risk finding themselves in violation of state law, despite their belief that the Attorney General’s authority to enforce such law was federally preempted. Here, by contrast, the Attorney General never mentioned the FHA until after Clearing House filed this action. The Attorney General’s mere assertion, made during trial, that he had the authority to bring a parens patri-ae action under the FHA did not result in any direct or immediate consequences and did not require Clearing House’s members to alter their “primary conduct” in any way that would affect our ripeness analysis.

Because it was unripe, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Clearing House’s claim regarding enforcement of the FHA. We therefore vacate the injunction against the Attorney General’s enforcement of the *125FHA and remand the case to the district court to dismiss that claim. Prudential considerations also weigh in favor of this result. Despite the Attorney General’s stated intentions at the outset of the litigation, it is not certain that he will file an enforcement action under the FHA against national banks now or in the foreseeable future. Since it is unclear what the precise contours of such an action would be, we are neither sure of the exact harm that might be alleged nor of the relief that might be sought.

Moreover, this Court has never had occasion to address the underlying question of whether a state attorney general has standing to sue as parens patriae under the FHA. Cf. Support Ministries for Pers. With Aids, Inc. v. Vill. of Waterford, 799 F.Supp. 272, 279 (N.D.N.Y.1992) (concluding that New York State had parens patri-ae standing to maintain a suit under the FHA); Hous. Auth. of the Kaw Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. City of Ponca, 952 F.2d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that a state housing authority could be considered a “person” for purposes of standing under the FHA). Though we do not believe it would be appropriate to do so in the first instance on the basis of the hypothetical action posited in this case, we note that both Congress and the Supreme Court have made clear that standing to sue under the FHA is extraordinarily permissive. See infra. As a result, the question of whether the NBA precludes state attorneys general from seeking to enforce the FHA against national banks is significantly more complicated than the district court’s analysis suggests.

The FHA includes a broad remedial provision that allows any “aggrieved person” to bring an action in district court on the basis of a discriminatory housing practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of this provision as evincing “a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (holding that a non-profit organization had standing to sue under the FHA); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-11, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (holding that a municipality had standing to sue as an aggrieved person under the FHA, and reiterating Traffi-cante’s broad interpretation of standing under the statute).12 Congress itself “reaffirm[ed] the broad holdings of these cases” when it adopted amendments to the FHA in 1988. H.R.Rep. No. 100-711, at 23 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184 (citing Havens Realty and Gladstone). As the district court recognized, we have generally interpreted such broad grants of standing as reflecting “Congressional intent to permit states to enforce the rights protected by federal statutes through parens patriae actions.” Clearing House v. Spitzer, 394 F.Supp.2d at 628 (citing Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir.2002)). In light of these powerful indicators that Congress intended expansive standing to enforce the FHA, we *126are reluctant to consider arguments for restricting that standing on the basis of what is at best an incomplete record.

For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the district court’s judgment in OCC v. Spitzer. We Affirm in part and Vaoate in part the district court’s separate judgment in Clearing House v. Spitzer, and we Remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss the Fair Housing Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.