Sacirbey v. Guccione

In this appeal we consider whether an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court that no longer has jurisdiction over the accused, nor the power to enforce the warrant, can provide an adequate basis for the extradition of a United States citizen. This is a question of first impression-and the fact that this issue has not been previously decided should not be surprising. It is a rare circumstance where the very document that provides the basis for an extradition request turns out to have been issued by an entity that no longer has lawful authority over the matter. While the factual and procedural history of this case is extraordinary, our resolution of it requires only that we apply the plain meaning of the provisions of the relevant treaty. The treaty authorizes the extradition of an individual who has been “charged” with a crime and requires that an arrest warrant and supporting materials be provided in order to obtain that extradition. Because the arrest warrant at issue in this case was issued by a court that neither has jurisdiction over the matter nor authority to enforce the warrant, the requirement of the treaty that an individual be “charged” with an extraditable offense has not been satisfied. This defect falls within the narrow category of issues that is cognizable on habeas review of an extradition order; we therefore reverse the order of the District Court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Overview1

Muhamed Sacirbey, also known as Mu-hamed Saeirbegovic, was born in 1956 in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. At that time, the Communist regime led by Josip Broz (Tito) controlled Yugoslavia, and Sacir-bey’s parents opposed Tito’s authoritarian government. For their dissenting political beliefs, Sacirbey’s parents were imprisoned for a time. In the 1960s, the Sacir-bey family fled Yugoslavia and immigrated to the United States, where they settled in Ohio. On April 27, 1973, at the age of sixteen, Sacirbey became a naturalized citizen of the United States. During the *55years that followed, Sacirbey attended Tulane University on a football scholarship; he earned a bachelor’s degree and a degree in law at Tulane and a Master of Business Administration degree at Columbia University. After his admission to the Bar of the State of New York, Sacirbey worked as a lawyer for a New York law firm. In the 1980s, he left his law firm to work in the financial sector, first as a Vice President at Standard and Poor’s, the rating agency, and later as Vice President of an investment bank.

On April 5, 1992, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovinia (“Bosnia”) declared its independence from Yugoslavia. The United States officially recognized Bosnia’s independence two days later, and Bosnia was admitted to membership in the United Nations on May 22, 1992. Shortly thereafter, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, a leader of the Muslim community of Bosnia, appointed Sacirbey to serve as Bosnia’s ambassador to the United Nations. Despite international recognition, Bosnian Serbs continued to oppose independence and, with the support of the government of Serbia — a neighboring province in the former Yugoslavia — launched a violent campaign to partition the country along ethnic lines. According to the United States Department of State, “[t]he conflict continued through most of 1995, and many atrocities were committed, including acts of genocide committed by members of the [Bosnian Serb armed forces] in and around Srebre-nica from July 12-22, 1995, where approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed.” Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), available at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm (last visited December 8, 2009). Sacirbey, appointed Bosnian Foreign Minister upon the assassination of his predecessor in 1995, represented Bosnia at peace talks held in 1995 outside of Dayton, Ohio.2 Those talks lead to the Dayton Peace Accords, which were formally signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris and which ended the war in Bosnia after more than three years and ensured Bosnia’s independence under the supervision of a High Representative selected by the United Nations Security Council. Id.

Sacirbey continued to represent Bosnia at the United Nations until 2000. During his eight-year tenure as Bosnia’s first United Nations ambassador, Sacirbey opened the Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the General Consulate of Bosnia in New York (the “U.N. Mission”), promoted the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”),3 and managed the legal team in an action against Yugoslavia for genocide in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).4 For much of this period, the finances of the U.N. Mission were in disarray. Sacirbey claims that he received no salary for his services and that he had to open the U.N. Mission *56using his personal resources, including fees from his speaking engagements, and by soliciting contributions from sympathetic nations. As Saeirbey concedes, funds earmarked for one project were often spent on another, and personal bank accounts were used to house those funds. See J.A. 11-12 (Affidavit of Muhamed Sacirbey, Mar. 17, 2005, at ¶¶ 21-27).5

Saeirbey resigned from his ambassadorship and returned to private life in the United States in December 2000. After his resignation, Saeirbey claims to have learned that Bosnian Foreign Minister Zlatko Lagumdzija, a perceived political adversary of Saeirbey and allegedly a former official in the Communist Party, had launched an investigation of him. In early 2001, the Foreign Ministry requested that the Cantonal Prosecutors Office in Sarajevo 6 investigate alleged financial irregularities at the U.N. Mission during Sacirbey’s tenure. On April 11, 2001, the Cantonal Prosecutor submitted a Demand for Investigation to the Cantonal Court, alleging that Saeirbey had abused his office in violation of Bosnian law. Specifically, the prosecutor alleged that (1) Saeirbey had embezzled $610,982.46 and (2) there was a $1.8 million shortfall in an investment account over which Saeirbey had signature authority.7 See Sacirbey v. Guccione, No. 05 Cv. 2949, 2006 WL 2585561, *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006) (“Saeirbey II”). In response to the prosecutor’s application, the Cantonal Court issued a Decision to Investigate Saeirbey on August 20, 2001, and later, on December 5, 2001, a Decision for Detention and an International Arrest Warrant for Saeirbey. Id. at **1-2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *5-6.

Bosnia sought the extradition of Sacir-bey in a formal request to the United States Department of Justice dated January 29, 2002. Bosnia’s request was made pursuant to an extradition treaty executed in 1902 by the United States and the Kingdom of Serbia (the “Treaty”),8 which provides, in part, that

*57The Government of the United States and the Government of Servia [sic] mutually agree to deliver up persons who, having been charged with or convicted of any of the crimes and offenses specified in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties, shall seek an asylum or be found within the territories of the other: Provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had been committed there.

Treaty for Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, U.S.-Serb., art. I, Mar. 7, 1902 (date of ratification by the President), 32 Stat. 1890, 12 Bevans 1238. Under Article II of the Treaty, “[e]mbezzlement by public officers” is among the offenses specified for extradition. Id. In order to secure extradition of a “fugitive [who] is merely charged with crime,” Article III of the Treaty requires the requesting government to provide “a duly authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest in the country where the crime has been committed, and of the depositions or other evidence upon which such warrant was issued.... ” Article IV provides that “in advance of the presentation of formal proofs, complaint on oath ... shall be made by an agent of the Government of Servia [sic] before a judge or other magistrate authorized to issue warrants of arrest.” In addition, the Treaty provides that “[n]either of the high contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this Treaty,” id. at art. V, and that “offense[s] of a political character” may not lead to extradition under the Treaty, id. at art. VI.

While the Treaty expressly authorizes the United States to decline to extradite Sacirbey because he is a U.S. citizen, the Department of State is authorized by statute to extradite U.S. citizens who otherwise come within the scope of the relevant extradition treaty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (“If the applicable treaty or convention does not obligate the United States to extradite its citizens to a foreign country, the Secretary of State may, nevertheless, order the surrender to that country of a United States citizen whose extradition has been requested by that country if the other requirements of that treaty or convention are met.”). The Department of State appears to have chosen to exercise its discretion in this case by requesting Sacireby’s extradition. On March 17, 2003, the Department of Justice filed a Complaint for Arrest with a View Towards Extradition of Sacirbey in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Sacirbey was arrested in March 2003 and detained for over a year until he was released on bail in July 2004.9

B. Procedural History

The matter was assigned to Magistrate Judge Frank Maas for a determination of whether Sacirbey should be extradited pursuant to Bosnia’s request. See In re The Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic, No. 03 Crim. Misc. 01, 2005 WL 107094, at *1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2005) (“Sacirbey I”). Judge Maas held a hearing on December 23, 2003, during which the govern*58ment introduced the following evidence in support of extradition: (1) the Cantonal Court’s August 20, 2001 Decision to Investigate; (2) the Cantonal Court’s December 5, 2001 Decision for Detention and International Arrest Warrant for Sacirbey; (3) the sworn statements of three witness; and (4) an affidavit from Robert E. Dalton, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs at the United States Department of State, briefly explaining the history of the Treaty. See id. at **3-6, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *10-17; Appellees’ Br. 7-8.

Sacirbey opposed extradition on the grounds that (1) there was no valid extradition treaty between the United States and Bosnia, (2) the offense of Abuse of Office or Authority for which extradition was sought failed to meet the Treaty requirements, (3) Bosnia had failed to charge him formally with an extraditable offense, (4) Bosnia had failed to establish probable cause to believe that he committed any crimes, and (5) his conduct fell within a Treaty exception for crimes of a political character. Sacirbey I, 2005 WL 107094, at *1, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *2. In support of his case, Sacirbey offered his own testimony, as well as the testimony of Paul Robert Williams, a former State Department employee and current professor of law, and the declaration of Michael Hartmann, then an adviser to the State Department on matters of criminal prosecution in Afghanistan, as an expert on Bosnian criminal law. Sacirbey testified that the finances of the U.N. mission were haphazard during his tenure and that his political adversaries were using a criminal investigation to retaliate against him. Id. at **6-8, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at **20-25. Professor Williams corroborated Sacirbey’s claims, testifying that “after Sa-cirbey left office, the party controlling the Bosnian government changed hands, and the new party, ‘which was the former communist party, essentially recloaked, had a very specific motive in going after members of the former regime to discredit them for political reasons.’ ” Id. at **6-7, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *19-20.

In an Opinion and Order dated January 19, 2005, Magistrate Judge Maas granted the extradition request. Rejecting Sacir-bey’s arguments, Magistrate Judge Maas concluded that (1) Bosnia had succeeded to the Treaty, see id. at **11-12, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *33-34; (2) the offense of “abuse of authority” was sufficiently equivalent to “embezzlement by public officers” to warrant extradition under the Treaty, see id. at *15, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *45; (3) a formal criminal charge is not required by the Treaty, see id. at *16, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *47-48; (4) probable cause had been established by the affidavits submitted in support of the extradition request, see id. at *19, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *57; and (5) the political-crimes exception did not apply to allegations of embezzlement, see id. at **19-21, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 707, at *58-61. On January 25, 2005, Judge Maas issued a Certification of Extraditability and Order of Commitment. [A 794]

Three months later, Sacirbey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Barbara S. Jones, Judge).10 Observing that the scope of its review was limited to determining whether (1) the *59magistrate judge had jurisdiction, (2) the charged offense fell within the Treaty, and (3) there was a reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty of the charged offense, the District Court denied Sacirbey’s petition. See Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, at *6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *19 (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925)).

In his habeas petition, Sacirbey did not challenge Magistrate Judge Maas’s jurisdiction over Bosnia’s extradition request, so that ground for habeas relief was effectively conceded. See id. at *6 n. 10, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *19 n. 10. Instead, he pressed the two other claims cognizable on habeas review, and made several constitutional challenges to the adequacy of the proceedings before Magistrate Judge Maas.

With respect to the second claim cognizable on habeas review, Sacirbey failed to persuade the District Court that he was not “charged” with an extraditable offense.11 Sacirbey argued, inter alia, that legal reforms in Bosnia had deprived the Cantonal Court of jurisdiction over this matter, thereby nullifying the arrest warrant for Sacirbey. At oral argument before the District Court, counsel for Sacir-bey emphasized, “The Cantonal Court is done. It does not exist.... The old system under which my client was charged has disappeared.” J.A. 845 (Tr. of Proceedings 50:1-4, Oct. 4, 2005). In light of the government’s concession that “ ‘[tjhere is ambiguity’ as to whether the Cantonal Court has jurisdiction over the investigation of Sacirbey,” J.A. 851 (Tr. of Proceedings 56:15-16, Oct. 4, 2005), the District Court authorized the parties to submit additional briefing on the question of whether a court had jurisdiction over the investigation of Sacirbey.

Pursuant to the District Court’s authorization, Sacirbey submitted declarations from his Bosnian lawyer, Zlatan Terzic, and from Michael Hartmann, the same expert who had previously filed a declaration in opposition to the government’s application to extradite Sacirbey. The Terzic declaration stated that, based on Terzic’s personal inquiries, neither the Cantonal Court nor the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the “National Court”) “has been seized of the case against ... Sacirbey. Therefore, there is no forum available to us to approach for resolution, to petition for appropriate remedies, or to challenge the propriety and legality of this allegedly ongoing investigation.” J.A. 871-72 (Nov. 22, 2005 Decl. of Zlatan Terzic ¶ 2). The Hartmann Declaration stated flatly that, “by the admissions of the Bosnian [government] ... neither the National nor Cantonal Court, nor the Cantonal Prosecutor, have possession of the case. The only state organ not denying possession of the case but rather affirming its possession is the office of the National Prosecutor.” J.A. 910 (Nov. 22, 2005 Decl. of Michael Hartmann ¶ 25). Sacirbey argued that, because no court had jurisdiction over his case, he was not charged with a crime, but only the target of an investigation.12

*60In response, the government submitted two letters written by Amra Kosovic, Counselor to the Bosnian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Kosovic’s first letter, dated October 11, 2005, stated that “[the National Court] will proceed in the matter of [Sacirbey] if the request for extradition would be approved by the appropriate authorities of [the] United States.” J.A. 960 (Oct. 11, 2005 Letter of Amra Kosovic). A second letter, dated November 10, 2005, was more equivocal on the question of whether the National Court had jurisdiction over the case. Kosovic’s letter stated in relevant part:

The Cantonal Court ... exists and hears all cases that are within its jurisdiction. During the period of justice system reforms, the [National Court] was established and the [National] Court can, on request of the parties in a case, decide to hear this case of extradition or any other case if the necessary requirements according to the [Bosnian Criminal Procedure Code are met]. As you were informed, [the] Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia ... has sent notice that [it] took the investigation which was previously] held by [the] Prosecutor’s Office of Canton Sarajevo.

J.A. 961 (Nov. 10, 2005 Letter of Amra Kosovic) (emphasis added). Recognizing that these letters “do[] not elaborate on the relationship between the Cantonal Court, which originally issued the arrest warrant and demand for investigation against Mr. Sacirbey, and the [National Court], which now appears to be ... seized of jurisdiction over Mr. Sacirbey’s case,” the government argued that these letters nevertheless demonstrated that “a Bosnian court ... would handle Mr. Sacir-bey’s proceeding upon his extradition.” J.A. 958 (Nov. 22, 2005 Letter of Assistant United States Attorney Anjan Sahni).

The District Court agreed with the government. Explaining that the “issue arises because of [Bosnia’s] change from a civil law to a common law system [13] since the issuance of the original Demand against Sacirbey,” the District Court found that “the investigative functions which had been vested in [Bosnia’s] civil law courts were transferred to independent prosecu*61tors at the cantonal and national levelsf, and] a National Court system was established, equivalent to the United States federal court system, and a new National Criminal Code was adopted.” Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, *7 n. 12, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577 at *23 n. 12. The District Court concluded that, “by the time the United States Government filed the Complaint, the Investigative Office of the Cantonal Court that had issued the Warrant Order no longer had any power to enforce it.” Id. These developments were “quite beside the point,” in the view of the District Court, because “[a]ll that is required is that Sacirbey be ‘charged,’ which he had been at the time his extradition was sought, and continues to be.” Id. at *7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *23.

Relying on authority from the Seventh Circuit and a district court in our Circuit, the District Court observed that “[t]he term ‘charge,’ in this context, has been interpreted by courts to require something less than a formal charge: for example, the requirement has been deemed satisfied where a subject is ‘accused,’ or the requesting nation ‘intends to prosecute’ him.” Id. at *7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *21 (quoting In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1242 (7th Cir.1980) (“Assarsson I”); Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136 F.Supp.2d 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y.2001)) (brackets omitted). The District Court held that the evidence showed Bosnia’s intent to prosecute Sacirbey for abuse of authority. This determination was based on the record developed in the proceedings before Judge Maas and on the two letters written by Kosovie, the Bosnian Embassy counselor, which demonstrated to the District Court “a present intent to prosecute Sacirbey in the National Court [of Bosnia].” Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, at *7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *23 (emphasis added).

The District Court also determined that the charged offense, “abuse of authority,” fell within the Treaty’s enumerated offenses — namely, the offense of embezzlement. See id. at **7-8, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *24 (citing Art. II of the Treaty). It further held that the requirement of “dual criminality” — i.e., that the alleged conduct constitute a criminal offense in both countries — was “easily satisfied” because “there are numerous federal crimes for which Sacirbey could have been charged in the United States based on the allegations against him.” Id. at *10, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *33. The political offense exception set forth in Article VI of the Treaty did not bar Sacirbey’s extradition, according to the District Court, because the exception applied to “political offenses — not political figures,” id. at **10-11, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *34, and the financial misconduct at issue here did not constitute a political offense. Accordingly, the District Court concluded that the charged offense fell within the scope of the Treaty.

Turning to the third claim cognizable on habeas review of an extradition order, the District Court determined that there was a reasonable basis to believe Sacirbey was guilty of the charged offense. The District Court listed the evidence against Sacirbey:

(i) there were significant shortfalls in the [U.N.] Mission’s account, over which Sacirbey had signature authority; (ii) Sacirbey refused to explain certain non-routine expenditures to Ministry representatives, even though [Bosnian] procedures do not allow for confidential expenditures; (iii) President Izetbegovic expressly denied that Sacirbey had been authorized to spend [Bosnian] funds on the ICJ and ICTY cases; (iv) Sacirbey represented that he would be able to restore some of the missing funds, but then failed to do so; (v) he may have evaded the efforts of [Bosnian] authori*62ties to question him about the accounting problems; and (vi) he failed to account properly for personal advances that he had taken against the Mission account.

Id. at *12, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *88-39. In the District Court’s judgment, “[t]his evidence clearly supported] [Magistrate] Judge Maas’s determination that a finder of fact reasonably could conclude that Sacirbey embezzled funds from the Mission account and used them for his own personal needs.” Id. at *12, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *39 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The District Court also rejected Sacir-bey’s constitutional challenges to the adequacy of the proceedings before Magistrate Judge Maas. First, Sacirbey argued that the government’s refusal to produce evidence relating to the role of United States officials in preparing or pursuing the extradition request violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The District Court disagreed, explaining that “[e]ven if Brady can be said to apply in the extradition context ... Brady would not extend to Sacirbey’s discovery requests ... because Sacirbey’s requests were directed not at exculpatory evidence, but rather information regarding the political motivations, if any, behind [Bosnia’s] request for his extradition.” Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, at *14, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *44 (emphasis in original). Second, Sacir-bey challenged Magistrate Judge Maas’s refusal to reopen the extradition hearing to allow the submission of a reply declaration in response to an expert declaration submitted by the government. The District Court rejected the challenge because Sacirbey failed to show prejudice. Id. at **14-15, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *45-46. Third, Sacirbey urged the District Court to consider the danger and deprivation of due process he would face if extradited to Bosnia. Citing the “well-entrenched rule of non-inquiry” into the legal procedures of a country requesting extradition pursuant to a treaty, the District Court did not entertain this challenge. Id. at *15, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *47; see Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir.1990) (“A consideration of the procedures that will or may occur in the requesting country is not within the purview of a habeas corpus judge.”).

Having made these determinations, the District Court denied Sacribey’s habeas corpus petition. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Sacirbey reiterates the arguments that he presented to the District Court, including that he was not charged with an extraditable offense under the Treaty. This argument presents a question of first impression for our Court, requiring us to examine a relatively undeveloped area of law.14

A. Standard of Review

The basis for Sacirbey’s petition for habeas corpus is that, by means of the extradition proceedings against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, he has been placed “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Our review of the denial of a petition for habeas corpus in extradition proceedings is “narrow” in scope. Murphy v. United States, *63199 F.3d 599, 601 (2d Cir.1999). A reviewing court can consider only three issues: “(1) whether the judge below had jurisdiction; (2) whether the offense charged is extraditable under the relevant treaty; and (3) whether the evidence presented by the Government established probable cause to extradite.” Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.2000); see also Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312, 45 S.Ct. 541.

We are not at liberty to second guess the determination of the magistrate judge to issue an order certifying a request for extradition. Under our precedents, “[hjabeas corpus is not a writ of error, and it is not a means of rehearing what the [extradition] judge or magistrate already has decided.” Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1066; accord Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192-93 (5th Cir.1971) (“A writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to hear for a second time the findings of the court which conducted the initial hearing. As has been said often, habeas corpus cannot take the place of a writ of error.”).

It is nevertheless “our duty ... to ensur[e] that the applicable provisions of the treaty and the governing American statutes are complied with.” U.S. ex rel. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 565 (2d Cir.1963) (Marshall, J.); see also Murphy, 199 F.3d at 601-02 (“The function of habeas review in this context is to test only the legality of the extradition proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

With these principles in mind, we review the factual findings of the District Court for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. See Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir.2009) (providing the general standard for review of habeas corpus petitions); cf. Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.2006) (reviewing de novo a petitioner’s legal arguments — raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2241— that his confinement for civil contempt violated the Fifth Amendment and several federal statutes).

B. Sacirbey Was Not Charged with an Extraditable Offense under the Treaty.

Sacirbey argues that he has not been “charged” with an extraditable offense pursuant to the terms of the Treaty.15 On Sacirbey’s reading of the record, the evidence shows that an investigative warrant for his arrest was issued in 2001, but the issuing court was subsequently dissolved, with the consequence that “no [c]ourt in Bosnia is currently seized of the matter.” Appellant’s Br. 24 (emphasis in original). In Sacirbey’s view, the putative interest that Bosnia asserted in correspondence cannot remedy the inadequacy of the warrant that underlies Bosnia’s extradition request. The government responds that the Treaty “does not condition extradition on formal charges,” and “all that need be shown is that the requesting nation intends to prosecute the extraditee.” Appel-lees’ Br. 34-35. Under the government’s reading of the record, “Bosnia has repeatedly and unambiguously” indicated its intention to prosecute Sacirbey. Id. at 35. As noted above, the District Court agreed with the government’s view of the evidence. Relying on non-binding precedents construing similar language in other treaties, the District Court observed that “[t]he term ‘charge,’ in this context, has been interpreted by courts to require something less than a formal charge: for example, the requirement has been *64deemed satisfied where a subject is ‘accused,’ or the requesting nation ‘intend[s] to prosecute’ him.” Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, at **6-7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *21 (internal citations omitted).

In one of the cases on which the District Court relied, Assarsson I, the petitioner argued that because “a formal document, called a ‘charge’ in the Swedish criminal code, ... ha[d] not yet been filed against him, he [could not] be extradited.” 635 F.2d at 1239. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds that (1) “[t]he filing of formal charges is not stated anywhere [in the treaty] as a prerequisite to extradition,” id. at 1242; and (2) U.S. courts are not empowered to “review compliance with foreign criminal procedure” in the course of ordering extradition pursuant to a valid treaty, id. at 1244. The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a case involving the brother of the petitioner in Assarsson I. In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir.1982) (“Assarsson II”). The Eighth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s holding that, where “[t]he filing of formal charges is not stated anywhere as a prerequisite to extradition ..., we may not review the magistrate’s determination that [the extraditee] was charged under the terms of the treaty.” Assarsson II, 687 F.2d at 1160 (quoting Assarsson I, 635 F.2d at 1242).

The government informs us that the reasoning of Assarsson I and Assarsson II, has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit as well. Appellees’ Br. 35; see Emami v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444, 1448-49 (9th Cir.1987). Like the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit determined that, where an extradition treaty does not condition extradition on the filing of formal charges, it would not read such a requirement into the treaty. That court explained, “We refrain from interpreting the requirements of German criminal procedure [with respect to the filing of a public charge] both out of respect for German sovereignty and because we recognize the chance of erroneous interpretation is much greater when we try to construe the law of a country whose legal system is not based on common law principles.” Id. at 1449.16

Similar “formal-charge” arguments have been rejected by other courts, including district courts in this Circuit. These courts have also addressed the question of how to establish that a crime has been “charged” for the purposes of an extradition treaty, holding that a demonstrated intent to prosecute on the part of the country requesting extradition is sufficient. See Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136 F.Supp.2d 125, 130 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (“American courts *65cannot become enmeshed in the technicalities of foreign criminal processes, and ... the ‘charge’ requirement is satisfied by a requesting nation’s intent to prosecute as evidenced by the record.” (emphasis added)); In re La Salvia, No. 84 Cr. Misc. 1, 1986 WL 1436, *6, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29789, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1986) (“[T]he reference to ‘persons ... charged’ in [the treaty] ... is a generic term referring to those persons whose extradition is sought so that they may be brought to trial.” (emphasis added)); cf. In re Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 512 (D.Del.1996) (“[SJufficient evidence of an intent to prosecute exists making extradition proper under these circumstances.”) (emphasis added).

The government interprets these precedents to stand for the following proposition: When extradition treaties state that an individual must be “charged” with a crime in order to be extradited, but do not require the filing of an accusatory instrument, a state seeking extradition need show only an intent to prosecute the individual in order to satisfy the requirement that he be “charged” with a crime. This proposition appears reasonable insofar as it gives meaning to treaty language stating that an individual must be “charged” with an offense in order to be extradited, while avoiding unwarranted incursions into the fine details of foreign criminal procedure. See, e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.1976) (“It is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation. Such an assumption would directly conflict with the principle of comity upon which extradition is based.”). Applying that teaching to this case, the government urges us to conclude that, because the Treaty requires that an individual be “charged” with a crime but does not require that formal charges be brought, a “clear intent” to prosecute is sufficient to satisfy the terms of the Treaty. Appellees’ Br. 44.

Sacirbey responds that one additional proposition follows from the cases cited by the District Court and the government— “that there at least be a judicial body in the requesting state seized of the matter, to which the extraditee can petition for relief.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 8. Sacirbey observes that, in all of these cases, an “instituted judicial proceeding,” id. was underway in the requesting country. See Emami, 834 F.2d at 1447 (Bochum Local Court in Germany); Assarsson II, 687 F.2d at 1158 (Malmo District Court in Sweden); Assarsson I, 635 F.2d at 1239 (Malmo District Court in Sweden); Borodin, 136 F.Supp.2d at 127 (proceedings before a Swiss Examining Magistrate); In re Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. at 508 (Saarbrucken District Court in Germany); In re La Salvia, 1986 WL 1436, at *7, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29789, at *21 (Federal Court of First Instance in Penal and Correctional Matters in Argentina). Based on this observation, Sacirbey argues that the Treaty should be read to require a showing of “[t]he presence of a judicial authority conducting proceedings toward prosecution of the potential extraditee.” Appellant’s Br. 23. In the absence of such a requirement, Sacirbey fears that “an ex-traditee may ... be handed over to political officers of a foreign country for arbitrary and potentially brutal prosecution.” Id. at 24. He urges us to conclude that, “because no existing [c]ourt has issued a warrant for his arrest or assumed responsibility for his prosecution or protection,” he has not been “charged” with a crime under the Treaty. Appellant’s Reply Br. 11.

We appreciate the force of Sacirbey’s concerns. Indeed, he may be right that extradition treaties should contain provi*66sions ensuring that a judicial body in the requesting country stand ready to ensure procedural regularity upon the transfer of custody over the accused. Whether or not the United States should condition extradition — particularly the extradition of its own citizens — on such safeguards is not, however, a question over which this Court has jurisdiction. “[T]he question of the wisdom of extradition remains for the executive branch to decide.” Murphy, 199 F.3d at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our power, by contrast, is “limited to ensuring that the applicable provisions of the treaty and the governing American statutes are complied with.” Petrushansky, 325 F.2d at 565.

In keeping with that limited authority, we examine the requirements of the extradition treaty in this case. “In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992); see also Kahn Lucas Lancaster v. Lark Int’l, 186 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.1999) (“Treaties are construed in much the same manner as statutes[,] [and their interpretation] must account for the ... full text, language as well as punctuation, structure and subject matter.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). A basic canon of statutory interpretation, which is equally applicable to interpreting treaties, is to avoid readings that “render statutory language surplusage” or “redundant.” Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 220 (2d Cir.2004); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1981) (“[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.”). In addition, we have observed that “the meaning of one term may be determined by reference to the terms it is associated with, and that where specific words follow a general word, the specific words restrict application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated.” City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 401 (2d Cir.2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) (1981) (“[Sjpecific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language.”).

In the instant case, our review focuses on “whether the offense charged is extraditable under the relevant treaty.” Cheung, 213 F.3d at 88 (emphasis added). Article I of the Treaty sets forth a foundational principle that the states parties “mutually agree to deliver up persons who[] hav[e] been charged with or convicted of any of the crimes and offenses” (emphasis added), which are supplied in Article II. The remaining articles of the Treaty define the contours of the broad agreement in Article I, including certain limitations on the breadth of the term “charged.” Most important to the instant case, Article III of the Treaty imposes a requirement that when “[a] fugitive is merely charged with crime, a duly authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest in the country where the crime has been committed, and of the depositions or other evidence upon which such warrant was issued, shall be produced.” 17 Treaty art. Ill (emphases added). In other words, the “warrant of arrest” is a formal legal instrument that is required by the Treaty to show that a person has been charged with an extraditable crime. See art. IV (describing the *67Article III warrant requirement as a “presentation of formal proofs” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we interpret these provisions to mean that the proof required under the Treaty to establish that an individual has been “charged” with a crime is a valid arrest warrant and the evidence submitted in order to obtain that warrant. Any other reading would ignore the express terms of Article III. Cf. Filler, 378 F.3d at 220 (stating that courts should avoid readings that “render statutory language surplusage”).

Under this construction of the Treaty, Bosnia can satisfy the requirement that Sacirbey be “charged” with a crime only if it can provide, inter alia, a valid warrant for his arrest. Bosnia seeks the extradition of Sacirbey pursuant to an “international arrest warrant” issued by the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo. However, as the District Court found, the Cantonal Court currently lacks jurisdiction over the investigation of Sacirbey’s alleged crimes and “no longer ha[s] any power to enforce” the arrest warrant. Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, at *7 n. 12, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *23 n. 12.18 Such a warrant—one issued by a court lacking jurisdiction to enforce it — has been described in another context by the Supreme Court as a “dead letter.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (rejecting an argument that a warrant issued by a magistrate in the United States would have force in Mexico); see also In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 171 n. 8 (2d Cir.2008) (describing the power conferred by a valid search warrant). The arrest warrant for Sacirbey was never re-issued — or otherwise ratified — by a Bosnian court with jurisdiction over this case.19 Accordingly, the existence of this arrest warrant — issued by a court ousted of jurisdiction and no longer able to enforce it — cannot satisfy the Treaty’s requirement that Bosnia demonstrate a “charge” by producing a valid arrest warrant.

Consistent with its interpretation of the precedents discussed above, the government maintains that the defect in Bosnia’s application can be remedied by official statements indicating Bosnia’s intent to prosecute Sacirbey for his alleged crimes. The government points to letters from various Bosnian officials that allegedly show an intention to prosecute Sacirbey, but proof of such an intention is not what the Treaty requires.20 Even if it did, these letters are equivocal, at best, on the question of whether Bosnian authorities intend to prosecute Sacirbey for his alleged crimes. The letter dated October 2, 2003 from Assistant United States Attorney E. Danya Perry to Magistrate Judge Mass states: “[T]he Cantonal Prosecutor, Mus-tafa Bisic, confirmed that there is an ongoing criminal investigation against Sacir-bey” and that the Bosnian government sought extradition to further that investi*68gation. J.A 383. The virtually illegible attachment to the October 2 letter also refers to an “investigation against Sacir-bey” but does not indicate an intention to prosecute, rather than merely investigate, him. Id. at 385.

The letters from Amra Kosovie, Counselor to the Bosnian Embassy in Washington DC, similarly confirm only that Sacir-bey is under investigation in Bosnia, not that the Bosnian government seeks to prosecute him. Her letter of October 11, 2005 states ambiguously that “the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina will proceed in the Matter of Mohamed Sacirbegovic if the request for extradition would be approved.” Id. at 960. This statement does not hint at how the Bosnian court will proceed — that is, whether by immediate prosecution or by permitting the prosecutor to undertake further investigation. Kosovic’s letter of November 10, 2005 does nothing to clarify the matter. In that letter, she states that the “Cantonal Court — the one that issued the warrant and demand for investigation of Mr. Mu-hamed Sacirbegovic — was [not] abolished by the justice system reforms,” and she confirms that the “Court exists and hears all cases that are within its jurisdiction.” J.A 961. Of course, we know that Sacir-bey’s case is no longer within that court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Bosnia’s judicial reforms. Sacirbey II, 2006 WL 2585561, at *7 n. 12, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64577, at *23 n. 12. Perhaps recognizing this fact, the letter notes that “the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established and ... can, on request of the parties in a case, decide to hear this case of extradition.” J.A. 961 (emphasis added). Contradicting this conditional statement regarding the Bosnian court’s jurisdiction, Kosovie reiterates, verbatim from her earlier letter, that “[t]he Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina will proceed in the Matter of Mohamed Sacirbegovic if the request for extradition would be approved.” Id. (emphasis added). In addition, she observes that the “Prosecutor’s office of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... took the investigation which was previously held by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Canton Sarajevo.” Id. Again, the letter is devoid of any statement that Sacirbey is sought for prosecution in Bosnia.21

That nothing more than a criminal investigation of Sacirbey is now pending in Bosnia finds further support in a letter, dated March 3, 2005, from the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo stating that “no indictment against [Sacirbey] ... has been brought before the Municipal Court Sarajevo or the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo.” Id. at 749. This letter states that the “criminal investigation against [him] ... was referred to the Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office Sarajevo on 08/06/2003 for appropriate action.” Id. While formal charges are not required to grant an extradition request, this letter corroborates that an in*69vestigation of Sacirbey in the prosecutor’s office — rather than a prosecution in court22 — is pending in Bosnia. Based on our review of this evidence, we are dubious that Bosnia seeks to prosecute Sacirbey for a crime.23

In any event, whether Bosnia has an “intent to prosecute” Sacirbey is not the relevant inquiry. As explained above, the Treaty requires a valid arrest warrant as proof that an individual sought for extradition has been charged with a crime. That requirement is not satisfied by a demonstration of intent to prosecute. The necessary showing has not been made in this case. All of the “formal charges” cases cited by the government indicate the existence of a valid arrest warrant issued by a foreign tribunal. See Emami, 834 F.2d at 1447 (arrest warrant issued by a German court); Assarsson II, 687 F.2d at 1158 (arrest declaration issued by Swedish court); Assarsson I, 635 F.2d at 1239 (arrest declaration issued by Swedish court); Borodin, 136 F.Supp.2d at 127 (arrest warrant issued by Swiss magistrate); In re Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. at 508 (arrest warrant issued by a German court); In re La Salvia, 1986 WL 1436, at *7, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29789, at *21 (arrest warrant issued by Argentina court). None of those cases involve a situation where the issuing tribunal subsequently lost jurisdiction over the case owing to a constitutional reorganization, regime change, or any other reason, such that the arrest warrant was no longer valid.

Because the record contains no evidence of a valid warrant authorizing the arrest of Sacirbey, Sacirbey has not been charged with an extraditable offense pursuant to the terms of the Treaty. This defect falls within the narrow category of issues that is cognizable on habeas review of an extradition order, see Cheung, 213 F.3d at 88, and we therefore grant Sacirbey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Sacirbey has not been “charged” with an extraditable offense pursuant to the terms of the extradition treaty between the United States and Bosnia. He is therefore entitled to habeas relief.

We also note, in passing, that, if Bosnia renews its request to extradite Sacirbey, the Department of State is authorized by the extradition treaty and by statute to refrain from extraditing Sacirbey because he is a citizen of the United States. An exercise of that discretion might be warranted if Bosnia renews its extradition request and the Department of State determines that the investigation into Sacirbey’s tenure as United Nations Ambassador is motivated by a political vendetta, or that *70Sacirbey faces mistreatment if he is delivered into Bosnian custody, or for any of the other grounds available to the Department to decline extradition — or, indeed, for no reason at all, as the Treaty does not require any justification for declining to extradite U.S. citizens. See Treaty for Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, U.S.-Serb., art. V, Mar. 7, 1902 (date of ratification by the President), 32 Stat. 1890, 12 Bevans 1238 (“Neither of the high contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this Treaty.”). That determination rests, of course, with the Executive Branch of Government, not the Judiciary.

Accordingly, the order of the District Court denying the petition is REVERSED, and Sacirbey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby GRANTED. The restrictions imposed on Sacir-bey’s liberty are VACATED and he shall not be extradited to Bosnia pursuant to the formal requests that have been made.

It is so ordered.