Phyllis Edwards v. Dothan City Schools
Citation82 F.4th 1306
Date Filed2023-10-04
Docket22-10858
Cited15 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10858
____________________
PHYLLIS EDWARDS,
PlaintiďŹ-Appellant,
versus
DOTHAN CITY SCHOOLS,
DOTHAN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MICHAEL SCHMITZ,
individually and in his oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
BRENDA GUILFORD,
individually and in her oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
FRANKLIN JONES,
individually and in his oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
SUSAN VIERKANDT,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
individually and in her oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
BRETT STRICKLAND,
individually and in his oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
AMY BONDS,
individually and in her oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
CHRIS MADDOX,
individually and in his oďŹcial capacity as a member of the
Dothan Board of Education,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00248-ECM-JTA
____________________
Before WILSON, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Dr. Phyllis Edwards appeals the district courtâs dismissal of
her wrongful termination suit against Dothan City Schools and
Dothan City Board of Education (collectively, the Board), as well
as Michael Shmitz, Brenda Guilford, Franklin Jones, Susan
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22-10858 Opinion of the Court 3
Vierkandt, Brett Strickland, Amy Bonds, and Chris Maddox (collec-
tively, the Board members). Dr. Edwards alleged three claims: (1)
denial of due process; (2) conspiracy to deprive her of her due pro-
cess rights; and (3) breach of contract by the Board members in
their official and individual capacities. After reviewing the record,
and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse the district
courtâs denial of Dr. Edwardsâ due process claim and affirm the de-
nial of the conspiracy and breach of contract claims.
I. Background
On January 16, 2018, Dr. Edwards was hired as the Superin-
tendent of Dothan City Schools in Dothan, Alabama. Her employ-
ment contract term spanned from February 26, 2018, until June 30,
2023. The employment contract stated Dr. Edwards could only be
terminated for cause. Furthermore, the contract stated that the ter-
mination would not be effective until the Board provided Dr. Ed-
wards with a statement of the cause for termination and allowed
her an opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, the employment contract
provided that Dr. Edwards could resign with or without cause as
long as she gave at least 120 daysâ notice in writing of her resigna-
tion to the Board.
During Dr. Edwardsâ term of employment, she claims she
experienced various interpersonal difficulties with the Board. The
complaint alleges Dr. Edwards fielded criticism and accusations by
Board members outside of official Board meetings. Due in large
part to this treatment, Dr. Edwards emailed her âintent to resignâ
to the Board on September 8, 2020. Her letter states: âI intend to
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
tender my resignation to the Dothan City School Board. Please let
me know who I should deal with to iron out the details.â The com-
plaint alleges that, because this was only an intent to resign and not
an official resignation, Dr. Edwards did not offer a date on which
she planned to leave.
On September 14, 2020, six days after the intent to resign
was sent, the complaint alleges that the Board voted to terminate
Dr. Edwardsâ contract. The minutes, mentioned in the complaint
but first supplied by the Boardâs motion to dismiss, detail the
Boardâs vote to âacceptâ Dr. Edwardsâ resignation.
Consequently, Dr. Edwards filed the instant action in the
district court. She brought claims for deprivation of due process
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
and breach of contract. In response, the Board and the Board mem-
bers filed a motion to dismiss on April 26, 2021. On February 28,
2022, the district court dismissed: (1) the due process and conspir-
acy claims with prejudice; (2) the breach of contract claim against
the individual Defendants in their official capacity without preju-
dice on the basis of sovereign immunity; and (3) the breach of con-
tract claim against the Board members in their individual capacities
with prejudice. Dr. Edwards timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district courtâs order dismissing a com-
plaint. FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1295
(11th Cir. 2011). We must âaccept the [factual] allegations in the
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22-10858 Opinion of the Court 5
complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.â Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997, 1001 (11th Cir.
2021). But we âare not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.â Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))
(quotation marks omitted). âTo survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to âstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.ââ Id. âA claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend-
ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.â Id. While the plausibility
standard is not analogous to a âprobability requirement,â it re-
quires âmore than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted un-
lawfully.â Id.
III. Analysis
Dr. Edwards claims (1) denial of procedural due process; (2)
conspiracy to deprive her of her due process rights; and (3) breach
of contract by the Board members in their official and individual
capacities. We will address each claim in turn.
A. Procedural Due Process
When a public employee is in a position where they can only
be discharged for cause, the public employee has a constitutionally
protected property interest in their employment and cannot be
fired without due process. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928â29
(1997). When bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plain-
tiff must show that the conduct was committed under the color of
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
state law and deprived her of her constitutional rights. However,
when an employee voluntarily resigns, the employee is not de-
prived of any protected interest in her employment. Hargray v. City
of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court held that it is sufficient to uphold tak-
ings of property without any predeprivation process if the taking is
the result of a ârandom and unauthorizedâ act by a state employee.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Further, postdeprivation
remedies alone are appropriate if there is a need for exigency by the
State in the taking or if providing predeprivation process would be
impracticable. Id. at 538â39. But we previously found that when
there is a procedural due process violation, Parratt does not apply
âwhen the state is in the position to provide predeprivation pro-
cess.â Burch v. Apalachee Cmty. Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d
797, 801 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Importantly, we have not ad-
dressed whether an unanticipated mistake is included in random
and unauthorized conduct.
Our circuit encountered a similar case to the one at issue in
Fetner v. City of Roanoke. 813 F.2d 1183 (11th Cir. 1987). In Fetner, a
public employee was terminated without a formal hearing,
whether the employee resigned or was terminated was at issue,
and the claim was dismissed by the district court at the motion to
dismiss stage. Id. at 1184, 1186. We decided that, when a state pro-
cedure exists to provide for the deprivation of property and it is
practicable for the State to abide by those predeprivation measures,
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22-10858 Opinion of the Court 7
disregarding of the same constitutes a procedural due process vio-
lation. Id. at 1186. Further, we held that determining whether the
employee voluntarily resigned or was terminated was a question
of fact that precluded summary judgment. Id.
Dr. Edwards argues that she is a public employee dismissible
only for cause, thereby ensuring a protected property interest in
her employment. As such, she asserts that she could not be termi-
nated without due process. She states that the district court erred
in finding that the Board engaged in ârandom and unauthorized
conductâ by misinterpreting her letter as a voluntary resignation.
Dr. Edwards alleges that the Board, with premeditation, acted in-
tentionally and willfully by terminating her, which deprived her of
due process. She maintains her letter expressed an âintent to re-
sign,â with no date specified, and was subject to further discussion.
In arguing for its interpretation of the facts, the Board urges
us to consider Dr. Edwardsâ letter, the minutes of the relevant
Board meeting, and the employment contract. The Board argues
these documents demonstrate that Dr. Edwards left of her own vo-
lition and support the district courtâs characterization of the
Boardâs conduct as ârandom and unauthorized.â Dr. Edwards re-
ferred to this group of documents in her complaint, and the Board
attached the documents to the motion to dismiss the complaint
without objection.
Normally, we will not consider anything beyond the face of
the complaint and documents attached thereto when considering
a motion to dismiss. Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). However, we will
consider outside documents attached to a defendantâs motion to
dismiss when: (1) the plaintiff mentions the document(s) at issue in
the complaint; (2) the document is central to the claim; and (3) the
contents are not in dispute, i.e., the documentâs authenticity is un-
questioned. Id.; Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2023). When a document considered at the motion to dismiss
stage contains âambiguities . . . subject to interpretation,â courts
should interpret all ambiguities in the plaintiffâs favor. Baker, 67
F.4th at 1277.
Here, there is no disagreement as to the contents of Dr. Ed-
wardsâ letter or the employment contract, and these can properly
be considered. But while neither party contests the minutesâ au-
thenticity, disagreement surrounds their consideration. The
minutes refer to Dr. Edwardsâ letter as a resignation, while Ed-
wardsâ allegations reflect that the Board terminated her without
cause and in violation of the due process provisions contained in
her contract. Though the minutes do present ambiguity as to
whether Dr. Edwardsâ letter should be interpreted as a resignation
or termination, this does not bar their consideration. Thus, the
minutes were properly considered by the district court.
What was improper, however, was the district courtâs inter-
pretation of the ambiguity against Dr. Edwards. Instead of constru-
ing all ambiguities in Dr. Edwardsâ favor, the district court used the
minutes to recharacterize the allegations within Dr. Edwardsâ com-
plaint. When taking the factual allegations in Dr. Edwardsâ
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22-10858 Opinion of the Court 9
complaint as true, there is a plausible claim for relief. In paragraph
18 of the complaint, Dr. Edwards classifies her communication as
an âintentâ to resign, not an actual resignation. In paragraphs 19
and 21, Dr. Edwards alleges that in the Boardâs âhaste to get rid ofâ
her, it did not give her a statement of cause or an opportunity to be
heard, as required by the contract, before terminating her employ-
ment. These allegations, when taken as true, meet the plausibility
standard that there is more than a sheer possibility that the Board
and its members acted to deprive Dr. Edwards of due process. It is
plausible that, based on the face of the complaint: Dr. Edwards did
not voluntarily resign but was terminated; as in Fetner, there were
no exigent circumstances necessitating a lack of predeprivation
process; in such a scenario, the ârandom and unauthorizedâ excep-
tion under Parratt would be inapplicable; therefore, the lack of pre-
deprivation process violated Dr. Edwardsâ procedural due process
rights.
While our analysis should not be considered determinative
on the merits, it is illustrative that Dr. Edwards alleged, at mini-
mum, a plausible case worthy of surviving a motion to dismiss. The
district court erred by ignoring that Dr. Edwards had a plausible
claim to relief and not drawing reasonable inferences in her favor.
We therefore reverse the dismissal of Dr. Edwardsâ due process
claim.
B. Conspiracy
Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights occurs when two
persons conspire to prevent another person from performing their
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
duties or deprive them of their rights or privileges. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. A plaintiff seeking recourse under § 1985(3) must allege that
the defendant had a âclass-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus behind the defendantâs action taken in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.â Dean v. Warren, 12 F.4th 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2021) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine pro-
vides that a corporationâs employees, acting as agents of the corpo-
ration, are unable to conspire among themselves or with the cor-
poration. Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Commân, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th
Cir. 2000). We have not addressed exceptions to the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine. See id. at 770 (reserving consideration of ex-
ceptions); Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1263 (11th Cir.
2010) (same); but see Greenville Publâg Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflector, Inc.,
496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding the intracorporate con-
spiracy doctrine may not apply if âthe officer has an independent
personal stake in achieving the corporationâs illegal objectiveâ).
Dr. Edwards argues that the Board members acted in con-
cert when terminating her contract, failed to afford her a hearing,
and prevented her performance of duties for the 120-day period
mandated by her contract. Dr. Edwards further encourages this
court to adopt the exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doc-
trine the Fourth Circuit identified in Greenville, as she claims the
Board acted outside their lawful authority.
Dr. Edwardsâ complaint does not sufficiently allege a con-
spiracy. Her complaint contains several legal conclusions, stating
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22-10858 Opinion of the Court 11
the Board conspired and caused her to be injured, as well as having
acted in concert when terminating the contract. She does not allege
any factual scenarios to support these claims. Indeed, no infor-
mation is provided regarding how two or more Board members
supposedly worked together. This dearth of information regarding
the Board membersâ conduct necessitates finding that the com-
plaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to establish a conspir-
acy claim. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly, Dr. Edwards failed to
allege that the Board discriminated against her under a âclass-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus,â preventing her from
seeking recourse under § 1985(3). Dean, 12 F.4th at 1255.
Based on the deficiencies in Dr. Edwardsâ complaint, she
fails to show that the district court erred. Thus, we affirm the dis-
trict courtâs dismissal of Dr. Edwardsâ conspiracy claim. 1
C. Sovereign Immunity Law
The State of Alabama generally enjoys absolute immunity
from lawsuits under Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitu-
tion. This immunity applies to arms or agencies of the state. Ex
parte Tuscaloosa Cnty., 796 So. 2d 1100, 1103 (Ala. 2000). According
to Alabama law, boards of education are considered state agencies,
1 Even had Dr. Edwards properly alleged a conspiracy, the intracorporate con-
spiracy doctrine would bar her claim. See Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 767. Dr. Ed-
wards encourages us to adopt an illegality exception. Due to the lack of factual
allegations regarding the illegal actions, we need not reach the issue.
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
thus providing immunity from suit. See Ex parte Phenix City Bd. of
Educ., 67 So. 3d 56, 60 (Ala. 2011).
However, there are limited exceptions where sovereign im-
munity does not apply to breach of contract claims. Ex parte Jackson
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 164 So. 3d 532, 536 (Ala. 2014). The Alabama Su-
preme Court has identified six exceptions to sovereign immunity:
(1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform
their legal duties;
(2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing
an unconstitutional law;
(3) actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial
acts;
(4) actions brought under the Declaratory Judgments
Act . . . seeking construction of a statute and its applica-
tion in a given situation;
(5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought against
State officials in their representative capacity;
(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State officials in
their representative capacity where it is alleged they
acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority,
or in a mistaken interpretation of law; and
(6)(b) actions for damages brought against State officials in
their individual capacity where it is alleged that they
acted . . . beyond their authority.
Id. at 535â36 (citations omitted).
Dr. Edwards argues that sovereign immunity does not apply
because her allegations fall within exceptions (1) and (3). She claims
that the legal and ministerial obligations apply because the parties
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22-10858 Opinion of the Court 13
had a legally binding contract, and the Board members have no dis-
cretion over whether to comply with the contract. Thus, the Board
members are left with a ministerial duty to perform according to
the terms of the contract.
Dr. Edwards heavily relies on Burch v. Birdsong, 181 So. 3d
343 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), to support her claim against the Board
members in their official capacities. This support is misplaced. In
Burch, the plaintiff did not sue for damages or backpay; both the
court and the plaintiff acknowledged that § 14 immunity barred
this recovery. Burch, 181 So. 3d at 351. Instead, the plaintiff was
seeking prospective relief in the form of an order compelling the
school board members to comply with their legal duties under the
employment contract. Id.
Here, Dr. Edwards is seeking money damagesâthe very re-
lief the plaintiff in Burch disclaimed. Because her suit does not seek
prospective relief, exceptions (1) and (3) are inapposite. Dr. Ed-
wardsâ claim against the Board members in their official capacities
is, therefore, barred by sovereign immunity. 2
Dr. Edwardsâ claims against the Board members in their in-
dividual capacities also must fail. While individual capacity claims
against the Board members are not barred by sovereign immunity,
2 As this court has firmly established, issues not raised in the initial brief on
appeal are typically deemed abandoned. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
871(11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); see also Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co.,385 F.3d 1324
, 1330â32 (11th Cir. 2014). Dr. Edwards did not argue the other ex-
ceptions to sovereign immunity. Therefore, we do not address them here.
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-10858
âagents cannot be held liable for a principalâs breach of contract.â
Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1389 (Ala. 1986); see
also Whitehead v. Davison Oil Co., 352 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (Ala. 1977).
Dr. Edwardsâ contract was with the Board, not the Board members
in their individual capacities. The Board members were acting as
the Boardâs agents to accomplish the Boardâs objectives. Thus, the
breach of contract claims against the Board members in their indi-
vidual capacities are necessarily unsuccessful.
In sum, Dr. Edwards did not plausibly plead an exception to
sovereign immunity, and the district court properly dismissed both
breach of contract claims. We affirm the district courtâs dismissal
of Dr. Edwardsâ breach of contract claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we reverse the district courtâs denial
of Dr. Edwardsâ due process claims and affirm the district courtâs
denial of Dr. Edwardsâ conspiracy and breach of contract claims.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
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22-10858 BRASHER, J., Concurring 1
BRASHER, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I concur in the Courtâs opinion. I write separately to flag an
issue for the parties and district court.
We have long recognized that tenured public employees
have a right to continued employment that is a constitutionally
protected property interest under the Due Process Clause. Ed-
wards says that her employment contract creates a protected prop-
erty interest in continued employment because it prohibited her
termination without cause.
At oral argument, the Board argued for the first time that
Edwards lacks a constitutionally protected property interest in con-
tinued employment because her right to employment derives
solely from a contract, not a state statute.
Although I do not know the right answer to the Boardâs ar-
gument, the issue is not as straightforward as the Board suggests.
We have recognized, as a general matter, that â[t]he existence of
an enforceable contract with a state or local government entity
does not give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest.â
Key W. Harbour Dev. Corp. v. City of Key W., Fla., 987 F.2d 723, 727
(11th Cir. 1993). But, as to continued employment, our predecessor
court has said that â[t]he source of such a right can be a state stat-
ute, a local ordinance, or an express or implied contract.â White v.
Mississippi State Oil & Gas Bd., 650 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir. Unit A.
May 29, 1981). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207
(11th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(recognizing that Fifth Circuit decisions
issued before Oct. 1, 1981 are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).
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2 BRASHER, J., Concurring 22-10858
The Court wisely declines to address this issue, as it was not
briefed in this Court or the district court. But, considering the ap-
parent tension in our precedents, I suggest the parties and the dis-
trict court carefully evaluate this issue on remand.