City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hospitality Holdings, L.P.
Citation82 F.4th 1031
Date Filed2023-09-13
Docket22-12419
Cited56 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12419
____________________
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,
a State of Florida municipal corporation,
PlaintiďŹ-Counter Defendant,
versus
JACKSONVILLE HOSPITALITY HOLDINGS, L.P.,
a Delaware Limited Partnership, et al.,
Defendant-Counter Claimant,
CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC.,
a Wyoming Corporation,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Counter Defendant
Third Party PlaintiďŹ-Appellant,
PGS,
Defendant,
CLAUDE NOLAN CADILLAC, INC., et al.,
Third Party Defendants,
HPL GP, LLC,
HOUSTON PIPE LINE COMPANY, L.P.,
Third Party Defendants-Counter Claimants
Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00850-HES-MCR
____________________
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 3
Before WILSON, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
The procedural histories of some cases make one appreciate
even more the exemplary work done by our countryâs district and
magistrate judges. This is one such case.
After eight years of litigation involving ten different parties,
Continental Holdings, Inc. (Continental) appeals the district courtâs
denial of its November 2015 motion to voluntarily dismiss Hou-
ston Pipe Line Company, L.P. and HPL GP, LLC (collectively,
Houston) from the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 41(a)(2). Continental argues that we should reverse the dis-
trict courtâs Rule 41(a)(2) decision and vacate all of the subsequent
orders governing its dispute with Houston.
Fortunately, we need not delve too far into the volumes of
court filings today. What is important for our purposes is that, over
the course of this litigation, many parties filed motions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) in an attempt to vol-
untarily dismiss their claims against another party. For each mo-
tion, fewer than all parties involved in the litigation provided a sig-
nature. Yet, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) only permits a plaintiff to dismiss
an action without a court order by filing âa stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared.â (emphasis added). The
question for this court is the following: In a multi-defendant law-
suit, does âall parties who have appearedâ refer to 1) all parties in-
volved in the dismissal (e.g., the plaintiff and the defendant(s) being
dismissed), or 2) all parties who have appeared in the lawsuit (e.g.,
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
the plaintiff and all other parties who have appeared at some point
during the litigation)?
We conclude that the plain text of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) re-
quires the latter. Because multiple motions made under this Rule
were not signed by all parties who appeared in the lawsuit, they
were ineffective, and the claims they purported to dismiss remain
pending before the district court. Consequently, there has not
been a final judgment below, and we lack jurisdiction to consider
the merits of this appeal.
I. Background
A truncated history of this litigation may be useful here.
This saga began in March 2015, when the City of Jacksonville (the
City) filed a second amended complaint to recover costs and dam-
ages related to the contamination of soil and groundwater near a
gas plant located within its borders. In its complaint, the City al-
leged that three parties were liable to it under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(2), and Florida Statute
§ 376.313. The three named defendants were Jacksonville Hospi-
tality Holdings L.P. (JHH); Shoppes of Lakeside, Inc. (Shoppes);
and Continental.
The parties filed answers and counterclaims. Then, in April
2015, Continental filed an amended third-party complaint against
six third-party defendants, including Houston (both Houston Pipe
Line Company, L.P. and HPL GP, LLC); Greif, Inc. (Greif); Claude
Nolan Cadillac, Inc. (Claude Nolan); JEA f/k/a/ Jacksonville
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 5
Electric Authority (JEA); and Texaco, Inc. (Texaco). Continental
alleged that these third-party defendants were liable for the release
of pollutants at the gas plant. Houston lodged counterclaims in
return. Then, in May 2015, Continental filed an amended, four-
count counterclaim against the City, contending that the City was
also liable for the pollution.
Bit by bit, whether through amended complaints, summary
judgments, or voluntary dismissals, the claims dropped off. Im-
portant for this case, numerous claims were âdismissedâ using stip-
ulations of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). By our
tally, the following combinations of parties filed such stipulations:
1) Continental and Texaco (purporting to dismiss Texaco from the
action); 2) Continental and Greif (purporting to dismiss Greif from
the action); 3) Continental and Claude Nolan (purporting to dis-
miss Claude Nolan from the action); 4) the City and Shoppes (pur-
porting to dismiss âall remaining claims and defenses against each
other in this actionâ); 5) the City and JHH (purporting to dismiss
âall remaining claims and defenses asserted against each other in
this actionâ); 6) the City, Continental, and JEA (purporting to dis-
miss âall claims, defenses counterclaims, and/or third party com-
plaints against one anotherâ); and 7) Continental and Houston
(purporting to dismiss âthe Counterclaims filed by [Houston]â).
For each of these, fewer than all parties involved in the litigation
signed the stipulation. As an example, the stipulation between
Continental and Texaco that purported to dismiss Texaco from the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
case was only signed by those two partiesâno other parties added
their signatures. 1
After the dust settled and all the claims were seemingly re-
solved, Continental filed its notice of appeal, challenging an earlier
district court order that denied its motion to voluntarily dismiss
Houston pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). 2 Continental contests this or-
der because, well over a year after it was denied, the district court
granted a motion by Houston to impose sanctions on Continental
for what the district court determined was frivolous and bad-faith
litigation. Toward the end of the proceedings, after a hearing to
determine the appropriate sanctions, the district court ordered
Continental to pay Houston nearly $1.5 million in attorneysâ fees
and costs. From Continentalâs perspective, though, these mone-
tary sanctions would not have been unduly multiplied if the district
1 It appears that the closest any of these Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) dismissals came to
including the signatures of all parties who appeared in the litigation was the
stipulation between Continental and Greif, which only omitted a signature
from Texaco. At the time, Texaco had already been dismissed from the law-
suit through a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with Continental. As we will
explain, though, Continental and Greif still needed Texacoâs signature for the
dismissal to be effective.
2 Unlike Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), which we will discuss in more detail below, Rule
41(a)(2) requires a plaintiff wishing to dismiss an action to obtain a court order.
âThe decision of whether to grant a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2) . . . falls within the sound discretion of the district court.â Arias v. Cam-
eron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015).
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 7
court did not abuse its discretion in denying (at Houston's request)
its Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss Houston from the case.
Before receiving the partiesâ briefs on the merits, we issued
a jurisdictional question. The question cited Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)
and inquired âwhether all the voluntarily dismissed claims have
been properly resolved for purposes of this Courtâs appellate juris-
diction.â We now turn to our resolution of that question. 3
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
âWe have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have ju-
risdiction to hear an appeal, for âwithout jurisdiction we cannot
proceed at all in any cause.ââ Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal ex rel.
Mut. Benefits Keep Polây Tr., 22 F.4th 979, 986 (11th Cir. 2022) (quot-
ing Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020)).
The jurisdiction of this court âis ordinarily limited to appeals from
final decisions of the district courts.â Id. (quoting Thomas v. Blue
3 In response to a letter memorandum from this court that directed the parties
to some of the caselaw discussed below, the parties filed a joint motion re-
questing a stay of the appeal so they could return to the district court to obtain
a Rule 54(b) certification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (allowing a court to âdirect
entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or par-
tiesâ). Because issues involving voluntary dismissals under Rule 41 are fairly
commonplace in this circuit, see, e.g., In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664 (11th Cir. 2023);
Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141 (11th Cir. 2023), we denied the motion in
order to resolve the jurisdictional question. We are grateful to counsel from
both parties for presenting thoughtful arguments to aid the court in settling
this matter.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
Cross & Blue Shield Assân, 594 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2010)). âIn a
case involving multiple claims, in the absence of a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) certification, a district courtâs disposition of
fewer than all the claims does not constitute an appealable final
judgment.â Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 779â
80 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant,
689 F.3d 1244, 1245â46 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
We review the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and any jurisdictional issues de novo. United States v.
Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2009).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) states that, subject to certain rules and
statutes (none of which are relevant here), a âplaintiff may dismiss
an action without a court order by filing . . . a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared.â (emphases added). âWe
give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and
generally with them as with a statute, when we find the terms un-
ambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.â Pavelic & LeFlore v. Mar-
vel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (cleaned up).
Guided by this instruction, this court has recently explained
the meaning of âan actionâ in the context of Rule 41(a). In the case
of In re Esteva, we made clear that a âplain readingâ of Rule
41(a)(1)(A) âreveals that the Rule does not authorize the voluntary
dismissal of individual claims.â 60 F.4th 664, 675 (11th Cir. 2023).
Instead, the word âactionâ refers to an entire lawsuit and not just
particular claims within it. Id.; see also id. at 675â76 (explaining that
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 9
âreading Rule 41(a)(1)(A) in concert with Rule 41âs other provi-
sions, as we must, makes it abundantly clearâ that there is a distinc-
tion in the Federal Rules between âactionsâ and âclaimsâ).
In another recent case, Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, we held that the
reasoning of In re Estevaâand numerous cases before itâcomfort-
ably extends to Rule 41(a)(2). We explained that âa Rule 41(a)(2)
dismissal can only be for an entire action, and not an individual
claim.â 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2023). Both Rosell and In re
Esteva highlighted an important, longstanding exception to this
rule. That is, âRule 41(a) allows a district court to dismiss all claims
against a particular defendant.â Id.at 1144 n.2; In re Esteva,60 F.4th at 677
; see also Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc.,376 F.3d 1092, 1106
(11th Cir. 2004); Plains Growers ex rel. Floristsâ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-
Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 1973). 4
We now pick up where those cases left off and turn to the
meaning of the phrase âall parties who have appeared.â There
have been a paucity of cases addressing this interpretive question,
and those that do exist, unhelpfully enough, arrive at different con-
clusions.
Continental urges us to follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit,
which, in the case of National City Golf Finance v. Scott, briefly stated
in a footnote that â[i]n a multi-defendant suit, the plaintiff may
4 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981, are
binding on this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
single out a party for dismissal; in those cases only the dismissed
defendant need sign the stipulation.â 899 F.3d 412, 415 n.3 (5th Cir.
2018). 5 Continental argues that this course is correct for at least
two reasons: one textual and one pragmatic.
Textually, Continental reasons that because Rule 41(a)(1)(A)
concerns itself with the dismissal of âan action,â it is sensible to ap-
pend the word âactionâ to the end of subsection 41(a)(1)(A)(ii),
such that it effectively reads that parties may file âa stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.â
And, because we have precedent that permits individual defend-
ants to be dismissed using Rule 41(a)(1)(A), it follows that when
this happens, only the plaintiffs and individual defendants involved
in the dismissal should have to sign the stipulation. See Rosell, 67
F.4th at 1144 n.2 (âOur Circuit has recognized that Rule 41(a) al-
lows a district court to dismiss all claims against a particular
5 The Fifth Circuit cited two sources to support this position: Plains Growers ex
rel. Floristsâ Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250,
253 (5th Cir. 1973) and 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice & Procedure § 2362 (3d ed. Apr. 2018 update). However, neither of these
sources address the question of who must sign a stipulation of dismissal in
order for it to be effective. Instead, both advance a proposition that, as dis-
cussed above, is already well-accepted in this circuit: Rule 41(a) permits vol-
untary dismissals of individual parties in multi-defendant suits. See Plains
Growers, 474 F.2d at 253 (holding that plaintiffs are âentitled to a dismissal
against one defendant under Rule 41(a), even though the action against an-
other defendant would remain pendingâ); Wright & Miller, § 2362 (noting that
the âsounderâ interpretation of Rule 41(a) is one that allows dismissals of indi-
vidual defendants from a multi-defendant suit).
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 11
defendant. But that exception (if it can be called that) is compatible
with the ruleâs text because in a multi-defendant lawsuit, an âactionâ
can refer to all the claims against one party.â (internal citations
omitted)).
Pragmatically, Continental argues that it makes little sense
to burden counsel with the inconvenience of tracking down every
party that has appeared in a case just to dismiss a single defendant.
This very dispute highlights the point: ten parties have been in-
volved, with claims being resolved at different points over the
course of eight years. As Continental sees it, requiring parties to
gather ten signatures each time a defendant is voluntarily dismissed
adds an unnecessary inefficiency to the adjudication process.
On the other side of the debate is Houston, which points us
to two unpublished decisions (including one from this circuit) hold-
ing that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires the signatures of all parties in
a lawsuit. See Hardnett v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 21-13195,
2023 WL 2056285, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (per curiam); An-
derson-Tully Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 347 F. Appâx 171, 176 (6th Cir. 2009).
Both of those cases relied primarily on the plain text of the Rule.
See Hardnett, 2023 WL 2056285, at *1 (noting that âin interpreting
Rule 41(a)(1), we have repeatedly said that the Rule âmeans pre-
cisely what it saysââ) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Intâl Bhd.
of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1975)); Anderson-Tully Co.,
347 F. Appâx at 176 (finding that, given the âplain languageâ of the
Rule, âthe more prudent course is to decline the invitation to
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
qualify the meaning of the word âpartiesâ when the drafters could
have done so themselvesâ).
Mindful of our obligation to âgive the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure their plain meaning,â Sargeant v. Hall, 951 F.3d 1280,
1283 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Commcâns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991)), we find Houstonâs
side of the argument more persuasive. Looking to the text of Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), there is simply no language that qualifies the clause
âall parties who appeared.â The lack of any words restricting the
subsectionâs scope suggests that a broad readingâone covering all
parties in a lawsuitâis warranted. This interpretation is supported
by the fact that the drafters qualify the term âpartyâ or âpartiesâ
elsewhere in the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A)
(âexisting partiesâ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (âexisting partiesâ); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3) (âoriginal parties[]â); Fed. R. Civ. P. at 25(a)(2)
(âremaining partiesâ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (âaffected partiesâ).
In fact, even in Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the drafters permit a plaintiff to
âdismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a notice of
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a mo-
tion for summary judgment.â (emphasis added). In Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the drafters swap the words âopposing partyâ for âall
parties,â expanding its scope.
And all means all. We agree with the Sixth Circuitâs holding
in Anderson-Tully that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation also requires
the signature of a party that appeared but has already been re-
moved from an action. 347 F. Appâx at 176.
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 13
We recognize the logic of Continentalâs argument that one
could, perhaps, read the phrase âin the actionâ into Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and that given our precedent, this could reasonably
lead to the conclusion that only those parties involved in the dis-
missal need to sign the stipulation. However, it is the function of
this court to interpret and apply rulesânot write them. Given that
the drafters could have inserted narrowing language into Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) but chose not to, we must turn down the oppor-
tunity to pick up the pen and do so for them.
A sizeable portion of the appeal of Continentalâs argument
is undoubtedly its practicality. Indeed, we are not blind to the in-
conveniences this may cause parties in large, multi-defendant law-
suits. And, we further recognize the draftersâ directive that the Fed-
eral Rules should be âconstrued, administered, and employed by
the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.â Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
However, there are practical considerations that support this hold-
ing as well. âThe purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1) is to permit the plaintiff to dismiss an action voluntarily
when no other party will be prejudiced.â 9 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2362 (4th ed. June
2023 update). By requiring each and every party that has thus far
appeared in a lawsuit to sign a stipulation of dismissal, this con-
struction helps to ensure that other parties are not somehow prej-
udiced by the sudden dismissal of a defendant.
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
It does not take a stretch of the imagination to see how omit-
ting some partiesâ signatures in a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal could prej-
udice those partiesâ interests. This litigation involved the allocation
of liability for pollutants discharged by a long-defunct gas com-
pany. Continental, via its third-party complaint, pointed the blame
at a handful of other parties as the true successors-in-interest of the
company, and thus of the liabilities. While we do not imply that
this occurred here, in a similar suit one could easily imagine two
parties striking a collusive agreement to dismiss all claims, whether
in order to strategically increase the exposure for another party or
to throw roadblocks in front of the Cityâs efforts to obtain the or-
derly and efficient adjudication of its claims. Requiring signatures
from all parties would serve as a bulwark against these possibilities.
Further, it is not always true that a removed party has no more
interest in the course of a suit; consider that the final judgment in
the district court often triggers the beginning of appellate proceed-
ings. See Anderson-Tully, 347 F. Appâx at 176.
We also note that if counsel are unable to acquire signatures
from all parties who have appeared in the litigation, the Rules do
not leave them without recourse. Should this situation arise, Rule
41(a)(2) still provides parties with an avenue for securing dismissals
through court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (âExcept as pro-
vided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's
request only by court order, on terms that the court considers
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22-12419 Opinion of the Court 15
proper.â). 6 And other alternatives are available as well. As we laid
out in Rosell, â[l]itigants who wish to dismiss, settle, or otherwise
resolve less than an entire action can ensure that they receive a final
judgment on the remainder of their claims . . . by seeking partial
final judgment under Rule 54(b) from the district court, or by
amending their complaints under Rule 15.â 67 F.4th at 1144 (citing
Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018)).
III. Conclusion
The eight-year path of this litigation has been long and wind-
ing, and unfortunately, we must extend it a little further. Because
many parties purported to voluntarily dismiss their claims through
joint stipulations but did not obtain the signatures of âall parties
who ha[d] appearedâ as we have interpreted that phrase here, the
dismissals were ineffective, and the claims remain before the dis-
trict court. Because judgment is not final on all of the claims, we
lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
6 Of course, we express no opinion as to whether the district court acted
within the bounds of its discretion in denying Continentalâs Rule 41(a)(2) mo-
tion in this case.
We note also that two of the stipulationsâbetween the City, Continental, and
JEA, and between Continental and Houstonâwere followed by orders by the
district court granting the dismissal. Arguably, we could treat these as func-
tional Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals. But even if we did, that would leave five defec-
tive stipulations. As previously explained, even one defective dismissal defeats
our jurisdiction over this appeal.
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-12419
We DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.