Eric K. Brooks v. D Miller
Citation78 F.4th 1267
Date Filed2023-08-22
Docket21-10590
Cited35 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-10590
____________________
ERIC K. BROOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
D MILLER,
Officer,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States district court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00524-MW-MAF
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
____________________
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
Everyoneâs heard the saying that âthe camera doesnât lie.â
That notion lies at the heart of Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Usually, on a motion for summary judgment, we view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving partyâmean-
ing we accept the nonmoving partyâs version of events if the parties
disagree about what happened. But in Scott, a video told âquite a
different storyâ than the plaintiff there. And the Supreme Court
held that â[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment.â Id. at 380. In other words, Scott stands for the com-
monsense proposition that when a video proves that the plaintiff
canât be telling the truth, we donât accept the facts as he alleges
them, even for purposes of deciding a summary-judgment motion.
But Scottâs rule has its limits. Most obviously, it applies only
when the video actually proves that the plaintiffâs version of the
facts cannot be true. When the action happens off camera and the
audio doesnât clearly contradict the plaintiffâs story, Scottâs rule be-
comes irrelevant. Under those circumstances, we default to the
usual rule: we accept the nonmoving partyâs version of the facts in
determining whether to enter summary judgment.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 3
This appeal from an order granting summary judgment re-
quires us to apply both the default rule and Scottâs rule in evaluat-
ing the evidence supporting Plaintiff-Appellant Eric K. Brooksâs
various claims. Brooks alleges that Defendant-Appellee Officer Da-
mon Miller falsely arrested him, used excessive force in doing that,
and then was deliberately indifferent to Brooksâs alleged medical
needs.
The dash-cam recording from Brooksâs interaction with Of-
ficer Miller proves definitively that Miller did not falsely arrest
Brooks. And though the dash-cam recording does not resolve
Brooksâs deliberate-indifference claim, Brooks hasnât shown that
any violation Officer Miller may have committed was clearly estab-
lished. So Officer Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on that
claim as well. As for Brooksâs excessive-force claim, the recording
did not capture Officer Millerâs physical arrest of Brooks, so we
must rely on the default summary-judgment rule and assume the
truth of Brooksâs attestations that Miller used excessive force in ar-
resting him. And when we do that, we must conclude that
Brooksâs excessive-force claim survives summary judgment.
For these reasons, we affirm the district courtâs entry of sum-
mary judgment in part and reverse in part. And we remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
As weâve mentioned, the record contains different versions
of the facts. To keep track of them, we set them out separately
below.
1. Brooksâs Version
Brooks filed a verified complaint, so we treat his allegations
as his testimony. Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir.
2019).
According to Brooks, on November 12, 2016, he was stand-
ing around with other people, when Officer Miller arrived on the
scene. Officer Miller stepped out of his car and âdemand[ed] to talk
to whomever it was that drove the black Kiaâ located nearby.
When Brooks started to walk away, Officer Miller stopped
him and asked for Brooksâs identification. But Brooks said he had
ânothing to talk to [Officer Miller] about and he did not know who
was drivingâ the Kia.
Officer Miller responded by grabbing Brooks by the shirt and
âslam[ming] him into [Millerâs] patrol vehicle.â Then Officer Mil-
ler âhandcuffed [Brooks] so tight that sharp pain shot through
[Brooksâs] armsâ and Brooks lost âall circu[]lation in his [w]ris[t]
and arms.â
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 5
With Brooks handcuffed, Officer Miller searched him and
found drugs in Brooksâs right pocket. So Officer Miller arrested
Brooks.
Brooks complained to Officer Miller that âthe handcuffs
were to[o] tight and that he could not feel his hands.â He also asked
Officer Miller for medical attention âbecause he thought his
[wrists] were broke[n] or damaged.â Instead of taking Brooks for
medical care, though, Officer Miller drove him to the Leon County
Jail.
When Brooks arrived at the Jail, he again complained of
pain. But the nurse at the Jail prescribed only Tylenol and ibu-
profen.
Brooks filed grievances about these events.
In his complaint, Brooks did not allege that his wrists were,
in fact, broken or damaged. Nor did he assert that he suffered any
ongoing, extended, or permanent damage from the handcuffs.
2. Officer Millerâs Version
Officer Miller filed a probable-cause affidavit in support of
his arrest of Brooks. In it, (as relevant here) he said that he saw
Brooks driving a black Kia, which Brooks parked at the scene of the
incident. After Brooks pulled in, he got out of the car and walked
towards others who were gathered in the area.
Officer Miller then parked in the area, left his patrol car, and
asked Brooks for his driverâs license. Brooks answered that he
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
didnât have a valid license. So Officer Miller arrested him for oper-
ating a motor vehicle without a valid license.
In connection with the arrest, Officer Miller searched
Brooks. In Brooksâs left front jacket pocket, Officer Miller found
crack cocaine. Immediately, Brooks said he didnât know that the
crack was in his pocket.
Officer Miller took Brooks to the Leon County Jail âwithout
incident,â and Brooks was also charged with possession of cocaine.
3. The Video
As it turns out, Brooks and Officer Miller werenât the only
witnesses to Brooksâs arrest and transport to the Jail. Officer Mil-
lerâs patrol vehicle was equipped with a dash cam that recorded at
least part of the events.
The video shows another officerâs patrol vehicle following a
black Kia as the Kia turns into a dead-end street and parks. The
Kiaâs door opens, and a man wearing a black and grey hoodie exits
the car through the driverâs door. The parties agree that that man
is Brooks, though Brooks disputes he was driving the Kia. No one
else leaves the car or appears to remain in it.
Brooks then walks out of view of the camera, and Officer
Miller gets out of his patrol car and follows in the same direction.
While both men remain outside the cameraâs view, Officer Miller
begins to make casual conversation with what sounds like a group
of people. He asks one of these individuals (who the parties agree
is Brooks) whether he has a driverâs license with him. Brooks
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 7
audibly responds that he does not. So Officer Miller asks whether
Brooks has a driverâs license at all. Although we canât distinctly
hear Brooksâs response, Officer Miller asks Brooks a couple times,
âWhy you ainât got a driverâs license?â Again, to the extent that
Brooks answers, we canât really hear what he says.
Officer Miller then instructs Brooks to put his hands behind
his back and tells Brooks, âJust relax.â We hear a very brief bit of
what sounds like friction on Officer Millerâs body microphone, and
Officer Miller places Brooks under arrest for driving without a
driverâs license.
Officer Miller notices crack and a pipe on the ground and
asks Brooks whether he dropped them. Brooks denies knowing
anything about them.
Then Officer Miller and Brooks, walking side by side with a
few inches between them, reenter the dash camâs view. Although
Brooks is handcuffed behind his back when he reenters the dash
camâs view, he does not appear to be uncomfortable or hurt in any
way, and at this point, Officer Miller is not touching him. Officer
Miller directs Brooks to stand in front of Millerâs car and asks
Brooks whether he has anything in his pockets that Miller should
know about. Brooks responds that thereâs nothing that will hurt
Officer Miller, and Miller calmly reaches into each of Brooksâs
pockets. In Brooksâs left front hoodie pocket, Officer Miller finds
crack cocaine. Brooks takes a look and says, âIt damn sure is!â But
he insists that he âdidnât even know that was in there.â
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
At this point, Officer Miller tells Brooks heâs under arrest for
driving without a driverâs license and for possession of cocaine.
When Officer Miller reads Brooks his rights, Brooks indicates that
he understands. Throughout the entirety of the encounter that un-
folds before the dash cam, both men calmly interact with each
other.
Officer Miller, another officer, and Brooks then walk in front
of the patrol car and out of the dash camâs view once again. Shortly
after that, we hear what sounds like a car door opening and Officer
Miller and Brooks talking. About a minute later, the video screen
goes black but we still hear audio. Officer Miller says heâs going to
take the handcuffs off so Brooks can take his jacket off, and he in-
structs Brooks to âplease [not] try anything.â The two talk some
more, and Officer Miller directs Brooks to put his hands âstraight
up in the airâ and âpull it off,â presumably referring to Brooksâs
hoodie. Of course, these are things Brooks could not have done if
he remained handcuffed at that time.
Then Officer Miller tells Brooks he is going to put the cuffs
back on and says, âYouâve been straight-forward with us so far.â
He explains, âWhen you sit in the carâa little trickâput your
hands facing that door over there, so that way your hands donât go
numb. And try not to change it at all âcause if you change it, thatâs
gonna change up the way itâs gonna feel.â With that, Officer Miller
directs Brooks to âhave a seat,â and we hear what sounds like a car
door closing.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 9
Next, we hear Officer Miller speaking with others outside
the car and on the scene.
After this, Officer Miller returns to his patrol car and asks
Brooks whether he dropped the pipe the officers found. Brooks
denies having done so. Officer Miller goes back and speaks to oth-
ers again. Then Brooks yells, âHey, Sir!â And Officer Miller seem-
ingly returns to Brooks. Once Officer Miller responds, Brooks
pleads with him not to take him to jail. Officer Miller explains that
he has no leeway because the crack offense is a felony.
After this occurs, and about sixteen minutes after the picture
on the dash-cam video goes black, the video feed comes into view
for about fifteen seconds, before blacking out again. At this time,
Officer Millerâs car is still parked at the scene. Soon after that, we
hear Officer Miller on his police radio. Then Officer Miller speaks
to Brooks again, explaining further that, under the governing pro-
cess, he canât let Brooks go without taking him to the jail. At this
point, we begin to hear what sound like driving-related noises (cars
going by, possible wind sounds, and the metronome-like beating of
what sounds like a car signal).
After a period of silence, Officer Miller and Brooks discuss
Brooksâs biographical information. Officer Miller then comments
on traffic.
Officer Miller asks Brooks whether theyâve met before, and
Miller and Brooks discuss that Miller has previously arrested
Brooks for hitting Brooksâs mother and possessing drugs.
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
As the drive continues, Officer Miller asks Brooks whether
thereâs too much wind for him. It sounds like Brooks says no.
Other than the wind and some additional announcements from Of-
ficer Millerâs police radio, the recording is quiet for a few minutes.
And for a fraction of a second here and there (and about two sec-
onds at one point), the video picture returns in whole or in part.
Several more minutes pass, and Officer Miller again asks
Brooks about the crack cocaine in his pocket. Although we hear
Brooksâs voice, we canât discern what he says. During this period,
it sounds as though the car has stopped.
A few minutes later, Officer Miller asks Brooks to confirm
some of his biographical information, and Brooks does. Soon after
that, we hear the sounds of a car door opening and closing. Officer
Miller instructs Brooks to step out and walk to a door, and the
video picture returns long enough for us to catch a glimpse of what
appears to be the Leon County Jail. The picture blacks out again,
and a few seconds later, the recording ends.
About twenty-five minutes go by between the earliest point
when Officer Miller could have been driving and the time that Mil-
ler directs Brooks to get out of the police cruiser.
At no point in the recording do we hear Brooks make sounds
of pain or distress. Nor do we hear him ever complain about pain
or physical distress or even hear him mention his handcuffs. In fact,
all interactions that we can hear throughout the 51-minute record-
ing sound calm and low-key.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 11
B. Procedural Background
As weâve mentioned, Brooks was charged with possession
of cocaine and driving without a valid driverâs license. But the
Leon County State Attorneyâs Office eventually dismissed those
charges in exchange for Brooksâs guilty plea in an unrelated case.
Almost two years later, Brooks, proceeding pro se, sued Of-
ficer Miller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brooks asserted claims for false
arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; excessive force, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and deliber-
ate indifference to medical needs, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
In a nutshell, Brooks alleged in his false-arrest claim that
without probable cause, Officer Miller arrested him for driving
without a license and for possession of drugs, and that Miller un-
lawfully searched Brooks in the process. He made a tagalong claim
that Officer Millerâs search of Brooksâs pockets at the time of
Brooksâs arrest also violated Brooksâs Fourth Amendment rights.
As for his excessive-force claim, Brooks contended that Officer Mil-
ler âslammed [Brooks] against his patrol vehicle [in arresting him]
and hand cuff[ed] [Brooks] so tight that both hands, [wrist] and
arms resulted in los[s] of circu[]lation and excruciating pain when
there were no need for any violence.â And finally, in his deliberate-
indifference claim, which he referred to as a denial-of-medical-care
claim, Brooks alleged that he âmade several request[s] that he was
hurt and needed medical attention because he could not feel his
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
hand[] and [wrists] due to the evil intent of squeezing the handcuffs
as tight as [Officer Miller] could.â But, Brooks continued, Officer
Miller ârefuse[d] to allow [Brooks] to see any medical person[nel]
and waited some time before taking [Brooks] to jail where he again
[sought] medical attention.â
Six months after Brooks filed his complaint, Officer Miller
moved for summary judgment. He argued that he was entitled to
qualified immunity because he did not violate any of Brooksâs con-
stitutional rights, and even assuming he did, any rights were not
clearly established. In further support of his position, Officer Miller
asserted that the dash-cam video completely contradicted Brooksâs
claims and showed that his allegations were false.
Soon after filing his motion for summary judgment, Officer
Miller moved to stay discovery pending a ruling on his motion for
summary judgment. Noting that qualified immunity is a defense
not only from liability but also a âlimited âentitlement not to stand
trial or face the other burdens of litigation,ââ (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), the magistrate judge granted the
motion.
Brooks objected to the entry of the stay of discovery.
Among other things, Brooks sought his medical records, if any,
from Leon County Jailâs medical records. Brooks contended that
these records would âbolster [Brooksâs] description of the type and
extent of his injuriesâ from being handcuffed by Officer Miller.
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The magistrate judge denied Brooksâs discovery requests
without prejudice until after the court resolved Officer Millerâs mo-
tion for summary judgment. That said, the magistrate judge did
allow Brooks to file a response to the order, explaining why any
specific discovery he sought was necessary for him to adequately
respond to Officer Millerâs motion for summary judgment.
Brooks filed a motion for review of the magistrate judgeâs
order staying discovery. Upon review, the district judge overruled
Brooksâs objections and affirmed the magistrate judgeâs order.
Brooks then responded to Officer Millerâs motion for sum-
mary judgment. He argued first that the video recording left gen-
uine issues of material fact in dispute. In particular, Brooks alleged
that Officer Miller had used excessive force against him outside the
cameraâs view but that the audio portion of the recording picked
up the interaction. Brooks also contended that the video portion
of the recording cut out before Officer Miller tightened Brooksâs
handcuffs, so Officer Miller could not rely on it to prove that he
hadnât tightened Brooksâs handcuffs. As for Brooksâs alleged pleas
to loosen the handcuffs because they were hurting him, Brooks said
the audio part of the recording did not pick those up because they
were drowned out by Officer Millerâs patrol-car radio. Finally,
Brooks asserted that âclear evidence of tamperingâ with the dash-
cam video existed. In support of this proposition, Brooks relied
solely on things he observed while watching the recording itself,
like the portions where the video went black.
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
(âR&Râ), recommending that the court grant Officer Millerâs mo-
tion for summary judgment. See Brooks v. Miller, No. 4:19-CV-
00524, 2020 WL 8258414, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2020). First, the
magistrate judge concluded that the video refuted Brooksâs ac-
count of the events that transpired because (1) the dash-cam video
showed two police cars in pursuit of a black Kia for several blocks,
and Brooks was the man who exited the Kia from the driverâs side;
(2) the recording gave no indication that Officer Miller employed
any force in arresting Brooks; (3) Officer Miller and Brooks walked
towards the patrol car calmly, and Brooks had no apparent injury;
and (4) Officer Miller gave Brooks instructions on how to wear the
handcuffs comfortably, and Brooks never complained of pain or in-
jury.
Then the magistrate judge determined that Brooksâs false-
arrest, excessive-force, and deliberate-indifference claims each
failed. Id. at *5â*8. Starting with Brooksâs false-arrest claim, the
magistrate judge found that Officer Miller had probable cause to
arrest Brooks for driving without a license when he saw Brooks
driving and leaving the Kia and Brooks admitted he did not have a
driverâs license. As for Brooksâs excessive-force claim, the magis-
trate judge viewed the dash-cam video as ârefut[ing] [Brooksâs]
claimsâ that Officer Miller âslam[med]â Brooks into the car when
he was arresting Brooks. But even if Officer Miller did âshoveâ
Brooks, the magistrate judge reasoned, that action did not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation because the alleged force was
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 15
de minimis. On the deliberate-indifference claim, the magistrate
judge said that Officer Miller used no force, and Brooks suffered no
injury. And even if he did use force, the magistrate judge con-
cluded in the alternative, Brooks failed to put Officer Miller on no-
tice of a risk of serious harm because Brooks made no complaints
of âinjury, pain, or discomfortâ that would have alerted Officer Mil-
ler that Brooks required medical attention. Id. at *8. Because Of-
ficer Miller violated none of Brooksâs rights, the magistrate judge
reasoned, Miller was entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
The district judge adopted the report. Brooks v. Miller, No.
4:19CV524, 2021 WL 230059, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021). He
then noted that Brooksâs sworn complaint was testimony, so if Of-
ficer Millerâs statements were the only other evidence in the rec-
ord, material facts would be in dispute and the case would survive
summary judgment. But on this record, the district judge ex-
plained, the court had the benefit of the dash-cam video. And in
the district courtâs view, that recording discredited Brooksâs allega-
tions. So the district court granted Officer Millerâs motion for sum-
mary judgment and dismissed Brooksâs case for failure to state a
claim. Id. at *2.
Brooks now appeals the district courtâs order adopting the
magistrate judgeâs R&R. He also appeals the stay of discovery.
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district courtâs grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the nonmoving partyâhere, Brooks. Chap-
man v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Summary judgment is appropriate when âno genuine issues [of]
material factâ exist and the law entitles the movant to judgment on
the record. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Universe of Applicable Facts
Because the facts are everything in this appeal, we begin
with them. But before we can determine the operable facts, we
must discuss Scott. When opposing parties disagree about the rel-
evant facts, Scott is the Supreme Court case that tells us how to
identify the applicable facts for purposes of ruling on a summary-
judgment motion.
In Scott, to end a high-speed chase, the defendant officer hit
the plaintiffâs car from behind, causing the plaintiff to lose control
of his car and crash. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375. The plaintiff sued, al-
leging that the officer had violated the plaintiffâs Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from the use of excessive force. Id. at 376. In
support of his claim, the plaintiff said that, throughout the chase,
he had remained in control of his car, slowed for turns and inter-
sections, and used his turn signals. Id. at 379. He also claimed he
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 17
hadnât run anyone off the road and wasnât a threat to pedestrians
or other motorists. Id. But when the Court viewed a recording of
the incident, it concluded that â[t]he videotape t[old] quite a differ-
ent story.â Id. In fact, the Court said, the plaintiffâs âversion of
events [was] so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable
jury could have believed him.â Id. at 380. For that reason, the
Court held that the district court should not have relied on the âvis-
ible fictionâ that was plaintiffâs version of events in ruling on the
officerâs summary-judgment motion. Id. at 380â81.
As the Court explained (and as weâve mentioned), â[w]hen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.â Id. at 380. Our review
of Scott teaches us that two important requirements must be met
before we can disregard the non-moving partyâs version of events:
(1) the recording (or other evidence) must âso utterly discredit[]â
the partyâs story âthat no reasonable jury could have believedâ that
party, id.; see also Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2013); Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007)
(refusing to extend Scott to police photographs that failed to depict
âall of the defendantâs conduct and all of the necessary contextâ);
and (2) there must be no evidence that the recording has been âdoc-
tored or altered,â Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. So if a valid recording
completely and clearly contradicts a partyâs testimony, that testi-
mony is not credible, and the court should disregard it. See
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
Morton, 707 F.3d at 1284. But if the recording renders a partyâs
story merely unlikely yet does not necessarily contradict it, the de-
fault rule kicks in: we must accept the partyâs version for purposes
of considering the motion for summary judgment.
Applying Scottâs rule here, we conclude that the material
facts for purposes of summary judgment are as follows1:
Officer Miller followed the Kia until it stopped on a dead-
end road. When the Kia parked, Brooks got out of the driverâs seat.
No one else appeared to be in the car.
Soon after Brooks left the Kia, Officer Miller walked over to
a group of people where Brooks was standing and asked Brooks
whether he had a license. Brooks said he did not. So Officer Miller
arrested Brooks for driving without a license. We must use this
universe of facts because the video recording âso utterly
1 Brooks asserts that the video recording was tampered with. We need not
address that because his allegations of tampering apply to only the parts of the
recording dealing with Brooksâs excessive-force and deliberate-indifference
claims, and we reverse the entry of summary judgment on the excessive-force
claim and donât rely on the recording to affirm the entry of summary judg-
ment on the deliberate-indifference claim. As for Brooksâs false-arrest claim,
Brooks agrees that the recording accurately represents the events from the
time that it began through at least when Officer Miller arrested Brooks for
driving without a license. Indeed, Brooks himself relies on that part of the
recording in advocating for reversal of summary judgment on the false-arrest
claim. And that is what we rely upon as well in our analysis of that claim.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 19
discredit[s]â Brooksâs version of this part of the story that âno rea-
sonable jury could . . . believe[] him,â Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
As for the arrest itself, that occurred outside the cameraâs
view. So we canât see Officer Miller âgrab[bing] [Brooks] by the
shirt and slam[ming] him into the patrol vehicle,â as Brooks al-
leged. But during the arrest, we can hear what sounds like friction
on Officer Millerâs microphone. We canât say that sound is Officer
Miller slamming Brooks against the patrol car, but we also canât
rule out the possibility because the friction obscures the audio. To
be sure, when we see Brooks walking with Officer Miller to Millerâs
patrol car soon after we hear the friction, Brooks does not appear
at all hurt. But itâs not necessarily the case that we would have
been able to see any injuries slamming Brooks against the car to
arrest him might have caused. The long and short of these circum-
stances is that the recording doesnât preclude the possibility that a
reasonable juror could conclude that Officer Miller âgrab[bed]
[Brooks] by the shirt and slam[med] him into the patrol vehicleâ
when Officer Miller arrested Brooks. So we accept that version of
the story for purposes of reviewing the summary-judgment order.
Next, we consider the facts as they relate to Brooksâs claims
that Officer Miller overtightened Brooksâs handcuffs and ignored
his pleas for assistance. Again, nearly all Brooksâs time in handcuffs
occurred outside the cameraâs view (not to mention, the video pic-
ture was also black for most of that time). Add to that the fact that
we canât clearly distinguish Brooksâs statements while sitting in the
police cruiser. And again, we must conclude that we canât rule out
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
the possibility that a reasonable juror could find that Brooks com-
plained about the tightness of the handcuffs and Officer Miller did
not respond. Even if, given the rest of the recording, we might not
reach that conclusion, the bottom line is that the recording does
not âso utterly discreditâ Brooksâs version of this part of the story
that âno reasonable jury could . . . believe[] him.â Id. So for pur-
poses of reviewing the summary-judgment order, we accept
Brooksâs claims that Officer Miller overtightened the handcuffs and
did not respond to Brooksâs complaints while they rode to the Leon
County Jail, and that his hands and wrists were numb and hurt.
Now that weâve identified the relevant facts, we turn to the
legal analysis.
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government employees from
suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions they per-
form while going about their duties. The thought behind the doc-
trine is the âbalanc[ing of] two important public interests: âthe need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irre-
sponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distrac-
tion, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.ââ Da-
vis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Under the balance that qual-
ified immunity strikes, âall but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the lawâ enjoy its protection. Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 21
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, we en-
gage in a burden-shifting analysis. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). At the first step, the public-employee
defendant must show that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when he committed the challenged acts.
Once the defendant does that, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who
must show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. To do
that, the plaintiff must establish two things: (1) the defendant vio-
lated a constitutional right, and (2) that constitutional right was
âclearly establishedâ at the time of the defendantâs actions. Powell
v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022).
A plaintiff can show that a violation is âclearly establishedâ
in any of three ways: (1) by relying on a âmaterially similar decision
of the Supreme Court, of this Court, or of the supreme court of the
state in which the case arose;â (2) by invoking ââa broader, clearly
established principle [that] control[s] the novel factsâ of the case;â
or (3) by persuading us that the officerâs acts âso obviously violate[]
th[e] [C]onstitution that prior case law is unnecessary.â Id. (citation
omitted) (fourth alteration in original; other alterations added). If
a plaintiff proceeds under the first or second method, he must point
to a court decision. Id. The second and third methods require âob-
vious clarity.â Id. That is, the principle must be so apparent that,
even without a case with similar facts to light the way, any compe-
tent officer would know that his conduct crossed the line. See id.
In sum, the âclearly establishedâ part of the qualified-immunity in-
quiry asks whether the law when the officer engaged in the
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
challenged conduct gave him ââfair warningâ that his conduct was
unlawful.â Id. at 921 (citation omitted).
Courts have âdiscretion to decide which of the two prongs
of [the] qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.â Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). And since a plaintiff must show both
prongs to overcome qualified immunity, if the prong the court con-
siders first is not satisfied, the court need not consider the other
prong because the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, regard-
less. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Here, the parties agree that Officer Miller acted within his
discretionary authority during the alleged conduct Brooks chal-
lenges. For that reason, we turn to the questions of whether the
alleged conduct violated Brooksâs rights and whether, at the time
of the alleged violations, the law was clearly established.
1. Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks and
properly searched Brooksâs pockets incident to Brooksâs arrest.
We begin by addressing Brooksâs claim that Officer Miller
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him.
Brooks asserts that Officer Miller lacked probable cause to arrest
him for two reasons: (1) because Brooks never conceded to driving
the black Kia, and (2) because even if Brooks drove the Kia, âdriving
without a valid license is a non-criminal traffic infraction for which
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 23
one cannot be arrested.â 2 Appellantâs Br. at 13. Both reasons lack
merit.
To be sure, a warrantless arrest without the existence of
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis
for a § 1983 claim. See Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th
Cir. 1996); see also Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1382
(11th Cir. 1998). To succeed on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must
establish (1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest. See Rich-
mond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022). Probable cause
exists when âa reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there [is]
a substantial chance of criminal activity.â Washington v. Howard,
2 Brooks also argues that when Officer Miller approached Brooks and asked
whether he had a license, that was pretextual because Miller was allegedly
there investigating possible drug crimes. But Brooks, who was not detained,
voluntarily answered Officer Millerâs question about whether Brooks had a
license. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200â201 (2002) (âLaw en-
forcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendmentâs prohibition of un-
reasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other
public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen . . .
Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may . . . ask for identification . . . provided they do not induce
cooperation by coercive means.â). See also United States v. Caraballo, 595
F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2010) (âLaw enforcement officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment simply by approaching an individual on the street or in
some other public place and asking a question or asking for identification.â).
Because Brooks said he did not have a license and the video shows Brooks
driving, Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks for driving without
a license, regardless of what Officer Miller was investigating before Brooksâs
arrest. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). And proba-
ble cause is an âabsolute barâ to a § 1983 false-arrest claim. Rankin
v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).
The problem for Brooks is that the record undoubtedly re-
flects that Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks for
driving without a license.
First, as weâve noted, the video recording clearly shows
Brooks exited the driverâs door of the Kia immediately after the car
was parked. And Brooks was the only one to leave the car. Because
Brooksâs claim that he was not driving the Kia is âblatantly contra-
dicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,â
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, the district court correctly dismissed his at-
testations to that effect and concluded that Brooks was driving the
Kia.
Second, probable cause supports the arrest. Besides the fact
that Brooks was driving the Kia, the recording shows that after
Brooks left the car, Officer Miller walked over to a group where
Brooks was standing. And we hear a microphoned Officer Miller,
who, at that point, was not in view of the camera, ask Brooks
whether he has a driverâs license with him. Brooks admitted that
he did not. Officer Miller then repeatedly asked Brooks why he
didnât have a driverâs license. And when Brooks didnât answer, Of-
ficer Miller arrested Brooks for driving without a license.
Florida Statutes § 322.03(1) makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to operate a car without a driverâs license. So given that
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 25
Officer Miller saw Brooks driving the Kia without a license and that
Brooks admitted he had no license, Officer Miller had probable
cause to arrest Brooks for violating that law. Indeed, â[i]f an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.â Atwa-
ter v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
And because Officer Millerâs arrest of Brooks was lawful, the
search Officer Miller conducted of Brooksâs pockets incident to that
arrest was also lawful. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232
(2011).
2. Brooksâs excessive-force claim that Officer Miller slammed
him into the car and overtightened his handcuffs survives sum-
mary judgment.
Next, Brooks argues that Officer Miller used excessive force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Miller allegedly
âslam[med]â Brooks into the car at the time of the arrest and âover-
tightened Brooksâs handcuffs, causing âexcruciating painâ and
numbness, and refused to adjust the cuffs. As weâve explained,
these events do not appear in the video of the recording. And based
on the audio portion, we canât rule out the possibility that Officer
Miller âslam[med]â Brooks into the patrol car when he arrested
him. Nor can we say with certainty that Brooks did not complain
to Officer Miller that his handcuffs were too tight and were causing
him pain and numbness. Given these facts that we must accept for
purposes of considering Officer Millerâs summary-judgment
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26 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
motion, we conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate
on Brooksâs excessive-force claim.
â[T]he right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it
the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof
to effect it.â Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). But the
Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from the use of
excessive force during an arrest. 3 Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262,
1266â67 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the Fourth Amendment, we eval-
uate whether force is excessive by applying an objective reasona-
bleness standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395â96. That is, we ask
âwhether the officerâs conduct is objectively reasonable in light of
the facts confronting the officer.â Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002). This inquiry requires us to balance the
ânature and qualityâ of the acts on the individual against the gov-
ernmentâs justification for using force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In
making this assessment, we employ âthe perspective of a reasona-
ble officer on the scene, rather than . . . 20/20 . . . hindsight.â
3 Brooks asserted in the district court that Officer Millerâs alleged use of exces-
sive force violated Brooksâs Eighth Amendment rights. But Brooks was not in
prison at the time of the events here. And we evaluate a âfree citizenâs claim
that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an
arrestâ under the Fourth Amendmentâs âobjective reasonableness standard.â
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. We apply Eighth Amendment case law when an
incarcerated person alleges excessive force. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
35â38 (2010).
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 27
Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,
1248 (11th Cir. 2004).
Our cases identify some non-exclusive factors that help us
assess whether an officerâs use of force was objectively reasonable:
(1) how severe the underlying crime was; (2) the type of threat, if
any, a suspect presented to the safety of the officers or others; and
(3) âwhether [the suspect] actively resist[ed] arrest or attempt[ed]
to evade arrest by flight.â Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217,
1229(11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham,490 U.S. at 396
). Weâve
recognized that â[n]onviolent misdemeanors are crimes of minor
severity for which less force is generally appropriate.â United
States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
When we apply these factors to the facts weâve identified for
summary-judgment purposes, we conclude that Brooksâs exces-
sive-force claims survive. First, Officer Miller arrested Brooks for
the misdemeanor crime of driving without a license. We canât say
that this crime ârise[s] to the level of criminal conduct that should
have required the use of force.â Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d
1298, 1322 (11th Cir. 2017). Second, no evidence so much as sug-
gests that Brooks posed any threat to Officer Miller or anyone else.
In fact, Officer Millerâs probable-cause affidavit expressly notes that
the âarrest was without incident.â And third, Brooks neither re-
sisted arrest nor tried to flee.
Under these circumstances, it was objectively unreasonable
to âslam[]â Brooks into the car while arresting him. Similarly, it
was objectively unreasonable for Officer Miller to unnecessarily
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28 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
overtighten Brooksâs handcuffs as part of this same arrest and re-
fuse to make any adjustments when Brooks complained of numb-
ness and âexcruciating pain.â So if these events occurred, they vi-
olated Brooksâs Fourth Amendment rights.
Brooksâs right to be free from the use of this type of exces-
sive force was also clearly established when Officer Miller arrested
him on November 12, 2016. In Lee v. Ferraro, a plaintiff alleged
that the defendant officer slammed her head onto the car when he
arrested her for improperly honking her horn. 284 F.3d at 1191.
Under her version of the facts, the plaintiff posed no risk to anyone
and she did not attempt to resist or flee. Id. at 1198. We said that,
in those circumstances, it was âabundantly clear . . . that [the of-
ficer] used force that was plainly excessive, wholly unnecessary,
and, indeed, grossly disproportionate . . . .â Id.
We think Lee provides clear guidance to officers that they
use excessive force if they slam a person into a car during an arrest
for a relatively minor offense when the suspect does not endanger
anyone else, does not resist, and does not attempt to escape. And
if an officer cannot slam a person into a car under these circum-
stances, the officer certainly cannot engage in additional unneces-
sary force, such as gratuitously overtightening handcuffs and refus-
ing to adjust them in response to complaints of âexcruciating painâ
followed by numbness. For these reasons we conclude that, under
the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Brooks as the non-
moving party, Officer Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 29
on the excessive-force claim that he âslam[med]â Brooks into the
car and unnecessarily overtightened Brooksâs handcuffs.
Because we hold that Officer Miller is not entitled to quali-
fied immunity on Brooksâs excessive-force claim at the summary-
judgment stage, we direct the district court to remove the stay on
discovery as it pertains to this claim and to reconsider Brooksâs re-
quest for his medical records from the Leon County Jail.
3. The district court properly granted summary judgment on
Brooksâs deliberate-indifference claim.
That leaves Brooksâs other handcuff-related claim: that Of-
ficer Miller was deliberately indifferent to Brooksâs alleged serious
medical needs arising from his being handcuffed too tightly. But
unlike with the excessive-force claim, we conclude that the district
court properly found that Officer Miller was entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim.
We begin with the facts. As weâve mentioned, at no point
during any of the audio portion of the recording can we hear
Brooks complain about pain or numbness from the handcuffs. But
during the car ride, the recording includes some portions of garbled
audio that preclude us from ruling out the possibility that Brooks
complained at some point about pain and numbness from the cuffs.
Besides that, Brooks alleges that Officer Miller turned up the radio
to cover up Brooksâs complaints of injury. And we do hear the ra-
dio in portions of the recording.
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30 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
So while we canât hear Brooks complain about the cuffs, the
audio does not âblatantly contradict[]â Brooksâs version of events.
Because the audio offers only some support for Officer Millerâs ver-
sion of the incident, we must accept Brooksâs allegations for pur-
poses of ruling on the summary-judgment motion. As a result, we
assume that Brooks complained to Officer Miller during the car
ride that the handcuffs were too tight and they were making his
wrists and hands numb.
As for the substance of Brooksâs deliberate-indifference
claim, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires government officials to provide medical care to those
whoâve been injured during arrest. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). To prevail on a § 1983 claim alleg-
ing a violation of that right, a plaintiff âmust satisfy both an objec-
tive and a subjective inquiry.â Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265,
1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of an objec-
tively serious medical need. Id. A âserious medical needâ is âone
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctorâs attention.â Kuhne v. Fla. Depât of Corr.,
745 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2014). Or a serious medical need can
exist if a delay in treating the need exacerbates the condition. Mann
v. Taser Intâl, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). But in ei-
ther scenario, the need âmust be one that, if left unattended, pos[es]
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 31
a substantial risk of serious harm.â Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Second, as to the subjective inquiry, the plaintiff must prove
that the officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
need. Id. More specifically, the plaintiff must present evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) the officer knew
facts that should have allowed him to draw the inference that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed; (2) the officer actually drew
that inference; (3) the officer nonetheless disregarded the risk of se-
rious harm; and (4) the officerâs conduct amounted to more than
negligence of a specified degree. 4
The district court concluded that Officer Miller was entitled
to qualified immunity on this claim. As weâve explained, to over-
come qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the officer âvi-
olated a statutory or constitutional rightâ that âwas clearly estab-
lishedâ at the time of his challenged conduct. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at
735.
4 As of the time we issue this opinion, arguably, some uncertainty exists in our
precedent as to whether the standard is âmore than mere negligenceâ or
âmore than gross negligence.â Compare, e.g., Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537
(11th Cir. 1995), and Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir.
2010). Luckily for us, we need not wade further into this sticky wicket here
because, as our analysis of Brooksâs claim shows, it makes no difference
whether the standard is âmereâ or âgross.â
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32 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
On Brooksâs deliberate-indifference claim, we start with the
âclearly establishedâ prong because it resolves the question of qual-
ified immunity. In determining whether Officer Miller violated a
clearly established constitutional right, we must focus on the spe-
cific facts and context of this case. See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809
F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). So we ask whether, when Officer
Miller transported Brooks to the Jail on November 12, 2016, it was
clearly established that an officer acted with deliberate indifference
to a transported personâs complaints that his handcuffs were caus-
ing numbness and injury, if he drove about twenty-five minutes to
a jail where the transported person could receive medical attention,
instead of stopping on the road or driving to a nearby hospital for
medical assistance. We conclude that, even if these facts state a
constitutional violation, any such violation was not clearly estab-
lished when Officer Miller transported Brooks.
To support the opposite conclusion, Brooks relies on case
law that establishes the general proposition that if an officer âactu-
ally know[s] about a condition that poses a substantial risk of seri-
ous harm and yet do[es] nothing to address it, [he] violate[s] the
Constitution.â Appellantâs Supp. Br. at 34 (quoting Patel v. Lanier
Cnty., 969 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020)). And to be sure, Patel
states the general rule. But that case does not get to the heart of
the allegations here.
Even assuming without deciding that Brooks had a serious
medical need, the general principle Brooks relies on does not pro-
vide clear notice to a reasonable officer in Officer Millerâs position.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 33
It does nothing to clarify whether driving about twenty-five
minutes for medical attention in response to an arresteeâs state-
ment that handcuffs are too tight, instead of stopping roadside to
provide medical attention or finding a hospital and obtaining care
in a local emergency room, would violate a detaineeâs rights. And
we do not see how Patelâs general principle would have provided
Officer Miller with ââfair warningâ that his conduct was unlawful.â
Powell, 25 F.4th at 921. Because Brooks failed to point to any prec-
edent or a generally established rule that would give Officer Miller
fair warning that his specific conduct was unconstitutional, Officer
Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on Brooksâs claim for delib-
erate indifference to a serious medical need.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district courtâs grant of Officer Millerâs mo-
tion for summary judgment on Brooksâs false-arrest and deliberate-
indifference claims, and we reverse the district courtâs summary-
judgment ruling on Brooksâs excessive-force claim. So we remand
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART.
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1 JORDAN, J. Concurring 21-10590
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
When it comes to matters of technology and science, the
courts frequently lag behind society. See John G. Roberts, 2014
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, United States Supreme
Court, at 3, (Dec. 31, 2014) (â[T]he courts will often choose to be
late to the harvest of American ingenuity.â); Lillian R. BeVier, The
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A
Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1049,
1061â62 (1999) (âFor many reasons, the pace of legal change can
never keep up with the pace of technological evolution.â). And
that reality is probably more true today than in years past given the
current pace of technological innovation.
In a world of artificial intelligence, video and picture editing
software, and video and image generatorsâto only name a fewâ
we must âtread carefully . . . to ensure that we do not âembarrass
the futureââ when assessing video footage like the dash-cam record-
ing in this case. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,
2220(2018) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,322 U.S. 292, 300
(1944)). To âkeep pace with the inexorable march of
technological progress,â United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
285 (6th Cir. 2010), we must be confident that a video or photo-
graph is truly what it purports to be before accepting it as gospel.
Some of todayâs smart phones, like the Google Pixelâwith its
âMagic Eraserâ featureâcan edit or erase persons and objects from
photographs with a couple of clicks and replace them with AI-
generated imagery that fills the gap. Similar technology, I am sure,
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2 JORDAN, J. Concurring 21-10590
will likely soon be available for the editing of videos. Indeed, there
are reports that the next version of âMagic Eraserâ will allow users
of Google Pixel phones to remove audio (like background noise)
from videos. See Brad Linder, Audio Magic Eraser Feature May
Debut With the Google Pixel 8 (Liliputing - August 12, 2023).
Mr. Brooks asserts that the dash-cam recording was tam-
pered with. That may or may not be true. But, as the courtâs opin-
ion explains, we need not decide the matter. The tampering alle-
gations apply only to the parts of the recording relating to Mr.
Brooksâ excessive-force and deliberate-indifference claims, and âwe
reverse the entry of summary judgment on the excessive-force
claim and donât rely on the recording to affirm the entry of sum-
mary judgment on the deliberate-indifference claim.â Maj. Op. at
18 n.1.
With these thoughts, I join Judge Rosenbaumâs opinion for
the court in full.