John Doe v. Rollins College

USCA11 Case: 21-11081    Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023   Page: 1 of 51




                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-11081
                           ____________________

        JOHN DOE,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant
                                                         Cross-Appellee,
        versus
        ROLLINS COLLEGE,


                                                     Defendant-Appellee
                                                        Cross-Appellant.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cv-01069-RBD-LRH
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11081


        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
        JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
                Jane Roe, a student at Rollins College, accused John Doe, a
        fellow student, of sexual assault. Following an investigation, Rol-
        lins determined that Doe violated its sexual misconduct policy.
        Doe was able to graduate and receive his undergraduate degree but
        was not allowed to participate in commencement/graduation cer-
        emonies. Rollins imposed a sanction of dismissal, resulting in per-
        manent separation of Doe without the opportunity for readmis-
        sion; privilege restrictions, including a prohibition on participating
        in alumni reunion events on or off campus; and a contact re-
        striction as to Roe.
               Doe sued Rollins in federal court, asserting two claims under
        Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681—one for selective enforcement and one
        for erroneous outcome—and a third claim under Florida law for
        breach of contract. Following discovery, the district court ex-
        cluded the opinions proffered by Doe’s expert as to Rollins’ pur-
        ported gender bias. Then, on cross-motions for summary judg-
        ment, the district court (a) entered summary judgment in favor of
        Rollins on the Title IX claims and (b) entered partial summary judg-
        ment in favor of Doe on the breach of contract claim.
               On the Title IX claims, the district court concluded that
        there was “no evidence by which a reasonable juror could conclude
        [that] Rollins[’] conduct toward Doe was motivated by his gender.”
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        21-11081                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        D.E. 156 at 16. On the breach of contract claim, the district court
        concluded that Doe had shown that Rollins breached a provision
        of its Title IX sexual misconduct policy stating that the process for
        resolving a sexual misconduct claim would typically be completed
        within 60 days. The investigation began in November of 2017, but
        Rollins did not complete it until March of 2018. See id. at 17. 1
               The district court did not enter judgment in favor of Doe on
        the contract claim because it concluded that a jury had to decide
        whether Rollins’ breach was material and caused harm. See id. at
        26–27. The district court also ruled that there were factual ques-
        tions as to whether Rollins’ inquiry into Doe’s sexual history was
        relevant and whether Rollins responded fairly and equitably to
        Roe’s allegations. See id. at 27–28.
                After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
        Rollins on the breach of contract claim. The jury found that Rol-
        lins’ breach of the 60-day provision was not material; that Rollins
        did not breach a contractual obligation to not have irrelevant prior
        sexual history considered in the investigation of Roe’s allegations;
        and that Rollins did not breach a contractual obligation to reach a
        timely and fair resolution of Roe’s allegations.
               This is Doe’s appeal. Following oral argument and a review
        of the record, we affirm. We conclude that the district court did


        1 Doe submitted an appeal of the investigation, which was resolved in April of

        2018. See D.E. 61-4 at 22. The appeal resulted in a modification of sanctions
        such that Doe’s dismissal was made effective in the Spring of 2018. See id.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-11081

        not abuse its discretion in precluding Doe’s expert from presenting
        opinions about Rollins’ purported gender bias, and that it correctly
        granted summary judgment in favor of Rollins on Doe’s two Title
        IX claims. On the breach of contract claim, we cannot review
        Doe’s challenge to the district court’s partial denial of summary
        judgment because materiality is not a pure legal issue under Florida
        law and was later resolved by the jury. Insofar as Doe contends
        that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on materiality,
        we disagree because the evidence on that issue was disputed and
        the jury could have found that the breach was not material.
                                          I
               In his Title IX claims, Doe asserts that Rollins—based on its
        gender bias—selectively prosecuted him and erroneously found
        him to be in violation of its sexual misconduct policy. To provide
        the necessary context for these claims, we set out the different ver-
        sions of events presented by Roe and Doe.
                                         A
               From 2014 to 2017, Doe was a student at Rollins. During
        that time, he met Roe, another student at Rollins, and the two be-
        came friends. They “hung out around campus, did homework”
        and “spent time together.” D.E. 61-4 at 5. On February 17, 2017,
        Doe invited Roe to his fraternity’s “Grab-a-Date” event. The event
        was “champagne and shackles themed,” which meant that dates
        were “zip-tie[d]” to one another until a shared “bottle of
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        21-11081              Opinion of the Court                       5

        champagne [was] empty.” D.E. 61-2, Exh. B at 18. Roe accepted
        Doe’s invitation, and the two went to the event together that even-
        ing.
                Later, in the early morning hours of February 18, Doe and
        Roe, along with others from the party, walked to a local bar. Even-
        tually, Doe and Roe left the bar together and went to Doe’s room.
        But Doe’s and Roe’s recollections of how they ended up at Doe’s
        room, and what happened once there, differ.
                Roe stated that her “intention was to go to [her] own room
        to go to sleep, by [herself], because [she] was incoherently drunk
        and incredibly tired” but “in between ‘blackouts’ somehow [she]
        ended up in [Doe’s] dorm and room.” Id. at 20–21. She told Doe
        “multiple times that [she] wanted to leave and just go to bed in
        [her] own room but [Doe] insisted [they] hang out and to just wait
        [there in his room] because he had to go to the bathroom.” Id. at
        21. Roe—“too tired to argue, and too confused to want to go else-
        where”—saw Doe’s couch, laid down, and “fell asleep for what felt
        like 5 or 10 min[utes].” Id. When Doe returned, he picked a movie
        and Roe fell asleep again. While Roe was on the couch and as the
        movie was playing, Doe “started making out with [Roe] and touch-
        ing [her] near [her] chest/bra area,” then “started touching [her]
        underwear and moved it aside and began penetrating [her] with his
        finger.” Id.
               Roe recounted “saying ‘[n]o’ and objecting [to] his advances
        through multiple parts of the beginning of this assault, but [her]
        right hand was trapped in the fold of the couch, and [her] left
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

        trapped under him as he was on top of [her] and [she] was too tired,
        dizzy, and intoxicated to do anything other than try to say no.” Id.
        Roe continued to say “no” and fell in and out of sleep. She ex-
        plained:
               As he was touching my thighs I said no, as he was
               touching my vagina I said no, and as he began pene-
               trating me I said no[.] I do think during these no’s I
               was kissing him (in the sense where kissing means my
               lips were on his) at this point but I was intoxicated,
               falling in and out of sleep, and felt as though I was
               unable to move my own body. I remember seeing
               his penis out as he was on top of me and my right
               hand at my sides, trapped between the couch and my
               body, and my left hand under him, which he was now
               moving towards his penis as I was saying no. This
               part of the contact was only for about 4 seconds at
               most (that my hand was touching his penis).
        Id.
                According to Roe, Doe asked “what[’]s wrong” multiple
        times and “discouraged [Roe] from leaving when [she] would ex-
        press that [she] wanted to be in [her] own room.” Id. When Doe
        had “shifted off” of Roe to ask what was wrong, she sat up and “fi-
        nally stood up in an attempt to get out and head towards the door.”
        Id. at 21–22. Doe “stopped [Roe] and was holding [her] arms and
        was saying things like ‘no, just stay’ and ‘we don’t have to have sex’
        and ‘you can just sleep here’ and would keep trying to kiss [Roe]
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                       7

        and move [her] over to the bed.” Id. at 22. Roe, wanting to go to
        her own bed, left Doe’s room.
                 Doe provided a very different account of the evening. While
        at the local bar, he and Roe sat “in the outdoor section” by them-
        selves and “had normal conversation.” D.E. 61-2, Exh. C at 26. “It
        started getting late” and they “decided to return to [his] dorm room
        . . . to watch a movie.” Id. They “began walking and talking on
        the way back, and ultimately started holding hands until [they] ar-
        rived to [their] building on campus.” Id. Once they got to Doe’s
        room, Doe went downstairs to the water fountain with his room-
        mate, who “asked if anything was going on between [Roe] and
        [Doe], as [Roe] appeared to be interested in [Doe] over the course
        of the night and was knowledgeable that the two of [them] had
        been talking regularly for quite some time.” Id. Doe “was not sure
        what to expect and was going to see where the night would take
        [him].” Id.
             Afterwards, in Doe’s room, Doe and Roe “played a movie
        on Netflix and sat next to each other.” Id. Doe described what
        happened next as follows:
              I put my arm around [Roe], in which she was com-
              fortable with. . . . we started kissing. We continued
              on and I started touching her intimate parts, in which
              she showed no resistance. I penetrated her digitally
              and there were no signs of her being uncomfortable.
              Eventually she paused, and I asked if everything was
              okay. I asked because I knew we had been friends for
              an extended period of time and perhaps getting
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

               intimate was not worth losing a friendship over. She
               said that everything was fine and then continued to
               unbuckle my belt, unbutton my pants, and then ex-
               posing and touching my penis. In no way, shape or
               form did I cause her to touch my intimate body parts.
               We continued with kissing and forms of petting until
               [Roe] paused again. I asked if everything was okay,
               and this second time, she indicated that she wanted to
               stop. We stopped immediately and continued watch-
               ing the movie for a little while longer. It had gotten
               late (after 2 AM) and I wanted to go to bed. I said that
               she was welcome to spend the night on the futon or
               to go home (right next door) if she wanted to. She
               stated that she wished to go home and I walked her
               out.
        Id. at 26–27.
                                          B
                A few days later, on February 22, 2017, Roe went to Rollins’
        Title IX office and met with the Title IX Coordinator, Oriana Jimé-
        nez Guevara, to discuss what happened on February 17—an inci-
        dent that she believed to be in violation of the Rollins Title IX sex-
        ual misconduct policy. See D.E. 56-5 at 2–3. Roe “chose not to
        exercise her right to request an investigation” at that time, but she
        “filed a report” and requested “interim measures” such as housing
        accommodations—moving to a different building and to a single
        room—as well as academic accommodations. See D.E. 56-2 at 117,
        123–124.
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                        9

                Later that year, in November of 2017, “an anonymous caller
        reported . . . that an individual with a name similar to [Doe’s] sex-
        ually assaulted three girls.” D.E. 56-5 at 3. Ms. Jiménez Guevara
        called Roe “to see if [Roe] had additional information about the
        caller.” Id. They also discussed whether Roe wanted to move for-
        ward with an investigation, and ultimately she decided to do so.
                On November 20, 2017, Ms. Jiménez Guevara called Doe
        and advised him that she needed to meet with him regarding a Title
        IX case he was involved in. Doe met with Ms. Jiménez Guevara
        that day and was informed that a complaint alleging sexual miscon-
        duct had been made against him by Roe. Doe was also advised of
        “some of the rights that [he] had[,]” including the right to an advi-
        sor. See D.E. 61-4 at 24. According to Doe, during the meeting
        Ms. Jiménez Guevara said “something to the effect of, ‘[w]hen it’s
        all said and done, I will make sure that you appeal this case.’” Id.
        Doe understood that to mean “that the decision of [the Title IX]
        case had already been predetermined before [he] even had a single
        question asked of [him].” Id.
               Rollins selected Deena Wallace as the outside independent
        investigator. Ms. Wallace, an attorney, had previously served as a
        sex-crimes prosecutor at the state attorney’s office. See D.E. 228 at
        88–89.
               Ms. Wallace interviewed Roe and 22 other witnesses (in-
        cluding 20 currently-enrolled Rollins students) as part of her inves-
        tigation. She interviewed Doe on December 7, 2017. During the
        interview, Doe had a lawyer hired by his mother present as his
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    21-11081

        advisor. Doe also provided two written statements to Rollins. Fol-
        lowing the interviews, Ms. Wallace prepared a 71-page report set-
        ting out what each of the witnesses had said. See D.E. 56-5 & D.E.
        56-6.
               In the report, Ms. Wallace summarized each witness’ testi-
        mony, considered additional evidence (e.g., text messages), made
        credibility determinations, explained those determinations, and ap-
        plied Rollins’ sexual misconduct policy to the evidence. Using a
        preponderance of the evidence standard, she found that Roe’s ac-
        count was more credible than Doe’s, and concluded that Doe had
        violated Rollins’ sexual misconduct policy by digitally penetrating
        Roe without her consent.
                Ms. Jiménez Guevara reviewed the report, made some sty-
        listic edits, and concluded that Ms. Wallace’s “process, and what
        she wrote in the report, was permissible” and “followed guide-
        lines.” D.E. 56-2 at 183–84. Doe then submitted an appeal to Rol-
        lins. Mamta Accapadi, Rollins’ Vice-President for Student Affairs,
        reviewed the appeal and determined that Rollins had “followed
        [its] process.” D.E. 61-9 at 15. Because the investigation was com-
        pleted after Doe had already earned his undergraduate degree, it
        did not impact that degree. See D.E. 61-9 at 17. 2




        2 As noted, Doe was not permitted to participate in commencement/gradua-

        tion exercises. Following the appeal, Dr. Accapadi modified the sanctions to
        make clear that they were not impacting Doe’s undergraduate degree and the
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        21-11081                  Opinion of the Court                              11

                                              II
               We begin with Doe’s challenge to the district court’s order
        limiting the testimony of his expert, Professor Robert K.C. John-
        son, to the history of Title IX and excluding his opinions on “the
        gender bias and fairness of Rollins[’] procedures.” D.E. 109 at 7.
        This is our starting point because the summary judgment record
        on the Title IX claims changes if the district court erred in excluding
        Professor Johnson’s opinions.
                                              A
               We review the exclusion of Professor Johnson’s expert opin-
        ions for abuse of discretion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 

 (1997). The abuse of discretion standard allows for a
        range of choice, and that means that sometimes we will affirm even
        though we might have decided the matter differently in the first
        instance. See Gall v. United States, 

 (2007); United
        States v. Frazier, 

 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In-
        herent in this “deferential standard is a certain ‘play in the joints’
        that permits divergent results on the same evidence, depending on
        the [court’s] explanation for the exercise of discretion.” Thomas
        D. Schroeder, Toward a More Apparent Approach to Considering
        the Admission of Expert Testimony, 

,
        2043 (2020).



        dismissal from Rollins “was in effect post the earning of his degree.” D.E. 61-
        9 at 17.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

               The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal
        Rule of Evidence 702, which has three basic requirements: the ex-
        pert must be qualified; his methodology must be reliable; and his
        testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact. See Sorrels v. NCL
        (Bahamas) Ltd., 

 (11th Cir. 2015). The propo-
        nent of the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing each
        requirement by a preponderance of the evidence under Rule
        104(a). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 

, 592 & n.10 (1993); Frazier, 

.
               These Rule 702 requirements are necessarily set out in gen-
        eral terms. As we have observed, the rules relating to expert testi-
        mony “are not precisely calibrated and must be applied in case-spe-
        cific evidentiary circumstances that often defy generalization.”
        United States v. Alabama Power Co., 

 (11th Cir.
        2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
                                          B
               Professor Johnson holds a bachelor’s degree from Harvard,
        a master’s degree from Chicago, and a Ph.D. from Harvard. All
        three degrees are in history, and he teaches that subject at Brooklyn
        College and the City University of New York Graduate Center. See
        D.E. 58-6 at 2; D.E. 109 at 6. He is, “first and foremost, a professor
        of history.” D.E. 228 at 65. He does not have any experience or
        education in higher education administration, human resources,
        student affairs, gender studies, psychology, sociology, behavioral
        science, neurological science, statistical analysis, mental health
        counseling, forensic psychology, or psychiatry. See 

 at 61–62.
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        21-11081                  Opinion of the Court                              13

               In his initial expert report, Professor Johnson explained that
        his experience regarding Title IX “began in 2006-2007, when [he]
        wrote a daily blog on the Duke lacrosse case.” D.E. 63-1 at 2. He
        co-authored a book about that case, and “served as a consultant to
        ABC’s Law & Justice Unit for the final five months of the case.” 

        A decade later, he co-authored another book which “examin[ed]
        due process and fairness in Title IX adjudications.” 

 He has been
        invited to speak on this topic—at the State Risk and Insurance Man-
        agement Association annual conference and before college and uni-
        versity audiences—and has also written on the topic. His writing
        includes a law review article which, at the time of his expert report,
        was forthcoming, two reported articles, two legal commentaries,
        and op-eds in certain publications.
               The district court allowed Professor Johnson to testify about
        the history of Title IX. But it excluded three of his opinions because
        Doe “failed to show Professor Johnson [wa]s qualified to reach [his]
        conclusions on fairness or gender bias by comparing past lawsuits
        against” the facts in this Title IX case. See D.E. 109 at 6–9. The first
        excluded opinion was that Rollins failed to provide Doe with a fair
        process. The second was that gender bias was a motivating factor
        behind Rollins’ erroneous findings. And the third was that Rollins
        acted in a manner that favored female reporting parties and disad-
        vantaged male responding parties. See Br. for Appellant at 55. 3


        3 Doe addresses the excluded opinions together in his brief, and we follow suit

        here.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

               As the district court saw things, the “critical question” with
        respect to admissibility was “fit[:] Does Professor Johnson’s educa-
        tion or experience fit the subjects in his expert report?” D.E. 109 at
        7. The district court concluded that Professor Johnson could not
        opine that the “way Rollins treated Doe was unfair and gender-bi-
        ased” by “comparing past lawsuits [against other academic institu-
        tions] against the[ ] facts” in this case. 

 “Without training or
        experience in these areas,” he was “not qualified to testify about
        them.” 

                                          C
                The “principles set out in Daubert apply to soft-science ex-
        pert testimony” of the kind offered by Professor Johnson; “[s]ocial
        science testimony, like other expert testimony . . . , must be tested
        to be sure that the person possesses genuine expertise in a field and
        that her court testimony adheres to the same standards of intellec-
        tual rigor that are demanded in her professional work.” Carrizosa
        v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 

 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
               Professor Johnson sought to opine on Rollins’ discrimina-
        tory conduct and behavior (i.e., its purported Title IX gender bias).
        Generally speaking, federal courts do not allow experts to testify
        about such motives or biases in discrimination cases unless there is
        some rational connection between the methodology and the opin-
        ion—something that explains how the application of the method-
        ology permits the conclusion(s) reached. See, e.g., Chadwick v.
        WellPoint, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming the
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                        15

        exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert testimony on sex stereotyping in
        a gender discrimination case in part because of a “mismatch be-
        tween the expert’s knowledge and qualifications and her ability to
        helpfully opine on the specifics of th[e] case”).
                Consider Downing v. Abbott Laboratories, 

 (7th
        Cir. 2022), an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff in
        that case sought to use an expert, who was a “legal academic with
        a background in social psychology,” to opine that the employer’s
        conduct was “consistent with how stereotyping and biases (either
        implicit or explicit) manifest and affect people in employment set-
        tings.” 

. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s
        decision to exclude the expert’s testimony on various grounds, in-
        cluding lack of reliability. It explained that the expert had reviewed
        “literature concerning stereotyping and discrimination” and then,
        without discussing her methodology, pivoted to her opinion that
        the employer’s conduct was “consistent with the possibility of ste-
        reotyping or bias.” 

. The district court properly exercised
        its discretion with respect to reliability because the expert had not
        “‘bridge[d] the analytical gap’ by showing a ‘rational connection’
        between the data and the . . . contested conclusion.” 

               The circumstances here are similar. Professor Johnson
        based his unfair process and gender bias opinions on a review of
        hundreds of Title IX lawsuits against colleges and universities
        brought by persons who had been accused of sexual misconduct.
        See D.E. 228 at 12–14, 67. But he never explained why that com-
        parative review allowed him to reach his gender-bias opinions.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-11081

              There were also other problems. We highlight some of
        them below.
               First, in conducting his review of post-2011 Title IX cases by
        accused students against colleges and universities, Professor John-
        son assumed that complaints that survived the motion-to-dismiss
        stage were indicative of gender discrimination. See, e.g., D.E. 58-6
        at 17–18, 24. But, as he later acknowledged, the courts in those
        cases had merely ruled that the factual allegations pled in the com-
        plaints, accepted as true, had made out plausible claims of gender
        bias. See D.E. 228 at 72–73.
               Second, Professor Johnson determined that Rollins’ single-
        investigator model was not the “best practice” or the optimum
        method for getting at the truth, and that schools were moving
        away from such a model. See 

 at 26–27, 29, 84–86. Yet disagree-
        ment with the single-investigator model, no matter how sincere or
        well-grounded, says nothing about why the use of that model sug-
        gests gender bias on the part of Rollins in conducting Title IX in-
        vestigations generally or in conducting the investigation of Roe’s
        allegations specifically.
                Third, Professor Johnson pointed to sex stereotypes in some
        of Rollins’ Title IX training materials. See 

 at 22–23. But he
        acknowledged that the training materials he criticized were pre-
        pared for students and not for investigators like Ms. Wallace.
        Moreover, he conceded that Ms. Wallace had not been shown any
        of the stereotyped training materials and disavowed any suggestion
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        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                        17

        that gender stereotyping by Ms. Jiménez Guevara should be at-
        tributed to Ms. Wallace. See 

 at 75–80, 88, 98–99.
               Fourth, Professor Johnson relied on Rollins’ failure to inves-
        tigate two possible cases of sexual misconduct by females when
        both the females and males were intoxicated. See 

 at 34–36. In
        these two cases, however, the males did not file Title IX com-
        plaints. See 

 at 36–37.
                Doe argues that Professor Johnson’s “academic research
        makes him fully qualified to comment on gender bias in Title IX
        matters” because a “witness’ expertise generally allows the witness
        to offer an expert opinion reasonably within the confines of that
        expertise.” Br. for Appellant at 56–57. Even where experience is
        the basis for an expert’s qualification, however, there can some-
        times be “too great an analytical gap between the data and the
        opinion proffered.” Joiner, 

. “If an expert is relying
        solely or primarily on experience, then [he] must explain how that
        experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is
        a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably
        applied to the facts.” Carrizosa, 

 (internal quotation
        marks omitted).
               It is not enough for Doe to point to Professor Johnson’s ac-
        ademic research and review of other Title IX cases—he “must put
        forth sufficient indicia of reliability and demonstrate that [Professor
        Johnson’s] expertise permits the opinion(s) rendered.” 

 Doe
        does not explain in his brief how Professor Johnson’s expertise al-
        lowed him to opine that Rollins’ Title IX investigation was infected
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11081

        with gender bias. And that is fatal under abuse of discretion review.
        See 

 (affirming exclusion of an expert who “didn’t explain how
        his experience or sources led to or supported the conclusion he
        reached”); Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 

 (11th
        Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
        in concluding that “the leap from data to opinion was too great,
        and therefore exclud[ing] [the] testimony”).
                According to Doe, “because [Professor Johnson] main-
        tain[ed] a database of litigation documents involving Title IX, he
        has on record this enormous array of material of how other col-
        leges and universities handled these matters and could compare
        Rollins to how other institutions had done so.” Reply Br. for Ap-
        pellant at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). We still cannot
        discern any abuse of discretion. Though this collection of data may
        demonstrate how Professor Johnson could opine on how Rollins’
        handling of Title IX matters differed from that of other colleges and
        universities—and maybe why the single-investigator model was
        not the optimal system under current industry practices—Doe
        does not explain how the data provided a basis for concluding that
        Rollins had a Title IX process that was based on or infected with
        gender bias. Indeed, when asked about how his “education, train-
        ing, and experience as a historian assist[ed] [him] in drawing con-
        clusions from [his] database,” Professor Johnson answered only
        that “[t]his is the kind of research that [he’d] always done, which is
        [to] study primary sources and especially primary sources that help
        to illustrate how institutions make procedural decisions behind the
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        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                        19

        scenes.” D.E. 228 at 97. An expert testifying on the basis of his
        experience cannot support an opinion merely by saying that he
        reached it after doing what he has always done. He must also ex-
        plain why the method he has long employed permits or supports
        the opinion at issue.
                                          III
               Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judg-
        ment on Doe’s Title IX claims is plenary. See Marbury v. Warden,
        

 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is war-
        ranted “when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
        the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact
        and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving
        party.” Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 

 (11th
        Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
                                          A
               Under Title IX, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
        the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
        benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
        program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 

(a). “Title IX bars the imposition of university disci-
        pline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision to disci-
        pline.” Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 

 (2d Cir. 1994).
                Last year, in a case arising at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, we ad-
        dressed the “framework for analyzing Title IX challenges to univer-
        sity disciplinary proceedings.” Doe v. Samford Univ., 

,
USCA11 Case: 21-11081      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 08/14/2023      Page: 20 of 51




        20                      Opinion of the Court                   21-11081

        686 (11th Cir. 2022). We examined the tests set forth by the Second
        Circuit in Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715—the “erroneous outcome” test and
        the “selective enforcement” test—as well as “a test first developed
        by the Seventh Circuit: ‘do the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible
        inference that the university discriminated against [the plaintiff] ‘on
        the basis of sex’?’” Samford Univ., 29 F.4th at 686 (quoting Doe v.
        Purdue Univ., 

, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2019)).
               Under the “erroneous outcome” test, “a student must show
        both that he was ‘innocent and wrongly found to have committed
        an offense’ and that there is ‘a causal connection between the
        flawed outcome and gender bias.’” Doe v. Valencia Coll., 

 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Yusuf, 

). And
        under the “selective enforcement” test, “a student must allege and
        ultimately prove ‘that, regardless of the student’s guilt or inno-
        cence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the
        proceeding was affected by the student’s [sex].’” Samford Univ., 29
        F.4th at 686 (quoting Yusuf, 

). We explained in Sam-
        ford University that these two tests “do not capture the full range
        of conduct that could lead to liability under Title IX,” but instead
        “simply describe [two] ways in which a plaintiff might show that
        sex was a motivating factor in a university’s decision.” Id. at 687
        (internal quotation marks omitted).
               Because “[t]he Seventh Circuit’s test hew[ed] more closely
        to ‘the text of the statute and binding precedent’ than . . . Yusuf,”
        we agreed with that approach in Samford University, albeit with
        one modification. See id. at 686. Namely, rather than asking
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        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                         21

        whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff raise a plausible inference,
        we determined that the inquiry ought to be whether the facts, if
        true, permit a reasonable inference of a Title IX violation. See id.
        at 687.
                Although the procedural posture of the appeal in Samford
        University was different—that case involved the dismissal of a com-
        plaint at the pleading stage—the analysis on the appropriate frame-
        work still holds. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 

        (10th Cir. 2021) (reframing the Seventh Circuit’s test for summary
        judgment review). Here we simply modify the inquiry to fit review
        of a grant of summary judgment: could a jury presented with the
        record evidence, viewed in Doe’s favor, reasonably find that Rol-
        lins discriminated against Doe on the basis of sex? See 

 (“[W]e
        reframe the operative question for summary judgment and ask:
        Could a reasonable jury—presented with the facts alleged—find
        that sex was a motivating factor in the University’s disciplinary de-
        cision?”).
                                           B
                To state a Title IX claim for selective enforcement, a plaintiff
        “must plausibly allege ‘an inconsistency’ between his treatment by
        the university and the university’s treatment of a similarly-situated
        member of the other sex.” Samford Univ., 29 F.4th at 693. Applied
        at the summary judgment stage, this standard requires a plaintiff to
        present sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the institution’s
        treatment of similarly-situated male and female students was in-
        consistent. See Univ. of Denver, 

.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

                Doe argues that Rollins engaged in selective enforcement by
        treating Roe more favorably based on sex. Doe contends that even
        though he and Roe were similarly situated in terms of their con-
        duct, Rollins treated Roe more favorably by “fail[ing] to initiate a
        disciplinary process” to determine whether she violated Rollins’
        sexual misconduct policy. See Br. for Appellant at 31. According
        to Doe, his conduct was “nearly identical” to Roe’s because “(i)
        they both engaged in the exact same sexual conduct; (ii) they both
        admitted to drinking; and (iii) they both claimed the other initiated
        sexual activity.” Id. at 32.
                The district court concluded that these similarities were not
        enough because Doe, unlike Roe, did not allege any misconduct
        and did not file a complaint. It explained that “[c]omparing . . . Roe
        and Doe does not eliminate a non-discriminatory reason for Rol-
        lins[’] decision not to investigate . . . Roe – Doe’s failure to allege
        misconduct.” D.E. 156 at 24. As explained below, we agree with
        the district court’s conclusion that Doe was not similarly situated
        to Roe, and as a result “[n]othing about the different[ial] treatment
        of [Doe and Roe] suggests [that sex] had anything to do with it.”
        Anthony v. Georgia, 

 (11th Cir. 2023) (Hinkle, J.,
        concurring).
             It is undisputed that Doe (unlike Roe) did not allege any mis-
        conduct. He acknowledged in his deposition that he did not make
        a complaint that Roe had sexually assaulted him.
               Although Doe does not claim that he lodged a complaint, he
        asserts that Roe never initiated a complaint either. This is simply
USCA11 Case: 21-11081      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 08/14/2023      Page: 23 of 51




        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                          23

        incorrect. Roe did not initially “request an investigation,” but days
        after the incident she went to Rollins’ Title IX office, “filed a report”
        with Rollins’ Title IX Coordinator, and sought “interim
        measures”—“academic accommodations and other support ser-
        vices.” D.E. 56-2 at 117, 123–24. See also D.E. 56-5 at 2–3 (Rollins
        College Report Part 1: “On February 22nd, 2017, [Roe] . . . appeared
        in person at the Office of Title IX and met with [the] Title IX Coor-
        dinator . . . to discuss an incident that she believed to be in violation
        of the Rollins Title IX Policy.”). Thus, unlike Doe, Roe reported
        what she believed to be a Title IX violation to Rollins’ Title IX Co-
        ordinator.
               Doe asserts that “[t]he obligation of Rollins to investigate
        turned on the school’s knowledge of potential misconduct, not on
        whether someone filed a formal complaint.” Br. for Appellant at
        33. According to Doe, Rollins “failed to initiate a disciplinary pro-
        cess with respect to Roe after receiving credible information that
        Roe may have violated the [s]exual [m]isconduct [p]olicy by initi-
        ating sexual activity with Doe while [he] was incapacitated due to
        alcohol.” Id. at 31. On this record, that contention fails.
               Under Rollins’ policy, “incapacitation constitutes a circum-
        stance where a person would not be able to consent.” D.E. 56-2 at
        58–60. See also D.E. 56-1 at 7–8 (“An individual who is physically
        incapacitated from alcohol or other drug consumption (voluntarily
        or involuntarily), or is unconscious, unaware or otherwise physi-
        cally helpless is considered unable to given consent. For example,
        one who is asleep or passed out cannot give consent.”). Rollins’
USCA11 Case: 21-11081       Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 08/14/2023       Page: 24 of 51




        24                       Opinion of the Court                    21-11081

        policy states that “incapacitation is a state beyond drunkenness or
        intoxication” and “indicators of incapacitation may include, but are
        not limited to, lack of control over physical movements, being un-
        aware of circumstances or surroundings, or being unable to com-
        municate for any reason.” D.E. 56-1 at 8. See also D.E. 56-2 at 60
        (Deposition of Ms. Jiménez Guevara: “Q. Okay. If a person is in-
        toxicated, are they able to provide affirmative consent, under the
        Rollins policy? A. According to our policy, the statement is, where
        alcohol is involved, incapacitation is a state beyond drunkenness or
        intoxication.”).4
               For Doe’s argument to succeed, the record must contain ev-
        idence sufficient for a jury to find that Rollins learned that Doe was
        incapacitated—and therefore unable to consent—but nonetheless
        chose not to investigate the matter or initiate disciplinary proceed-
        ings against Roe. The record does not contain such evidence. Alt-
        hough Roe said that she believed Doe was drunk at certain points
        during the evening, she thought he was not as intoxicated as she
        was, and she did not think that he was incapacitated. See D.E. 56-
        5 at 8–9.
               Ms. Wallace, the Title IX investigator, testified similarly:
               Q. Did you have any – after you received information
               that the respondent may have been drunk, did you


        4 We are not called upon to decide whether Rollins’ policy—which expressly

        distinguishes being “drunk” from being “incapacitated” for purposes of con-
        sent—correctly assesses one’s ability to provide consent.
USCA11 Case: 21-11081     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023     Page: 25 of 51




        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                       25

              have any concerns that he was incapacitated due to
              the use of alcohol?
              A. No. There w[ere] no allegations that – and even I
              believe reporter or responding party himself told me
              that he wasn’t incapacitated. I don’t want to mis-
              quote him, but I believe he told me he wasn’t even
              drunk at the time of the incident.
              Q. But the reporting party told you he was drunk,
              right?
              A. No. The reporting party told me that he was drunk
              earlier in the night during the – I believe like the so-
              rority serenade event.
        D.E. 56-9 at 106.
                Critically, Doe never claimed that he was incapacitated.
        When asked whether she made “any efforts to determine whether
        [Doe] was able to consent to [ ] sexual activity,” Ms. Wallace an-
        swered that “[t]here was absolutely no mention of [Doe] being vic-
        timized by [Roe.]” Id. at 107–108. According to Ms. Wallace, Doe
        “never brought that up. Had he brought that up, had he said – had
        he told me [he] was in an – even if he didn’t allege incapacitation,
        even if he said intoxication, [she] would have inquired further as to
        his intoxicated state; however, that is not what he said at all.” Id.
        at 108.
               Indeed, Doe’s own statements belie any claim of incapacita-
        tion. Doe submitted two statements to Ms. Wallace in response to
        allegations made against him. See D.E. 61-2, Exh. C at 25–31. In
        the first statement, Doe did not say or suggest that he was
USCA11 Case: 21-11081     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023     Page: 26 of 51




        26                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

        physically incapacitated from alcohol, or unconscious, or unaware,
        or otherwise physically helpless. He did not even claim that he was
        intoxicated. Doe’s only reference to his alcohol consumption that
        evening was the following: “When we entered the bar, someone
        purchased me a beer (Corona), while Jane Roe did not consume
        any drinks there.” Id. at 26. Although Doe specifically “address[ed]
        the term incapacitation and it[s] definition” in [Rollins’ policy], he
        did not at any point state that he was incapacitated that evening.
        See id. at 28. When he submitted a second statement to Ms. Wal-
        lace with additional thoughts after he “processed all the infor-
        mation that [she] gave [him],” Doe again did not say anything to
        indicate or suggest that he was incapacitated in any way. See id. at
        30–31.
                The record, as we have noted, contains some evidence of
        Doe drinking alcohol on the night in question. But this was not
        enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rol-
        lins discriminated against Doe on the basis of sex by failing to in-
        vestigate Roe. Given that Doe did not file a complaint against Roe,
        and that Doe disclaimed any incapacity, no reasonable jury could
        find that Rollins’ failure to investigate Roe was based on sex.
               Doe’s reliance on Doe v. Amherst College, 

 (D. Mass. 2017), falls short for this very reason. In Amherst
        College, the operative complaint alleged that the college learned
        that the alleged female victim “may have initiated sexual activity”
        with the male student subject to the disciplinary proceedings
        “while he was ‘blacked out,’ and thus incapable of consenting” but
USCA11 Case: 21-11081     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023    Page: 27 of 51




        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                       27

        “did not encourage him to file a complaint, consider the infor-
        mation, or otherwise investigate.” 

. Those allegations,
        the district court concluded, were “sufficient to survive a motion
        for judgment on the pleadings.” 

 Here, the record—viewed in
        the light most favorable to Doe—does not suggest or show that
        Rollins learned that Doe was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
        consent. As a result, a reasonable jury could not find that Rollins’
        failure to investigate Roe was improperly based on her sex or Doe’s
        sex.
                                         C
                To state a Title IX erroneous outcome claim, a plaintiff must
        plausibly allege “both that he was innocent and wrongly found to
        have committed an offense and that there is a causal connection
        between the flawed outcome and [sex] bias.” Samford Univ., 29 F.
        4th at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the summary
        judgment stage, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for a
        jury to make both of these findings. See Univ. of Denver, 

.
               Doe denied that he engaged in sexual activity with Roe with-
        out her consent. We agree with the district court that his first-hand
        version of events, if believed, was sufficient to create an issue of
        fact on the first prong of the erroneous outcome standard. See
        United States v. Stein, 

, 857–58 (11th Cir. 2018) (en
        banc).
USCA11 Case: 21-11081     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023     Page: 28 of 51




        28                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

               That leaves the second prong—whether there is sufficient
        evidence for a jury to find a causal connection between the flawed
        outcome and gender bias. Doe claims that he “presented evidence
        of procedural deficiencies and patterns of enforcement which,
        when combined with evidence of external pressure from [the U.S.
        Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights,] was sufficient to
        show that Rollins employed outdated and discriminatory views of
        gender and sexuality.” Br. for Appellant at 37 (internal quotation
        marks omitted). Like the district court, we conclude that this evi-
        dence—viewed collectively—is not sufficient for a jury to find
        there was gender bias in Rollins’ investigation and determination,
        such that Doe was disciplined on the basis of sex.
              Before discussing the evidence Doe relies on, we briefly
        summarize the allegations presented, and found to be insufficient
        to make out a claim of gender bias, in Samford University. Alt-
        hough Samford University arose in a Rule 12(b)(6) context, we
        mention the allegations there because, if they were deemed inade-
        quate to survive a motion to dismiss, then the same allegations,
        when established by evidence at summary judgment, would like-
        wise not be enough to get to a jury.
                The plaintiff in Samford University alleged that “procedural
        irregularities at the investigation and hearing stages, ‘public pres-
        sure[ ] to comply with Title IX,’ public statements by university
        officials, and ‘statistics revealing numerous allegations against male
        students’ raise[d] a reasonable inference of sex discrimination.” 29
        F.4th at 687. Specifically, the plaintiff’s allegations of procedural
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        21-11081                 Opinion of the Court                           29

        irregularities included the following: “the decision of [t]he [univer-
        sity’s] appellate board . . . [to] reject[ ] all medical evidence showing
        the falsity of [Roe’s] claims”; “the university’s failure to redact the
        portions of the investigative report containing statements from
        witnesses who did not testify at the hearing, as the [university’s]
        Title IX policy requires”; the “complaint against [the plaintiff] was
        [the investigator’s] first Title IX investigation”; and “prior to lead-
        ing the investigation . . . [the investigator] received little to no train-
        ing” and “lacked the experience necessary to conduct a Title IX in-
        vestigation on her own in accordance with the [p]olicy.” Id. at 688–
        89 (internal quotation marks omitted). As for statistics revealing
        numerous allegations against male students, the plaintiff in Sam-
        ford University alleged that “there ha[d] been at least seven re-
        ported rapes and nine reported cases of fondling; and . . . all the
        accused students were . . . males.” Id. at 692 (internal quotation
        marks omitted). The plaintiff further alleged that “the university
        promoted an ‘It’s On Us Initiative’ . . . tout[ing] [that] every 21
        hours there is a rape on an American college campus; and that the
        university was subjected to . . . pressure from federal regulators to
        comply with Title IX and appear tough on sexual assault.” Id. at
        691 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the plaintiff,
        “the university favor[ed] all complainants and disfavor[ed] all re-
        spondents in Title IX proceedings.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation
        marks omitted).
               These and other allegations, accepted as true and viewed in
        the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fell short in Samford
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

        University. They did not permit a reasonable inference that the
        university discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of sex. See
        id. at 687–93. We therefore do not write on a clean slate in review-
        ing Doe’s Title IX erroneous outcome claim.
               Doe identifies four types of evidence which he says shows
        (or creates an issue of fact on) Rollins’ gender bias: (1) evidence of
        stereotyped views of gender; (2) evidence of procedural flaws in the
        investigation; (3) evidence of external pressure from the Depart-
        ment of Education; and (4) evidence on patterns of decision-mak-
        ing at Rollins. We assess this evidence collectively because “the
        whole is often greater than the sum of its parts.” District of Co-
        lumbia v. Wesby, 

 (2018) (discussing the “totality
        of the circumstances” standard for assessing probable cause). Cf.
        Lewis v. City of Union City, 

, 1220 n.6 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (en banc) (explaining that a plaintiff may show discriminatory in-
        tent by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evi-
        dence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination).
        But to understand what Doe’s evidence means collectively, we first
        discuss each component of the mosaic and its limitations. See Sam-
        ford Univ., 29 F.4th at 687–92.
               Stereotyped Views of Gender. Doe points to two emails
        sent by Rollins’ Title IX Coordinator in October and November of
        2015, as well as certain information set out in some of Rollins’ train-
        ing materials. According to Doe, the email from October of 2015
        “misrepresented the definition of consent . . . indicating a female-
        centric view where consent could not be implied by ‘a few too
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                        31

        many drinks or a short skirt,’” while the email from November of
        2015 “stat[ed] a common stereotype about males: ‘Men act in a hy-
        per-masculine and sexually aggressive manner to gain approval
        from their male peers . . . .’” Br. for Appellant at 40. As for the
        training materials, Doe argues that they “reinforced the stereotype
        of men as predators.” 

 Doe cites documents that “included the
        false claim that ‘99% of people who rape are men.’” 

 (citing D.E.
        74-9).
               The October 2015 email includes the “short skirt” comment,
        but the rest of its content is gender neutral with respect to the mat-
        ter of consent: “To make a mutual, voluntary, informed decision
        between clear-minded, of age participants before ANY and EVERY
        sexual act. Consent can be withdrawn at ANY time and you are
        NOT ENTITLED.” D.E. 74-8 at 1. It also states, with bullet points,
        that “[c]onsent is an enthusiastic, unequivocal, voluntary, verbal
        and passionate – YES!”; that “[c]onsent is not an interpretation”;
        that “[t]here are no grey areas”; that consent “is not unsure, or im-
        plied, after a few too many drinks or by a short skirt, it’s not
        drugged, it’s never a ‘maybe’ or an ‘okay’ and it sure isn’t coerced
        or convinced”; and that a “person cannot consent if they are asleep
        or incapacitated by alcohol, drugs, or any other cause!” See 

               The November 2015 email states that “[m]en are an integral
        part of moving campus culture away from tolerance of sexual vio-
        lence,” and that “[w]hile most men do not commit acts of violence,
        males perpetrate the majority of sexual assaults on women and
        other men.” D.E. 74-7 at 1. It also says that “[m]en act in a hyper-
USCA11 Case: 21-11081         Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 08/14/2023         Page: 32 of 51




        32                         Opinion of the Court                        21-11081

        masculine and sexually aggressive manner to gain approval from
        their male peers, not to impress women, research suggests.” Id. at
        2.
                One set of training materials from the Office of the Title IX
        Coordinator, which were used for student orientation, defines sex-
        ual assault as “[h]aving or attempting to have sexual intercourse or
        sexual contact with another individual without consent” and in a
        bullet point mentions “[t]hreat, force, coercion, incapacitation.”
        D.E. 74-12 at 14. The slide for “consent” states the following: “The
        decision to engage in sexual activity must be informed, knowing,
        and voluntary. It exists when all parties exchange mutually under-
        standable affirmative words or behavior indicating their agreement
        to freely participate in mutual sexual activity.” Id. at 17. Additional
        slides about “consent” and “coercion” are gender-neutral. See, e.g.,
        id. at 18 (explaining that a person who is “physically incapacitated”
        is “considered unable to give consent”). One of the “scenario” dis-
        cussions employs a hypothetical in which a male student harasses
        a female student; another uses a hypothetical in which one male
        student engages in the sexual assault of another male student; and
        a third uses a hypothetical in which a male student touches the
        breast of a female student without her consent. See id. at 36–38. 5


        5 Doe says in his brief that “all of the training scenarios included male perpe-

        trators.” Br. for Appellant at 40. Yet review of the training slides in the record
        shows largely gender-neutral guidance. For example, one “Exercise” slide pre-
        sented two questions: “What do individuals who identify as men do on a daily
        basis to prevent themselves from being raped or sexually assaulted?” and
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        21-11081                    Opinion of the Court                                33

               Another set of training materials, this one from August of
        2014, is entitled “Peer Education Title IX Training.” See D.E. 74-9.
        It contains a number of slides on sexual assault statistics. One of
        the slides states that “1 in 5 college women will be sexually as-
        saulted during their college years,” id. at 3 (citing “USDOJ, 2005”
        as the source), and another states that “99% of people who rape are
        men,” id at 7 (citing “Greenfeld, 1997” as the source). 6
                 Doe contends in his brief that the former statistic is “ques-
        tionable” and that the latter is “false.” Br. for Appellant at 40. But
        he does not cite to any evidence in the record indicating the respec-
        tive statistics are questionable or false, and it is not appropriate for
        us on our own to try to figure out if the figures are accurate or
        not—even assuming we could. If Doe asserts that Rollins used al-
        legedly questionable or false statistics about sexual assaults to sug-
        gest or show gender bias on the part of Rollins, it is his responsibil-
        ity to point us to a source which questions the validity of those sta-
        tistics.


        “What do individuals who identify as women do on a daily basis to prevent
        themselves from being raped of [sic] sexually assaulted?” D.E. 74-11 at 2. An-
        other slide from a different training presentation states that one of the four
        “Things to Know About Title IX” is that it “applies to all genders.” D.E. 74-12
        at 9. In a later slide, “Sexual Assault (Rape)” is defined as “[h]aving or attempt-
        ing to have sexual intercourse of sexual contact with another individual with-
        out consent.” Id. at 15.
        6 Ms. Jiménez Guevara, who was not the Title IX Coordinator in 2014, testified

        she “never used” the 99% statistic and did not use the 2014 training presenta-
        tion for any purpose. See D.E. 56-2 at 93.
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11081

               Evidence of Procedural Flaws in the Investigation. Doe iden-
        tifies a number of purported deficiencies in the investigation.
        These are Rollins’ failure to adhere to the 60-day timeline; Ms. Wal-
        lace’s alleged failure to consider evidence that could have nega-
        tively affected the credibility of Roe, such as her delay in pursuing
        an investigation or her receipt of academic and housing benefits;
        Ms. Wallace interviewing Doe only once but Roe multiple times;
        Ms. Wallace taking Roe’s account at face value; the belief of Doe
        and his advisor that Ms. Wallace supposedly made up her mind be-
        fore his interview; Ms. Wallace’s reliance on the stereotype that
        men are constantly seeking sex and are responsible for obtaining
        consent, even when Doe indicated that Roe had initiated the sexual
        activity; and Ms. Wallace’s inquiry into Doe’s prior sexual history,
        but not Roe’s prior sexual history. See Br. for Appellant at 42–44.
        Most of these alleged flaws are not flaws at all or demonstrate little
        connection to gender bias.
               First, although Rollins exceeded its own 60-day deadline,
        “[a] deviation from a Title IX policy is not, in and of itself, a viola-
        tion of Title IX.” Samford Univ., 29 F.4th at 688. Ms. Jiménez Gue-
        vara explained that she did not open up an investigation at the time
        of Roe’s initial report in February of 2017 because she “didn’t have
        enough information to supersede [Roe’s] wishes at that time.”
        D.E. 56-2 at 117. Choosing not to begin an investigation against
        Doe for dearth of information (and/or because of Roe’s decision
        not to proceed) is not evidence of sex discrimination.
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        21-11081                  Opinion of the Court                             35

               As for the delay from November of 2017 to March of 2018,
        Ms. Wallace interviewed Roe, Doe, and 22 other witnesses, and
        then prepared a 71-page report. When asked why it took her so
        long to finish the report, Ms. Wallace explained that although her
        investigation concluded on December 12, 2017, she was admitted
        into the hospital on December 22 and “didn’t really come out until
        March 19”—and during that time Ms. Jiménez Guevara was re-
        viewing her first draft. See D.E. 61-7 at 40.
                Second, Doe asserts that Ms. Wallace interviewed Roe four
        times—three in-person interviews and one phone call—but inter-
        viewed him only once. But Doe submitted two written statements
        in addition to his interview. So Ms. Wallace still heard from Doe
        several times, albeit in a different format. Moreover, Ms. Wallace
        testified that Doe “was interviewed at the end” and after she “in-
        terviewed [Doe] and re-interviewed [Roe], there were no outstand-
        ing questions in [her] mind that gave [her] any reason to re-inter-
        view him for any reason.” Id. at 34. Additionally, Ms. Wallace in-
        terviewed the witnesses Doe submitted and they did not provide
        any additional information or leave any outstanding questions in
        her mind “that would have called for him to be re-interviewed.”
        Id. 7


        7 As to Doe being interviewed at the end, Ms. Wallace “believe[d] the date

        kept getting pushed back because [Doe] was trying to line up his counsel . . .
        and so it took him some time to do that” and “the process [was] moving from
        obviously interviewing everyone else in the meantime while [they were] wait-
        ing for his to come along.” D.E. 61-7 at 34.
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

                Third, Doe says that he and his advisor believed Ms. Wallace
        had made up her mind before the interview. Lay witnesses may
        sometimes testify, based on their own observations and percep-
        tions, about the state of mind of another person, and we assume
        that the opinions of Doe and his advisor were admissible. See, e.g.,
        John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 

, 1293–94
        (5th Cir. 1978). Nevertheless, we note that any inference of bias by
        Ms. Wallace in favor of Roe may be a bias in favor of report-
        ing/complaining parties, and not a bias in favor of females. See
        Samford Univ. 29 F.4th at 690 (“discrimination against respondents
        is not discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’ . . . and does not permit
        a reasonable inference of an anti-male bias because both men and
        women can be respondents”) (internal quotation marks and cita-
        tion omitted). See also Doe v. Stonehill Coll., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2022) (“[D]eference to Roe, without more, does not
        show that her treatment -- or Doe’s -- is attributable to sex rather
        than to some other reason, such as Roe’s status as the complain-
        ant.”). As the district court put it, though the record “may demon-
        strate a victim-centered approach to the investigation of the alleged
        sexual misconduct, [ ] conspicuously absent is evidence of discrim-
        inatory bias motivated by gender.” D.E. 156 at 23.
               Fourth, it is true that Ms. Wallace inquired about Doe’s past
        sexual history but not about Roe’s past sexual history. In a vac-
        uum, that might permit some inference of gender bias. But the
        evidence cannot be viewed in isolation, and here there was an
        anonymous allegation that Doe had sexually assaulted three other
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                      37

        female students. Given that allegation, and the lack of any similar
        allegation about Roe, the decision to inquire about Doe’s past sex-
        ual history is not suggestive of gender bias.
              Pressure from the Department of Education. Doe points to
        the Department of Education’s issuance of its 2011 “Dear Col-
        league” letter—which discussed, among other things, schools’ ob-
        ligations to respond to sexual harassment and sexual violence, pro-
        cedural requirements pertaining to such harassment and violence,
        and steps to prevent and correct its discriminatory effects on the
        complainant and others—and maintains that Rollins changed its
        Title IX policies in response to “pressure” from the Department.
        See Br. for Appellant at 44–45; Reply Br. for Appellant at 36–38.
        Doe also cites to the testimony of Ms. Jiménez Guevara, who said
        that “[p]art of [her] job was ensuring that [Rollins was] following
        the mandates of Title IX, as an institution” and that the “Dear Col-
        league letter and the government was very clear on what the con-
        sequences are for any institution that doesn’t follow the mandates
        of Title IX.” D.E. 56-2 at 114.
               In Samford University, we explained that the Department of
        Education’s 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter” was not indicative of
        gender bias on the part of the university because it was rescinded
        in September of 2017 and because new regulations, e.g., 

, provided more procedural protections for those accused
        of sexual misconduct. See Samford Univ., 29 F.4th at 691–92.
        Here, Rollins began its investigation of Roe’s complaint in Novem-
        ber of 2017, after the “Dear Colleague Letter” had been rescinded.
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        38                     Opinion of the Court                21-11081

        See also Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 

, 855–56 (7th Cir.
        2019) (cited with approval in Samford University, and holding that
        “generalized allegations” about “the ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter,”
        even when combined with allegations of procedural impropriety,
        did not permit a “plausibl[e] infer[ence] that [the] investigation or
        adjudication was tainted by an anti-male bias”).
              Patterns of Decision-Making at Rollins. Doe maintains that
        that Rollins “never investigated a female for sexual misconduct
        while Doe was a student at the school despite the fact that the Rol-
        lins student body at that time was 60% female.” Br. for Appellant
        at 47. He also argues that Rollins’ investigations “show[ ] actions
        consistent with gender bias”—for example, “[m]any of the reports
        delved into the sexual history of the male respondents.” Id. at 48.
                Statistics are often illuminating, but they sometimes do not
        tell the whole story. Maybe that is why Benjamin Disraeli, the Brit-
        ish statesman, once remarked that there are three kinds of lies:
        “lies, damned lies, and statistics.” The Yale Book of Quotations 208
        (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
               Doe’s statistical presentation is misleading. Of the 12 re-
        ported cases of alleged sexual misconduct at Rollins between 2011
        and 2018, none included complaints against a female student—11
        were female students complaining about male students, and the
        other was a male student complaining about a male student. Doe
        therefore has not cited any evidence of Rollins choosing not to in-
        vestigate complaints against female students. See Samford Univ.,
        29 F.4th at 692.
USCA11 Case: 21-11081      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023     Page: 39 of 51




        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                        39

               As the district court explained, “schools are not responsible
        for which students choose to report sexual misconduct.” D.E. 156
        at 22 (quoting Rossley v. Drake Univ., 

        (S.D. Iowa 2018), aff’d, 

 (8th Cir. 2020)). In any event,
        the fact that 5 of the 12 accused male students were ultimately
        found to not have engaged in sexual misconduct, see D.E. 74-1,
        demonstrates that Rollins’ investigations didn’t invariably yield
        anti-male results. And that, in turn, weighs against a finding of anti-
        male bias. As for looking into the sexual history of the male stu-
        dents accused of sexual misconduct, in Doe’s case the inquiry was
        due to the fact that an anonymous caller reported that Doe had
        assaulted three female students.
               The Evidence Viewed Collectively. As noted, Doe’s evi-
        dence of procedural deficiencies and patterns of enforcement must
        be viewed collectively. But even when taken as a whole, and
        viewed in Doe’s favor, the evidence does not create a jury issue as
        to whether there was a causal connection between the purported
        erroneous outcome in Doe’s case and gender bias on the part of
        Rollins. See Yusuf, 

 (explaining that the record must
        contain enough evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to
        whether “gender bias was a motivating factor behind the errone-
        ous finding” in the plaintiff’s case). First, although some of the 2015
        emails and the various training materials Doe highlighted do con-
        tain some problematic language—for example, as Doe notes, the
        hypothetical example scenarios included only male perpetrators—
        they were geared toward student orientation and training and
USCA11 Case: 21-11081     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023     Page: 40 of 51




        40                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

        some were years removed from Doe’s investigation. And, as Pro-
        fessor Johnson acknowledged, Ms. Wallace—the Title IX investiga-
        tor in Doe’s case—did not see any of those materials and there was
        no claim that any gender stereotyping on the part of Ms. Jiménez
        Guevara was imputed to Ms. Wallace. Second, the alleged proce-
        dural deficiencies are either not flaws at all or matters that have a
        gender-neutral explanation. Cf. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th at 688
        (“Doe’s ‘bare assertion’ that the procedural irregularities are at-
        tributable to his sex does not make his speculation plausible.”).
        Third, the pressure from the Department of Education had dissi-
        pated by the time of Doe’s investigation, as the 2011 “Dear Col-
        league” letter was rescinded in September of 2017. See Univ. of
        Denver, 952 F.3d at 1192–1193 (explaining that the “Dear Col-
        league” letter is gender-neutral on its face and evidence of the pres-
        sure the university felt to comply with its guidance “cannot support
        [the student’s] summary judgment burden unless combined with a
        particularized ‘something more’”) (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted). Fourth, on this record there are no discernable patterns of
        gender-biased decision-making.
               The cases Doe relies on exemplify the shortcomings of this
        record. For example, in Doe v. Marymount University, 

 (E.D. Va 2018), the district court had before it
        allegations specifically regarding the adjudicator of the sexual mis-
        conduct proceedings—the person “ultimately responsible for de-
        termining [the student’s] guilt or innocence.” Because the district
        court was considering a motion to dismiss, it accepted as true the
USCA11 Case: 21-11081     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023    Page: 41 of 51




        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                       41

        allegations, which “reveal[ed] that [the adjudicator’s] decision-
        making was infected with impermissible gender bias.” 

                Here, the record is markedly different. Doe has not pointed
        to any evidence showing that Ms. Wallace, the Title IX investigator
        in his case, had or acted on gender bias. Ms. Wallace was selected
        as a Title IX investigator for Rollins around April of 2017 and the
        first training she attended was on May 31, 2017. See D.E. 61-7 at
        6–7. Doe does not argue that Ms. Wallace attended any of the
        problematic training sessions he cites to, and it is unclear from the
        record whether they even took place while Ms. Wallace was serv-
        ing as an investigator—some of the presentations appear undated,
        but at least one appears to be from August 14, 2014, which was
        years before Ms. Wallace was even selected by Rollins. For the
        same reason, Ms. Wallace could not have received the October and
        November 2015 emails Doe references.
               We are likewise unpersuaded by Doe’s reliance on Doe v.
        Purdue University, 

 (7th Cir. 2019). The allegations in
        Purdue University—which, again, had to be accepted as true at the
        Rule 12(b)(6) stage of that case—included that the university center
        posted an article during the same month the male student was dis-
        ciplined titled “Alcohol isn’t the cause of campus sexual assault.
        Men are.” 

. Moreover, the university chose to credit the
        female student’s account without actually “hearing directly from
        her.” 

 The record here does not contain such facts.
               Finally, we have considered Doe v. William Marsh Rice Uni-
        versity, 

 (5th Cir. 2023) (2-1 decision reversing
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        42                     Opinion of the Court                21-11081

        grant of summary judgment in favor of university on Title IX
        claims by male student who was found to have engaged in sexual
        misconduct), which Doe has submitted as supplemental authority.
        Title IX cases are inherently fact-specific, see Samford Univ., 29 F.
        4th at 701 (Jordan, J., concurring), and though Rice University in-
        volved the same summary judgment posture as this case, the un-
        derlying accusation and the handling of the Title IX investigation
        are markedly different.
                In Rice University, a student—we’ll call her Student A—al-
        leged that “she became infected with herpes after a consensual sex-
        ual encounter with another student who knew he had herpes” but
        failed to sufficiently inform her of that during their relationship.
        See 

. After Student A submitted a written complaint
        to Rice University, the other student—we’ll call him Student B—
        was placed on an interim suspension. See 

. The investi-
        gation against Student B was to determine whether he violated
        Rice University’s prohibition from “intentionally inflicting or at-
        tempting to inflict mental or bodily harm on any person” and “tak-
        ing reckless disregard, from which mental or bodily harm could re-
        sult to any person” and “whether his conduct may qualify as dating
        violence under the [u]niversity’s [s]exual [m]isconduct [p]olicy.”
        

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                Roe and Student A are alike in that each submitted a com-
        plaint to their university alleging sexual misconduct, and Doe and
        Student B are alike in that each filed lawsuits against their univer-
        sity alleging gender bias. But that’s really where the relevant
USCA11 Case: 21-11081      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 08/14/2023      Page: 43 of 51




        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                         43

        similarities end. First, in Rice University, the issue was not inability
        to provide consent due to alleged incapacitation. Instead, Student
        A accused Student B of “failing to inform her of his herpes diagno-
        sis, and this was the charge [Student B] defended against. Rice ul-
        timately found that [Student B] had informed [Student A] of his
        herpes diagnosis but sanctioned him anyway for failing to go fur-
        ther by informing [Student A] of the risks of having sex with a her-
        pes carrier, despite the fact that no such rule appears in Rice’s stu-
        dent code.” 

. Second, Student B’s lawyer—unlike Doe’s
        lawyer during Rollins’ investigation—“was not allowed to partici-
        pate in the process or view any documents in the disciplinary file
        in order to counsel” Student B. See 

 Third, Student B—unlike
        Doe—“was kicked off campus on 24 hours’ notice because of the
        risk that he might have sex with other students and infect them
        with herpes.” 

 Fourth, Student B “was ultimately sanctioned
        with what amounted to expulsion for failing to inform a sex partner
        of the potential consequences of having sex with a herpes carrier.
        Yet when [Student B] offered the [u]niversity evidence that [Stu-
        dent A] was doing precisely the same thing, and [Student A] ex-
        pressly informed the [u]niversity of her intent not to tell future sex
        partners of her herpes diagnosis, the [u]niversity did nothing.” 

        As discussed, Doe did not complain to Rollins during the investiga-
        tion that he was incapacitated and unable to consent, or that Roe
        may have engaged in sexual misconduct, or that she was otherwise
        engaging in sexual misconduct with other students. In contrast, in
        Rice University, Student B alleged Student A “was guilty of the
USCA11 Case: 21-11081         Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 08/14/2023          Page: 44 of 51




        44                          Opinion of the Court                        21-11081

        same conduct of which he was charged: failure to disclose the risk
        of STD transmission.” 

.
                Based on these facts, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit con-
        cluded that the district court did not view the record in the light
        most favorable to Student B, and that material fact issues remained
        as to whether the university’s proceedings were motivated by gen-
        der bias. Rice University does not establish that the district court
        here erred; it shows how a different record can lead to a different
        result. 8
                                               IV
                Doe argues that he was entitled to summary judgment on
        the liability aspect of his breach of contract claim. To recap, the
        district court partially granted Doe’s motion for summary judg-
        ment, concluding that Rollins breached the 60-day provision of its
        Title IX sexual misconduct policy. That provision typically re-
        quired the process for sexual misconduct and harassment reports
        to be completed within 60 days. Doe challenges the district court’s

        8 The dissent in Rice University maintained that Student B’s “experience with

        the [u]niversity’s disciplinary process reveal[ed] no evidence of gender dis-
        crimination.” 

 (Graves, Jr., J., dissenting). Specifically, the dis-
        sent believed that the selective enforcement claim failed because there was
        “no evidence that similarly situated women were either not investigated or
        punished in the same way as” Student B, and the erroneous outcome claim
        failed because Student B “produced no evidence that the [u]niversity’s decision
        was wrong or that it was based on gender bias.” 

 at 718–721 (Graves, Jr., J.,
        dissenting). Given how different the facts in Rice University were, we need
        not decide whether the majority or the dissent got it right.
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        21-11081                Opinion of the Court                        45

        ruling that a genuine dispute of fact existed on whether Rollins’
        breach of the 60-day provision was material—an issue that pro-
        ceeded to trial and was resolved by the jury in Rollins’ favor.
                 There was “a full trial and judgment on the merits” of the
        materiality issue. As a result, Doe’s challenge to the district court’s
        denial of summary judgment is not properly before us. See Lind v.
        United Parcel Serv., Inc., 

, 1286 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We
        . . . hold that this Court will not review the pretrial denial of a mo-
        tion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the
        merits.); Am. Builders Ins. Co. v. S.-Owners Ins. Co., 

        (11th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e have repeatedly and broadly held that ‘this
        Court will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary
        judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits.’”) (quoting
        Lind, 254 F.3d at 1286)); Carrizosa, 

 (“In our circuit
        . . . ‘a party may not appeal an order denying summary judgment
        after there has been a full trial on the merits.’”) (citation omitted).
               The Supreme Court recently held in Dupree v. Younger, 

, 1389 (2023), that a “post-trial motion under Rule 50 is
        not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue
        resolved at summary judgment.” As a panel of our court just ex-
        plained, under Dupree “arguments denied at summary judgment
        are appealable after a trial on the merits if they raise ‘purely legal
        issues.’” Am. Builders Ins. Co. v. Southern-Owners Ins. Co., 

 (11th Cir. 2023).
               Dupree does not apply here. The reason is that under Flor-
        ida law—which governs Doe’s breach of contract claim—
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        46                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

        materiality is an issue of fact and not a pure question of law. See
        Covelli Fam., L.P. v. ABG5, L.L.C., 

 (Fla. 4th
        DCA 2008) (“The issue of whether an alleged breach is vital or ma-
        terial is reviewed as a question of fact.”). Accord 23 Williston on
        Contracts § 63:3 (4th ed & May 2023 update) (“The determination
        whether a material breach has occurred is generally a question of
        fact, dependent on the circumstances of the case.”) (footnotes omit-
        ted). We therefore cannot review the district court’s denial of sum-
        mary judgment on liability for Doe’s breach of contract claim. See
        Am. Builders Ins. Co., 71 F.4th at 859–61.
                                          V
               Doe also challenges the district court’s denial of his Rule 50
        motions for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of materiality.
        Our review is plenary, and we view the evidence in the light most
        favorable to Rollins, which prevailed at trial. See Combs v. Planta-
        tion Patterns, 

, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997).
               During trial, Doe moved for partial judgment as a matter of
        law under Rule 50(a), arguing that Rollins’ breach of the 60-day
        provision was material. Specifically, Doe asserted that he and his
        advisor in the Title IX investigation both testified that his “ability
        to defend himself was impacted because of the delay in informing
        [him] of the allegations and initiating an investigation.” D.E. 191
        at 3. Doe further claimed that “the ability to obtain physical evi-
        dence, such a[s] surveillance videos or electronic communications,
        was lost,” and that “memories fade over this period of time.” Id.
        According to Doe, Rollins did not present “any contrary evidence”
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                        47

        and “no reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary
        basis to find for [Rollins] on the issue of materiality related to the
        60-day provision.” Id.
               The district court reserved ruling on Doe’s partial Rule 50(a)
        motion, and the jury returned a verdict in Rollins’ favor, finding
        that Rollins’ breach of the 60-day provision was not material. Fol-
        lowing trial, the district court denied Doe’s partial motion for judg-
        ment as a matter of law. Doe renewed his motion under Rule
        50(b), and in the alternative requested a new trial pursuant to Rule
        59.
                In his renewed motion, Doe argued that the district court
        had “misapplied the material breach rule” by focusing on whether
        the delay impacted Rollins’ investigator, rather than himself, the
        non-breaching party. See D.E. 210 at 4. The district court denied
        Doe’s Rule 50(b) motion, and noted that “[h]ow the delay affected
        the investigator goes directly to [Doe’s] injury – it was Ms. Wallace
        [the investigator] who found [Doe] violated the policy.” D.E. 222
        at 4. The district court explained that “if Ms. Wallace testified that
        the delay negatively affected her investigation, it would be evi-
        dence that the breach of contract was not minor. Conversely, her
        lack of testimony that the delay affected her investigation relates to
        whether the breach was material.” Id. The district court con-
        cluded that, “[i]n the light most favorable to [Rollins] as the non-
        moving party, there [was] sufficient evidence to support [the jury’s]
        verdict,” and “judgment as a matter of law [was] not appropriate.”
        Id. at 5.
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        48                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11081

               We will reverse the district court’s denial of the Rule 50 mo-
        tions only if “the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in fa-
        vor of [Doe], such that reasonable people could not arrive at a con-
        trary verdict.” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 

 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
        ted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rollins,
        we hold that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably
        find that its breach of the 60-day provision was not material.
               Under Florida law, “[t]o constitute a vital or material breach,
        a defendant’s non-performance must be such as to go to the es-
        sence of the contract.” Marchisio v. Carrington Mortg. Servs.,
        LLC, 

 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). See also Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A. v. L. Offs. of E.
        Clay Parker, 

 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“To establish
        a material breach, the party alleged to have breached the contract
        must have failed to perform a duty that goes to the essence of the
        contract and is of such significance that it relieves the injured party
        from further performance of its contractual duties.”). “A party’s
        failure to perform some minor part of his contractual duty cannot
        be classified as a material or vital breach.” Covelli Fam., L.P., 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also JF & LN,
        LLC v. Royal Oldsmobile-GMC Trucks Co., 

, 509
        (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“A trivial noncompliance or minor failure to
        perform is not a material breach.”).
             As the district court explained, “the jury had to determine
        whether [Rollins’] failure to comply with the [60]-day provision
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        21-11081               Opinion of the Court                       49

        (i.e., taking longer than [60] days to complete the process) was mi-
        nor or trivial.” D.E. 222 at 4. The evidence introduced at trial
        shows that “reasonable and fair-minded persons exercising impar-
        tial judgment might reach different conclusions” on this issue. See
        Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co., 

 (11th Cir.
        2010).
               Doe points to testimony from Eric Barker, the lawyer who
        served as his advisor during the Title IX proceedings, to support his
        claim that the breach was material. Mr. Barker testified that Doe
        was placed at a disadvantage, that witnesses “may forget over nine
        months all of the details or some of the important details,” and that
        surveillance videos may disappear. See Br. for Appellant at 59 (cit-
        ing D.E. 230 at 215–16). Doe also relies on his own trial testimony,
        where he “noted he would have taken ‘several different acts’ had
        he been informed of the investigation in a timely manner.” 

 (cit-
        ing D.E. 234 at 33). Specifically, Doe testified that he “probably
        would have thoroughly looked through any text messages that [he]
        may have had over that nine-month period . . . and collect any posts
        from social media from the time that could have been relevant[.]”
        D.E. 234 at 33. He also stated that he “[c]ould have [gone] to any
        local businesses with security footage to help provide more con-
        text” and “could have written down a lot of [his] thoughts from
        that evening, from that current time period instead of letting this
        sit over the course of nine months and potentially allowing or risk-
        ing the ability to recover a lot of that information.” 

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        50                     Opinion of the Court                21-11081

               This testimony, if credited by the jury, could have supported
        a finding in Doe’s favor on materiality. But the jury did not have
        to credit the evidence Doe presented, and in any event the evidence
        on materiality was not as one-sided as Doe suggests.
                For example, Rollins cites to testimony from Ms. Jiménez
        Guevara that “immediately following . . . Roe’s report in February
        [of] 2017, she attempted to obtain footage of Doe and . . . Roe on
        campus from the night in question, but no surveillance footage ex-
        isted.” Br. for Appellee at 57–58 (citing D.E. 234 at 281–85). Ms.
        Jiménez Guevara explained that she “contacted Campus Safety to
        ask if there was any video footage of any of the areas where [Roe]
        described that she had been located walking with . . . Doe.” D.E.
        234 at 284. Ms. Jiménez Guevara also testified that she asked Roe
        “to provide [her] with any documentation, with a statement, with
        any text messages, or anything that she could provide [her] with at
        that point in time.” Id. at 283.
               There was also the investigation report, which was admitted
        into evidence. The report shows that, as part of her investigation,
        Ms. Wallace was able to review text messages from February of
        2017, including messages Roe sent to different persons—some as
        immediate as 3:29 a.m. and 3:31 a.m. the morning of the incident
        that was the subject of the Title IX investigation—as well as the
        text exchange between Roe and Doe on February 18, 2017, which
        Roe reported to be the last time she spoke with Doe. See D.E. 201,
        Exh. 16 at 10–11. And although Ms. Wallace acknowledged that
        the memories of witnesses could fade over time, she also said that
USCA11 Case: 21-11081        Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 08/14/2023        Page: 51 of 51




        21-11081                  Opinion of the Court                            51

        they don’t always do so: “Sometimes traumatic incidents are for-
        ever imprinted in a person’s mind.” D.E. 234 at 162–63.
                In sum, although Rollins breached the 60-day provision,
        “reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
        judgment might reach different conclusions” on whether that
        breach was material. See Christopher v. Florida, 

 (11th Cir. 2006). Cf. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Motie,
        

, 206-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (reversing directed ver-
        dict and holding that jury had to decide whether homeowner’s fail-
        ure to report storm damage for 103 days was a material breach of
        the insurance contract). We therefore affirm the district court’s de-
        nial of Doe’s motions for judgment as a matter of law. 9
                                             VI
               The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
        the gender bias and unfair process opinions of Doe’s expert, and
        properly granted summary judgment in favor of Rollins on Doe’s
        Title IX claims for selective enforcement and erroneous outcome.
        On the breach of contract claim, the district court did not err in
        denying Doe’s Rule 50 motions because the evidence on the issue
        of materiality was disputed and the jury could have reasonably
        found that Rollins’ breach was not material.
                AFFIRMED.


        9 Given our conclusion on Doe’s breach of contract claim, we need not address

        Rollins’ cross-appeal.