A.W. by and through J.W. v. Coweta County School District
Citation110 F.4th 1309
Date Filed2024-08-07
Docket22-14234
Cited17 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14234
____________________
A.W. BY AND THROUGH J.W.,
E.M. BY AND THROUGH B.M.,
M.F. BY AND THROUGH J.C.,
D.G. BY AND THROUGH D.G.,
PlaintiďŹs-Appellants,
versus
COWETA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
CHRISTI HILDEBRAND,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14234
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00218-TCB
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER,
Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act allows the recovery of damages for
emotional distress, see 42 U.S.C. § 12133, and whether several spe-
cial education students alleged a constitutional violation against a
principal and school district. The students alleged that the principal
and school district violated Title II when the studentsâ teacher
physically and emotionally abused them. They also alleged that the
principalâs deliberate indifference violated their constitutional right
to due process. The district court dismissed the studentsâ com-
plaint. It correctly ruled that emotional distress damages are not
recoverable under Title II, but it erred when it failed to consider
whether the students might be entitled to other relief. It also cor-
rectly ruled that the students failed to state a constitutional viola-
tion against the principal and the school district. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
We draw all facts from the studentsâ proposed amended
complaint. The Coweta County School District operates Elm
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Street Elementary School in Coweta County, Georgia. The school
district is a public entity under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
see id. § 12131(1). Dr. Christi Hildebrand served as the principal of
Elm Street in fall 2019. A.W., E.M., M.F., and D.G. attended Elm
Street as students in fall 2019 and were assigned to the same special
education classroom. The students have disabilities that affect their
ability to communicate to varying degrees.
A.W. was 12 years old in fall 2019. He has several disabilities,
including developmental delays that affect his cognitive abilities
and language skills. He is âverbal but non-communicative.â He also
has Dravet Syndrome, a rare and severe kind of epilepsy that is dif-
ficult to control.
E.M. was 11 years old in fall 2019. He has autism and suffers
from social delay and learning disabilities. He is verbal, but he has
limited social understanding and a limited ability to communicate.
In 2022, E.M. was an eighth-grade student with the cognitive ability
of a second grader.
M.F. was 10 years old in fall 2019. She has Down Syndrome
and autism. She also has a heart condition and is legally blind. She
is verbal but has limited communication skills.
D.G. was seven years old in fall 2019. She is âfairly verbalâ
but needs special education and was awaiting a formal diagnosis
when this suit was filed. D.G.âs mother described her as âa slow
learner.â
Hildebrand hired Catherine Sprague to teach the students in
fall 2019. Sprague had never served as a lead teacher and had never
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been responsible for a classroom of students with moderate to sig-
nificant disabilities. Sprague also did not have a special-education
certification. The Georgia Professional Standards Commission re-
quired Sprague to pursue additional instruction and training to re-
main in her position.
Throughout fall 2019, the studentsâ parents saw signs that
their children had become frightened by school and that Sprague
was not managing the classroom well. For example, A.W. resisted
going to school and started acting âmean and defiantâ in ways that
were out of character. He frequently came home from school with
clothing âsoaked in urine or soiled with feces.â Similarly, M.F. be-
came âincreasingly unhappyâ with school and said for the first time
that she âdid not want to be there.â M.F. also came home with her
clothes âoften soaked with urine or soiled with feces.â She returned
home one day with marks around her neck. She stated that she had
been âchokedâ by one of her classmates, but her parents were
never notified about an incident. D.G. told her mother that she was
spanked at school and that Sprague had locked her in the bathroom
for âtime out.â D.G. explained that Sprague placed her foot on the
door so that D.G. was trapped inside. On one occasion, D.G.âs
mother visited D.G. at school and observed a paraprofessional
âholding down D.G. with a very angry look on her face.â E.M.âs
mother believes that E.M. did not tell her about Spragueâs conduct
because he feared that his mother would remove him from the
class and that he would be unable to see his friends. At least one
parent contacted Hildebrand during the fall to express concerns
about the classroom environment.
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Nicole Marshall, a paraprofessional assigned to work with
Sprague, observed problems in the classroom. On October 2, 2019,
Marshall saw Sprague âslapâ M.B., a student not party to this ac-
tion. When M.B. cried, Sprague called her âridiculousâ and a
âbully.â On December 5, 2019, Marshall saw Sprague place her
hands around M.B.âs neck and move her head âback and forth ag-
gressively.â On a different occasion, when M.B. had an accident,
Marshall saw Sprague call her âa disgusting animal and a baby who
will never have friends.â On December 6, 2019, Marshall saw Spra-
gue grab D.G.âs shoe and throw it at M.F., striking M.F. in the face.
On December 13, 2019, Marshall saw Sprague âthreaten[] to punch
an autistic student.â On December 16, 2019, Marshall saw Sprague
âpinch [a studentâs] inner forearm.â Marshall reported Spragueâs
conduct to Hildebrand on December 6, 10, 11, 12, and 16, 2019.
State law requires school administrators with reasonable
cause to suspect that child abuse has occurred to report the sus-
pected abuse to authorities âimmediately, but in no case later than
24 hours from the time there is reasonable cause to believe that
suspected child abuse has occurred.â GA. CODE § 19-7-5(c)(1)(I),
(e)(2). Hildebrand contacted law enforcement about Marshallâs al-
legations on December 18, 2019. School officials also notified the
studentsâ parents about the reports on December 18, 2019. In Jan-
uary 2020, the district superintendent acknowledged that Hilde-
brand failed to report the abuse allegations as promptly as state law
required. Hildebrand was suspended for two days without pay and
was required to undergo training about the reporting require-
ments.
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The students sued the school district and Hildebrand. Their
complaint alleged violations of the studentsâ right to due process,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violations of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, see id. § 12132; violations of section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 794; and negligence, see GA. CODE
§ 19-7-5. The students sought âdamages for mental anguish and
pain and sufferingâ and special damages for the federal claims, as
well as punitive damages from Hildebrand under section 1983.
A few months after the students sued, the Supreme Court
held in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., that emotional
distress damages are not recoverable under section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act. 142 S. Ct. 1562, 1576 (2022). The school district
and Hildebrand then moved to dismiss the studentsâ complaint for
failure to state a claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). They argued
that because Title II incorporates the damages and other remedies
provision of the Rehabilitation Act, Cummings foreclosed recovery
of emotional distress damages under Title II. They also argued that
the complaint failed to state a constitutional violation by either de-
fendant and that Hildebrand enjoys qualified immunity.
After obtaining an extension to file a response, the students
moved for leave to amend their complaint and attached a proposed
amended complaint. The students argued that the proposed
amended complaint cured any previous defects. They acknowl-
edged that Cummings foreclosed recovery under the Rehabilitation
Act but argued that the decision did not foreclose damages for
emotional distress under Title II. They also argued that the
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amended complaint alleged a violation of the right to substantive
due process against the school district and Hildebrand and that Hil-
debrand is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court dismissed the studentsâ complaint and de-
nied the motion to amend as futile. It ruled that after Cummings the
students could not recover damages for emotional distress under
Title II because Title II expressly incorporates the remedies of the
Rehabilitation Act. It also ruled that the students had failed to state
a constitutional claim against Hildebrand and alternatively that she
was entitled to qualified immunity. It dismissed the constitutional
claim against the school district. And it declined to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over the negligence claim.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ac-
cept the allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P.,
814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain
that, although damages for emotional distress are unavailable un-
der Title II, the district court erred when it dismissed the studentsâ
claim without considering whether they might be entitled to other
relief. Second, we explain that the students failed to allege consti-
tutional claims against Hildebrand and the school district.
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A. Title II Does Not Allow Damages for Emotional Distress,
But the District Court Erred by Failing to Consider
Whether the Students Could Seek Other Relief.
The students argue that the district court erred when it ruled
that damages for emotional distress are unavailable under Title II.
Although the students acknowledge that Cummings held that emo-
tional distress damages are unavailable under the Rehabilitation
Act, they argue that the rationale of Cummings does not extend to
Title II because Congress enacted Title II under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Spending Clause. But precedent
forecloses that argument. Yet the district court erred when it failed
to consider whether the students could seek other kinds of relief.
Title II expressly incorporates the remedies of the Rehabili-
tation Act: the âremedies, procedures, and rights set forth inâ the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, are the âremedies, procedures,
and rightsâ that Title II âprovides to any person alleging discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132,â 42
U.S.C. § 12133. The Rehabilitation Act, in turn, incorporates the
âremedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.â 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). So the remedies availa-
ble under Title VI are the same remedies available under the Reha-
bilitation Act and Title II.
Damages for emotional distress are not recoverable under
Title II. Because Cummings held that âemotional distress damages
are not recoverableâ under the Rehabilitation Act, 142 S. Ct. at
1576, it follows that emotional distress damages are not
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recoverable under Title II, which provides the same âremedies,
procedures, and rightsâ as the Rehabilitation Act, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12133.
That Congress enacted Title II under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not matter. The students argue that
Cummings does not limit the remedies available under Title II be-
cause it is not a Spending Clause statute. But the Supreme Court
rejected that kind of reasoning in Barnes v. Gorman. See 536 U.S. 181,
189 n.3 (2002) That is, it rejected the argument that although puni-
tive damages are unavailable under Title VI, they remain available
under the Americans with Disabilities Act because it was not en-
acted under the Spending Clause. Id. The Court explained that the
Americans with Disabilities Act âcould not be clearerâ that its rem-
edies âare the sameâ as those of the âRehabilitation Act, which is
Spending Clause legislation.â Id. And the incorporation of those
remedies âmake[s] discussion of the [Americans with Disabilities
Act]âs status as a ânon Spending Clauseâ tort statute quite irrele-
vant.â Id.; see also Doherty v. Bice, 101 F.4th 169, 174â75 (2d Cir.
2024).
Barnes requires us to read the remedies available under Ti-
tle II of the Americans with Disabilities Act as mirroring the reme-
dies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Ingram v. Ku-
bik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2022). In Ingram, the plaintiff
sought to hold the defendant vicariously liable under Title II for
discrimination against disabled people in his department. Id. at
1257. We held that vicarious liability did not apply under Title II
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because âvicarious liability is unavailable under Title VI.â Id. at
1258. The plaintiff argued that the unavailability of vicarious liabil-
ity under Title VI did not control because Congress did not enact
Title II under the Spending Clause. Id. at 1259. We ruled that Barnes
âforeclosedâ that argument. Id. So we must reject that argument
here too.
The students argue, in the alternative, that the district court
erred when it dismissed their Title II claim even if they cannot re-
cover damages for emotional distress. The students contend that
they should be allowed to seek other kinds of relief under Title II,
including damages for physical harm, compensation for lost educa-
tional benefits, remediation, and nominal damages. We agree.
Requesting an improper remedy is not fatal to a claim. A
complaint is sufficient if it alleges facts that establish that the plain-
tiff is entitled to any relief that the court can grant. Hawkins v. Frick-
Reid Supply Corp., 154 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1946). That a plaintiff
might misconceive his remedy does not warrant dismissal of the
complaint unless he is entitled to ââno relief under any state of
facts.ââ Kent v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 349 F.2d 480, 481 (5th Cir.
1965) (citation omitted). For example, in Levine v. World Financial
Network National Bank, the district court dismissed a complaint be-
cause it sought damages for emotional distress. 437 F.3d 1118, 1120
(11th Cir. 2006). We reversed and explained that the complaint
âstated a prima facie claimâ and requested âall other relief that the
Court deems just and appropriateââa demand that encompassed
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other damages available under the governing statute. Id. at 1123â
25 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although these precedents pre-date Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, that decision did not disturb the rule that requesting an
improper remedy is not fatal to a claim. See 550 U.S. 544, 555â56
(2007). Twombly replaced the âno set of factsâ standard with the re-
quirement that complaints must state âplausibleâ claims. Id. at 556,
561 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Twombly did not
change the rule that a district court must consider whether a com-
plaint that seeks an improper remedy might warrant another form
of relief.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confirm as much.
Rule 54(c) states that a district court must âgrant the relief to which
each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief
in its pleadings,â when it enters any final judgment except a default
judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). As our sister circuit explained after
Twombly, ââthe selection of an improper remedy in the Rule 8(a)(3)
demand for relief will not be fatal to a partyâs pleading if the state-
ment of the claim indicates the pleader may be entitled to relief of
some other type.ââ Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp.,
635 F.3d 1106, 1108 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1255, at 508â09 (3d ed.
2004)).
The district court should have considered whether the stu-
dents might be entitled to other relief. The studentsâ complaint re-
quested that the district court grant âother and further reliefâ as it
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âdeems just and proper.â The failure to consider that request was
error. Although the parties dispute the availability of other relief,
those arguments are better suited for the district court to consider
first.
B. The District Court Correctly Ruled that the Students Failed to State
Section 1983 Claims Against Hildebrand and the School District.
The students also argue that the district court erred when it
dismissed their claims under section 1983 against Hildebrand and
the school district. To state a claim under section 1983, the students
must allege that an act or omission, committed by a person acting
under color of state law, deprived them of a right, privilege, or im-
munity secured by the Constitution or a federal statute. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983. At this stage, the claim need only be âplausible on its
face.â Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is plausible when it âper-
mit[s] the reasonable inferenceâ that the state actor âis liable for the
misconduct alleged.â Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1281
(11th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The students allege that Hildebrand and the school district
violated their right to due process of law. The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment bars state officials from depriving
âany person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.â Although the text of the clause mentions only the process
that must accompany a deprivation of certain rights, the Supreme
Court has recognized a substantive component to this constitu-
tional guarantee. See Dobbs v. Jackson Womenâs Health Org., 142 S.
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Ct. 2228, 2246 (2022). The students allege that Hildebrand was de-
liberately indifferent to Spragueâs misconduct.
There are two plausible ways to understand the studentsâ
theory of liability. One theory considers Hildebrand liable as Spra-
gueâs supervisor because she was deliberately indifferent to Spra-
gueâs misconduct. The other considers Hildebrand independently
liable based on her deliberate indifference to the misconduct. We
need not decide which theory the students advance because both
fail as a matter of law.
Both theories would require the students to prove that Spra-
gue violated their right to substantive due process. A supervisor is
liable for a subordinateâs constitutional violation only if she âper-
sonally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conductâ or
causes the constitutional violation. Christmas v. Harris County, 51
F.4th 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). That is, Hildebrand is liable as Spragueâs supervi-
sor only if she participated in violating the studentsâ rights or
caused them to suffer a violation at the hands of Sprague. Students
are in a noncustodial relationship with the state. L.S. ex rel. Hernan-
dez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020). In that setting,
âconduct by a government actorâ violates substantive due process
âonly if the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience
shocking in a constitutional sense.â Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriffâs
Off., 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003). So Hildebrandâs liability
as a supervisor turns on whether she participated in or caused con-
science-shocking conduct, and her independent liability turns on
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whether her alleged deliberate indifference to the alleged abuse
shocks the conscience. We have never held that an officialâs delib-
erate indifference in a noncustodial setting can shock the con-
science. Hernandez, 982 F.3d at 1331. Indeed, even allegations of in-
tentional misconduct seldom shock the conscience. Nix v. Franklin
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 2002).
Our precedent makes clear that Spragueâs alleged abuse did
not violate the studentsâ right to substantive due process. We have
held that a similar complaint that a teacher abused a disabled stu-
dent did not shock the conscience. See T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd.
of Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 598â603 (11th Cir. 2010). In T.W., a
special education teacher engaged in excessive corporal punish-
ment and verbal abuse and physically abused a student without any
disciplinary purpose. Id. at 598â99. The corporal punishment in-
cluded twisting the studentâs arms behind his back, pinning him
against things with her body, and even tackling him to the ground.
Id. at 595â96. The teacher also tripped the student with her foot
after releasing him from timeout. Id. at 596. That act served no dis-
ciplinary purpose. Id. at 599. We ruled that the shock-the-con-
science standard governed the teacherâs conduct. See id. at 598â99.
And the lack of any serious bodily injury weighed against holding
that the abuse violated that standard. See id. at 595â96, 599, 601.
None of the allegations established a violation where the student
suffered at most âtransient pain.â Id. at 599, 601.
In the light of T.W., Spragueâs alleged abuse does not satisfy
the shock-the-conscience standard. âOnly the most egregious
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22-14234 Opinion of the Court 15
official conductâ shocks the conscience. Hernandez, 982 F.3d at 1330
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the stu-
dentsâ complaint contains several allegations of abuse, only two al-
legations involved a party: Sprague allegedly struck M.F. in the face
with a shoe causing her to cry, and Sprague allegedly spanked D.G.
and locked her in the bathroom for timeout. Although troubling,
these acts do not satisfy the shock-the-conscience standard. The
complaint does not allege that any student suffered âanything more
than transient pain.â See T.W., 610 F.3d at 601.
The Supreme Court has cautioned against judicial expansion
of rights to substantive due process âbecause guideposts for respon-
sible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended.â Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
We âtake seriouslyâ those warnings, Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1304, es-
pecially when asked to expand substantive due process âinto areas
of conventional tort law,â Nix, 311 F.3d at 1376. Allegations of a
teacherâs intentional abuse are ordinarily the province of state tort
law. See Lawson v. Bloodsworth, 722 S.E.2d 358, 359â60 (Ga. Ct. App.
2012) (reversing summary judgment for teacher on studentâs bat-
tery claim because the record reflected that the teacher might have
intentionally thrown a chair at the student). Spragueâs alleged
abuse does not warrant supplanting state tort law and exceeding
the limited contours of the shock-the-conscience standard.
Because Spragueâs alleged abuse did not violate the studentsâ
constitutional rights, Hildebrand and the school district also did not
violate them. Hildebrand did not participate in or cause a
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-14234
constitutional violation as Spragueâs supervisor. See Christmas, 51
F.4th at 1355. Hildebrandâs alleged deliberate indifference also can-
not independently shock the conscience when Spragueâs alleged
abuse fails to satisfy that standard. And the studentsâ failure to al-
lege that Sprague or Hildebrand violated their constitutional rights
defeats their claim against the school district. To state a claim
against the school district under section 1983, the students must al-
lege that a policy or custom of the district caused a constitutional
violation. See Bd. of Cnty. Cmmârs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)
(citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Without an underlying constitutional violation, we need not con-
sider whether the school district had a policy or custom that caused
one.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the dismissal of the section 1983 claims,
VACATE the dismissal of the Title II claim, and REMAND with
instructions for the district court to consider in the first instance
whether the students may be entitled to any relief under Title II.