United States v. Hamill
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony R. HAMILL, Defendant-Appellant
Attorneys
Karin M. Fojtik, Office of the United States Attorney District of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellee., Anthony R. Hamill, Marion, IL, pro se.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Anthony R. Hamill, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (āCOAā) to appeal the district courtās denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for postconviction relief. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
On November BO, 2006, Hamill pleaded guilty in the District of Utah to a one-count information alleging possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). After accepting his plea, the district court sentenced Hamill to 120 monthsā imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release. Hamill did not directly appeal his conviction, but instead moved for collateral relief in December 2006.
In his § 2255 motion, Hamill raised five grounds in support of his request for relief: (1) His trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a valid defense; (2) His trial counsel was ineffective in failing to disclose that counsel had a conflict of interest stemming from his position as an attorney admitted to practice law; (3) The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because āthe U.S. codes ... are without an enacting clauseā; (4) The trial court lacked jurisdiction because Hamillās contract with Jesus Christ ārelieved [him] from the lawā; and (5) The trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process because the United States is āa bankrupt-fiction corporationā that ālacks the authority to prosecute any criminal or civil matters.ā Concluding that all five claims raised by Hamill were frivolous, the district court denied Hamillās motion for relief. 1 Reasserting these same five arguments on appeal, Hamill now seeks a COA from this court. 2
*262 In his first argument, Hamill contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in rejecting his request to raise the Uniform Commercial Code (āU.C.C.ā) as a defense. Under the two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Hamill must prove that ācounselās representation fell below an objective standard of reasonablenessā and that āany deficiencies in counselās performance [were] prejudicial to the defense.ā We examine such claims with a āstrong presumption that counselās conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance....ā Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Given that the U.C.C. is a civil code that governs only commercial transactions, see U.C.C. § 1-102, it provides no conceivable defense to the criminal possession of child pornography. Counselās decision not to raise the requested defense was thus objectively reasonable and did not prejudice Hamillās overall defense.
In his second Sixth Amendment claim, Hamill asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because of an irreconcilable conflict of interest. In essence, Hamill contends that his counsel, as a licensed attorney and member of the bar, was āa government agent sitting at the āDefense Tableā ā whose first duty was to the court rather than to the client. Because Hamill did not object to this alleged conflict in the trial court, Hamill must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyerās performance. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir.1994). An actual conflict of interest exists āif counsel was forced to make choices advancing other interests to the detriment of his client. Without a showing of inconsistent interests, any alleged conflict remains hypothetical, and does not constitute ineffective assistance.ā United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Hamill has failed to show an actual conflict of interest in his counselās representation and has not demonstrated that his counsel advanced any interests other than Hamiflās. His claim is therefore without merit.
Hamillās remaining arguments regarding the trial courtās jurisdiction and his due process rights are frivolous, and we need not consider them further. Accordingly, Hamillās request for a COA is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED.
. Because the district court did not act on the issue of a COA within 30 days of Hamillās notice of appeal, the COA is deemed denied. 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C).
. Hamill may not appeal the district courtās denial of habeas relief under § 2255 without a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A COA may be issued āonly if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.ā § 2253(c)(2). Hamill must show āthat reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.ā Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. *262 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (quotations omitted).