Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Preferred Contractors Insurance Co.
DOUBLE AA BUILDERS, LTD., an Arizona corporation v. PREFERRED CONTRACTORS INSURANCE COMPANY, LLC, a Montana company
Attorneys
Holden Willits PLC, Phoenix, By Michael J. Holden, Barry A. Willits, R. Stewart Hal-stead, Nelson A.F. Mixon, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC, Phoenix, By Robert T. Sullivan, Alicyn M. Freeman, Kevin R. Myer, Counsel for Defen-danVAppellant
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
OPINION
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of a general contractor that sought recovery from its subcontractorâs insurer (under which it was named as an âAdditional Insuredâ) for the cost of replacing the subcontractorâs faulty work. The superior court held that coverage existed and entered summary judgment in favor of the contractor. We reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the insurer. We hold that coverage was unavailable under the policyâs âyour workâ exclusion, and that the âsubcontractor exceptionâ to that exclusion does not apply.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2 In 2007, Harkins Theatres hired Double AA Builders, Ltd., to serve as general contractor for the construction of a theater complex. Double AA subcontracted with Anchor Roofing, Inc., to install a Built-Up Roofing (âBURâ) system. At the time Anchor performed its work, it was the âNamed Insuredâ under a series of materially identical general commercial liability policies issued by Preferred Contractors Insurance Company, LLC. Double AA, which was itself insured by Westfield Insurance Company, was added to Anchorâs Preferred policies as an âAdditional Insured.â
¶ 3 After the theater project was completed, the BUR began to leak, causing damage to work installed by other subcontractors and causing Harkins to lose business. Harkins asked Double AA to replace the BUR. Double AA did so and filed an action in the superior court seeking indemnification from Westfield, Anchor, and Preferred on the theory that Anchor had not properly installed the BUR. Significantly, Double AA sought to recover only the cost of replacing the BUR, and not the cost of the damage to other property.
¶ 4 Double AA settled with Westfield and obtained a default judgment against Anchor. Preferred and Double AA filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the question whether Double AAâs cost of replacing the BUR was a covered loss under the relevant policy. The court denied Preferredâs motion and granted Double AAâs, concluding that coverage was triggered by an âoccurrenceâ and âproperty damage,â and that a âsubcontractor exceptionâ clause removed the claim from the policyâs âyour workâ exclusion provision. The court further concluded that the property damage had begun to manifest before the applicable policy expired and that Double AAâs replacement efforts constituted compensable preventative measures.
¶ 5 The court entered an appealable judgment on liability, and Preferred timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶ 6 We review summary judgment rulings, and the interpretation of insurance policies, de novo. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, 218 Ariz. 394, 397, ¶ 8, 187 P.3d 1107 (2008); Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7 (2003).
¶ 7 Double AA prevailed in the trial court based on its arguments that the policy provides coverage for âproperty damageâ caused by an âoccurrenceâ that takes place within the coverage territory during the policy period. But even assuming that Double AAâs expenditure could qualify for coverage as âproperty damageâ caused by an âoccurrence,â coverage was defeated under the policyâs terms, specifically the so-called âyour workâ exclusion and inapplicability of the âsubcontractorâ exception to that exclusion.
¶8 The policy âexclusionâ removes from the scope of coverage ââ[pjroperty damageâ
¶ 9 Put simply, the exclusion applies because the case relates only to Anchorâs defective work. The exception does not apply because the work was performed by Anchor acting as a subcontractor, not by a subcontractor acting on Anchorâs behalf.
¶ 10 In general, a âyour workâ exclusion âprevent[s] liability policies from insuring against an insuredâs own faulty workmanship, which is a normal risk associated with operating a business.â 9A Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 129:18 (3d ed. 2016 & Supp. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter âCouchâ\. The exclusion âdiscourages the performance of careless workâ and âprevents liability insurance from becoming a performance bond.â Id.
¶ 11 Our opinions concerning coverage do not define the scope of coverage in all casesâthey merely interpret the way in which parties choose to allocate risk in private agreements. But we have consistently interpreted Commercial General Liability (âCGLâ) policy âyour workâ exclusions to bar coverage for the cost of repairing an insuredâs faulty work. In a duty-to-defend case, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Corp. v. Advance Roofing & Supply Co., Inc., 163 Ariz. 476, 788 P.2d 1227 (App. 1989), we recognized that âsome authorities ... appear to conclude that the mere showing of faulty work is sufficient to bring a claim for resulting damages (of whatever nature) within policy coverage.â 163 Ariz. at 482, 788 P.2d 1227. We opted to follow âthe better reasoned authoritiesâ that held otherwise. Id. We followed this line of authority in Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 214 Ariz. 255, 262, ¶¶ 19-20, 151 P.3d 538 (App. 2007) (holding that faulty workmanship that causes property damage, not just faulty workmanship, constitutes an âoccurrenceâ under the CGL policy) and Desert Mountain Properties Limited Partnership v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 225 Ariz. 194, 206, 236 P.3d 421 (App. 2010) (holding that a specific policy exclusion for insuredâs faulty workmanship does not bar coverage for repair of damage resulting from the defective workmanship). Because of this exclusion, we need not reach the question whether the Named Insuredâs faulty work constitutes an âoccurrenceâ unless an exception to the exclusion applies.
¶ 12 It is undisputed that Double AA sought to recover only the cost of repairing Advanceâs defective work, which occurred on premises owned or rented by Harkins. Because Double AA does not seek to recover for damage resulting from the defective work, the âyour workâ exclusion bars Double AAâs recovery unless the âsubcontractor exceptionâ to the exclusion applies.
¶ 13 We hold that the exception does not apply. The only Named Insured is Anchor, and Anchor performed the defective work itselfânot through a subcontractor. The reference in the âsubcontractor exceptionâ to work âperformed on your behalf by a subcontractorâ refers to work performed by a subcontractor of Anchor onlyânot to Anchorâs work performed as a subcontractor of Double AA. See Couch § 40:27 (â[Bjecause the policy defines âyouâ and âyourâ as the named insured, the exception applies when someone else does work as the named insuredâs subcontractor, not when the named insured is a subcontractor.â).
¶ 14 The policy language, though convoluted, leads us to this conclusion. The exception is limited to damage arising from work âperformed on your behalf by a subcontractor.â (Emphasis added.) Under the terms of the
¶ 15 Double AA is an âAdditional Insuredâ under the policy, not a âNamed Insured.â The relevant policy endorsements provide that: (1) an âAdditional Insuredâ is an insured only for âyour acts or omissionsâ or âthe acts or omissions of those acting on your behalf, in the performance of your ongoing operations for the additional insured(s)â; and (2) an âAdditional Insuredâ receives âcoverage as if [the additional insured] was a Member ... only ... with respect to liability arising out of your ongoing operations performed for the original member listed on the Declarations of the Policy [i.e., the Named Insured] ... [and] only providing that the Additional Insured performs all obligations required under the Policy.â
¶ 16 Under the language of the policy, therefore, an Additional Insuredâs coverage is limited: an Additional Insured receives coverage for conduct of the Named Insured and certain of those acting on the Named Insuredâs behalf, and the Additional Insured is itself treated like a Named Insured, with coverage for its own conduct, only if such conduct relates to the Additional Insuredâs performance of ongoing operations for the original Named Insured. Here, Double AA performed no operations for Anchor. And while Double AAâs coverage was coextensive â with that of Anchor, it cannot be greater. Indeed, because coverage for Additional Insureds is limited, often no additional premium is required to add a party as an Additional Insured. Couch § 40:26. At oral argument in this case, Preferredâs counsel acknowledged that no additional premium was paid to add Double AA to Anchorâs CGL policy.
¶ 17 In effect, Double AAâs argument would require us to hold that an Additional Insured could take advantage of the âsubcontractor exceptionâ while the Named Insured could not. Were we to interpret the âAdditional Insuredâ coverage to allow recovery by Double AA for losses for which Anchor was not covered, we would effectively render the âyour workâ exclusion superfluous while requiring Preferred to accept greater risk with no compensation in the form of additional premiums. Such an interpretation would neither be rational nor consistent with the express language of the policy.
¶ 18 Double AAâs reliance on the policyâs âSeparation of Insuredsâ provision to justify treating an Additional Insured on equal footing as a Named Insured is also misplaced. That provision provides that the policy applies â(a) As if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured; and (b) Separately to each insured against whom claim is made or âsuitâ is brought.â The provision merely ensures that each insuredâs coverage is determined separately. It does not transform an Additional Insured into a Named Insured.
¶ 19 The âsubcontractor exceptionâ to the âyour workâ exclusion does not apply. The policy, therefore, does not provide coverage to Double AA for repairing Anchorâs faulty workmanship. The superior court therefore erred by granting Double AAâs motion for summary judgment and denying Preferredâs.
CONCLUSION
¶20 We reverse the grant of summary judgment for Double AA and remand with instructions that the superior court enter summary judgment in favor of Preferred. See PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Brendgen & Taylor Pâship, 193 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 10, 970 P.2d 958 (âWhere cross-motions have been filed ... the court may remand with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of appellant.â). We deny Double AAâs request for attorneyâs fees and costs on appeal, Preferred does not ask for attorneyâs fees, but it is entitled to recover its costs upon compliance with AR-CAP 21.